Laues-Gholston v. Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA, LLC

Filing 65

OPINION AND Order (1) Overruling Plaintiff's Objections 64 , (2) Accepting The Recommendation Contained In The Magistrate Judge's Report And Recommendation Dated November 28, 2014 61 , (3) Granting Defendants' Motion For Sanctions And/Or Dismissal 47 , (4) Dismissing Case With Prejudice, And (5) Denying All Pending Motions And Objections 36 , 38 , 42 , 44 , 52 , 57 , 58 , 59 As Moot. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROY LAUES-GHOLSTON,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 14-CV-10844
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

vs.
MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL
SERVICES USA, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER (1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (Dkt. 64),
(2) ACCEPTING THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DATED NOVEMBER 28, 2014
(Dkt. 61), (3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND/OR
DISMISSAL (Dkt. 47), (4) DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE, AND (5) DENYING
ALL PENDING MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS (Dkts. 36, 38, 42, 44, 52, 57, 58, 59) AS
MOOT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this case, Plaintiff Roy Laues-Gholston, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendants,
Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA, LLC (“Mercedes-Benz”), the Law Offices of Richard
Green (“LORG”), and Richard Green, individually (“Green”), engaged in unlawful debtcollection practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et
seq. See Am. Compl. (Dkt. 10).1 The case was referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand for
all pretrial proceedings. See Order of Referral (Dkt. 9). The matter is presently before the Court
on (i) Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order striking Plaintiff’s Amended

1

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint — the operative Complaint in this action — erroneously states
that Plaintiff is bringing an action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. Am. Compl. at 1 (Dkt. 10). In actuality, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Section 1601 et seq. codifies the Truth in Lending Act.
1

Complaint and motion for declaratory judgment, 11/3/2014 Obj. (Dkt. 58);2 (ii) Plaintiff’s
Objections to the Court’s Order affirming the Magistrate Judge’s Order granting Defendants’
motion to compel, which the Court will interpret as a motion for reconsideration, Pl. Mot. for
Reconsideration (Dkt. 59); (iii) the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”),
which recommends granting Defendants’ motion for sanctions, (Dkt. 61); and (iv) Plaintiff’s
Objections to both the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and the Magistrate Judge’s Order staying the
scheduling order, 12/12/2014 Obj. (Dkt. 64). The Court reviews de novo any portion of the
R&R to which specific objections are filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). For the reasons discussed
more fully below, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, and
accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion for sanctions and
dispose of the case. Accordingly, the Court denies the remainder of Plaintiff’s outstanding
motions and objections as moot.
II.

BACKGROUND

This case appears to revolve around a purported debt owed by Plaintiff to Defendant
Mercedes-Benz arising out of the financing of a Mercedes-Benz vehicle, and the collection of
that debt by Defendant Mercedes-Benz and its counsel, Defendant LORG, in an earlier statecourt action. See R&R at 2-3. Plaintiff objects “to each and every paragraph of [Magistrate
Judge Grand’s] alleged Factual Background” on the basis that “[Magistrate Judge Grand]
testifies to information without support of affidavit or evidentiary support.” 12/12/2014 Obj. at 2
(cm/ecf page). Notably, however, Plaintiff does not offer any alternative set of facts which he
might contend controls. In any event, the factual background is immaterial to the Magistrate

2

Plaintiff filed his Objections twice, making the Objections at Docket No. 57 and Docket No. 58
duplicative.
2

Judge’s recommended disposition of the case, as that recommendation is based on Plaintiff’s
present conduct in the current action.
III.

ANALYSIS

As mentioned supra, a number of Plaintiff’s filings are presently before the Court.
However, because the Court accepts the disposition recommended in the Magistrate Judge’s
R&R, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s other filings, and denies them as moot.
Plaintiff’s objections are largely incoherent.

