Morgan v. Social Security
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER (1) Adopting Magistrate Judge's 24 Report and Recommendation; (2) Granting Plaintiff's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; (3) Denying Defendant's 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) Remanding Matter to the Commissioner of Social Security. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN PAUL MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 15-12544
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S JULY 5,
2016 R&R; (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; AND (4) REMANDING MATTER TO THE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Plaintiff applied for Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits under the
Social Security Act on August 29, 2013, alleging that he became disabled on
August 19, 2013. The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s
application for benefits initially. Upon Plaintiff’s request, Administrative Law
Judge Regino Sobrina (“ALJ”) conducted a de novo hearing on December 18,
2014. The ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled in a decision issued January 13, 2015.
The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner
(“Commissioner”) when the Social Security Appeals Council denied review.
On July 17, 2015, Plaintiff initiated the pending action challenging the
Commissioner’s decision. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth
A. Stafford on the same date “for determination of all non-dispositive motions
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and issuance of a Report and
Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C).” (ECF No. 3.)
The parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos.
14, 16.)
On July 5, 2016, Magistrate Judge Stafford issued a Report and
Recommendation (R&R) in which she recommends that this Court grant Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment, deny the Commissioner’s motion, and remand the
matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings under sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 24.) At the conclusion of the R&R, Magistrate Judge
Stafford advises the parties that they may object to and seek review of the R&R
within fourteen days of service upon them. (Id. at Pg ID 649-50.) The
Commissioner filed objections to the R&R on July 15, 2016. (ECF No. 25.)
Standard of Review
The Social Security Act provides:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain
a review of such decision by a civil action . . . The court shall have the
power to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the
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Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added); see also Boyes v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1994). “Substantial evidence is
defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’ ” Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). If the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court
must defer to that decision “ ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that
would have supported an opposite conclusion.’ ” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin. 402 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Warner v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The court reviews de novo the parts of an R&R to which a party objects.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich.
2001). However, the Court “is not required to articulate all the reasons it rejects a
party’s objections.” Id.
The ALJ’s Decision and the R&R
An ALJ considering a disability claim is required to follow a five-step
sequential process to evaluate the claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The fivestep process is as follows:
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1.
At the first step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
2.
At the second step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has
a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment
that meets the duration requirement of the regulations and
which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic
work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c).
3.
At the third step, the ALJ again considers the medical severity
of the claimant’s impairment to determine whether the
impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairment meets any
Listing, he or she is determined to be disabled regardless of
other factors. Id.
4.
At the fourth step, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) and past relevant work to
determine whether the claimant can perform his or her past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
5.
At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age,
education, and past work experience to see if he can do other
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1420(a)(4)(v). If there is no such work
that the claimant can perform, the ALJ must find that he or she
is disabled. Id.
If the ALJ determines that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at a step, the
ALJ makes his or her decision and does not proceed further. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4). However, if the ALJ does not find that the claimant is disabled
or not disabled at a step, the ALJ must proceed to the next step. Id. The claimant
bears the burden of proof through the first four steps. Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 652 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378
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F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004)). If the claimant meets his burden, the burden of
proof shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step. Id.
At the first step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since August 19, 2013. (ECF No. 10-2 at Pg ID 42.)
The ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of
degenerative disc disease and mood disorder. (Id.) The ALJ next analyzed
whether Plaintiff’s impairments met any of the listed impairments and determined
that they did not. (Id. at Pg ID 42-43.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following limitations:
the opportunity to alternate from sitting to standing, and from standing
to sitting, for up to five minutes approximately every 20 minutes; no
twisting movements of the trunk; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; no crawling; occasional climbing of stairs, balancing,
stooping, kneeling, and crouching; no exposure to hazards; no use of
left foot or leg controls; and simple, routine, repetitive work not done
at production rate pace (e.g., no assembly-line work), with minimal
changes in the work setting.
(Id. at Pg ID 44-51.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ gave “limited weight” to
the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating doctors: family practice physician David
Schwarz, M.D., and psychiatrist Todd Rosen, M.D. (Id. at Pg ID 50.) The ALJ
found that the restrictions these treating doctors provided are not fully supported
by the clinical findings, diagnostic test results, or treatment history. (Id.)
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The ALJ next concluded that Plaintiff is not capable of performing his past
relevant work as a mechanic. (Id. at Pg ID 51.) The ALJ concluded, however, that
given Plaintiff’s age (41 years), education, work experience, and RFC, he is
capable of performing jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. (Id. at 52.) Specifically, the ALJ identified the jobs of inspector,
packager, and order checker. (Id.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff is
not disabled. (Id. at Pg ID 53.)
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Stafford concludes that the ALJ erroneously
rejected Dr. Schwarz’s medical opinion.1 (ECF No. 24 at Pg ID 644-49.)
