Williams v. MD Helicopters, Inc. et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 7 , 11 Defendants MD Helicopters, and Helicopter Technology's Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, and DENYING 24 Defendant Henkel's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
CIV. NO. 14-13787
v.
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
MD HELICOPTERS, INC., an
Arizona corporation, HELICOPTER
TECHNOLOGY CO., a California
corporation, and HENKEL CORP.,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MD HELICOPTERS,
AND HELICOPTER TECHNOLOGY’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION (DKTS. 7 & 11) AND DENYING
DEFENDANT HENKEL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 24)
This product liability case arises from the crash of a helicopter in Somerset,
England. Plaintiff Kevin Williams (“Plaintiff”), who piloted the helicopter and
suffered serious injuries from the crash, is a citizen of the United Kingdom, though
he currently lives in Ohio. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants MD Helicopters, Inc.
and Helicopter Technology, Co (the “Helicopter Defendants”) are liable for design
defects in the helicopter’s tail rotor which, according to Plaintiff, caused the crash.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Henkel, Corp. (“Defendant Henkel”) is liable for its
production of a cleansing product, called Alumiprep 33, that was meant to reduce
corrosion on the tail rotor, but failed to do so, thus contributing to the crash.
The Helicopter Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (Dkts. 7 & 11).
Defendant Henkel has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, because
Plaintiff served the summons and complaint on Henkel’s resident agent in Ohio
(rather than serving Henkel’s resident agent in Michigan), service of process was
defective and, in the absence of effective service, the statute of limitations has run.
For the reasons set forth below, the Helicopter Defendants motions to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction are GRANTED, and the Complaint against them is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant Henkel’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2014, Plaintiff, a citizen of the United Kingdom, filed a
Complaint in the Circuit Court for Oakland County, Michigan (Dkt. 1, Ex. A,
Compl.). Defendants then timely removed the action to this Court (Dkt. 1, Notice of
Removal). The Complaint alleges that on June 19, 2011, Plaintiff was piloting an
MD 369E helicopter, bearing UK registration G-KSWl, when the aircraft’s tail rotor
suddenly failed, causing the helicopter to crash near Glastonbury, Somerset, United
Kingdom (Compl., Count I ¶¶ 4,6). Plaintiff advances claims of strict liability and
negligence against Defendants MD Helicopters, Inc., Patriarch Partners, LLC1,
On December 17, 2014, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the Complaint against Defendant
Patriarch Partners, LLC without prejudice (Dkt. 23).
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Helicopter Technology Co., Aerometals, Inc.2, and Henkel Corp. (Id. at Counts IVIII).
Defendant Helicopter Technology, Co. is a California corporation, with its
principal place of business in California. Defendant MD Helicopters, Inc. is an
Arizona corporation, with its principal place of business in Arizona. The record
before the Court indicates that the Helicopter Defendants conducted the following
business in Michigan. As to Defendant MD Helicopters, since at least 2009 it has
sold almost $140,000 worth of goods and services to Michigan residents or entities
(Dkt. 35, Ex. B, MD’s Answers to Interrogatories, Nos. 9, 24); purchased products
and services from 21 different Michigan entities (Id. no. 24); provided helicopter
maintenance training services to the Monroe County Sheriff (Id. No. 17); and
solicited and marketed, but apparently never consummated, the sale of a helicopter
to the Detroit Police Department (Id. No. 16).
As to Defendant Helicopter Technologies, from at least 2003 to 2014 it sold
rotor blades to Michigan residents or entities, including three sales over a fourmonth period in 2014; its sales to Michigan residents total approximately $130,000
(Dkt. 36, Ex. C).
Defendant Henkel apparently operates a large manufacturing facility in
Michigan and does not contest the fact that it is subject to this Court’s personal
jurisdiction. For its part, however, Defendant Henkel moves for summary
On November 12, 2014, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant Aerometals, Inc. without
prejudice (Dkt. 17).
