Prieur v. Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendant's 5 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOSHUA PRIEUR,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 15-12547
Honorable Linda V. Parker
v.
ACUITY,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
This diversity jurisdiction action arises from Plaintiff’s claim for Michigan
workers’ compensation benefits and Defendant’s request during the processing of
the claim that Plaintiff attend an independent medical examination (“IME”).1 In
Plaintiff is a citizen of Michigan. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) Defendant is a citizen of
Wisconsin. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered damages over $75,000. (Id.)
The Sixth Circuit has instructed that “[i]n determining whether a claim’s value
exceeds $75,000, we use the plaintiff’s alleged amount unless ‘it is apparent, to a
legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.’ ” Ozormoor
v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 354 F. App’x 972, 973 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 298 (1938) (“the sum claimed
by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.”)). Such
“legal certainty” generally is found “only when state law categorically bars the
plaintiff from recovering the necessary amount. Id. (citing Kovacs v. Chesley, 406
F.3d 393, 395-97 (6th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, courts have found jurisdiction even
where the damages claimed appear to be overstated. Id. at 974 (citing cases). In
his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he suffered “mental anguish, outrage at loss of
liberty, emotional distress, [and] loss of workers’ compensation benefits” due to
(Cont’d . . .)
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his Complaint, filed July 17, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant twice
committed the tort of false imprisonment by requiring him to attend an IME or risk
losing his workers’ compensation benefits.2 Presently before the Court is
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) on August 13, 2015. The motion has been fully briefed. The Court finds
the facts and legal arguments sufficiently presented in the parties’ pleadings and
therefore is dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan
Local Rule 7.1(f). For the reasons that follow, the Court is granting Defendant’s
motion.
Defendant’s wrongful conduct. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) This Court has found no
authority suggesting that Plaintiff would be precluded from recovering more than
$75,000 on his claim under Michigan law.
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Plaintiff’s Complaint includes three “counts.” The first count alleges false
imprisonment. The second count seeks class action status, injunctive relief and
declaratory relief. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of this count on August
13, 2015. (ECF No. 6.) In his last count, labeled “RICO Complaint,” Plaintiff
acknowledges the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims
Management Services, 731 F.3d 556 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2133 (2014),
that racketeering activity leading to a loss or reduction of workers’ compensation
benefits does not constitute the type of injury that will support a RICO claim. (See
ECF No. 1 ¶ 15.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff indicates that “[i]f the Sixth Circuit or
Supreme Court decide that Jackson was wrongfully decided,” he should be deemed
to be asserting a RICO claim against Defendant. (Id.) The better practice would
be for Plaintiff to seek leave to amend his complaint to add a RICO claim if such a
claim becomes viable in the future.
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I.
Applicable Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of
the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134
(6th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain
“detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . ..”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not
“suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court
must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This presumption, however, is not applicable to legal
conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
II.
Factual Background
According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, he suffered traumatic brain injury in a
work-related accident and his employer was insured for Michigan workers’
compensation benefits by Defendant. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 3.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant sent letters to Plaintiff on October 8, 2013 and November 13, 2013,
requesting that he submit to an examination by psychologist Dr. Rhonda LevyLarson on November 13 and 26, 2013. (Id. ¶ 6.) The letters advised Plaintiff:
“Your failure to appear for this examination could substantially affect your right to
workers’ compensation benefits.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant routinely
uses such language when requesting that claimants undergo examinations. (Id.
¶ 5.)
Michigan’s Workers’ Disability Compensation Act provides that if a
claimant refuses to submit to or obstructs an employer’s or carrier’s requested
examination of the claimant by a physician or surgeon, the claimant’s right to
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compensation will be suspended and, during the period of suspension, may be
forfeited. Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.385. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Levy-Larson
is not a physician or surgeon authorized to practice medicine under the laws of
Michigan. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff submitted to the examinations with Dr. Levy-Larson on November
13, and 26, 2013. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he first examination was so
stressful to [him] that he left during the examination.” (Id. ¶ 10.) He claims that
both examinations inflicted “mental anguish, outrage at loss of liberty, emotional
distress, loss of workers’ compensation benefits and other damages.” (Id.)