They appear to comprise mostly of

unsubstantiated allegations of abuse and fraud by and against Defendants’ counsel and
Magistrate Judge Grand. See generally 12/12/2014 Obj. Plaintiff also repeatedly asserts that the
Court lacks jurisdiction over the Magistrate Judge’s R&R for a variety of reasons, including:
(i) fraud and bias, (ii) Defendants’ purported failure to dispute or impeach Plaintiff’s affidavit
with an affidavit of their own, and (iii) because Defendants’ motion to compel was not properly
before the Court. Id. at 2, 3, 4 (cm/ecf pages).3 Plaintiff also makes claims that Defendant
Green impermissibly interfered with the discovery process by failing to provide answers from
the “real party in interest,” and by engaging in witness tampering. Id. at 4 (cm/ecf page).
Plaintiff further submits that he was harassed into attending “a sham Court Hearing” designed to
“[embarrass] and waste the court resources,” and that Plaintiff’s deposition was procured by
fraud, as he was under duress and could not focus on the deposition questions “for fear of
retaliation” from Magistrate Judge Grand. Id. The remainder of Plaintiff’s objections consists of
a “judicial notice” and a “memorandum of law in support of judicial notice” indicating that

3

This Court has already addressed the Magistrate Judge’s previous order concerning
Defendants’ motion to compel, as well as Plaintiff’s objections with respect to that order. See
10/21/2014 Order (Dkt. 55).
3

Plaintiff intends to sue Defendant Green and his business associates under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Id. at 4-9 (cm/ecf pages).4
The Court finds that none of Plaintiff’s statements constitute cognizable objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R recommending dismissal as a sanction for Plaintiff’s repeated noncompliance with the Court’s discovery order. Most — if not all — of Plaintiff’s statements are
conclusory assertions, devoid of further factual or legal support. To the extent Plaintiff provides
legal support, he cites to legal rules or principles that are taken out of context, and without any
additional explanation or development. See, e.g., id. at 2 (cm/ecf page) (citing to Fed. R. of
Evid. 301 for the proposition that “defendants had the burden of producing evidence to rebut the
presumption in plaintiff’s affidavit [] of not owing [Defendant Mercedes-Benz] any money.
Defendant is estopped from later entering on the record evidence of a debt owed.”). Generally,
“issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.

It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible

argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.” McPherson v.
Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-996 (6th Cir. 1997) (alterations in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s objections are

overruled.
The Court has reviewed the R&R, as well as the underlying motion and its accompanying
exhibits and appendixes, which indicate that Plaintiff repeatedly engaged in dilatory behavior
that was the result of willfulness and bad faith. As the docket reflects, a motion to compel was
4

Plaintiff also states that, “[Magistrate Judge] Grand’s so-called motion to dismiss for failing to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted must fail as Plaintiff’s averments do constitute a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” 12/12/2014 Obj. at 9 (cm/ecf page) (emphasis in
original). However, this argument fails to appreciate that Plaintiff’s claims are being dismissed
for his failure to participate meaningfully and in a cooperative manner in the discovery process,
not for failure to state a claim pursuant to a motion to dismiss, and certainly not on a motion of
the Magistrate Judge’s own initiative.
4

necessary to prompt Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ discovery requests in the first instance.
See Defs. Mot. to Compel (Dkt. 32); 9/4/2014 Order (Dkt. 37) (Magistrate Judge’s order
granting motion to compel); 10/21/2014 Order (Dkt. 55) (Court’s order affirming Magistrate
Judge’s order granting motion to compel over Plaintiff’s objections). The Magistrate Judge’s
Order made explicit that Plaintiff’s subsequent failure to comply fully and truthfully in the
discovery process would result in a recommendation that his case be dismissed. 9/4/2014 Order
at 2.
Notwithstanding the Magistrate Judge’s warning, Plaintiff’s discovery responses and his
subsequent associated behavior continued to demonstrate an unwillingness to meaningfully
cooperate in the discovery process. For instance, Defendants’ requests for admissions ask
Plaintiff to admit, among other foundational facts, facts that would establish that Plaintiff
executed a contract for the purpose of financing a 2009 Mercedes-Benz vehicle; that Plaintiff’s
signature appeared on the contract; that Plaintiff financed the purchase of the 2009 MercedesBenz vehicle; and that Plaintiff borrowed $87,745 to purchase the vehicle. See Discovery
Requests to Pl., App. A to Defs. Mot. for Sanctions, at 3-7 (cm/ecf pages) (Dkt. 47-5). For
Plaintiff’s convenience, the paperwork surrounding the vehicle purchase, to which many of the
requests referred, was included within the requests for admissions. See id. at 8-11 (cm/ecf
pages). In response, Plaintiff objected to the requests on grounds of relevance, inadmissibility of
evidence, and harassment. Pl. Resp. to Discovery Requests, App. B to Defs. Mot. for Sanctions,
at 2 (cm/ecf page) (Dkt. 47-6). Plaintiff also individually responded to each of the requests,
however, the responses merely, and almost uniformly, assert that Plaintiff had not entered into a
contract with, or owed no monetary obligation to, Defendant Mercedes-Benz, id. at 3 (cm/ecf
page), despite the absence of any reference to, or mention of, Defendant Mercedes-Benz in any

