McDaniel v. Bechard et al

Filing 48

ORDER denying 43 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER McDANIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 4:15-cv-13892
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
HON. DAVID R. GRAND

T. BECHARD and P. STEELE,
Defendants.
______________________________________/ 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
I.

BACKGROUND

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Christopher McDaniel’s
Motion for Relief for Final Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b). Dkt.
43. On November 28, 2017 the court adopted Magistrate Judge David
Grand’s Report & Recommendation (R&R) granting Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment, and dismissing all of Plaintiff’s
claims with prejudice except for his First Amendment retaliation claim
and his Eighth Amendment deprivation of food claim. Dkt. 41. At Pg ID
379.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
is DENIED.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), the Court may
relieve a party from a final judgment if it finds: 1) Mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; 2) Newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); 3) Fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
4) that the judgment is void; 5) that the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; if it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or; 6) any other reason that justifies relief. Rule 60(b) was designed to
address mistakes attributable to special circumstances, and not merely
to erroneous applications of the law. Am. Trucking Assns. v. Frisco, 358
U.S. 133 (1958). Thus, the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the
burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing
evidence. Crehore v. United States, 253 F. App’x 547, 549 (6th Cir. 2007).
Although courts are allowed to revisit final orders under this rule of procedure, relief is “circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007).

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III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues he is entitled to relief from judgment under either
Rule 60(b)(1) because of a mistake, inadvertence, or neglect, or Rule
60(b)(6), the catchall provision for relief from final judgment. As discussed below, the court finds he is not entitled to relief under either of
these provisions.
a. No relief from judgment under 60(b)(1)
Plaintiff cites “mistake or inadvertence” as grounds for relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), arguing the court did not review his reply
to Defendants’ objections. Dkt. 43 at Pg ID 386. Courts have the power
and duty to correct judgments which contain clerical errors, or judgments
which have been issued due to inadvertence or mistake. Frisco, 358 U.S.
133 (1958). In order to be granted relief under 60(b)(1), “the moving party
must demonstrate both the existence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect and a meritorious claim or defense.” Marshall v.
Monroe & Sons, Inc., 615 F.2d 1156 (6th Cir. 1980).
This Circuit has determined 60(b)(1) provides relief in two instances:
“(1) when a party had made an excusable mistake or an attorney has
acted without authority, or (2) when the judge has made a substantive
mistake of law or fact in the final judgment order.” United States v. Reyes,
307 F.3d 451, 455 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park,
226 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2000).

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Plaintiff seems to argue the court’s “mistake” was failing to review his
reply to Defendants’ response to his objections, and not considering it in
denying his objections. Dkt. 43 at Pg ID 386. Plaintiff infers that the court
did not review his reply because it was untimely due to delays in prisoner
mail and because the court made no specific reference to it in its order
adopting the R&R. Id. at 388. Although the delay in prisoner mail was
the reason Plaintiff’s case was originally dismissed without objections
(Dkt. 37), the Court vacated that order after receiving Plaintiff’s mailed
objections, which the prison had date-stamped within the 14 days for filing objections, but which the court had not received within that time period. Dkt. 41. The Court then considered all of the briefing regarding the
objections—including the reply, which was filed on October 2, 2017 (Dkt.
40)—before issuing its November 28, 2017 order. Dkt. 41.
The court’s order adopting the R&R did not specifically mention any
of the arguments in Plaintiff’s reply because it did not raise any new arguments or facts beyond those included in his objections. None of the
arguments in Plaintiff’s reply would have necessitated a different outcome for any of his claims. Moreover, Plaintiff has not specified any clear
mistake of law or fact in the final judgment order based on the Court’s
alleged failure to read his reply. Relief from judgment is thus not warranted under 60(b)(1).

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b. No relief from judgment under 60(b)(6)
Plaintiff alternatively contends that if he is not entitled to relief under
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(1), the court’s order should nonetheless be vacated
under Rule 60(b)(6). Dkt. 43 at Pg ID 388. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is
only available where a party can establish “exceptional or extraordinary
circumstances” not enumerated in the other five subsections describing
proper grounds for relief from final judgment. Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly,
subsection (6) should only be applied in “unusual and extreme situations”
and “where principles of equity mandate relief.” Id.
This Circuit has noted that there are few cases “elaborating” on when
“something more than one of the grounds contained in Rule 60(b)’s first
five clauses is present” because “clauses 1-5 cover almost every conceivable ground for relief.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487
F.3d 465, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp.,
910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff cites the same reason for relief under 60(b)(6) that he
did under 60(b)(1): the court’s failure to address his reply brief in its order
denying his objections and adopting the R&R. Dkt. 43 at Pg ID 388. A
court’s failure to mention a particular filing by name—particularly where
it added nothing that the court failed to address—is not an “unusual or
extreme situation” that mandates equitable relief. Plaintiff complains
that the court’s lack of reference to his reply brief somehow “precluded
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[him] from seeking relief within the District Court.” Plaintiff was not precluded from seeking relief; all of his objections were heard and specifically
addressed in the court’s order. He is therefore not entitled to relief under
60(b)(6).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment
(Dkt. 43) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: August 21, 2018

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on
August 21, 2018, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.

s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

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