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judgment, arguing that the Michigan summons was improperly served on its
resident agent in Ohio, and that the state summons has consequently expired and
the statute of limitations run on Plaintiff’s claims.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2), the plaintiff has the burden of proving the court’s jurisdiction over the
defendant. See Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir.
2002); see also Children’s Legal Services, PLLC v. Shor Levin and Derita, PC, 850 F.
Supp. 2d 673, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2012). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the district court has three procedural alternatives: “[it] may
determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in
aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the
motion.” Serras v. First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir.
1989). In this case, the Court permitted Plaintiff to take discovery.
“[I]n the face of a properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may
not stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific
facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Children’s Legal Servs., 850 F. Supp.
2d at 679 (citing Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991)).
When, as here, the district court allows discovery on the motion, the court should
consider the facts offered by both parties and rule according to the preponderance of
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the evidence. See SFS Check, LLC v. First Bank of Delaware, 774 F.3d 351, 356
(6th Cir. 2014).
B.
The Helicopter Defendants are Not Subject to the Personal
Jurisdiction of this Court
In a diversity case, as here, personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper
only if it comports with the requirements of the state long-arm statute and federal
constitutional due process. See Children’s Legal Servs., 850 F. Supp. 2d at 679
(E.D. Mich. 2012); see also Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.711, 600.715. The Sixth
Circuit has held that “[w]here the state long-arm statute extends to the limits of the
due process clause, the two inquiries are merged and the court need only determine
whether exercising personal jurisdiction violates constitutional due process.”
Children’s Legal Servs., 850 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Still N The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 2003)). “The Michigan
Supreme Court has construed Michigan’s Long-Arm Statute to bestow the broadest
possible grant of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.” Audi AG and
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. D’Amato, 341 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
In Michigan, personal jurisdiction over corporations may be general, see Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.711, or specific, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715. In his
responses to the Helicopter Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff states that he
is not arguing that the Court has specific jurisdiction over the Helicopter
Defendants, and argues only that the Court has general jurisdiction over the
Helicopter Defendants (Dkts. 35 & 36, at 1 ¶¶ 1, 2).
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General personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction for all purposes. Michigan law
provides for general personal jurisdiction over a corporation that is (1) incorporated
in Michigan, (2) has consented to jurisdiction in Michigan, or (3) carries on a
“continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state.” Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.711. It is undisputed that the Helicopter Defendants are not
incorporated in Michigan, nor have they not consented to the jurisdiction of this
Court, so this Court can only exercise general personal jurisdiction over them if the
Helicopter Defendants have been carrying on a “continuous and systematic part of
[their] general business within the state.” Hige v. Turbonetics Holdings, Inc., 662 F.
Supp. 2d 821, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
The question, then, is whether the business conducted by the Helicopter
Defendants in Michigan is “continuous and systematic.” The record before the
Court, and the relevant case law, indicates that it is not. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel
conceded during oral argument that this case could not be distinguished from
several Supreme Court decisions declining to exercise general jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant, including Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746, 751, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014). In both of those cases, the party challenging
general personal jurisdiction conducted considerably more business in the forum
state than the Helicopter Defendants did in Michigan, and yet the Supreme Court
found them not to have had continuous and systematic business operations
sufficient to support general jurisdiction. Plaintiff is unable to distinguish the
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authority of these cases, and is bound thereby. Therefore, the Helicopter
Defendants motions to dismiss are granted, and the Complaint against them is
dismissed without prejudice.
C.
Defendant Henkel Was Properly Served
Defendant Henkel filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 24) arguing
that Plaintiff’s service of the summons and complaint on Henkel’s resident agent in
Ohio (rather than in Michigan) was defective, and that the three-year statute of
limitations has since run.