Specifically, Magistrate Judge Stafford finds that the ALJ, in error, interpreted the
clinical findings in the record to discount Dr. Schwarz’s opinions and assess
Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at Pg ID 644.) Rejecting the Commissioner’s argument that
Dr. Schwartz’s statements do not qualify as opinions to which the treating
physician rule applies, Magistrate Judge Stafford indicates that the ALJ’s
independent assessment of the medical evidence was not a “good reason” for
discounting the doctor’s opinion. (Id. at Pg ID 645.) Magistrate Judge Stafford
concludes that it was error for the ALJ to substitute her opinion for Dr. Schwartz’s
While Plaintiff originally challenged the ALJ’s assessment of his mental
impairment, Magistrate Judge Stafford indicates that Plaintiff waived the argument
at the hearing before her. (See ECF No. 24 at Pg ID 640-41.) Thus, the ALJ’s
assessment of Dr. Rosen’s opinion was not relevant to Magistrate Judge Stafford’s
analysis.
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opinion regarding Plaintiff’s limitations stemming from his impairments. (Id. at Pg
ID 648.) For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Stafford recommends vacating the
Commissioner’s decision and remanding the matter for further proceedings
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Commissioner raises two objections to the R&R.
Objections & Analysis
The Commissioner first argues that Magistrate Judge Stafford committed
legal error “by concluding that an ALJ may never discount a treating physician
opinion based upon his or her independent assessment of the medical evidence.”
(ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 653-57.) The Commissioner contends that there are
instances where an ALJ, without obtaining a separate medical opinion, may
independently evaluate the medical evidence of record and conclude that a treating
doctor’s opinion should be discounted. The Commissioner cites to the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Rudd v. Commissioner of Social Security, 531 F. App’x 719
(2013), as an example of where this was properly done.
Magistrate Judge Stafford did state in the R&R that “ ‘an ALJ’s independent
assessment of the medical evidence never constitutes a good reason for discounting
the opinion of a treating physician.’ ” (ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 653, emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, it is clear from the R&R that Magistrate Judge Stafford recognized
that there are instances where the ALJ is able to interpret the medical evidence,
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without a medical opinion, and conclude that the evidence undermines a treating
doctor’s opinion. (See id. at Pg ID 646.) In fact, Magistrate Judge Stafford
explicitly acknowledged the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rudd as an example. (Id. at
n.4.) Thus, while Magistrate Judge Stafford’s earlier statement may have been an
unfortunate overstatement, it did not cause any legal error in her evaluation of the
ALJ’s decision.
Unlike Rudd, the present case does not present a scenario where diagnostic
tests and examination results do not support the treating physician’s opinion.2 A
musculoskeletal examination on August 7, 2013, showed that Plaintiff had a
“stooped” gait and spasms in the lumbar spine. An MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine
in September 23, 2013, revealed an annular tear with broad-based central disc
bulge at L4-L5 and moderate spinal canal stenosis. A musculoskeletal
examination on October 10, 2013, showed Plaintiff with a decreased range of
motion in the spine and a kyphotic curve. In December 2013, Plaintiff had
decreased range of lumbar spine motion. On August 4, 2014, James C. Culver,
M.D., a pain management specialist, evaluated Plaintiff and, on examination, noted
a positive left leg raise test, with a positive Laseque’s sign, and “some weakness of
ankle plantarflexion on the left as compared to the right[.]” A musculoskeletal
As Magistrate Judge Stafford noted in the R&R, in Rudd, x-rays showed no
abnormalities, and examination showed no issues with the claimant’s gait or
standing. Rudd, 531 F. App’x 719, 725 (6th Cir. 2013).
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examination, inspection/palpation of joints, bones, and muscles was noted as
“abnormal” on October 6, 2014. Thus, it was inaccurate for the ALJ to conclude
that “the only findings cited in support of the extensive limitations Dr. Schwarz
listed are a diagnosis (‘degenerative disc disease’) and a statement regarding
treatment (“patient requires Valium and hydrocodone daily”), or that the doctor’s
opinion “is not consistent with the clinical findings ….” (ECF No. 10-2 at Pg ID
50.) In the face of the medical evidence in the record showing abnormalities in
Plaintiff’s physical condition, it was error, as Magistrate Judge Stafford correctly
concluded, for the ALJ simply to substitute her lay opinion with respect to
Plaintiff’s resulting functional limitations for the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating
physician.
The Commissioner argues in her second objection that Magistrate Judge
Stafford committed legal error by concluding that an ALJ must obtain a medical
opinion for every RFC determination. (ECF No. 25 at Pg ID 657-60.) As the
Commissioner points out, under Sixth Circuit precedent, an ALJ does not always
have to obtain a physician’s medical opinion to support the ALJ’s RFC finding.
(Id. at Pg ID 658, citing Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th
Cir. 2015). This Court does not read the R&R, however, as stating a contrary rule
of law. Instead, the Court understands Magistrate Stafford as having recognized
the correct legal standard, but finding this to be a case where an expert opinion was
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needed in order to discount the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. This
Court finds no error in Magistrate Judge Stafford’s conclusion.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court rejects the Commissioner’s objections to the
R&R and therefore adopts Magistrate Judge Stafford’s recommendations.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
14) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s decision denying
Plaintiff’s social security benefits is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion and Magistrate Judge Stafford’s July 5, 2016 R&R.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 29, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, September 29, 2016, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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