AMICA Mutual Insurance Company v. EPPLEETT et al

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER granting 20 Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AMICA MUTUAL INS. CO.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-10442
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
HON. ANTHONY P. PATTI

v.
TREVOR EPPLETT et al.,
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DKT. 20)
In this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) seeks a ruling that it does
not owe Michigan no-fault benefits to and on behalf of Defendants Trevor Epplett,
Keith Regentine, Zachary Wiggins, and Lauren Gray (“Defendants”) for a motor
vehicle accident that occurred in Florida on September 28, 2014.1 (Dkt. 1, p. 3.)
After Defendants were served but failed to answer or otherwise respond to the
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Plaintiff sought and obtained a clerk’s entry
of default for each Defendant. (Dkts. 13, 14, 16, 19.) Plaintiff then filed the present
Motion for Default Judgment on May 14, 2015. (Dkt. 20.) Defendants have not
responded to the motion, and failed to appear at a telephonic status conference held

On January 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against Defendants in
Hillsborough County, Florida. AMICA Mutual Insurance Company v. Trevor Epplett et al., Case No.
15-CA-000622, (Hillsborough Cty., Fla. 2015). While the above-captioned case pertains to Plaintiff’s
denial of Michigan no-fault insurance benefits, the Florida case pertains to Plaintiff’s denial of
liability coverage.

1

in this matter on September 2, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s
motion will be GRANTED as to all Defendants.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A clerk’s entry of default has been entered against Defendants in this case.
(Dkts. 13, 14, 16, 19.) Defendants have not moved to set these entries aside, and are
therefore deemed to have admitted all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations. Ford
Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 846 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (citing Visioneering
Constr. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar., 661 F.2d 119, 124 (6th Cir.1981)); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (providing that “[a]n allegation—other than one relating to the
amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the
allegation is not denied.”).
Plaintiff is an insurance company authorized to conduct business in Michigan
and with its principal place of business in Rhode Island. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 1.) Defendants
are individuals alleged to be domiciled or residing in Florida (Dkt. 1, ¶ 2), and all
Defendants were served in that state (Dkts. 7-10).
On or about August 1, 2014, Plaintiff issued a personal auto policy to Kristin
and David Epplett of Spring Lake, Michigan that was in effect until August 1, 2015.
(Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, p. 1, 20.) The policy number was 950821-20FC. (Id. at 1.) The
Eppletts are Defendant Trevor Epplett’s parents. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 4.) The policy covered
four vehicles: (1) a 1998 Buick LeSabre; (2) a 1999 Mercury Sable; (3) a 1998
Oldsmobile Intrigue; and (4) a 2002 Mercury Sable. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, p. 20.) While

2

Defendant Trevor Epplett was not a named insured on his parents’ policy, he is
listed as a household driver of the four insured vehicles. (Id.)
On September 28, 2014 at approximately 9:54 am, Defendants were involved
in a motor vehicle accident in Tampa, Florida. (Dkt. 20, Ex. C, p. 2.) Defendant
Trevor Epplett was driving a 2000 Ford Explorer in which Defendants Keith
Regentine, Zachary Wiggins, and Lauren Gray were passengers. (Id. at 3-5.)
Defendant Epplett turned left on a red light and his vehicle was struck on its right
side by an oncoming vehicle. (Id. at 6.)
Defendant Epplett had purchased the Explorer in Florida only two days
before the accident, listing his address on the bill of sale as 7891 Shoals Drive Apt.
C in Orlando, Florida. (Dkt. 20, Ex. D.) At the time of the accident, the Explorer had
Florida state license plates and was registered in Florida until October 25, 2014,
but Defendant Epplett was carrying a Michigan driver’s license that expires on
June 18, 2018. (Id. at 3.) On the crash report, Defendant Epplett’s address is listed
as “511 E Savide St” in Spring Lake, Michigan. (Id.) Defendants Keith Regentine,
Zachary Wiggins, and Lauren Gray all provided Florida addresses on the crash
report. (Dkt. 20, Ex. C, pp. 6, 8.) Except for the information regarding Defendant
Epplett, the record is silent regarding where the Defendants were domiciled at the
time this lawsuit was filed or where they are domiciled now.
Plaintiff is listed as Defendant Epplett’s insurer, under policy 950821-20FC,
on the crash report (Dkt. 20, Ex. C, p. 3) and on the Explorer’s bill of sale (Dkt. 20,

