Robinson v. Donovan et al
Filing
53
OPINION and ORDER (1) Denying Plaintiff's 48 Motion to Stay; (2) Adopting Magistrate Judge's 43 Report and Recommendation; and (3) Granting Defendant's 30 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
THOMAS ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
Case Number 4:13-cv-14752
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
OFFICER NEAL DONOVAN,
OFFICER ROBERT CAVETT,
DET. SGT. JAMES BALDWIN,
SGT. JAMES DALY, and OFFICER
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY
[ECF NO. 48]; (2)ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION [ECF NO. 43]; AND (3) GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 30]
Plaintiff Thomas Robinson (“Plaintiff”), a pro se litigant, commenced this
civil rights action against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November
18, 2013. On May 28, 2014, the Honorable Denise Page Hood reassigned this
matter to the undersigned pursuant to Administrative Order 14-AO-030. (ECF No.
25.) On September 10, 2014, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 30). This Court has referred Plaintiff’s lawsuit to Magistrate Judge
David Grand “for all pretrial proceedings, including a hearing and determination of
all non-dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and/or report and
recommendation on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).”
(ECF No. 39.)
On March 24, 2015, Magistrate Judge David Grand issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommends that this Court grant
Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 43). At the conclusion of his R&R, Magistrate
Judge Grand informs the parties that they have fourteen days to file objections to
the R&R and that the “[f]ailure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of
any further right of appeal.” (Id. at 18, citations omitted.) Plaintiff filed objections
on April 19, 2015. (ECF No. 46.) On May 8, 2015, Plaintiff also filed a “Motion
to Stay Proceedings in Lieu of Production of Records/Audio/Video/Documents.”
(ECF No. 48.) That motion has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 50, 51.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to stay, rejects
Plaintiff’s objections to Magistrate Judge Grand’s March 24, 2015 R&R, adopts
the R&R, and grants Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from an incident on September 19, 2011, at the
Hometown Inn in Flint Township, Michigan. Plaintiff claims that he was harassed
and arrested by Defendants based on retaliatory and racial motivation and due to
the exercise of his constitutionally protected right to free speech. The incident, in
addition to Plaintiff’s subsequent charges and plea, are set forth in detail in
2
Magistrate Judge Grand’s R&R. (ECF No. 43 at 1-5.) Plaintiff is suing the
following Flint Township Police Department officers in their individual capacities:
Patrol Officers Neal Donovan and Robert Cavett (“Officer Donovan” and “Officer
Cavett”, respectively); Detective Sergeant James Baldwin (“Sergeant Baldwin”);
Sergeant James Daly (“Sergeant Daly”), and Officer John Doe.
In his R&R, Magistrate Judge Grand concludes that Sergeant Baldwin
should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to establish that he was physically
present or involved in the conduct that gives rise to this lawsuit. (Id. at 8.)
Magistrate Judge Grand next recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s wrongful
detention and false arrest claim, concluding that they are barred by the doctrine set
forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Magistrate Judge Grand
recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim also based on
Heck. (Id. at 10.) Alternatively, the magistrate judge concludes that the claim
lacks merit because Plaintiff was not similarly situated to the individuals he asserts
were treated more favorably and because he fails to make the requisite showing of
discriminatory effect. (Id. at 10-12.)
As to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, Magistrate Judge Grand concludes
that Officer Cavett did not use excessive force “in light of the inherently dangerous
situation he was facing.” (Id. at 13.) In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate
judge notes that the officers arrived on the scene in response to a reported
3
abduction and Plaintiff “fit the description of one of the alleged abductors.”1 (Id.)
Magistrate Judge Grand concludes that there is no evidence suggesting that the
officers’ arrest of Plaintiff was retaliatory. (Id. at 14-15.) Specifically, Magistrate
Judge Grand finds no evidence to suggest that the officers arrested Plaintiff
because “he was exercising his First Amendment right to free speech or that, in the
absence of his alleged protected conduct, they would not have taken the same
actions.” (Id. at 15.)
Turning to Plaintiff’s claim that the length of his detention was
unconstitutional, Magistrate Judge Grand finds that Plaintiff’s assertion of how
long he was detained is “entirely unsupported by the record.” (Id. at 16.)
