Wudzinski v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER Overruling Plaintiff's Objection and Adopting 17 Report and Recommendation. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (KJac)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARK GREGORY WUDZINSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

Case No. 15-11062
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
HON. ANTHONY P. PATTI
/

OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION AND
ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In this appeal of the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that Plaintiff was
ineligible for disability Social Security benefits, Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti
issued a Report and Recommendation on July 29, 2016 (Dkt. 17) recommending
that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied (Dkt. 12), Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment be granted (Dkt. 14) and the Commissioner’s
findings and conclusions be affirmed.
Either party may serve and file written objections “[w]ithin fourteen days
after being served with a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Plaintiff filed a timely objection (Dkt. 18) and Defendant filed a response.
(Dkt. 19) A district court must conduct a de novo review of the parts of a Report and
Recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Court has reviewed Judge Patti’s Report and Recommendation and
Plaintiff’s objection that the Magistrate Judge erred in affirming the Administrative
Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision to discount the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician,
Dr. White. (Dkt. 18) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s objection is
OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation is ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court. Consequently, the findings and conclusions
of the Commissioner are AFFIRMED.
Because neither party objects to Judge Patti’s factual findings or procedural
history (Dkt. 17 at 2-9), the Court turns directly to a discussion of the law
applicable to Plaintiff’s objection, followed by an application of that law to the
relevant facts.
A.

Applicable Law
1.

Standard of Review

The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final
administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case
under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if
it is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal
standards.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007).
Substantial evidence is “defined as more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25
F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).

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2.

The Treating Physician Rule

In assessing the medical evidence supplied in support of a disability claim, an
ALJ must adhere to certain governing standards, including the treating physician
rule. SSR 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996); see also Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). Because treating physicians are “the
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a
claimant’s] medical impairment(s),” an ALJ must give their opinions controlling
weight if they are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the]
case record.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. In explaining the weight they assign a
treating physician’s opinion, an ALJ must give “good reasons,” or explanations
“sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that
weight.” SSR 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5.
Where a treating physician’s opinion is (1) not supported by the objective
medical evidence and (2) the bases for the opinion are unclear, the ALJ has an
obligation to make every reasonable effort to re-contact the treating physician to
clarify her opinion. SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *6; see also Ferguson v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. 628 F. 3d 269, 272-74 (6th Cir. 2010).
B.

Discussion
In accordance with the legal standards discussed above, Plaintiff’s objection

is overruled for the reasons stated below.

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1. The ALJ Properly Discounted Dr. White’s Opinion
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. White’s opinion
because it was not “weighed or discussed at all, just dismissed as vague.” (Dkt. 18 at
2). In fact, the ALJ summarized Dr. White’s opinion and explained his reasons for
giving it limited weight. Specifically, the ALJ stated:
Given that [Dr. White’s] opinion is not well supported by either the
objective or other substantial evidence of record relative to exertional
limitations, I ascribe it limited weight. Notably, muscle strength at the
right wrist was not significantly impaired on January 4, 2008, when it
was measured at 4/5 (citations omitted). In addition the claimant
voiced no pain complaints as of May 9, 2008 (citations omitted). I find
that Dr. White’s opinion is otherwise vague, and it does not meet the
criteria of SSR 96-8p as a function-by-function analysis of the
claimant’s limitations.
(Dkt. 10-2 at 22-23) The ALJ explained that Dr. White’s opinion was not well
supported, and indeed contradicted, by substantial relevant evidence in the record.
(Id. at 22) The description of Dr. White’s opinion as “otherwise vague” was
secondary to this evidentiary concern. (Id. at 23). As Judge Patti correctly concluded
(Dkt. 17 at 24-26), the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. White’s opinion was stated
clearly, supported by substantial evidence and sufficiently explained.
2.

Plaintiff’s Re-Contact Argument is Procedurally Barred and
Meritless

Plaintiff also argues, for the first time, that the ALJ failed to comply with the
treating physician rule because he discounted Dr. White’s opinion for vagueness
without first re-contacting him for clarification. (Dkt. 18 at 2) This argument is both
procedurally barred and meritless. In the Sixth Circuit, it is impermissible to raise
an argument for the first time in an objection to a magistrate’s Report and
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Recommendation. See Murr v. United States 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000);
Swain v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 379 F. App’x 512, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s
argument is thus procedurally barred. Notwithstanding this procedural barrier,
Plaintiff’s argument fails because the conditions necessary to trigger the ALJ’s recontact obligation were not met. That is, while the ALJ found that Dr. White’s
opinion was not well supported by the evidence, the ALJ did not find that the bases
for Dr. White’s opinion were unclear. (Dkt. 10-2 at 22-23) Although the ALJ
described Dr. White’s opinion as “otherwise vague,” there was no need to re-contact
the physician because the evidence Dr. White’s opinion relied on was apparent and,
in light of the other record evidence, sufficient to allow the ALJ to make a
determination as to Plaintiff’s disability status.
In sum, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. White’s opinion and Plaintiff’s
argument that the ALJ had a duty to re-contact Dr. White is procedurally barred
and meritless. Plaintiff’s objection is therefore overruled.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objection is OVERRULED and
Magistrate Judge Patti’s Report and Recommendation of July 29, 2016 (Dkt. 17) is
ACCEPTED and ADOPTED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. 12) is DENIED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 14) is
GRANTED.

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It is FURTHER ORDERED that the findings and conclusions of the
Commissioner are AFFIRMED.
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 6, 2016

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on September 6,
2016, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.
By: s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

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