Grewal et al v. Grewal

Filing 9

OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendant's 3 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (Loury, R)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BALWANT GREWAL et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Case No. 14-13228
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
NARINDER GREWAL,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION (ECF NO. 3)
Presently before the Court is Defendant Narinder Grewal’s (“Defendant”)
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), or, alternatively motion for partial summary judgment as
to Counts I, II, III, and V of the Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Def.’s Mot.,
ECF No. 3 at 1–2.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).
I.
Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs’ allegations, on their face, are
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over him, and moves to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). When deciding a Rule
12(b)(2) motion, a district court has three procedural alternatives at its disposal: (1)

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“it may decide the motion upon the affidavits alone”; (2) “it may permit discovery
in aid of deciding the motion”; or (3) “it may conduct an evidentiary hearing to
resolve any apparent factual questions.” Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454,
1458 (6th Cir.1991). Regardless of the method the court chooses, it is the plaintiff
who “bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Id. at 1458. Since
this Court has determined that the motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction can be decided upon the parties’ written submissions, the Court must
“consider the pleadings and the affidavits in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff,” Serras v. First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th
Cir.1989) (citation omitted), and “the plaintiff must make only a prima facie
showing that personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal.” Theunissen,
935 F.2d at 1458. In deciding a 12(b)(2) motion on the parties' written submissions,
the court “does not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking
dismissal.” Id. at 1459.
Federal courts may only exercise personal jurisdiction in a diversity case if
such jurisdiction is (1) authorized by the law of the state in which the court sits;
and (2) is otherwise consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Wright v. MGM Detroit Grand Casino, No. 11-15105, 2012 WL
1883344, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2012) report and recommendation adopted,

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No. 11-CV-15105, 2012 WL 1795827 (E.D. Mich. May 17, 2012) (citing Youn v.
Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir. 2003)).
In a diversity case, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is valid only if it
meets both the state long-arm statute and constitutional due process requirements.
Children's Legal Servs., PLLC v. Shor Levin & Derita, PC, 850 F. Supp. 2d 673,
679 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (citations omitted). “The Sixth Circuit has explained that
‘[w]here the state long-arm statute extends to the limits of the due process clause,
the two inquiries are merged and the court need only determine whether exercising
personal jurisdiction violates constitutional due process.’” Id. (quoting Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ'g, 327 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.2003) (per
curiam) (internal citations omitted). “‘[T]his Circuit historically has understood
Michigan to intend its long-arm statute to extend to the boundaries of the
fourteenth amendment.’” Id. (quoting Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1462). Thus, this
Court shall determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction in this matter
violates constitutional due process.
II.
There are two categories of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction, which
depends on a showing that the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts
with the forum state, unrelated to the underlying suit, and sufficient to justify the
state's exercise of judicial power with respect to any and all claims the plaintiff

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may have against the defendant; and specific jurisdiction, which exposes the
defendant to suit in the forum state only on claims that ‘arise out of or relate to’ a
defendant's contacts with the forum. Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106
F.3d 147, 149 (6th Cir.1997); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 n.6 (2014).
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have no bases for general or specific personal
jurisdiction. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 3 at 7.) Plaintiffs contend that only specific
jurisdiction is applicable to the case at hand. (Pl.’s Resp. Br., ECF No. 4 at 9.)
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs make no argument for general jurisdiction, and
because the Court finds no continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state
sufficient to impose personal jurisdiction thereunder, the Court concludes that there
is no basis in the record to conclude that this Court has general jurisdiction over
Defendant.
III.
Further, the Court does not have specific jurisdiction over Defendant. For
there to be specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, such a defendant
must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state in order to bind the
nonresident to a judgment of its courts. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121. The Supreme
Court in Walden v. Fiore, recently explained that "[t]he inquiry whether a forum
State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant [in accordance
with due process] ‘focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and

