Stojcevski et al v. Macomb, County of et al
Filing
50
OPINION and ORDER Denying Defendants' 45 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
VLADIMIR STOJCEVSKI, Individually
and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of DAVID STOJCEVSKI,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 15-11019
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
COUNTY OF MACOMB, et al.
Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
This action arises from David Stojcevski’s incarceration in the Macomb
County Jail in June 2014, which tragically led to his death from acute drug
withdrawal. Defendants fall into two groups which the Court has referred to as the
“Macomb County Defendants” and the “Correct Care Solutions Defendants”
(hereafter “CCS Defendants”). Vladimir Stojcevski, as personal representative of
David’s estate (hereafter “Plaintiff”), alleges constitutional violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and “gross negligence, intentional, willful and wanton conduct”
against all Defendants. Defendants filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint,
which this Court granted in part and denied in part on November 9, 2015.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for reconsideration filed pursuant
to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h). The motion has been fully
briefed.
Rule 7.1 provides the following standard for motions for reconsideration:
Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the
court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration
that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the court,
either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must
not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and
the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion
have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will
result in a different disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). Palpable defects are those which are “obvious, clear,
unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F.
Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002). “It is an exception to the norm for the Court
to grant a motion for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp.
2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010). “[A] motion for reconsideration is not properly
used as a vehicle to re-hash old arguments or to advance positions that could have
been argued earlier but were not.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub.
Sch., 298 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)).
Defendants seek reconsideration of the Court’s denial of their motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s “gross negligence, intentional, willful and wanton conduct”
claim (Count III). Specifically, Defendants maintain that the Court was misled by
a palpable defect-- that the Court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity as opposed to
original jurisdiction. Defendants contend that this defect caused the Court to err in
concluding that the procedural requirements for filing a medical malpractice claim
in Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.2912b do not apply to bar Plaintiff’s claim.
As an initial matter, Defendants argument for reconsideration is inapplicable
to Plaintiff’s claim against the Macomb County Defendants for the Court
concluded in its November 9, 2015 decision that Plaintiff stated a viable gross
negligence (as opposed to medical malpractice) claim against them. In any event,
Defendants are wrong that this Court found its jurisdiction premised on diversity as
opposed to original jurisdiction. Nowhere in its November 9 decision did the
Court state the basis for its jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. The Court was well
aware that it has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. Regardless, even if the Court
made such a palpable defect, it would not result in a different holding with respect
to whether Michigan’s requirements for malpractice claims apply.
Whether jurisdiction over a state law claim is premised on diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court must apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law when adjudicating the claim. See Witzman v. Gross, 148
F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.1998); Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010)
(“Where, as here, a federal court proceeds under supplemental jurisdiction, it is
obliged to apply federal procedural law and state substantive law.”); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 75, 102 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Super Sulky, Inc. v.
United States Trotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir.1999) (“A federal court
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the
law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity
jurisdiction.”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (holding that the
principles of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 54 (1938) apply to state law
claims in the same manner in pendent jurisdiction cases as they do in diversity
jurisdiction cases). The Court has concluded that Michigan’s requirements for
malpractice claims are procedural. Defendants simply are rehashing their
previously asserted arguments as to why the Court should conclude the
requirements are substantive. The Court has considered and rejected those
arguments.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 18, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, May 18, 2016, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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