III.
Applicable Law and Analysis
False imprisonment under Michigan law requires: “ ‘[1] an act committed
with the intention of confining another, [2] the act directly or indirectly results in
such confinement, and [3] the person confined is conscious of his confinement.’ ”
Moore v. City of Detroit, 652 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Adams v. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 508 N.W.2d 464, 468 (Mich. 1982)). Defendant
argues that Plaintiff fails to state a viable false imprisonment claim because he was
free to leave the IMEs with Dr. Levy-Larson and therefore, by definition, was not
“imprisoned” under Michigan law. (ECF No. 5 at Pg ID 22, citing Moore, 652
N.W.2d at 690-91.) In response, Plaintiff contends “that false imprisonment exists
where a person is physically free to move but financial coercion makes him stay
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put, or, as in the case of [Plaintiff], go and submit to a lengthy psychological
examination.” (ECF No. 7 at Pg ID 53.) In other words, Plaintiff claims that his
fear of losing his workers’ compensation benefits caused him to attend the IMEs
and this coercion amounted to an impermissible imprisonment.
In support of his argument, Plaintiff relies on two cases: Lavey v. Mills, 639
N.W.2d 261 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) and Clarke v. K Mart Corporation, 495
N.W.2d 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam). Lavey has no relevance here.
Lavey involved a severely disabled child whose conservator claimed the child was
falsely imprisoned when the defendants, suspecting the child of being the victim of
sexual abuse, brought her for a gynecological examination without first obtaining
parental consent or a court order. 639 N.W.2d at 263-64. The Michigan Court of
Appeals, however, never decided whether the facts supported a claim of false
imprisonment. Id. at 268 (declining to address the defendants’ argument that they
were entitled to summary disposition on the plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim
because the trial court neither considered nor decided the issue, having granting
summary disposition instead based on statutory immunity). Instead, the court was
presented only with the issue of whether the defendants were entitled to statutory
immunity from this claim under Michigan’s Child Protection Law, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 722.625. Id. at 267. The Michigan Court of Appeals did address whether
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the defendant’s conduct could support a false imprisonment claim in Clarke,
however.
In Clarke, the plaintiff was shopping at the defendant’s store and after
checking out was stopped by two store supervisors. 495 N.W.2d at 821. One of
the supervisors had seen part of the cashier’s transaction of the sale, which led the
supervisor to believe that the cashier or the plaintiff had engaged in wrongdoing.
Id. at 821-22. When they stopped the plaintiff, one of the supervisors snatched the
bag holding the plaintiff’s purchases, worth $250.00. Id. The plaintiff was told
this was a routine package check and she was detained for about ten or fifteen
minutes while the items in the bag were matched with her receipt. Id. at 821. The
plaintiff subsequently brought a lawsuit against the store alleging, inter alia, false
imprisonment.
The Michigan trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
disposition with respect to the plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, reasoning that
there was no restriction on the plaintiff’s freedom of movement. Id. at 822. The
plaintiff was neither “arrested nor detained in an office, she was free to roam
through the store, and in fact was free to leave if she wished to do so.” Id.
Although finding these observations “technically accurate,” the Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the lower court’s
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“holding rest[ed] on an unduly narrow view of [the false imprisonment] tort.” Id.
at 822-23.
The appellate court explained that while “ ‘[f]alse imprisonment is the
unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty or freedom of locomotion[,]’ ”
id. at 823 (quoting Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Mich. 1971)),
“ ‘manual seizure is not necessary.’ ” Id. (quoting Tumbarella v. Kroger Co., 271
N.W.2d 284, 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)) (additional quotation marks and citation
omitted). Instead, there need only be “some form of personal coercion.” Id. The
court turned to one example of “personal coercion” set forth in the Restatement of
Torts:
“A, the owner of a store, for the purpose of preventing B, a customer,
from leaving the store, but without any privilege to do so, seizes and
retains B’s purse, which contains a large sum of money. B reasonably
believes that she can leave the store only at the risk of losing the purse
and the money, and therefore remains in the store. A has confined B.”