Magistrate Judge Grand indicates that Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant Officer
John Doe verbally intimidated him is not cognizable under § 1983. (Id. at 17,
citations omitted). Finally, having found no constitutional violations, Magistrate
Judge Grand rejects Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Daly based on his
supervisory role over the other officers. (Id. at 17.)
Standard of Review
When objections are filed to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation on a dispositive matter, the district court judge must “make a de
1
This
Court does not believe the record supports this factual finding made by the
magistrate judge. As set forth infra, however, it does not impact the correctness of
the magistrate judge’s analysis of Plaintiff’s claims.
4
novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The
court, however, “is not required to articulate all of the reasons it rejects a party’s
objections.” Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(citations omitted). A party’s failure to file objections to certain conclusions of the
R&R waives any further right to appeal on those issues. See Smith v. Detroit
Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). This includes
the district court judge’s duty to independently review those issues. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
A court must construe a pro se litigant’s submissions liberally and interpret
them in a manner to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Kirkland v.
Cablevision Sys., 760 F. 3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, general objections, or those merely
restating arguments previously presented, do not sufficiently identify alleged errors
on the part of a magistrate judge. Watkins v. Tribley, No. 09-14990, 2011 WL
4445823, at *1 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 26, 2011). An objection that does nothing more
than disagree with a magistrate judge’s conclusion, or simply summarizes what has
been argued before, is not considered a valid objection. Howard v. Sec’y of Health
and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991). Only specific objections are
entitled to de novo review, not those objections that are “frivolous, conclusive or
5
general.” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s Objections
Plaintiff’s seventeen page filing (titled as a motion) does not concisely state
objections or specifically identify the portion of the magistrate judge’s R&R to
which objection is made. Instead, Plaintiff mostly reiterates the original arguments
he made in response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Although Plaintiff’s objections fall into the category of a general objection
that does nothing more than disagree with the conclusions reached by Magistrate
Judge Grand and summarizes positions that were argued before, the Court notes
that Plaintiff has loosely identified the following in his objections. First, Plaintiff
argues that the Heck doctrine does not bar his claim of wrongful detention, false
arrest, or selective enforcement. Governing Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit
precedent establishes, however, that Magistrate Judge Grand correctly concluded
(for the reasons set forth in his R&R) that Plaintiff’s plea to conspiracy to commit
disorderly conduct bars an award of damages on those claims, absent reversal of
the convictions on appeal or some other action rendering the conviction or
sentence invalid. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
The Supreme Court in Heck cites a time-honored principle that “civil tort
actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
6
criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Plaintiff was detained, arrested and
convicted of criminal charges. The pleadings confirm that Plaintiff views this case
as a means of contesting the lawfulness of his conviction. Under Heck, the claims
of wrongful detention, false arrest, and selective enforcement may not be pursued
while Plaintiff’s convictions remain outstanding. Plaintiff has neither alleged nor
produced evidence that he has successfully challenged his conviction. Therefore,
his claim of wrongful detention, false arrest, and selective enforcement cannot
proceed, as Magistrate Judge Grand concluded.
Next, Plaintiff argues that he can satisfy all of the elements of his selective
enforcement claim: that (1) a person belonging to an identifiable group has been
singled out for prosecution, where similarly situated persons not belonging to that
group were not prosecuted; (2) the prosecution was initiated with a discriminatory
purpose; and (3) the prosecution had a discriminatory effect on the group to which
the defendant belongs. Mitchell v. Boelcke, 440 F.3d 300, 305 (6th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff argues that Officer Cavett singled out Plaintiff and exhibited a reckless or
callous disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, and that Plaintiff was not afforded equal
treatment or protections because Officer Cavett used a racial slur against him.
Plaintiff contends that the women in the motel room should have been charged
with drug possession, but were not because they are white. Plaintiff then asserts
7
that an “adverse and discriminatory effect on black people necessarily follows
from racial references [sic].” (ECF No. 46 at 14.)
The Court has already determined that Plaintiff’s claim for selective
enforcement is barred by the Heck doctrine, so an analysis of whether he can show
the elements of the claim under Mitchell is unnecessary and would not produce a
different outcome. Nevertheless, Plaintiff cannot satisfy his burden of proof
because the women, in fact, were arrested and charged, albeit on other charges.
Furthermore, as described in the R&R, the women were not similarly situated to
Plaintiff based on the evidence available to the officers at the time which supported
Plaintiff’s drug charge. (See R&R at 11.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection is
overruled.