3

Ex. D). On the date of the accident, however, the Explorer was not one of the
vehicles insured by Plaintiff under that auto policy. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, p. 20.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have made claims to Plaintiff for Michigan
no-fault benefits. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court that it
“does not owe Michigan no-fault benefits to or on behalf of all Defendants for the
Florida motor vehicle accident of September 28, 2014.” (Dkt 20, p. 13.) When
Defendants did not answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment, Plaintiff sought and obtained clerk’s entries of default
against each Defendant. (Dkts. 11-16, 18, 19.) On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed the
present Motion for Default Judgment as to all Defendants. (Dkt. 20.) Defendants
have failed to appear in this action or respond in any way. They remain in default.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Default Judgment Requirements
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 states that “[w]hen a party against whom

a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend,
and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s
default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). In order to obtain judgment by default, the proponent
must first request the clerk’s entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a). Hanner v.
City of Dearborn Heights, No. 07–15251, 2008 WL 2744860, *1 (E.D. Mich. July 14,
2008); see also Hickman v. Burchett, No. 07–743, 2008 WL 926609, *1 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 4, 2008) (“[E]ntry of default under Rule 55(a) must precede grant of a default
judgment under Rule 55(b).” (internal quotation marks omitted, collecting cases)).

4

Once a default has been entered by the Clerk, all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations are deemed admitted. Cross, 441 F.Supp.2d at 846 (citing Visioneering,
661 F.2d at 124; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (providing that “[a]n allegation—
other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive
pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”).
When the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges damages for a sum certain, “the
clerk—on the plaintiff’s request, with an affidavit showing the amount due—must
enter judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has been
defaulted for not appearing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). “In all other cases, the party
must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Notice of
the motion is not required where, as here, the party against whom a default
judgment is sought has failed to appear in the action and is not a minor or
incompetent.2 Id. Moreover, a default judgment may be entered without a hearing
unless it is necessary to determine the amount of monetary damages. Id. Because
Plaintiff in this case is not seeking monetary damages, a hearing is not required.
1. Jurisdictional Requirements
To avoid entering a default judgment that can later be successfully attacked
as void, a Court should determine whether it has jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter. Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged diversity jurisdiction.
(Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiff alleges, and Defendant do not contradict, that Plaintiff is
an insurer authorized to conduct business in Michigan with its principal place of
Defendant Epplett was born in 1993, Defendant Wiggins was born in 1992, Defendant Regentine
was born in 1991, and Defendant Gray was born in 1990. (Dkt. 20, Ex. C, pp. 4, 6, 8.) The Court has
no reason to conclude that any Defendant is incompetent.
2

5

business in Rhode Island, and Defendants are domiciled in Florida. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-2.)
Plaintiff also alleges without contradiction that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. (Id. at ¶ 3.)
Without personal jurisdiction, “the court is powerless to proceed to an
adjudication.” Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 903-04 (6th Cir.
2006) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999)). Before a
default can be entered, the Court must have jurisdiction over the party against
whom the judgment is sought. 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Civ. § 2682 (3d ed. 1998). While Plaintiff consented to the Court’s jurisdiction over it
by filing the action here, the nonresident Defendants have failed to appear, plead or
otherwise defend. Defects in personal jurisdiction, however, are not waived by
default when a party fails to appear or to respond until after the default judgment
is entered. Wells v. Rhodes, 592 F. App’x 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gerber v.
Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2011)).
Accordingly, the Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over
Defendants before entering a judgment by default against parties who have not
appeared in the case. Citizens Bank v. Parnes, 376 F. App’x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“Personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a threshold issue that must be present to
support any subsequent order of the district court, including entry of the default
judgment.”) (citing Kroger Co. v. Malease Foods Corp., 437 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.
2006)); see also Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 845; State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. Sloan, No.
11-CV-10385, 2011 WL 2144227, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2011); Mexico Bus.

