Townsend v. Rhodes et al

Filing 51

ORDER DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 48 Motion to Stay--Signed by Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti. (MWil)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 4:14-CV-10411
Judge Terrence G. Berg
Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti

v.

KAREN RHODES,
VICKI CARLSON,
LINDA HAASE and
MARCIA O’CONNELL,
Defendants.
___________________________________/

ORDER DENYING IN PART MDOC DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY
DISCOVERY (DE 48)
This matter is before the Court on MDOC Defendants’ motion to stay
discovery (DE 48), in which they argue that they should not be required to provide
discovery “until the threshold question of immunity is resolved by the court” in
their pending motion for summary judgment (see DE 28 at 4). Plaintiff has filed a
response in opposition to the motion to stay, along with a supporting affidavit (DE
50).

While the Court recognizes that a stay should normally be granted while a
dispositive motion which would resolve the issue of qualified immunity is pending,
a brief review of Defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment reveals that,
notwithstanding Defendants’ characterization, the motion does not actually hinge
on qualified immunity. Instead, the motion hinges on the question of
“Whodunnit?” In fact, Defendants’ summary judgment motion is based entirely on
affidavits, which in essence state that Plaintiff has sued the wrong people, because
none of these three nurses allegedly had anything to do with the medical treatment
at issue in this case (DE 28 at 6). Thus, unlike a dispositive motion which truly
hinges on qualified immunity, the summary judgment motion here is not about the
reasonableness of Defendants’ actions, because the defendants are actually
claiming there were no actions, i.e., that they did nothing at all and had no contact
with this prisoner. In contrast with other qualified immunity motions, which hinge
on legal issues, Defendants’ summary judgment motion is at best hinged on only a
mixed question of fact and law, and more accurately appears to be based entirely
upon an issue of fact, which Defendants’ characterize as undisputed.
While this Court acknowledges that the Supreme Court in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-819 (1982) held that discovery should normally not
be allowed while the issue of qualified immunity is being resolved, it has also
stated:

Discovery involving public officials is indeed one of the evils that
Harlow aimed to address, but neither that opinion nor subsequent
decisions create an immunity from all discovery. Harlow sought to
protect officials from the costs of “broad-reaching” discovery, and we
have since recognized that limited discovery may sometimes be
necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity.

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 n.14 (1998) (internal citations omitted)
(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646, n. 6 (1987), Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597-601.
Here, Plaintiff indicates a need to continue limited discovery with respect to
his medical records and the very log books upon which Defendants rely in support
of their argument that they had no involvement in the treatment of this particular
prisoner. The ongoing discovery which he proposes is limited and reasonable, and
if he were to uncover anything helpful through such ongoing discovery prior to this
Court’s ruling on the pending summary judgment motion, he would be welcome to
bring it to the Court’s attention through a supplemental submission. “A lawsuit is
supposed to be a search for the truth.” Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel
Emples. & Rest. Emples. Int'l Union, 212 F.R.D. 178 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). It is not
about “hiding the ball.” While the Court is not inclined to delay its consideration
of the pending summary judgment motion to permit a “fishing expedition” by the
plaintiff in a fruitless effort to dispute the indisputable, it is also not inclined to

deprive him of the opportunity to further develop the record, if possible, on the
issue of whether the three nurses in question (Carlson, Haase and O’Connell) were
actually involved in the treatment he alleges to have occurred in paragraph 22 of
his complaint.
Accordingly, this motion is DENIED, and discovery is left open for the
limited purposes described herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this document was sent to parties of record on Friday, May 29, 2015, 
electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

s/Michael L. Williams   
Case Manager to the  
Honorable Anthony P. Patti