East Bay Women's Health, Inc. et al v. gloStream, Inc.

Filing 27

OPINION and ORDER Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendant's 15 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (Loury, R)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
EAST BAY WOMEN’S HEALTH, INC.,
and YVETTE GENTRY, M.D.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Case No. 14-11586
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
GLOSTREAM, INC.
Defendant.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS [ECF No. 15]
On March 19, 2014, Yvette Gentry, M.D. and East Bay Women’s Health,
Inc. (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed a third amended complaint (“TAC”) against
gloStream, Inc. (“gloStream” or “Defendant”) for damages for the following
counts: (1) fraud by deception; (2) intentional misrepresentation; (3) negligent
misrepresentation; (4) violations of the unfair competition law; (5) breach of
express warranty; (6) breach of contract; and (7) breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. (Third Am. Compl. 1.) This matter is currently before
the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 1, 4, 5, and 7 of Plaintiffs’
TAC, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on May 30, 2014.
(Def.’s Br. 1.) Defendant also requests that Plaintiffs’ damages request be stricken
as outside the scope of “agreed-upon allowed relief.” (Id.) On October 8, 2014, the
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Court held a motion hearing, at which Plaintiffs voluntarily agreed to dismiss
Count 7. For reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Factual Background
Because this matter is before the Court on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Court must generally confine its 12 (b)(6) ruling to the matters contained within
the pleadings and accept all well-pleaded allegations as true. Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gentek Building
Products, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams, 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff
Yvette Gentry, M.D. (“Dr. Gentry”) is a board-certified obstetrician and
gynecologist, currently residing in Alameda County, California. (Third Am. Compl.
¶10.) Plaintiff East Bay Women’s Health, Inc. (“EBWH”) is a California
corporation, providing obstetrics and gynecological services to patients residing
throughout the San Francisco Bay Area (Id. at ¶ 11.) Dr. Gentry is the sole owner
of EBWH. (Id.) Dr. Gentry, on behalf of EBWH signed a Software Licensing
Agreement (“the Agreement”) with Defendant for EBWH’s use of Defendant’s
electronic medical records computer system (“EMR”), in or around December
2009. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs purchased the EMR based upon Defendant’s
representation that its EMR would manage all of Plaintiffs’ various charts, records,
bills, and insurance forms in one repository. (Id. at 2) Per terms of the contract,

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Plaintiffs were appointed a certified partner, EndSight, to implement and support
Defendant’s product. Plaintiffs had to pay additional fees to EndSight for
professional services, as well as annual costs and monthly support. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.)
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant guaranteed that the EMR would streamline
Plaintiffs’ clinic operations, thereby creating increased revenues by serving more
patients. (Id. ¶ 18.) However, Plaintiffs assert that in fact, Defendant’s EMR was
still in “beta” (experimental) testing mode, and instead of relieving paperwork
obligations as promised, the system brought havoc to Plaintiffs’ medical practice.
(Id. ¶¶ 40, 41.) Defendant’s EMR supplied incorrect diagnostic and procedure
codes on automatically-generated insurance billings, randomly deleted treatment
notes, and assigned patient charts randomly to the wrong files. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 29, 35.)
Plaintiffs’ clinic operations slowed tremendously as both medical providers and
staff “fought an uphill battle to staunch the flow of mistakes and correct the
records.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs allege that the ongoing disruption diverted significant
resources from patient care, caused the loss of valuable staff and exposed plaintiffs
to potentially crippling liability. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiffs assert that they repeatedly complained to Defendant about these
problems, but were only offered empty guarantees that if they spent more money
and time in troubleshooting Defendant’s EMR, the EMR would work as promised.
(Id. at 3.) The aforementioned problems continued, and Plaintiffs became

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frustrated and hired additional technical support to make the EMR system
workable. (Id. ¶ 40.) After consulting with additional support, Plaintiffs discovered
they had served as testers for the EMR, and that the system would never work as
promised by Defendant. (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs promptly demanded a refund of all
sums paid to Defendant and EndSight. (Id. ¶ 43.) Defendant declined to offer a
refund stating that it appeared that Plaintiffs were unwilling or unable to provide
the resources necessary to make the EMR system successful. (Id. ¶ 44.)
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. Defendant, in response to Plaintiffs’
TAC moved the Court to dismiss counts 1, 4, 5, and 7 of Plaintiffs’ TAC, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and to strike Plaintiffs’ requested
damages as outside the scope of agreed-upon allowed relief. (ECF. No. 15.)
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs “must allege ‘enough facts to
state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” Traverse Bay Area Int. Sch.
Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Facial plausibility requires that the complaint plead factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants are liable for

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the misconduct alleged. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Std. & Poor’s Fin.
Servs., LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). “This standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but a
complaint containing a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of a
legally cognizable right of action is insufficient.” HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor,
675 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The court must “accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.” Bennet v. MIS
Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1091 (6th Cir. 2010). The court “need not, however, accept
unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Nor will
the Court entitle “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements” to an assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than

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“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Although a court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “primarily considers the
allegations in the complaint,” matters of public record, orders, items appearing in
the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint may also be
considered. Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted). The court also may consider documents incorporated by or referred to in
the pleadings, as well as documents that are central to the plaintiff’s allegations
even if not explicitly incorporated by reference. See Weiner v. Klais and Co., 108
F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997).
III.