Plaintiff also asserts that his excessive force claim is “substantiated by
substantive law and is not barred by [the] Heck rule.” (ECF No. 46.) Magistrate
Judge Grand did not apply the Heck doctrine to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
Instead, the magistrate judge made a finding that the use of force, given the volatile
nature of the encounter, was not excessive. While Plaintiff cites Thompson v.
Grida, 656 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2011), to argue that the force used against him was
excessive, the case is distinguishable in many relevant respects.
In Thompson, the plaintiff and his wife went to their children’s bus stop after
learning from neighborhood children of a problem on the bus involving the
8
plaintiff’s ten year old daughter. Id. at 366. When the plaintiff and his wife
approached the bus stop, there were police cars present and a school bus. Id. They
could not see their daughter but saw their fifteen year old son being held against a
police car. Id. When the plaintiff and his wife identified themselves as the parents
of the girl involved in the altercation and inquired of their daughter’s whereabouts,
an officer yelled repeatedly at them to “get back.” Id.
One of the officers then approached the plaintiff’s wife. Id. When the
plaintiff heard his wife yell, “don’t hit me, don’t put your hands on me”, he
stepped in between his wife and the officer. Id. The officer then grabbed the
plaintiff and began to kick him on his right side and groin. Id. The plaintiff then
was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by another officer, hit across the face,
his glasses were knocked off, and he was sprayed with pepper spray again directly
in the eye. Id.
Thus the officers in Thompson, unlike the officers in this case, were not
dealing with an individual suspected of engaging in a crime, who was possibly
armed and dangerous. Additionally, the force used against the plaintiff in
Thompson is far different than that which Plaintiff claims was used against him.
Assuming Plaintiff’s version of the events to be true, Officer Cavett grabbed
Plaintiff, thrust him against a wall, and handcuffed him. As Magistrate Judge
Grand found, these actions were necessary to prevent Plaintiff from closing the
9
motel room door and to effectuate Plaintiff’s swift detention. This Court accepts
the magistrate judge’s finding that the force used was reasonable, as a matter of
law, and therefore, overrules Plaintiff’s objection.
With respect to his claim based on the length of his detention, Plaintiff
argues that his detention should have lasted no longer than was necessary for the
officers to confirm and dispel the purpose of their arrival. He claims his
constitutional rights were violated because he was not released when the officers’
investigation revealed that the report of the women’s abduction was false.
According to Plaintiff, his detention was excessive under the substantive law of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and People v. Bloyd, 292 N.W.2d 546 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980).2 (ECF No. 46 at 10.) Plaintiff’s claim under Terry and Bloyd fails for
two reasons. First, when they detained Plaintiff, the officers were not investigating
suspicious behavior; they were responding to a reported crime. Second, briefly
following Plaintiff’s detention, the officers established evidence of other crimes
justifying his arrest. In short, Plaintiff’s detention was not unlawful, regardless of
whether it lasted two or four hours.
2
Plaintiff
originally claimed that the officers held him for four hours. As noted by
Magistrate Judge Grand, however, the evidence shows that Plaintiff was detained
for only two hours before being transferred to the county jail. (ECF No. 43 at 5.)
Plaintiff therefore now argues that even a two hour detention is unreasonable under
the law.
10
Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay
In his motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to refrain from deciding Defendants’
summary judgment motion until Plaintiff has obtained certain discovery
information. Plaintiff did not claim a need for discovery in order to address the
arguments raised in Defendants’ motion in his fifty-nine page pleading submitted
in response to the motion. In any event, the deadline for discovery in this matter
closed before Defendants’ motion was filed. (See ECF No. 18.) Prior to that time,
Plaintiff never filed a motion seeking discovery from Defendants. The only
discovery motion Plaintiff filed related to documents he sought to obtain from a
third party- the 67th District Court. Finally, the discovery Plaintiff now seeks
would not provide evidence that would alter the outcome of his claims.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court is denying Plaintiff’s motion to
stay adjudication of Defendants’ summary judgment motion to allow Plaintiff to
conduct additional discovery. For the reasons discussed above and in Magistrate
Judge Grand’s March 24, 2015 R&R, the Court holds that Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court therefore
adopts the R&R.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to stay (ECF No. 48) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 30) is GRANTED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: July 27, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, July 27, 2015, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?