Jamison v. Anzalone et al
Filing
10
OPINION and ORDER Granting 6 Motion to Dismiss, on Behalf of Defendants Anzalone, Castleberry and Pickard; and Sua Sponte Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendants Holly and Patton Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (Loury, R)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT JAMISON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Case No. 14-cv-13847
Honorable Linda V. Parker
ANNA MARIE ANZALONE,
BURKE CASTLEBERRY,
JOANNE HOLLY, TIMOTHY
PICKARD, and LARRY D. PATTON,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS ON BEHALF
OF DEFENDANTS ANZALONE, CASTLEBERRY AND PICKARD AND
SUA SPONTE DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS HOLLY AND PATTON PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A
Plaintiff is a Michigan prisoner currently serving sentences for convictions
of lying to a peace officer in the Circuit Court for Lenawee County, Michigan. In
this lawsuit, filed October 6, 2014, he is suing the following individuals: the state
court judge who presided over the criminal proceedings, the Honorable Timothy
Pickard,(“Judge Pickard”); the Lenawee County Prosecuting Attorney who
handled the criminal case, Burke Castleberry (“Prosecuting Attorney
Castleberry”); Plaintiff’s defense counsel in the criminal case, Anna Marie
Anzalone (“Attorney Anzalone”); Lenawee County Probation Officer Joanne Holly
(“Officer Holly”); and Supervisor of the Lenawee County Probation Department,
Larry Patton (“Supervisor Patton”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff claims
that Defendants violated the Federal Rules of Evidence, his rights under the United
States Constitution, and Michigan Court Rule 6.425 due to the admission of the
contents of a polygraph in his presentence report.1 (ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 3.)
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). (ECF No. 5.)
Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Judge Pickard,
Attorney Anzalone, and Prosecuting Attorney Castleberry pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on October 20, 2014. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff filed a
response to the motion on October 28, 2014. (ECF No. 8.) For the reasons that
follow, the Court grants the motion and sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s claims
against Officer Holly and Supervisor Patton pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A.2
1
Plaintiff also lists 88 A.L.R. 3d 227 in his Statement of Claims. (ECF No. 1
at Pg ID 3.) This is a treatise of the law. It is not a basis for a claim under state or
federal law.
2
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Prosecuting Attorney Castleberry and the
Lenawee County Prosecutor’s Office shortly before initiating the present action,
which currently is pending before the Honorable Gerald E. Rosen. Jamison v.
Lenawee County Prosecutors Office, No. 14-cv-13659 (E.D. Mich. filed Sept. 19,
(continued...)
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Applicable Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
tests whether a legally sufficient claim has been pleaded in a complaint, and
provides for dismissal where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” ’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570 (2007)). A claim is
facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a court to
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This plausibility standard “does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact[s] to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
[conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
When assessing whether a plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the
2
(...continued)
2014.) That lawsuit also asserts violations of state and federal law resulting from
the introduction of Plaintiff’s polygraph results in his presentence report. In that
lawsuit, the defendants have filed a motion to consolidate the two actions. They
also have filed a motion to dismiss. Judge Rosen has not decided either motion
and thus this Court is resolving the motion to dismiss pending here.
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district court must accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true. Ziegler
v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2001). Even so, “the pleading
must contain more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion
[of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A
plaintiff has the duty to provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Id. Therefore,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
Compared to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, a generally less stringent
standard is applied when construing the allegations pleaded in a pro se complaint.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Even so, pro se plaintiffs must
still provide more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Grinter v. Knight, 532
F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, a district judge is required
to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant
if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
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immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court is
similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government
entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. A complaint is frivolous if it
lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Plaintiff’s Claims Against Judge Pickard
“It is well-established that judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising
out of the performance of their judicial functions.” Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d
614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967);
Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 103 (6th Cir. 1994)) “This immunity applies even
when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[.]” Pierson, 386
U.S. at 554. Moreover, a judge is absolutely immune from liability for his or her
judicial acts even if the exercise “of authority is flawed by the commission of grave
procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). This immunity
extends to state and federal judges alike and it applies equally to actions alleging a
violation of the United States Constitution. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334
(1983).
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The immunity accorded to judicial officers is overcome in only two sets of
circumstances. Judges are not immune from liability arising from non-judicial
actions nor are they “immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1991)
(citations omitted). Neither circumstance is applicable to the conduct of which
Plaintiff complains in this case and therefore the judicial immunity accorded to
Judge Pickard is not overcome. In other words, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge
Pickard are barred by judicial immunity.
Prosecuting Attorney Castleberry
A prosecutor also is absolutely immune from suit, including suits seeking
monetary relief, for actions that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); see
also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 491 (1991) (quoting Imbler); Higgason v.
Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 2002). “Those acts that occur in the course
of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the state, e.g., acts taken to prepare for
the initiation of judicial proceedings or to prepare for trial, are protected by
absolute immunity.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 947 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Absolute prosecutorial
immunity is not overcome by a showing that the prosecutor acted wrongfully or
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maliciously. Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir.1989). In fact in
Imbler, the Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony
and the suppression of material evidence at the defendant’s criminal trial to be
“intimately associated” with the judicial phase of the criminal process, thereby
triggering absolute immunity. 424 U.S. at 413, 430.