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the litigation.’ ” Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775
(1984)) (additional citation and quotation marks omitted).
There are two related aspects of the aforementioned relationship: First, the
relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the
forum. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))
(emphasis added). The defendant-focused “minimum contacts” cannot be satisfied
by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum
State. Id. Second, the “minimum contacts” analysis looks to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who
reside there. Id. (citation omitted).
Having reviewed the record, it is clear that Plaintiffs fail to establish specific
jurisdiction over Defendant.
A.
In October 2009, Plaintiffs Balwant Grewal and Mohinder Grewal sold
property in Punjab, India (Property 1) and moved to Illinois to live with their son,
Defendant Narinder Grewal. (Pls.’ Compl., ECF No. 1-2 at 1.) Balwant and
Mohinder suffer from ailing health, and Defendant agreed to utilize the proceeds of
the sale to provide personal care for Balwant and Mohinder while residing with
him. (Pls.’ Resp. Br., ECF No. 5 at 4.) Specifically, Defendant was to facilitate the
transfer of the proceeds of the sale of Property 1 (approximately $400,000.00) into

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joint accounts with Balwant, Mohinder, and himself, and utilize the funds in the
joint bank accounts to provide for Balwant and Mohinder’s living expenses. (Pls.’
Compl., ECF No. 1-2 at 2; Pls.’ Resp. Br., ECF No. 5 at 4.) Subsequently, Balwant
and Mohinder gifted Defendant with a property located in Punjab, India (Property
2). (Pls.’ Resp. Br., ECF No. 5 at 3; Mohinder Aff., ECF No. 5-3 at 3.) In
September 2013, Balwant and Mohinder transferred ownership of an additional
property located in Delhi, India (Property 3) to their daughter, Plaintiff Jaswinder
Grewal-Karwa, as a gift. (Id.)
Balant, Mohinder, and Jaswinder (collectively “Plaintiffs”) claim that
following the September 2013 gifting of Property 3 to Jaswinder, Defendant began
to neglect Balwant and Mohinder. Defendant denied Balwant and Mohinder access
and itemized review of their joint accounts; there was growing turbulence in
Defendant’s home; consequently, Balwant and Mohinder moved to Michigan to
live with Jaswinder. (Pls.’ Resp. Br., ECF No. 5 at 4–5; Mohinder Aff., ECF No.
5-3 at 4; Jaswinder Aff., ECF No. 5-5 at 3–4.) Thereafter, Defendant refused to
return Balwant and Mohinder their legal identification and utilized the jointly held
funds to establish a personal line of credit, a certificate of deposit, and a new
business. (Id.) Further, Defendant used the funds to purchase rental property and
fund construction on his home. (Id.)

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Plaintiffs do not cite to Walden, which governs the matter at issue, but
nevertheless assert that there is specific jurisdiction over Defendant because he: (1)
“transacted business” in Michigan by visiting Plaintiffs in Michigan at least four
times to “discuss the situation”; (2) engaged in “tortious conduct” by not providing
Plaintiffs with access to or an accounting of their funds while in Michigan, and by
leaving threating voice messages to Plaintiffs at Jaswinder’s residence in
Michigan; (3) contacted Plaintiffs via email whom reside in Michigan; and (4) left
over 50 voice messages to Plaintiffs whom reside in Michigan. (Pls.’ Resp. Br.,
ECF No. 5 at 9–14.)
B.
“Transaction of Business” in Michigan
Plaintiffs assert that “on four separate occasions, Defendant met with them
at Jaswinder’s home and at [a restaurant] to discuss the proceeds of Property 1, the
division of Property 3, Defendant’s improper use of the sale proceeds, the creation
of a Trust account for the Plaintiffs, and the return of Plaintiffs’ legal identification,
among other items.” (Id. at 10.)
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause constrains a State’s
authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts and requires
that for specific jurisdiction to be created, the nonresident have certain minimum
contacts with the forum State. See Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1121 (citing World-Wide

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Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)). The Court held that a
defendant cannot be haled into court based on the random, fortuitous or attenuated
contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State. Id. at
1123. Further, the Court held that the important question is whether a defendant’s
conduct connects him to the forum State in any meaningful way and whether the
forum State is the focal point of the harm suffered. See id. at 1123, 1125.
The Court further explained that its decision in Calder v. Jones, 464 U.S.
783 (1984), demonstrated the application of these principles. In Calder, an actress
brought a libel suit in California state court against a reporter and an editor, both of
whom worked for the National Enquirer at its headquarters in Florida. Calder, 464
U.S. at 785–86. The plaintiff’s libel claims were based on an article written and
edited by defendants in Florida for publication in the National Enquirer, a national
weekly newspaper with a California circulation of approximately 600,000. Id. at
785. In Walden, the Court discussed its decision in Calder, explaining:
We found those forum contacts to be ample: The defendants relied on
phone calls to “California sources” for the information in their article;
they wrote the story about the plaintiff's activities in California; they
caused reputational injury in California by writing an allegedly
libelous article that was widely circulated in the State; and the “brunt”
of that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that State. 465 U.S., at
788–789, 104 S.Ct. 1482. “In sum, California [wa]s the focal point
both of the story and of the harm suffered.” Id., at 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482.
Jurisdiction over the defendants was “therefore proper in California
based on the ‘effects' of their Florida conduct in California.” Ibid.