5

of the requests for admission. Plaintiff also made similar objections and statements in response
to Defendants’ interrogatories and requests for productions. See id. at 4-7 (cm/ecf pages). As
detailed in Defendants’ motion for sanctions and in the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, this type of
obstructionist conduct continued during Defendants’ deposition of Plaintiff, which was
scheduled to take place at the Ann Arbor courthouse in the event that the Magistrate Judge’s
intervention was necessary, a premonition that came to fruition.
While lesser sanctions may be appropriate in other circumstances, Plaintiff’s continued
and subsequent behavior demonstrates that lesser sanctions are unlikely to improve Plaintiff’s
overall attitude toward this case.

This is particularly evident from Plaintiff’s deposition

wherein — even after the Magistrate Judge’s intervention on the record — Plaintiff’s answers
were evasive, e.g., Laues-Gholston Dep., App. C to Defs. Mot. for Sanctions, at 8, 13 (cm/ecf
pages) (Dkt. 47-7), non-responsive, id. at 11, 13 (cm/ecf pages), and contradictory, id. at 8
(cm/ecf page), on even the most basic or simplest of questions.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s

conspicuous absence from the Magistrate Judge’s scheduled hearing on Defendants’ motion for
sanctions, see R&R at 18, highlights Plaintiff’s lack of respect for the Court’s institutional
authority over this case, making it unlikely that Plaintiff will comply with future court orders in
this case. Defendants have already expended considerable time and resources in an attempt to
litigate this case smoothly and efficiently; allowing Plaintiff to continue to stonewall Defendants
at every turn would only exacerbate the prejudice already suffered and defeats the interests of
justice.
Finally, the Court’s decision should come as no surprise to Plaintiff, who was warned that
a failure to comply with the Magistrate Judge’s order would result in dismissal of his case. Not
only did the Magistrate Judge explain to Plaintiff his discovery obligations on the record, but the

6

Magistrate Judge also warned Plaintiff of the consequences of failing to comply with those
obligations: dismissal of the case. R&R at 5. This warning was memorialized in the Magistrate
Judge’s written order following the hearing on Defendants’ motion to compel. Id. Yet, Plaintiff
continued to undermine Defendants’ legitimate attempts at discovery. Plaintiff was also warned
a second time — indeed, during a hearing on the record necessitated by Plaintiff’s bad-faith
conduct during his deposition — that a failure to cooperate could result in a dismissal of his
action. Id. at 8. And still, being fully aware of the consequences of his actions, Plaintiff
continued to provide disingenuous answers to Defendants’ deposition questions.
Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
In addition to recommending dismissal of the case, the Magistrate Judge also
recommended the imposition of a monetary sanction. R&R at 17. In their motion to compel,
Defendants requested reasonable costs and attorney fees of $750.00, and the Magistrate Judge
took the request under advisement in granting the motion. Id. In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge
concluded that, as the prevailing party on their motion to compel and in the absence of any
applicable exception under the pertinent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Defendants were
entitled to reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the motion. Id. at 17-18. As such,
the Magistrate Judge recommended awarding Defendants $750.00 in reasonable expenses.
Plaintiff’s objections do not specifically address the monetary sanction, and the Court finds that
the Magistrate Judge was correct in his conclusion and, therefore, will included the sanction as
part of the instant Order. Plaintiff must pay the $750.00 within 21 days of service of this Order
by check, made payable to all Defendants and transmitted to Richard Green as attorney for all
Defendants.

7

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and agrees with the
recommendation contained therein. Consequently, Defendants’ motion for sanctions (Dkt. 47) is
granted, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice, and all pending motions and objections
are denied, as moot. Plaintiff is to pay Defendants $750.00 as directed above.

Dated: June 2, 2015
Detroit, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and
any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 2, 2015.
s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams
Case Manager

8