Walker v. Wayne County Prosecutor's Office et al

Filing 7

OPINION and ORDER Summarily Dismissing the 1 Complaint. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REGINALD WALKER,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 4:15-11789
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S
OFFICE, ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR
NANCY WESTVELD, JUDGE KYM L.
WORTHY, ATTORNEY WILLIAM
WINTERS III, DETROIT POLICE
DEPARTMENT, OFFICER RAPHAEL
CLEMENTS, OFFICER DANIEL VICKERS,
ANTHONY LYONS, OFFICER STANLEY KROPIK
Defendants,
/
OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff Reginald Walker (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se civil
rights complaint against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is
incarcerated at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility in Muskegon Heights,
Michigan. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s
Complaint must be summarily dismissed. The Court also concludes that an appeal
from this decision cannot be taken in good faith.
Plaintiff’s Complaint
On April 11, 2000, City of Detroit police officers arrested Plaintiff in
connection with a murder investigation. Plaintiff claims that the officers who are

named as Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him
without a warrant at the home of Barbara Jones, where he was staying as an
overnight guest. Plaintiff was charged with the murder of Larry John Troup.
On March 1, 2001, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder and
felony-firearm following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Wayne County,
Michigan. Defendant Kym L. Worthy was the judge who presided over Plaintiff’s
trial. Plaintiff claims that Wayne County prosecutors, including Defendant
Assistant Prosecutor Nancy Westveld, presented perjured testimony at the
preliminary examination to obtain a bind over and later at trial to obtain Plaintiff’s
conviction. Plaintiff further claims that the prosecutors suppressed exculpatory
evidence. Plaintiff asserts that his attorney, Defendant William L. Winters, III,
was ineffective for failing to present an insanity defense.
Plaintiff’s conviction was affirmed by the state appellate courts. See People
v. Walker, No. 249406, 2005 WL 657727 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2005), appeal
denied, 703 N.W.2d 815 (2005). He sought federal habeas relief, which was
denied by the district court. See Walker v. McQuiggin, No. 06-15686, 2010 WL
200813 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2010). However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court and granted the writ of habeas corpus, finding that trial
counsel had been ineffective for failing to investigate and present an insanity

2

defense. Walker v. Hoffner, 534 F. App’x. 406, 407 (6th Cir. 2013); cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1025 (2014).
In lieu of opting for a retrial, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of
second-degree murder and felony-firearm. Plaintiff was sentenced to terms of
imprisonment of fifteen to thirty years on the murder conviction and two years on
the felony-firearm conviction.1
Standard of Review
In this action, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee under 28 § U.S.C. 1915(a). (ECF No. 6.) Pursuant to
§ 1915, the Court is required to dismiss any action brought by a plaintiff
proceeding in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Moreover, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to initially screen any complaint filed by
a prisoner regardless of any filing fee paid, and to sua sponte dismiss any
complaint the Court determines is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

1

The Court obtained some of this information from the Michigan Department of
Corrections’ Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), of which the Court is
permitted to take judicial notice. See Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 323 F. Supp. 2d 818,
821, n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
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upon which relief can be granted, or that seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The Court must read a pro se complaint liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). All complaints, however, must plead facts sufficient to show that a legal
wrong has been committed from which the plaintiff may be granted relief. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” however, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide grounds entitling him to
relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
Analysis
Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A
for several reasons.
First, the Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights actions against a state and its
agencies and departments unless the state waived its immunity and consented to
suit, or Congress has abrogated that immunity. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). The State of Michigan has not consented to be
sued for civil rights actions in federal court, see Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874,
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877 (6th Cir. 1986), nor did Congress abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
when it enacted § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). The
Michigan Supreme Court and its lower courts operate as arms of the state, and thus
enjoy the same sovereign immunity as the State of Michigan. See Pucci v.
Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 762-64 (6th Cir. 2010). Eleventh Amendment
immunity likewise applies to state employees sued in their official capacities. See
Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F. 3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Co.,
574 F. 3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Next, absolute judicial immunity and § 1983 shield Defendant Worthy from
Plaintiff’s claims. The United States Supreme Court has held that judges are
absolutely immune from damages suits arising from “acts committed within their
judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). This is
because the principle of independent judicial decision-making “is so important to
our system of jurisprudence that judicial immunity even extends to allegations of
judicial acts done incorrectly, maliciously or corruptly.” King v. Caruso, 542 F.
Supp. 2d 703, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356 (1978)). Judges are “absolutely immune from liability for [their] judicial acts
even if [their] exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave
procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). There are only
two instances where judicial immunity will not apply: (1) the judge acts in a non5

judicial capacity; or (2) the judge acts in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). A judge acts in the complete absence
of all jurisdiction only if a matter was clearly outside the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1985). This immunity
extends to state and federal judges alike and it applies to actions alleging a
violation of the United States Constitution. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334
(1983).
The 1996 amendments to § 1983 also extended absolute immunity for state
judges to requests for injunctive or equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable”); see also Coleman v.
Governor of Michigan, 413 F. App’x 866, 873 (6th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Worthy relate only to her actions
presiding over Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Neither of the exceptions to judicial
immunity applies in this case. Accordingly, judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s
action against Defendant Worthy.
Further, “[a]bsolute prosecutorial immunity, like absolute judicial immunity,
is a common law principle that shields a prosecutor from § 1983 liability.” Cooper
v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 946 (6th Cir. 2000). A prosecutor has absolute immunity
6

