Auburn Sales, Inc. v. Cypros Trading & Shipping, Inc. et al
Filing
100
OPINION and ORDER Denying Defendants' 73 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AUBURN SALES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 14-10922
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
CYPROS TRADING &
SHIPPING, INC., JOSEPH
KILANI, and FADI KILANI,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [ECF NO. 73]
On February 3, 2015, this Court issued an opinion and order granting
Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and denying Defendants’
motion as to Plaintiff’s claims of tortious interference with a business relationship,
tortious interference with economic expectancy, and breach of contract. Presently
before the Court is Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. For reasons that follow,
the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.
I.
Standard of Review
Rule 7.1 of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan provides the
Court's standard of review:
Generally, and without restricting the court's discretion, the court will
not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present
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the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by
reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a
palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other persons
entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that
correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3).
Palpable defects are those that are “obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest or
plain.” Mich. Dep't of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F.Supp.2d 731, 734
(E.D.Mich.2002). “It is an exception to the norm for the Court to grant a motion
for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F.Supp.2d 759, 780
(E.D.Mich.2010). “[A] motion for reconsideration is not properly used as a vehicle
to re-hash old arguments or to advance positions that could have been argued
earlier but were not.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 298
F.Supp.2d 636, 637 (E.D.Mich.2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)).
II.
Analysis
Defendants assert that the Court committed a palpable defect by treating
their purported Rule 56 motion for summary judgment as a Rule 12(c) Judgment
on the Pleadings. (Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 73 at Pg. ID 553.) In support of this
assertion, Defendants make the following arguments: (1) “[t]he pleadings as well
as oral arguments suggest that the proper standard of review of the [m]otion should
be pursuant to [Rule] 56”; (2) “[s]ince the Court considered matters outside the
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pleadings, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under [Rule]
56”; and (3) “[t]he Court’s analysis of the [m]otion pursuant to [Rule] 56 may have
resulted in a different outcome.” (Id.) Defendants fail to state a palpable defect and
accordingly, their motion for reconsideration must be denied.
A. Pleadings and Oral Argument
As Defendants indicated in their motion for reconsideration, the Court in its
opinion and order held that despite the fact that Defendants labeled their motion as
a motion for summary judgment, having reviewed the motion, it was readily
apparent that “Defendants provide[d] solely a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, provide[d]
no evidence in support of the initial motion, and [made] an argument entirely on
the pleadings,” and consequently, the Court construed Defendants motion as a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 71 at Pg. ID 504-10)
Defendants assert that their motion should have been analyzed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 because they asked the Court to treat it as such at the
motion hearing, and because they used the phrase “summary judgment”
sporadically in their brief. This argument is futile, given that the arguments made
in Defendants’ motion were made entirely on the pleadings. Were the Court to
have treated the motion as a summary judgment motion, the Court would have
denied the motion as an entirely unsupported motion for summary judgment, given
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that the motion contained no actual record evidence as required under Rule 56(c).
Thus, this assertion fails.
B. Matters Outside of the Pleadings
Defendants next assert that that the Court considered matters outside the
pleadings, and that pursuant to Rule 56, the Court must treat the motion as one for
summary judgment. However, in stark contrast to this assertion, Defendants go on
to state the following: “[R]eliance on Rule 56 would have required the Court to
consider the affidavits and other exhibits filed in connection with the dispositive
motion. In the Opinion and Order, the Court did not even reference any reliance
upon exhibits.” (Defs.’ Mot., ECF no 73 at Pg. ID 560) Defendants are talking out
of both sides of their mouths in a desperate attempt to get the remaining claims
dismissed; nevertheless, Defendants fail to direct the Court to any particular
matters that were considered outside of the pleadings, and accordingly, this
argument fails.
C. Potentially Different Outcome
Defendants also assert that “the Court’s failure to address the legal issue of
whether a duty is owed by Defendants to Plaintiff is concerning as this may be
dispositive of the remaining counts under a Rule 56 analysis.” (ECF No. 73 at Pg.
ID 563.) Given that Plaintiff has failed to state a palpable defect, Defendants’
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argument that the Court’s analysis under Rule 56 would have resulted in a different
outcome is rendered moot.
Further, this concept of duty that Defendants continue to raise is not an
element of tortious interference with a business relationship, tortious interference
with economic expectancy, or breach of contract. Defendants repeatedly raise this
argument despite the fact that it is entirely based on the application of a legal
standard that does not apply to Defendants' motion. Given that the standard has no
bearing on the pending motion, because this concept of duty is not an element of
any of Plaintiff's remaining claims, the argument that a different result would have
occurred is futile. Going forward, Defendants should focus their efforts on the
elements of the remaining claims.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: December 11, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, December 11, 2015, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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