Serafino v. Hamtramck, City of
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Denying Without Prejudice Plaintiffs' 20 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CRAIG SERAFINO, WALTER TRIPP, and
MICHAEL J. SZYMANSKI, on behalf of
themselves, and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Case No. 14-14112
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
CITY OF HAMTRAMCK and CATHY SQUARE,
Defendants.
________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action lawsuit against Defendants on
October 24, 2014. In their Amended Complaint, filed November 12, 2014,
Plaintiffs allege that by making changes to their retiree health care benefits,
Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the United States Constitution and
breached contracts with Plaintiffs. On April 9, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Class Certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. (ECF No. 20.)
That motion has been fully briefed. (ECF No. 23, 26.) The parties also have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, to which response briefs have been filed. (ECF Nos. 35, 36, 44, 45.)
“ ‘[C]onsiderations of fairness and economy’ ” lead this Court to conclude that it
should decide the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment before engaging in
the time-consuming inquiry into certification. See Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina,
29 F.3d 238, 240-41 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 54556 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir.
1984) (“It has never been doubted that a complaint asserting a class action could be
dismissed on the merits before determining whether the suit could be maintained as
a class action.”); Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(citing Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995))
(“[A]lthough a certification decision will usually be ‘practicable’ before the case is
ripe for summary judgment, that will not always be so, and the word ‘practicable
allows for wiggle room”-- enough to make the order of disposition of motions for
summary judgment and class certification a question of discretion for the trial
court.”).
First, not all of the proposed class members retired under the same collective
bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). Plaintiffs assert that all of the CBAs under
which the proposed class members retired promised the same benefits for retirees,
and they have filed excerpts from the various CBAs to demonstrate this point. In
fact, however, the contract language is not identical. Moreover, the Court must
evaluate the full instruments to ascertain the intent of the contracting parties with
respect to the continuation of retiree health care benefits (including the duration
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and scope of those benefits). See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, -- U.S. --,
135 S. Ct. 926, 937-38 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that the “ ‘the
intention of the parties’ ” is “gathered from the whole instrument. . . .”) (emphasis
added). As a result, until this Court fully evaluates the relevant agreements, it
cannot assess whether all of the retirees in the proposed class in fact were promised
the same retiree health care benefits. The Court is not able to evaluate the
commonality and typicality requirements for class certification until it makes this
assessment. Certainly, the Court will need to fully evaluate the relevant
agreements to evaluate the parties’ summary judgment pleadings. Thus it seems
most efficient to start by doing so there.
Further, while Plaintiffs seek to include all retirees in the class, the CBAs
provide different coverage for individuals under the age of sixty-five and those
over sixty-five who are eligible for Medicare. It is not evident from the parties’
pleadings with respect to class certification whether Defendants’ challenged
conduct impacts these two groups in the same way. Further, none of the named
Plaintiffs are over sixty-five years old. Thus until the Court is satisfied that the
two groups are similarly situated, it cannot conclude that their claims are common
and typical or that the named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of all putative
class members.
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Finally, Plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice if their motion for class
certification is decided after the summary judgment motions. The named
Plaintiffs’ claims must survive summary judgment regardless of whether this case
is certified as a class action. If the claims do survive, the Court will be better
equipped to decide whether class certification is appropriate and, if so, which
retirees are properly in the class. If summary judgment is granted in Defendants’
favor, the absent class members will not be bound by the judgment, since no class
was ever certified.
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 23, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, March 23, 2016, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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