Bridges v. Palmer

Filing 3

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DENYING Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LONNIE BRIDGES,
Petitioner,

Case Number: 14-13097

v.

HONORABLE TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CARMEN PALMER,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
This is a habeas case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Lonnie Bridges
(Petitioner) is a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Michigan Reformatory in
Ionia, Michigan. He challenges his convictions for manslaughter, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.321, felony firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b, and felon in
possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f, on the ground that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct. It is plain from the face of the petition that
habeas relief is not warranted. Therefore, the petition will be dismissed.
Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of
manslaughter, felony firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm. On April 13,
2012, he was sentenced to 10 to 22 years for the manslaughter conviction, 2 to 5
years for the felon in possession conviction, and 5 years for the felony firearm
conviction.

Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals arguing
that prosecutorial misconduct and the improper admission of evidence denied him
the right to a fair trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s
convictions. People v. Bridges, No. 310176, 2013 WL 3815631 (Mich. Ct. App. July
23, 2013). The Michigan Supreme Court then denied Petitioner’s application for
leave to appeal. People v. Bridges, 495 Mich. 903 (Mich. Nov. 25, 2013).
Petitioner then filed the pending habeas petition. He raises this claim:
The trial court denied defendant a fair trial and the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct when the prosecutor impeached
defendant Bridges with the details of a prior assault with intent
to murder conviction in response to defendant’s testimony that
he acted in self-defense, and that he was aware that the victim
could be violent.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon the filing of a habeas corpus petition, the court must promptly examine
the petition to determine “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any
exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4, Rules
Governing Section 2254 cases. If the court determines that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief, the court shall summarily dismiss the petition. McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss
summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face”). The
habeas petition, on its face, does not establish the violation of a federal
constitutional right, therefore, the petition will be dismissed.

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The claims raised are reviewed against the standards established by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim –
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it
‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court
cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from
[this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable
application’ prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]
Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). “In

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order for a federal court find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court]
precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than
incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively
unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams,
529 U.S. at 409. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness
of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789
(2011), (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “Section
2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary
error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from
a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted).
Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court
factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this
presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Scott v. Houk, 760 F.3d 497,
503 (6th Cir. 2014).

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II. ANALYSIS
Petitioner presents a single claim for habeas relief: the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct when cross-examining Petitioner by referencing Petitioner’s prior
attempted murder conviction.
The prosecutor filed a pretrial motion, under Mich. R. Evid. 404(b), to admit
prior bad acts evidence, including Petitioner’s 2002 conviction for assault with
intent to murder. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, Petitioner testified on
direct examination that the victim was a violent person and described two
particular occasions when the victim behaved aggressively. The trial court ruled
that, because Petitioner offered evidence about the victim’s aggressive character,
the prosecutor could introduce Petitioner’s character trait for aggression under
Mich. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), and, because Petitioner claimed to have acted in selfdefense, ask Petitioner about specific instances of violent conduct under Mich. R.
Evid. 405(a).
Petitioner argues that, in eliciting this evidence, the prosecutor improperly
referred to the 2002 criminal conviction that resulted from Petitioner’s specific
conduct, rather than just the conduct itself. The trial court struck the evidence and
gave a curative instruction. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the
prosecutor’s reference to the 2002 conviction did not deny Petitioner a fair trial.
Bridges, 2013 WL 3815631 at *2. The state appellate court’s justification for its
holding was two-fold. First, the state court noted that jurors are presumed to follow

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their instructions. Id. Second, the state court observed that a defendant was not
likely to be prejudiced by improper admission of the fact of a conviction when each
of the elements of the crime leading to that conviction were already properly
introduced at trial. Id.
The “clearly established Federal law” relevant to a habeas court’s review of a
prosecutorial misconduct claim is the Supreme Court’s decision in Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). Parker v. Matthews, — U.S.—, 132 S. Ct.
2148, 2153 (June 11, 2012). In Darden, the Supreme Court held that a “prosecutor’s
improper comments will be held to violate the Constitution only if they ‘so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.’” Id. (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). This
Court must ask whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision denying
Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim “‘was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Parker, — U.S. at —, 132 S. Ct. at 2155,
(quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at —, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87).
“[T]he Darden standard is a very general one, leaving courts ‘more leeway ...
in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Parker, — U.S. —, 132
S.Ct. at 2155, (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The
Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably disposed of Petitioner’s prosecutorial
misconduct claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to Mich. R.

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of Evid. 404(a)(1) and 405(a), the prosecutor was properly permitted to crossexamine Petitioner on reports of specific instances of conduct. This Court will not
disturb a state court’s administration of its own evidentiary rules. Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit
the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state
evidentiary rules.”). The Court thus presumes the correctness of the state court’s
evidentiary ruling. The state court reasonably concluded that, because evidence
about the conduct underlying the prior conviction was properly introduced, and the
trial court gave a curative instruction regarding the fact of the prior conviction,
Petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not implicated by the prosecutor’s conduct. The
court of appeals’ decision was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S., at —, 131 S. Ct., at 786-787.
Habeas relief, therefore, is denied.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not
proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the
Court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant.”

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A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The substantial
showing threshold is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates “that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the
Court’s conclusion that the habeas petition does not warrant relief. Therefore, the
Court denies a certificate of appealability.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and a certificate of appealability are DENIED and the matter is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 23, 2015
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on January 23,
2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.
s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

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