for all acts “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,”
such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). The Sixth Circuit has explained:
Those acts that occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an
advocate for the state, e.g., acts taken to prepare for the initiation of
judicial proceedings or to prepare for trial, are protected by absolute
immunity. By contrast, a prosecutor who performs the investigative
functions normally performed by a detective or police officer such as
searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable
cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested is entitled only at most
to qualified immunity.
Cooper, 203 F.3d at 947 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As with
judicial immunity, the motives of the prosecutor are irrelevant for purposes of
immunity. Eldridge v. Gibson, 332 F.3d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed,
absolute prosecutorial immunity is not overcome by a showing that the prosecutor
acted wrongfully or maliciously. Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F. 2d 1135, 1138 (6th
Cir. 1989).
The Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office and Assistant Prosecutor Nancy
Westveld therefore are absolutely immune from liability for their actions in
prosecuting Plaintiff. This is so regardless of the fact that the Sixth Circuit
subsequently set aside Plaintiff’s first-degree murder conviction. See, e.g. Ziegler
v. Michigan, 59 F. App’x. 622, 623-624 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity on the prisoner’s § 1983 civil rights
claims even though the prisoner’s conviction was later reversed on the ground that
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the trial court judge had not adequately discussed the ramifications of selfrepresentation with prisoner).
Next, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant William L. Winters, his court
appointed attorney in the criminal case, must be dismissed because it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A viable § 1983
claim requires proof of “(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.”
Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “It is well-settled that a lawyer representing a
client is not a state actor ‘under color of law’ within the meaning of § 1983.”
Dallas v. Holmes, 137 F. App’x 746, 752 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Polk Cnty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 & n.7 (1998); Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 (6th
Cir. 1998)). “[E]ven though the defective performance of defense counsel may
cause the trial process to deprive an accused person of his liberty in an
unconstitutional manner, the lawyer who may be responsible for the
unconstitutional state action does not himself act under color of state law within
the meaning of § 1983.” Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 329, n.6 (1983) (internal
citations omitted); see also Floyd v. Cnty. of Kent, 454 F. App’x. 493, 497 (6th Cir.
2012) (holding that a public defender could not be liable in § 1983 suit for
ineffective assistance of counsel brought by his former client, as he did not act
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under color of state law when performing traditional functions as counsel for the
accused). Plaintiff’s Complaint therefore must be dismissed against Defendant
Winters.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint against the Detroit Police Department and the
individual officers based on his alleged illegal arrest is subject to dismissal because
he fails to allege that he suffered any injury as a result of his arrest other than the
fact the he subsequently was convicted. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), the Supreme Court articulated that civil actions “are not appropriate
vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. at
485. The Court therefore held that a claim for damages, which if decided in the
plaintiff’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence,” is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. The Court recognized,
however, that “the district court must consider whether a [civil] judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction . . . [and if
it would not], the action should be allowed to proceed in the absence of some other
bar to the suit.” Id.
Not every civil judgment will imply the invalidity of the underlying criminal
conviction because “doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery,
and especially harmless error” allow a court to recognize a constitutional violation
while upholding the conviction itself as constitutional. Id. at 487 n. 7 (citations
9

omitted). The Sixth Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on the
defendants’ alleged warrantless entry into his home “would not ‘imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’ ” Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d
676, 684 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). This was because the
plaintiff’s conviction in that case could not be disturbed whether he was legally or
illegally seized. Id.
To state a viable § 1983 claim based on an alleged unlawful arrest, however,
the plaintiff must show that his seizure was illegal and, if it was, that he suffered a
compensable injury. Id. (citing Braxton v. Scott, 905 F. Supp. 455, 458 (N.D. Ohio
1995) (quoting Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1999))
(“Fourth amendment claims under § 1983 may be brought without setting aside the
conviction only if success would not undermine the conviction and if the plaintiff
alleges a compensable injury other than the conviction.”). As the Supreme Court
noted in Heck:
[A] suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search
may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s
still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent
source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a
§ 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the
plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful. In order to recover compensatory
damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the
search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable
injury, which . . . does not encompass the “injury” of being convicted
and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned).
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512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant officers entered Barbara
Jones’ home, without a warrant, in order to arrest him. He has not alleged any
facts indicating that such conduct caused him “actual compensable injury” other
than the injury of being convicted and imprisoned on the criminal charges on
which he was arrested. As such, his claim against the officers and police
department is barred by Heck. This is so even though Plaintiff’s original firstdegree murder conviction was vacated, as his subsequent guilty plea to the lesser
offense of second-degree murder established that there was probable cause for his
arrest. See, e.g. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F. 3d 709, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2006).
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint is further subject to dismissal to
the extent he is seeking to have his criminal conviction for second-degree murder
vacated or set aside. Where a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration
of his physical imprisonment and the relief that he seeks is a determination that he
is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his
sole federal remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). A plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief relating to his
criminal conviction in a § 1983 action. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643
(2004). Instead, Ҥ 1983 must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute,
with its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements, where an inmate seeks
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injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his
sentence.” Id.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to reverse his current
criminal conviction, his Complaint would stand in habeas corpus and the current
defendants would not be the proper respondent. See Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty.
Police Dep’t, 91 F. 3d 451, 462 (3rd Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases). The only proper respondent in a habeas case is the habeas
petitioner’s custodian, which in the case of an incarcerated habeas petitioner would
be the warden of the facility where the petitioner is incarcerated. See Edwards
Johns, 450 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2006); See also Rule 2(a), 28 foll.
U.S.C. § 2254.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking to be released from custody and his
action should have been filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than a
civil rights suit under § 1983, the Court may not convert the matter to a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999).
Instead, the matter should be dismissed, leaving it to the prisoner to decide whether
to refile it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id.

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Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted and several defendants named in Plaintiff’s
Complaint are immune from suit.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A. The Court also
concludes that an appeal from this order cannot be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: July 15, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, July 15, 2015, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager