Alice Raden et al v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. et al

Filing 30

OPINION and ORDER denying Plaintiff's 27 Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (JOwe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ALICE RADEN and BOBBIE
MOORE, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 16-12808
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
MARTHA STEWART LIVING
OMNIMEDIA, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, and MEREDITH
CORPORATION, an Iowa Corporation,
Defendants.
________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION [ECF No. 27]
This lawsuit arises from Plaintiffs Alice Raden and Bobbie Moore
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) class action complaint alleging that Defendants Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (“Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia”) and
Meredith Corporation (“Meredith”) (collectively “Defendants”) violated
Michigan’s Personal Privacy Protection Act, M.C.L. § 445.1712 1 (“PPPA”) and
were unjustly enriched by disclosing sensitive and statutorily protected information
to third parties. In an Opinion and Order entered on July 20, 2017, this Court

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The statute is also referred to as the Michigan Video Rental Privacy Act.

granted, in part, Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23.) In that decision,
the Court found that Plaintiffs did not allege “actual damages” as required under
the amended PPPA and dismissed Count I of the complaint. The Court denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss on Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim. Presently
before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)2 filed on August 7, 2017. (ECF No. 27.)
With the Court’s permission, Defendant Martha Stewart Living filed a response to
the motion on August 29, 2017. (ECF No. 29.)
I.

Applicable Standards
Local Rule 7.1 provides the following standard for motions for

reconsideration:
Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the court will
not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present
the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by
reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a
palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other persons
entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that
correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). Palpable defects are those which are “obvious, clear,
unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to
any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.

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Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002). “It is an exception to the norm for the Court
to grant a motion for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp.
2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010). “To justify reconsideration under Rule 54(b),
plaintiff must show: 1) an intervening change in the controlling law; 2) that new
evidence is available; or 3) to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Govt. v. Hotels.com, L.P, 590 F.3d 381, 389
(6th Cir. 2009). “This standard vests significant discretion in district courts.
Justice does not require that the district court grant reconsideration on an issue that
would not alter its prior decision.” Kirk v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 1:16-00031,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116961, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. July 26, 2017) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
“[A] motion for reconsideration is not properly used as a vehicle to re-hash
old arguments or to advance positions that could have been argued earlier but were
not.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 298 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,
146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)). “A motion for reconsideration ‘addresses only
factual and legal matters that the court may have overlooked. . . .’ It is improper
on a motion for reconsideration to ‘ask the court to rethink what [it] had already
thought through—rightly or wrongly.’” Carter v. Robinson, 211 F.R.D. 549, 550
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99
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F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va 1983). Therefore, a motion that merely presents the same
issues already ruled upon by the Court shall not be granted. See Smith ex rel.
Smith, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
II.

Analysis
Plaintiffs argue that the Court committed a palpable defect when it based the

applicability of the amended PPPA on the date Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed.
Plaintiffs maintain that the Court erred in failing to recognize that the applicability
of a statute depends on when the cause of action accrues not when the complaint
was filed.
As the Court set out in its July 20, 2017 Order and Opinion, “[t]he reading of
the statute makes clear the statute went into effect on July 31, 2016,” the same date
Plaintiffs’ filed their Complaint. (ECF No. 23 at Pg ID 297.) Furthermore, the
Court noted that the statute explicitly states “[t]his act is ordered to take immediate
effect.” (Id. at Pg ID 298.)
Unlike the cases Plaintiffs cite, Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed on the same
date the amendment took “immediate” effect. The conclusion other courts have
reached concerning the applicability of the amended PPPA is not contrary to this
Court’s decision because the complaints in those cases were pending prior to the
amendment taking effect. Here, as supported by a clear reading of the statute, the
intent was for the amendment to take immediate effect, which happened to be on
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the same date Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. Because Plaintiffs failed to allege
“actual damages” as required under the amended PPPA, the Court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ PPPA claims.
In short, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a palpable defect in this Court’s July
20, 2017 decision, much less a defect the correction of which results in a different
disposition of Plaintiffs’ claims. Likewise, Plaintiffs failed to show any
intervening change in the controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or a
clear error or manifest injustice.
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for partial reconsideration (ECF

No. 27) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 18, 2018

s/Linda V. Parker
U.S. District Court Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on January 18, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens acting in the Absence of Richard Loury
Case Manager

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