Applicable Law and Analysis

1. Count 1- Fraud by Deception
On a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine
whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Under
general pleading standards, the facts alleged in the complaint need not be detailed,
although “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a
cause of action's elements will not do.” Id. at 555.

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Rule 9(b) provides that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind of a person may be
averred generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) is not to be read in isolation, but
is to be interpreted in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. U.S. ex
rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 679 (6th Cir.1988)).
Rule 8 requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim” made by “simple,
concise, and direct allegations.” Id. When read against the backdrop of Rule 8, it is
clear that the purpose of Rule 9 is not to reintroduce formalities to pleadings, but is
instead to provide defendants with a more specific form of notice as to the
particulars of their alleged misconduct. Id.
In complying with Rule 9(b), a plaintiff, at a minimum, must “allege the
time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation on which he or she relied;
the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury
resulting from the fraud.” Id. at 503–04 (citing Coffey v. Foamex L.P., 2 F.3d 157,
161–62 (6th Cir.1993)). In the case at hand, Plaintiffs comply with these
requirements. Plaintiffs assert that in or around December 2009, when Dr. Gentry
signed the contract, Defendant intentionally failed to disclose to Dr. Gentry and
EBWH that its EMR was in beta testing mode, that it had never been adequately

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tested with any health care provider, and that Defendant falsely represented to
EBWH and Dr. Gentry that its EMR was the right size and scope for Plaintiffs’
medical practice; that Defendant’s EMR would increase Plaintiffs’ profitability;
that its EMR was in substantial conformity with documentation as stated in the
contract; that the lab interface was fully operational; and that Defendant’s EMR
was in compliance with Medicare’s meaningful use criteria. (See generally Third
Am. Compl. ¶¶14–45.) In the paragraphs preceding Count 1, which Plaintiffs
reincorporate into Count 1, Plaintiffs discuss in great detail the losses suffered as a
result of Defendant’s misrepresentations. Plaintiffs explain that they made repeated
good faith efforts to resolve the problems with the EMR, only to learn from
technical support (which Plaintiffs purchased independently) that they had in fact
served as beta testers for Defendant’s EMR and that Defendant’s EMR would
never work as promised. (Id. ¶¶ 38–40.) Thus, it is apparent that the time, place,
content, scheme, intent, and injury requirements have been fulfilled by Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Count 1 is DENIED.
Plaintiffs requested that leave to amend their complaint as to Count 1 be
granted if the Court found that more facts were needed for their fraud claim. (Pls.’
Resp. Br. 10.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs state their fraud violation with
particularity, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); thus, Plaintiffs
do not need to amend their complaint as to Count 1.

