Robinson v. Donovan et al
Filing
67
OPINION and ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 56 Motion for Reconsideration and 61 Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment and/or Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (TMcg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
THOMAS ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
Case Number 4:13-cv-14752
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
OFFICER NEAL DONOVAN, ET AL.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [ECF NO. 56] AND “MOTION TO ALTER/AMEND
JUDGMENT AND/OR MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR
ORDER” [ECF NO. 61]
Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, commenced this civil rights action against
Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 18, 2013. The matter was
referred to Magistrate Judge David Grand for all pretrial proceedings and, on
March 24, 2015, Magistrate Judge Grand issued a report and recommendation
(“R&R”) in which he recommended that this Court grant a motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants. Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R. In an opinion
and order entered July 27, 2015, this Court adopted Magistrate Judge Grand’s
recommendation and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Presently before
the Court are two motions subsequently filed by Plaintiff.
In his first motion, filed August 7, 2015, Plaintiff seeks “leave to amend his
complaint, based on additional authorities which demonstrate the magistrate’s
[R&R] was incorrect . . ..” (ECF No. 56.] The Court construes the motion as one
for reconsideration under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1. In his
second motion, filed August 27, 2015, Plaintiff seeks to alter or amend the
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and for relief from
judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and/or (6). (ECF
No. 61.) For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motions.
Applicable Standards
Local Rule 7.1(h) provides that a motion for reconsideration only should be
granted if the movant demonstrates that the Court and the parties have been misled
by a palpable defect and that a different disposition of the case must result from a
correction of such a palpable defect. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). Palpable defects
are those which are “obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Mich. Dep’t
of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002). “It is an
exception to the norm for the Court to grant a motion for reconsideration.”
Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010). “[A]
motion for reconsideration is not properly used as a vehicle to re-hash old
arguments or to advance positions that could have been argued earlier but were
not.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 298 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637
2
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,
146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)). Therefore, a motion that merely presents the
same issues already ruled upon by the Court shall not be granted. Id.
Motions to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) may be granted
only if there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening
change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. GenCorp., Inc. v. Am.
Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). “Rule 59(e) permits a court
to alter or amend a judgment, but it ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to
raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry
of judgment.’ ” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5, 128 S. Ct.
2605, 2617 n.5 (2008) (citing 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)). As several judges in this District have stated,
“[Rule 59(e)] motions . . . are not intended as a vehicle to
relitigate previously considered issues; should not be utilized to
submit evidence which could have been previously submitted in
the exercise of reasonable diligence; and are not the proper
vehicle to attempt to obtain a reversal of a judgment by offering
the same arguments previously presented.”
Kenneth Henes Special Projects Procurement v. Cont’l Biomass Indus., Inc., 86 F.
Supp. 2d 721, 726 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (quoting Nagle Indus., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 175 F.R.D. 251, 254 (E.D. Mich.1997), aff’d 194 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
“ ‘A motion to alter or reconsider a judgment is an extraordinary remedy and
should be granted sparingly because of the interests in finality and conservation of
3
scarce judicial resources.’ ” In re J & M Salupo Dev. Co., 388 B.R. 795, 805
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Ltd. Inc., 179 F.R.D.
541, 547 (S.D. Ohio 1998)).
Rule 60(b)(2) allows a court to grant relief based on “newly discovered
evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to grant relief
for “any other reason that justifies” it; however, the rule applies only in
“exceptional and extraordinary circumstances not addressed by the first five
subsections of Rule 60(b).” Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 387 (6th Cir.
2001). The exceptional circumstances require “unusual and extreme situations
where principles of equity mandate relief.” Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910
F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990).
Analysis
In his motions, as he did in his objections to Magistrate Judge Grand’s R&R,
Plaintiff mostly reiterates the original arguments he made in response to
Defendants’ summary judgment motion. He does not present new evidence which
would warrant a different treatment of his claims. He continues to argue that the
doctrine in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar the claims as
ruled upon by the Court. The Court has addressed those arguments already.
In his second filed motion, Plaintiff argues that he has been denied his right
of access to the courts because this Court did not address his First Amendment
4
retaliation claim in its July 27, 2015 decision. The Court, however, only addressed
those issue raised by Plaintiff in his objections to Magistrate Judge Grand’s R&R.
Plaintiff did not challenge the magistrate judge’s analysis of his First Amendment
retaliation claim in his objections. (See ECF No. 46.) In any event, Plaintiff fails
to now demonstrate that the analysis was flawed.
In short, in his pending motions, Plaintiff simply reasserts his previous
arguments and argues that the Court just got it wrong. This is insufficient to entitle
him to relief under Local Rule 7 or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or
60(b).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 56)
is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter/Amend
Judgment and/or Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order (ECF No. 61) is
DENIED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: October 15, 2015
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?