Prosecuting Attorney Castleberry is entitled to absolute immunity here.
Plaintiff’s allegations against him arise from the actions that took place during
Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution and sentencing.
Attorney Anzalone
To successfully establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil
rights plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted under color of law and deprived
the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law. Block v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677
(6th Cir. 1998) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). Plaintiff is
suing Attorney Anzalone for her conduct as his defense counsel in the criminal
proceedings. Attorney Anzalone was not “acting under color of state law” in that
capacity and thus any claim against her under § 1983 fails as a matter of law. See
Polk Cnty v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315, 325 (1981) (explaining that “a
jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action” is that the defendant was acting under
color of state law and finding that “a public defender does not act under color of
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state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding.”); see also Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d
231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding the same with respect to a court appointed
defense attorney).
There is no state law claim for damages against individuals or municipalities
based on alleged violations of Michigan’s constitution. Jones v. Powell, 612
N.W.2d 423, 426 (Mich. 2000); Bennett v. Detroit Police Dep’t, 732 N.W.2d 164,
170 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006). There is no private cause of action for an alleged
violation of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, Michigan Compiled Laws Section
771.14, or Michigan Court Rule 6.425. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that
Attorney Anzalone provided ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal
proceedings, such a claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994), as a resolution in Plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his convictions or sentence. See Franklin v. Apelgren, No. 1:13-cv-1356, 2014
WL 204127, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2014) (citing, Mouton v. Louisiana, No.
13-30128, 2013 WL 6018986, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2013) (claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, trial court error, judicial
misconduct, juror misconduct and wrongful incarceration all are barred by Heck);
Spuck v. Clearfield Cnty., No. 13-2490, 2013 WL 4735057, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 4,
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2013); and Baldwin v. O'Connor, 466 F. App’x 717, 717–18 (10th Cir.2012)).
Although not addressed in the pending motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s
Complaint could be construed as raising a legal malpractice claim against Attorney
Anzalone. (ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 3.) To the extent Plaintiff is asserting such a
claim, the Court would have to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) to review it. The Sixth Circuit has stated that district courts should
generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where
any federal claims on which the court’s subject matter jurisdiction are based are
dismissed prior to trial. See Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182
(6th Cir. 1993); Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 917 (6th Cir.
1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court therefore will dismiss such a
claim, to the extent asserted, without prejudice.
Officer Holly and Supervisor Patton
Shortly before initiating the pending action, Plaintiff filed an application in
this District for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
challenging his Lenawee County convictions and sentence. Jamison v. Bergh, No.
14-13658 (E.D. Mich. filed Sept. 19, 2014). Plaintiff asserted the inclusion of the
polygraph results in his presentence report as a ground in support of his request for
habeas relief. Pet. at 7, Jamison, No. 14-14658, ECF No. 1. The matter was
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assigned to the Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow. Judge Tarnow issued a decision
summarily dismissing the habeas petition on December 2, 2014, holding in part
that Plaintiff’s allegations about the contents of his pre-sentence report do not state
a violation of federal law. See Order Summarily Dismissing the Habeas Pet. at 3,
Jamison, No. 14-13658 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2014), ECF No. 7. As Judge Tarnow
indicated, “ ‘the mere presence of hearsay or inaccurate information in a presentence report does not constitute a denial of due process.’ ” Id. (quoting Hill v.
Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 1998) (brackets omitted)). Judge Tarnow
further held that such allegations “raise state law issues [only].” Id.
As indicated earlier, to state a viable civil rights claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted under color of law and deprived the
plaintiff of rights secured by federal law. Block, 156 F.3d at 677. Judge Tarnow’s
holding in Plaintiff’s habeas corpus action that his claims concerning the inclusion
of information in his presentence report do not state a violation of federal law
precludes Plaintiff from establishing the second element of a § 1983 claim here.
See Reaves v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 580 F. App’x 49, 52 (3d Cir.
2014) (finding that the adjudication of the plaintiff’s claim in a prior habeas corpus
petition had preclusive effect in his civil rights action asserting the same claim);
Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, (9th Cir. 1993) (same). Thus the Court is sua
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sponte dismissing Plaintiff’s federal claim against Officer Holly and Supervisor
Patton pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.
As also indicated earlier, any claim against Officer Holly or Supervisor
Patton based on alleged violations of Michigan’s Constitution, the Michigan Rules
of Evidence, Michigan Compiled Laws Section 771.14, or Michigan Court Rule
6.425 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court holds that Judge Pickard and Prosecuting
Attorney Castleberry are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s claims and
Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are dismissed with prejudice. To the
extent Plaintiff is asserting federal civil rights claims or claims alleging violations
of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, Michigan Court Rules, or Michigan Compiled
Laws Section 771.14 against Attorney Anzalone, Officer Holly, or Supervisor
Patton, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and those claims
also are dismissed with prejudice. The Court declines to assert supplemental
jurisdiction with respect to any state law legal malpractice claim Plaintiff might be
asserting against Attorney Anzalone. A Judgment consistent with this decision
will issue.
Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED, that the Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Defendants
Anzalone, Castleberry, and Pickard is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
Holly and Patton are sua sponte dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
S/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: December 11, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, December 11, 2014, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
S/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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