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2. Count 4 – Breach of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et. seq
Defendant asserts that Count 4 of Plaintiffs’ TAC, for violation of Breach of
Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., California’s unfair competition
law, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Michigan law, which
governs the Agreement. (Def.’s Mot. at 11.) The Court agrees.
In or around December 2009, Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into a
contract for use of Defendant’s EMR. (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 14.). Within the
contract is a provision stating:
This Agreement will be governed, construed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the United States of America and the
State of Michigan, without regard to its principles of the conflict of
laws. Any and all litigation arising from or relating to this Agreement
will be filed and prosecuted before any court of competent subject
matter jurisdiction in the State of Michigan, The parties hereto
consent to the jurisdiction of such courts over them, stipulate to the
convenience, efficiency and fairness of proceeding in such courts, and
covenant not to allege or assert the inconvenience, inefficiency or
unfairness of proceeding in such courts.
(Agreement § 15.2.) (emphasis added).
The parties dispute whether the instant action is governed by Michigan law
or California law. To resolve this dispute, a federal court whose jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship must apply the conflict of law rules of the forum
state. Johnson v. Ventra Grp., Inc., 191 F.3d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). Because the case at
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hand is before the federal district court in Michigan, we must look to Michigan’s
conflict of law rules to determine whether Michigan law or California law governs
this dispute. Michigan has adopted the approach set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. (citing Banek Inc. v. Yogurt Ventures, U.S.A.,
Inc., 6 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir.1993)). According to this approach, a contractual
choice of law provision will be binding unless either:
(a) [t]he chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties
or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the
parties' choice; or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue and which, under the rule of §188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice
of law by the parties.
Id. (referencing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2) (1988))
(emphasis added). Plaintiff is essentially asserting its argument under § 187(2)(b).
Therefore, the Court must determine if: (1) applying the choice of law clause
would violate a fundamental policy of Michigan; and (2) Michigan has a materially
greater interest than California in the determination of the issue. See id.
(a) Violation of a Fundamental Policy
In the instant action, the contract states that “[t]his Agreement will be
governed, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the United States
of America and the State of Michigan, without regard to its principles of the
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conflict of laws.” (Agreement § 15.2) Choice-of-law clauses are generally
enforceable in Michigan. Offerdahl v. Silverstein, 569 N.W.2d 834, 835–36 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing the enforceability of choice-of-law and forumselection clauses). In general, parties may agree that all causes of action pertaining
to a particular matter may be subject to the law of a particular jurisdiction. Id.
(citing Hardy v. Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 270 (Mich.
1982); Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Industrial Services, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 715 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993)). Because in Michigan, choice-of-law clauses are generally
enforceable, and parties are able to agree to have all causes of action pertaining to a
particular matter be subject to the law of a particular jurisdiction, it is apparent to
the Court that the choice-of-law provision in the contract at hand is not a violation
of a fundamental policy.
(b) Materially Greater Interest
Plaintiff asserts that California has a “materially greater interest in the
lawsuit” because Dr. Gentry, EBWH, and their patients all reside in California, and
California has a “fundamental public policy of not only protecting its small
businesses from harm, but in protecting the public health.” (Pls.’ Resp. Br. 14.) A
state does have a public interest in protecting the public health. However, this is
not a case in which the state is bringing a lawsuit to protect its citizens; rather,
Plaintiffs are bringing this lawsuit seeking reimbursement of monies paid to

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Defendant for use of its EMR. Having read the TAC, it is apparent that the action
is not brought on behalf of the patients. Further, the Court believes that Michigan
has a significant relationship to the matter at hand, given that Defendant is a
Michigan corporation, its business is located in Michigan, performance of the
computer services occurs in Michigan, and Michigan has an interest in ensuring
that Michigan corporations have certainty in defending their rights in suits all over
the country. Having analyzed these interests, the Court believes that Michigan has
a greater interest in the matter and that the contract’s choice-of-law provision is not
in violation of Michigan policy. Accordingly, Michigan law governs. Because
Plaintiffs do not bring a cause of action under any Michigan equivalent,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Count 4 of the TAC is GRANTED.
3. Count 5 – Breach of Express Warranty
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ express warranty claim must be dismissed
because the Agreement “expressly limits warranties to those stated” within the
contract. (Def.’s Br. 12.) The Agreement in pertinent part states that:
Other than the warranties expressly stated in this agreement,
gloStream neither makes nor grants any warranties,
representations or conditions, express or implied. GloStream
expressly excludes all implied warranties, representations and
conditions, including specifically any and all implied
warranties, representations of merchantability, merchantable
quality, or fitness for any purpose, particular, specific or
otherwise.

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(Agreement § 13.1.) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs first allege that Defendant breached § 12.1 of the Agreement
– an express warranty, expressly guaranteed in the contract. (Third Am.
Compl. ¶ 70.) At the motion hearing, Defendant conceded that Plaintiffs’
sufficiently pleaded their claim as to Defendant’s breach of § 12.1’s express
warranty. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to breach of the
express warranty contained in § 12.1 of the Agreement is DENIED.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant made a series of oral promises
that created express warranties outside of the agreement. Specifically,
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant warranted that the EMR would comply with
the meaningful use criteria; that the EMR was the right size and scope for
the medical practice; and that the lab interface was operational. (Id. ¶¶ 70–
72.) Defendant asserts that any express warranties made outside of the
agreement were disclaimed per the terms of the contractual agreement
between the parties. (Def.’s Br. 12.) In response, Plaintiffs argue that
Defendant cannot disclaim express warranties it made in the contract. (Pls.’
Resp. Br. 20.)
The written contract unambiguously holds in relevant part, that “[o]ther than
the warranties expressly stated in this agreement, gloStream neither makes nor
grants any warranties, representations, or conditions, express or implied.”