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). A fact is material only if it might affect the
outcome of the case under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view
the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted); Redding v. St. Edward,
241 F.3d 530, 531 (6th Cir. 2001).
The relevant procedural history in this case is as follows. On June 18, 2014,
Plaintiff, then in pro per, filed this lawsuit in the Oakland County Circuit Court
(Case No. 2014-141437-NP) (Dkt. 1, Ex. A). Plaintiff did not initially obtain
summonses when he filed his Complaint on June 18, 2014. Plaintiff’s attorney had
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summonses issued from the state court on August 25, 2014, which expired on
September 17, 2014 (Dkt. 24, Ex. 3).
On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff obtained an Order extending the summonses
to November 17, 2014 (Dkt. 1, Ex. 8). On September 9, 2014, Plaintiff served the
Complaint on Henkel through its resident agent in Columbus, Ohio3 rather than
serving its resident agent in East Lansing, Michigan (Dkt. 24, Ex. 4, Ohio Proof of
Service). It does not appear that Plaintiff made any attempt to serve Defendant
Henkel through its resident agent in East Lansing, Michigan (Dkt. 24, Ex. 5) and on
September 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Ohioan return of service in the Oakland
County Circuit Court. Defendants removed the case to this Court on October 1,
2014, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. 1). The extended (Michigan State
Court) Summons expired on November 17, 2014.
The relevant Michigan Court Rule reads as follows: “Service of process on a
domestic or foreign corporation may be made by (1) serving a summons and a copy
of the complaint on an officer or the resident agent…” Mich. Ct. R. 2.105 (D). There
is no dispute that Plaintiff served Defendant Henkel’s resident agent, he just served
the resident agent in Columbus, Ohio as opposed to the resident agent in East
Lansing, Michigan. Defendant Henkel’s resident agent in Ohio and Michigan are,
incidentally, the same company – CSC Lawyers Incorporating Service. Defendant
During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that his administrative assistant called the
Michigan Secretary of State to inquire about the location of Defendant Henkel’s resident agent, and
was given an address in Columbus, Ohio. Based upon this information, Plaintiff served the
summons and complaint in Ohio. There is, however, no question that Defendant Henkel received
actual notice of this lawsuit, and filed timely responsive pleadings, and its counsel admitted this fact
during oral argument.
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Henkel has not pointed to any case indicating that service of process on a
corporation’s resident agent in another state is somehow defective. Moreover, the
plain language of the relevant court rule contemplates service on “the resident
agent,” not on the resident agent in the state of the suit.
Defendant Henkel argues that other sections of the Michigan Court Rule
provide support for its position that “resident agent” should be interpreted to mean
only the resident agent for the State of Michigan. Specifically, Defendant Henkel
maintains that the language of MCR 2.105(D)(4) – which allows for service by
registered mail to “the corporation or an appropriate corporation officer and to the
Michigan Bureau of Commercial Services” under circumstances where a company
has failed to appoint a resident agent and has failed to file its certificate “of that
appointment” – suggests that the term “resident agent” should mean only a
resident agent appointed according to a certificate on file with the State of
Michigan.
The Court rejects this reading of the Rule for three reasons. First, neither
party can point to any Michigan case law, and the Court can find none, supporting
such a narrow construction of the Rule. Second, subsection (4) of MCR 2.105(D), by
referencing the “Michigan Bureau of Commercial Services” shows that the drafters
of the Rule knew how to limit the rule’s application explicitly to Michigan entities
when they intended to do so. Third, it is clear that the overarching purpose of the
service requirements of MCR 2.105(D) is to provide notice to a company that is
being sued, not to preserve and protect the industry of Michigan-registered resident
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agents. Defendant Henkel’s resident agent in Ohio (the same agent registered to
receive process in Michigan) received service and Defendant Henkel had notice of
this suit and opportunity to respond. Under these circumstances, the Court will not
grant summary judgment to Defendant Henkel founded on a cribbed reading of
MCR 2.105(D).
The Court finds that service of process was proper, and Defendant Henkel’s
motion for summary judgment is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Helicopter Defendants’ motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkts. 7 & 11) are GRANTED, and the
Complaint against them is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant
Henkel’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 24) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: July 28, 2015
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on July 28,
2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.
s/A. Chubb
Case Manager
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