Taras v. Hamtramck et al

Filing 49

OPINION and ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 48 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TARAS P NYKORIAK,
Plaintiff,

Civil Case No. 14-11954
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
CITY OF HAMTRAMCK et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [ECF NO. 48]
On February 12, 2016, this Court issued an opinion and order dismissing
Plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 46.) Presently before the Court is Defendant’s
motion for reconsideration. For reasons that follow, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion.
I.
A. Standard of Review
Rule 7.1 of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan provides the
Court's standard of review:
Generally, and without restricting the court's discretion, the court will
not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present
the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by
reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a
palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other persons

1

entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that
correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3).
Palpable defects are those which are “obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest
or plain.” Mich. Dep't of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F.Supp.2d 731, 734
(E.D.Mich.2002). “It is an exception to the norm for the Court to grant a motion
for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F.Supp.2d 759, 780
(E.D.Mich.2010). “[A] motion for reconsideration is not properly used as a vehicle
to re-hash old arguments or to advance positions that could have been argued
earlier but were not.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 298
F.Supp.2d 636, 637 (E.D.Mich.2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)).
B. Analysis
In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff explicitly states the following:
After his arrest, Taras filed a complaint for claims under 42 U.S.C. [§]
1983 and MCL. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Taras seeks relief from this
court for false arrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), and
malicious prosecution (Count IV). Under MCL, Taras seeks relief
from this Court for invasion of privacy (Count III), assault and battery
(Count V), defamation (Count VI), negligence (Count VII), and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII).
(Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID 510.)
Thereafter, despite having never raised such a claim previously, Plaintiff in
his motion for reconsideration brings a Fourth Amendment claim against
2

Defendants, pursuant to § 1983. (Id. at Pg. ID 512.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers entered his
home and arrested him, because: (1) the officers lacked probable cause to make the
arrest; and (2) the arrest and entry into Plaintiff’s home occurred despite the fact
that no warrant existed, and if a warrant did exist, said warrant was unsigned and
thus invalid. (Id. at Pg. ID 512–13.)
With respect to raising new claims in a motion for reconsideration, the Sixth
Circuit holds the following, in pertinent part:
It is well-settled that “parties cannot use a motion for reconsideration
to raise new legal arguments that could have been raised before a
judgment was issued.” Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ'g,
477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir.2007). Additionally, reconsideration
motions cannot be used as an opportunity to re-argue a case.
Furthermore, a party may not introduce evidence for the first time in a
motion for reconsideration where that evidence could have been
presented earlier. See, e.g., Sommer, 317 F.3d at 691; CGH, 261
Fed.Appx. at 824 (affirming denial of reconsideration and stressing:
“It is hard to imagine how an affidavit from one of [plaintiff's] own
witnesses would have been previously unavailable to [plaintiff], and
[plaintiff] has not explained why it failed to introduce this evidence in
opposition to summary judgment.”).
Bank of Ann Arbor v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 563 F. App'x 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, federal rules and case law preclude Plaintiff from raising a new legal
argument.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is without merit.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims there was not a warrant in this case, and alternatively,

3

that even if there was a warrant, the warrant was unsigned. (Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48
at Pg. ID 508, 512, 513.) Plaintiff then concludes that Defendants violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by entering Plaintiff's home without a valid warrant. (Id.
at Pg. ID 512.)
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
Plaintiff’s assertion that there was no warrant and that the warrant was not signed
is perplexing, given that a bench warrant for the arrest of Plaintiff for failure to
appear in court was signed on August 28, 2013 by Judge Paul J Paruk. (ECF No.
40-8 at Pg. ID 347.) Thus, because there was a valid warrant in existence that the
officers relied upon to arrest Plaintiff, his Fourth Amendment argument necessarily
fails.
Next, Defendant in its motion for reconsideration reargues his malicious
prosecution claims. (Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID 515.) Plaintiff asserts the
same arguments he raised in his responsive brief. Plaintiff’s assertions are baseless,
and further, “reconsideration motions cannot be used as an opportunity to re-argue

4

a case[.]” Bank of Ann Arbor v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 563 F. App'x at 476.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding his malicious prosecution claims fail.
Finally, Defendant reargues his state law claims of: (1) invasion of privacy;
and (2) assault and battery. (Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID at 514–16.) As stated
previously, this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), has declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. (See ECF No. 46 at Pg.
ID 503.) Thus, the Court makes no determination as to the continuing viability of
Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Accordingly, for the abovementioned reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 48) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 26, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, April 26, 2016, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager

5