6

Contacts, S.C. v. Alken-Ziegler, Inc., No. 12-13529, 2012 WL 5379151, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 11, 2012); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wallace, No. 12-14479, 2013 WL
1843965, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2013); Etherly v. Rehabitat Sys. of Michigan, No.
13-11360, 2013 WL 3946079, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2013); Rohn v. Commercial
Recovery Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV-10780, 2013 WL 6195578, at *4-5 (E.D. Mich. Nov.
26, 2013); Gomba Music Inc. v. Avant et al., Case No. 14-11767, Dkt. 38, pp. 4-5
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2015). Personal jurisdiction must be analyzed and established
over each defendant independently. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985).
Personal jurisdiction is satisfied in this case. Pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.705(1), the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any individual who
has engaged in the “transaction of any business” within the state of Michigan. The
phrase “any business” has been interpreted very broadly. See, e.g., Viches v. MLT,
Inc., 127 F Supp 2d 828, 830 (E.D. Mich, 2000) (“The standard for deciding whether
a party has transacted any business under § 600.715[1] is extraordinarily easy to
meet. ‘The only real limitation placed on this [long arm] statute is the due process
clause.’” [citation omitted]).
Defendants have voluntarily applied for Michigan no-fault insurance benefits
under a Michigan auto policy belonging to Michigan residents. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 9.) In
doing so, Defendants have attempted to take advantage of certain protections and
benefits afforded under Michigan law. Accordingly, under Michigan law as well as
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

7

Constitution, it is reasonable for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
Defendants. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (Jurisdiction is proper where
Defendant’s contacts proximately result from actions by the Defendant himself that
create a substantial connection with the forum State.)
B. Entry of a Default Judgment is Warranted
Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) does not provide a standard to determine
when a party is entitled to a judgment by default, the case law indicates that the
court must exercise “sound judicial discretion” when determining whether to enter
the judgment. Sloan, No. 11–10385, 2011 WL 2144227 at *4; 10A Charles Alan
Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2685 (3rd ed. 1998).
Here, Defendants were personally served with the Complaint and have failed
to answer or otherwise respond. The Clerk has properly entered a default against
each Defendant and, as a result, Defendants are bound on the issue of liability as to
the factual allegations in the Complaint. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 846. In short,
Plaintiff’s allegations that (1) these nonresident Defendants were involved in a
motor vehicle accident in Florida on September 28, 2015 in which (2) Defendant
Epplett was driving an uninsured vehicle are deemed admitted.
Because the vehicle Defendant Epplett was driving was not covered under his
parent’s insurance policy issued by Plaintiff when he and the remaining Defendants
were involved in an accident in Florida, Defendant Epplett is not entitled to
Michigan no-fault benefits from Plaintiff. Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3113(b), a
person is not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily

8

injury where he or she “was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle
involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101
or 3103 was not in effect.” Default judgment is therefore appropriate against
Defendant Epplett because it is undisputed that he was the owner of the uninsured
vehicle involved in the crash.
The remaining Defendants are also not entitled to such benefits from
Plaintiff because Plaintiff was not Defendant Epplett’s or the vehicle’s insurer on
the day of the accident. When the accident occurred, Defendant Epplett was the
owner and operator of the uninsured vehicle occupied by all Defendants. Pursuant
to Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3114(4), “a person suffering accidental bodily injury
arising from a motor vehicle accident while an occupant of a motor vehicle shall
claim personal protection insurance benefits from” either “the insurer of the owner
or registrant of the vehicle occupied” or “the insurer of the operator of the vehicle
occupied.” Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants do not challenge, that it is not an
insurer within either of these two categories.3 Default judgment is therefore also
appropriate against Defendants Regentine, Wiggins, and Gray.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is
GRANTED. Plaintiff does not owe Michigan no-fault benefits to or on behalf of

The Michigan auto policy issued to Defendant Epplett’s parents supports Plaintiff’s allegation that
it was not Defendant Epplett’s insurer at the time of the accident. Under the terms of the policy,
insured parties included the named insured as well as any family member. (See, e.g., Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, p.
25.) A family member includes a child of the named insured who is a resident of the named insured’s
household. (Id.) At the time of the accident, however, Defendant Epplett was not residing with his
parents in their household but rather in Florida.
3

9

Defendants for the Florida motor vehicle accident that occurred on September 28,
2014.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 15, 2015

s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on September
15, 2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to the parties.
s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

10