Rogers v. Ryan et al

Filing 171

OPINION and ORDER Addressing Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff's Objections Thereto. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RODNEY D. ROGERS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Case No. 16-12735
Honorable Linda V. Parker

MATTHEW RYAN, ET AL.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER ADDRESSING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S MAY 2,
2019 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND PLAINTIFF’S
OBJECTIONS THERETO
This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 19,
2016, which arises from Plaintiff’s arrest three years earlier. The Court has
referred the matter to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand for all pretrial matters
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). (ECF No. 9.) The matter is presently before the
Court on Plaintiff’s objections to an order issued by Magistrate Judge Grand on
May 2, 2019. (ECF No. 168.)
In that order, Magistrate Judge Grand denied Plaintiff’s request to file a
Second Amended Complaint to plead “official capacity” claims against the
individual defendants because an official capacity claim is another name for a
Monell claim against a municipality and Plaintiff already has been denied leave to
assert such a claim. Magistrate Judge Grand also struck the Amended Complaint

Plaintiff filed on April 18, 2019, because Plaintiff did not obtain leave of court to
file the amended pleading and had previously been precluded from adding the
defendants he names in the pleading. Plaintiff filed objections to Magistrate Judge
Grand’s order on May 20, 2019, which are signed and dated on May 15, 2019.
(ECF No. 170.)
Standard of Review
Magistrate Judge Grand’s May 2, 2019 order was a non-dispositive decision.
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive decision, the
reviewing court must affirm unless the objecting party demonstrates that the ruling
is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard does not empower a reviewing
court to reverse a magistrate judge’s finding because it would have decided the
matter differently. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 57374 (1985). Instead, the “clearly erroneous” standard is met when despite the
existence of evidence to support the finding, the court, upon reviewing the record
in its entirety, “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)).

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Analysis
In his objections, Plaintiff argues that he should be permitted to add official
capacity claims against the individual defendants because they allegedly violated
his rights while performing their duties as police officers. Plaintiff’s objections—
as well as his continued attempts to amend his complaint—suggest that he still
does not appreciate the difference between his claims against these officers in their
“individual capacities” as police officers and a claim against them in their “official
capacities”—which is not surprising as these concepts are not straight-forward and
may be confusing to individuals untrained in the law.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants in their individual capacities
seeks to hold them liable for their conduct as state actors which allegedly deprived
Plaintiff of his federal constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Personal
liability against a state official in his or her individual capacity can be established
under § 1983 by showing “that the official, acting under color of state law, caused
the deprivation of a federal right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
In comparison, a claim against a defendant in his or her official capacity “is not a
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office[.]” Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To establish official capacity
liability, a plaintiff must: “(1) identify a municipal policy or custom; (2) connect
that policy or custom to the municipality; and (3) show that the execution of the
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policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.” See Garner v. Memphis Police
Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (noting
that official capacity suits are treated as suits against the governmental entity and
that a municipality’s “ ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation
of federal law”). Magistrate Judge Grand has not allowed Plaintiff to plead an
official capacity claim because he presents no allegations suggesting that a policy
or custom of the City or Detroit Police Department was the moving force behind
the alleged violations of his civil rights.
For that reason, Magistrate Judge Grand’s decision was neither “clearly
erroneous” nor “contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
This Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s objections and AFFIRMS Magistrate
Judge Grand’s May 2, 2019 order (ECF No. 168.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 20, 2019
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, June 20, 2019, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ R. Loury
Case Manager
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