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Walden, 134 S.Ct at 1123 (emphasis added). The minimum contacts requirement
was satisfied in Calder because the effects caused by defendants’ article – i.e., the
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of the California public –
“connected the defendants’ conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived
there.” Id. at 1124. The same cannot be said in the case at hand.
Despite the fact that Defendant visited Michigan on four occasions to
discuss the circumstances resulting from the gifting of Property 3, the harm
suffered by Balwant and Mohinder was in Illinois rather than Michigan. The
Supreme Court in Walden reaffirmed that the effects of a defendant’s conduct at
issue must connect a defendants’ conduct to the forum State. See Walden, 134
S.Ct. at 1123–1124. The effects of Defendant’s conduct – his alleged seizure of
funds and identification, and his misuse of funds - do not connect defendant to
Michigan. Plaintiffs’ legal claims were perfected in Illinois. Accordingly, specific
jurisdiction is not warranted on the foregoing grounds.
Denial of Access to Funds
Specific jurisdiction is defined as adjudicatory authority in which the suit
arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). In analyzing the facts, the Court in Walden
held that plaintiffs’ injury - the delayed return of their funds while residing in
Nevada – was not a meaningful injury, as plaintiffs only lacked funds in Nevada

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because Nevada “ [was] where plaintiffs chose to be at the time they desired to use
the funds…” Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1125. The Court reasoned that Plaintiffs would
have experienced the same lack of access wherever they traveled and found
themselves wanting more money. Id. Because the continued seizure of the funds
was not tied to Nevada in a meaningful way, the Court concluded that the effects
of defendant’s conduct on plaintiffs was not connected to the forum State in a way
that makes those effects a proper basis for jurisdiction. Id.
Plaintiffs’ assertion that jurisdiction is warranted because Defendant did not
provide Balwant and Mohinder with access to their funds or an accounting of their
funds while in Michigan, is almost the exact assertion the Supreme Court
addressed in Walden. Here, Michigan is simply the location in which Balwant and
Mohinder elected to reside at the time they sought use of the seized funds. They
would have experienced this same lack of access wherever else they might have
traveled. Accordingly, this argument provides no basis for jurisdiction.
Phone and Email Messages
Lastly, Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendant’s harassing phone calls and
emails to Plaintiffs, while residing in Michigan, warrant specific jurisdiction fails
as well. The conduct does not connect Plaintiff to Michigan in any meaningful way.
Plaintiffs would have experienced the same phone calls and emails wherever else

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they might have traveled and found themselves checking their email or voice
messages.
Further, Defendant’s phone calls and emails do not form the basis of any
cause of action in this suit. Instead, these communications were made in an effort
to resolve the disputed issues. Federal courts have declined to find specific
jurisdiction when the defendant's contact with the forum state is limited to an
attempt to resolve the parties' dispute. Harris v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, 281 F.
App'x 489, 495 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods.
Inc., 619 F.2d 676, 678 n. 10 (7th Cir.1980); Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332
(6th Cir. 2001).
The minimum contacts analysis looks at the defendant's contacts with the
forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with the persons who reside there.
Murtech Energy Servs., LLC v. ComEnCo Sys., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-12721, 2014
WL 2863745, at *9 (E.D. Mich. June 24, 2014) (citing Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122).
Plaintiffs cannot be the only link between Defendant and the forum. Id. The Court
finds that Defendant’s relevant conduct occurred in Illinois, and that the assertions
raised by Plaintiffs do not authorize specific jurisdiction over Defendant.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of

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personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).
SO ORDERED.

s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 25, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, November 25, 2014, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager

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