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(Agreement § 13.1) Having reviewed the contract, the Court finds that nowhere in
the agreement is there an express warranty providing for EMR compliance within
the meaningful use criteria; nor does the contract promise that the EMR is the right
size and scope for the medical practice, or that the lab interface was operational.
An express warranty may be created only between a seller and a buyer, and any
such express warranty becomes a term of the contract itself; however, where a
written contract is clear and unambiguous, parol evidence of prior negotiations and
representations cannot be adduced to create an express warranty and thereby vary
the terms of the contract.” Heritage Res., Inc. v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 284
Mich. App. 617, 634, 774 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Salzman
v. Maldaver, 24 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Mich. 1946)). Thus, because Plaintiffs could
not vary the terms of the written contract by extrinsic parol evidence of
representations made prior to its execution, Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for an
alleged breach of express warranty arising only by virtue of such representations.
See Salzman, 24 N.W.2d at 165. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to
Plaintiffs’ claim of breach of express warranty is GRANTED to the extent
Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim is premised on a series of oral
promises that created express warranties outside of the agreement.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count 5 is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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4. Damages Limitations
Defendant asserts that the Agreement limits the type and scope of
damages available to Plaintiffs. (Def.’s Br. 13.) Specifically, Defendant
asserts that the Agreement expressly limits damages to “replacement of
software maintenance or services, or return or credit of any amounts
received by gloStream.” (Id.) In response to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiff
asserts that “[w]hile parties may limit some damages, Michigan expressly
finds that such limitations are inapplicable to claims involving ‘willful,’
‘wanton,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ behavior: the exact type of outrageous
conduct pled in [Plaintiffs’] Complaint.” (ECF No. 21 at 20, citing Lamp v.
Reynolds, 645 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). In reply to
Plaintiffs’ response, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs do not plead gross
negligence, or willful or wanton behavior, and therefore the limitations
provision should stand. (Def.’s Reply to Motion to Dismiss 7–8.)
A party may not insulate himself against liability for gross negligence or
willful and wanton misconduct. See Lamp v. Reynolds, 645 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing) (“Plaintiff’s execution of two general releases did not
automatically bar his willful and wanton misconduct claim…”). However,
Plaintiffs have not asserted in the pleadings an allegation of Defendant’s gross
negligence, or wanton and willful misconduct. Such claims are independent causes

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of action, and need to be asserted in the pleadings. See generally Taylor v. Laban,
616 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Smith v. Jones, 632 N.W.2d 509, 514
(2001).
Further, Plaintiffs assert that fraud in the inducement (fraud by
deception) is an exception to the rule that a plaintiff’s damages are limited to
the contract. (Pls.’ Resp. Br. 14.) Although Michigan case law holds that
fraud in the inducement is an exception to the rule that a plaintiff’s remedy
is limited to the contract alone, Michigan case law limits the exception. See
Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d
541, 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). When asserting fraud in the inducement, a
plaintiff’s allegations of fraud must be extraneous of the contractual dispute.
Id. Such representations of fraud must be distinguishable from the terms of
the contract and warranty that Plaintiffs allege were breached. Id.
In determining whether Plaintiffs are able to seek remedy outside of
the contract’s provision, the Court turns to the Michigan Court of Appeals
decision in Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. In Huron Tool & Eng'g Co., plaintiff
entered into an agreement for the sale of a computer software system. Id. at
543. The agreement held that defendant would provide plaintiff with
system’s design, programming, training and installation services. Id.
Because of alleged defects in the software system, plaintiff filed suit alleging

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fraud, among other causes of action. Id. The fraudulent representations
alleged by plaintiff concerned the quality and characteristics of the software
system sold by defendants. Id. at 546. The court determined that such
representations are indistinguishable from the terms of the contract and
warranty. Id. Thus, the court held that because plaintiff's allegations of fraud
were not extraneous to the contractual dispute, plaintiff was restricted to its
contractual remedies. Id.
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs have failed to assert any wrongdoings by
Defendant that are independent of Defendant’s breach of contract and
warranty. Similar to the facts of Huron Tool & Eng’g Co., here, the
fraudulent representations alleged by Plaintiffs concern the quality and
characteristics of the software system sold by Defendant (gloStream’s
EMR). (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25–41; Agreement § 12.1.) Such
representations are not extraneous to the contractual dispute. Huron Tool &
Eng’g Co., 532 N.W.2d at 546. Thus, the fraud in the inducement exception
does not apply. Accordingly, for reasons previously mentioned, Defendant’s
request that Plaintiffs’ damages request be stricken is GRANTED.
Accordingly,
Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part, in that: Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to Count 1;

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GRANTED as to Count 4; DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as to
Count 5; and GRANTED as to Count 7. Further, Defendant's request to
strike Plaintiffs’ damages request is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiffs seek
damages beyond that which is allowed for in the contract.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 6, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, January 6, 2015, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager

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