Thomas v. Hackel

Filing 8

ORDER GRANTING 7 Motion for Reconsideration but AFFIRMING the Court's Dismissal of the Complaint. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-11261
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG

WILLIAM H. HACKEL, III,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DKT. 7)
BUT AFFIRMING THE COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John Tomas’ motion for
reconsideration (Dkt. 7) of the Court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights complaint on grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and because Defendant William H. Hackel, III, a Michigan state court
judge, was entitled to judicial immunity (Dkt. 5, p. 5). Plaintiff asserts that the
Court erred in dismissing the Complaint under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), and erred in finding that Defendant is entitled to absolute judicial
immunity.
Regarding Heck, Plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in dismissing his
Complaint because that case pertains to challenges to the validity of a criminal
judgment of conviction, while Plaintiff here is making a speedy trial claim under the
180-day rule that pertains to pending criminal charges, not the convictions for

which he is presently incarcerated. This fact was unclear from his original
complaint. Given this information, however, the Court finds that reconsideration is
necessary to properly resolve this matter. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration as to whether the Complaint should have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim under the Heck case. Because Heck does not
apply to Plaintiff’s situation, that rationale of the court’s order of dismissal was in
error and reconsideration is GRANTED. Upon reconsideration, however, the
Complaint nevertheless remains subject to dismissal upon the alternative ground of
judicial immunity stated in the Order, and consequently the order dismissing the
Complaint will be AFFIRMED.
In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff asserts that Heck does not bar his
claim because he is not challenging the validity of a criminal judgment. (Dkt. 7, ¶
5.) Instead, Plaintiff clarifies that the basis of his Complaint is that he “is still
facing unlawful criminal charges because Defendant arraigned him despite lacking
jurisdiction to do so.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “success in this action would not
invalidate [his] confinement or its duration,” but would instead “prevent an invalid
judgment from ever occurring.” (Id. at ¶ 6.)
Because Plaintiff’s Complaint concerns pending criminal charges, Plaintiff
appears to be correct that it was error for the Court to dismiss the Complaint under
the authority of the Heck decision. Plaintiff’s claim relates to currently pending
criminal charges, and Heck applies to claims challenging existing convictions,
rather than pending criminal charges. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94
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(2007) (stating that civil rights claims related to rulings that will likely be made in
pending or anticipated state criminal trials are not ripe for review and indicating
that a federal court should abstain from hearing such claims until after the
resolution of the state criminal proceedings).
However, having reconsidered its incorrect application of the Heck decision,
the Court must address the question whether the dismissal of the Complaint was
nonetheless appropriate because the Defendant was entitled to judicial immunity.
The Court finds that it was. Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not immune from
personal liability because Defendant was made aware that, according to Plaintiff,
jurisdiction was lacking because of a 180-day rule violation. (See Dkt. 5, ¶¶ 7-9.)
Even so, Defendant, as a state court judge, is entitled to absolute judicial immunity
for his actions (relative to the speedy trial claim) in Plaintiff’s pending state
criminal prosecution. Jurisdiction is construed broadly for purposes of determining
judicial immunity such that the defendant judge is entitled to absolute immunity
from liability under § 1983. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-13 (1991) (judge
performing judicial functions is absolutely immune from suit seeking monetary
damages even if acting erroneously or corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction); Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-60 (1978); Bright v. Gallia Cty, Ohio, 753 F.3d 639,
649-50 (6th Cir. 2014); Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). Here, there
is no question that the judge had jurisdiction over the legal issue presented.
Moreover, the 1996 amendments to § 1983 extended absolute immunity for
state judges to requests for injunctive or equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“in
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any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable”); see also Kipen v. Lawson,
57 F. App’x 691 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing federal judges’ immunity); Kircher v.
City of Ypsilanti, 458 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446-47 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Plaintiff does not
allege any facts to show that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory
relief is unavailable. Defendant is thus entitled to immunity and the Court did not
err in dismissing the Complaint on such a basis. Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS
its prior dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint. This case remains closed.
SO ORDERED.
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: June 30, 2015

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on June 30,
2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.
By: s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

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