Id. at 823 (brackets omitted) (quoting 1 Restatement Torts 2d, § 40A at 61).
The Clarke court apparently concluded that the withholding of the plaintiff’s
$250 worth of merchandise constituted coercion, forcing the plaintiff to remain in
the store. The court pointed out, however, “there is no false arrest if the plaintiff
voluntarily agrees to stay with the defendant.” Id. (citing Bonkowski v. Arlan’s
Dep’t Store, 174 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 1970) (the plaintiff returned to the store and
agreed to an inspection of her purse upon a security guard’s request); Bruce v.
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Meijers Supermarkets, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (the plaintiff
voluntarily submitted to a search but, additionally, there was probable cause for her
detention)). As the Michigan Supreme Court has explained:
“There can be no such thing as an action for false imprisonment where
the plaintiff has not been arrested; and while, as has been held, manual
seizure is not necessary, there must be that, or its equivalent, in some
sort of personal coercion.”
Bonkowski, 174 N.W.2d at 771 (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. Taylor, 15 N.W.
899, 900 (Mich. 1883)). In other words, the defendant’s actions must have
somehow constrained the plaintiff’s “liberty or freedom of movement.”
Tumbarella, 271 N.W.2d at 287 (citing Stowers, 191 N.W.2d at 363) (additional
citation omitted).
Plaintiff claims that, like the plaintiff in Clarke and the customer in the
Restatement of Torts’ example, he was financially coerced to attend the IMEs with
Dr. Levy-Larson. Plaintiff relies on the indication in Defendant’s letters to him
that that “[his] failure to appear for this examination could substantially affect [his]
right to workers’ compensation benefits.” There are several problems with
Plaintiff’s argument, however.
First, unlike the defendant in Clarke and the store owner in the Restatement
example, Defendant did not seize anything of value which belonged to Plaintiff to
force him to subject to the IMEs. Notably, Defendant did not advise Plaintiff that
he would lose his right to benefits if he failed to appear for the IMEs; Defendant
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indicated that he could lose his right to benefits. Second, “financial coercion” is
not sufficient on its own to state a viable false imprisonment claim. False
imprisonment requires a “restraint of [the] individual’s personal liberty or freedom
of locomotion.” Clarke, supra. In Clarke and the Restatement of Torts example,
an individual was confined to stay in one place, although not through physical
force, by the coercive conduct of the store’s agents or owner. Plaintiff, in
comparison, was asked to appear at an examination with Dr. Levy-Larson. His
actions are more akin to those of the plaintiff in Bonkowski, where the Michigan
court found no false imprisonment because the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to stay
with the defendant at its agent’s request. Notably, although appearing for the first
IME, Plaintiff left during the examination. This undermines any claim that he was
“confined,” as required for a false imprisonment claim.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to cite to any Michigan case suggesting that
Defendant’s conduct constituted false imprisonment or even “financial coercion.”
The Court’s independent research uncovered no such case and none of the cases
citing Clarke involve a scenario analogous to that case or the one now before the
Court. In fact, none of the cases citing Clarke discuss the concept of “financial
coercion” generally, or in support of a false imprisonment claim, specifically.
Finally, it unlikely that the Michigan courts would find conduct like
Defendant’s sufficient to support a false imprisonment claim. A finding that the
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“coercion” asserted here constituted false imprisonment would mean that an
insurance carrier violates the law anytime it requests verification of claim by
requiring the claimant to undergo examination by someone other than a physician
or surgeon licensed to practice medicine under the laws of the state-- whether it be
a physical or mental examination or an examination under oath or deposition.
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations of false
imprisonment fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 3, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, November 3, 2015, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ Richard Loury
Case Manager
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