VanWormer v. Social Security

Filing 30

OPINION and ORDER (1) Adopting Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment; (2) Denying Defendant's 25 Motion for Summary Judgment; and (3) Granting Plaintiff's 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRIAN S. VanWORMER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-12978
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER (1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S JULY
13, 2017 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [17, 25]; (2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (3) GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On August 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit challenging Defendant’s
final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits under the
Social Security Act. (ECF No. 1.) This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge
David R. Grand for all pretrial proceedings, including a hearing and determination
of all non-dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and/or a report
and recommendation (“R&R”) on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 4.) The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 17, 25.)

I.

Background
On July 13, 2017, Magistrate Judge Grand issued his R&R in which he

recommends that this Court deny Defendant’s motion, grant Plaintiff’s motion and
remand the matter to the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to obtain a medical
expert opinion for Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) (ECF No. 27.)
In his thorough analysis, Magistrate Judge Grand rejected Defendant’s argument
that the ALJ was capable of independently determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at Pg
ID 435.) Magistrate Judge Grand emphasized that based on the medical evidence,
Plaintiff’s physical impairment was of such a nature that the ALJ could not make a
“commonsense” determination as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations and a medical
opinion was required. (Id. at 435-36.)
Magistrate Judge Grand concludes by advising the parties that they may
object to and seek review of the R&R within fourteen days of service upon them.
(Id. at 437.) Specifically, he further advises the parties that “[f]ailure to timely file
objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal.” (Id.) Defendant
filed objections on July 27, 2017. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff responded to
Defendant’s objections on August 10, 2017. (ECF No. 29.)
II.

Standard of Review
When objections are filed to a magistrate judge’s R&R on a dispositive

matter, the Court “make[s] a de novo determination of those portions of the report
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or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court, however, “is not required to articulate all of the
reasons it rejects a party’s objections.” Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942,
944 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citations omitted). A party’s failure to file objections to
certain conclusions of the report and recommendation waives any further right to
appeal on those issues. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829
F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Likewise, the failure to object to certain
conclusions in the magistrate judge’s report releases the Court from its duty to
independently review those issues. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
III.

Applicable Law & Analysis
Defendant’s sole objection is that the magistrate judge erred when he found

that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 28 at
Pg ID 439.) Defendant argues that a medical opinion was not required to
correspond to the ALJ’s RFC finding because the objective medical evidence
supported a finding that Plaintiff had “few physical impairments.” (Id. at 440,
443). Also, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not provide the ALJ with any
evidence of his physical limitations by a treating or examining official, and “it was
Plaintiff’s burden, not the Commissioner’s, to prove his RFC.” (Id. at 439, 447.)
It is well established that “[t]he ALJ reserves the right to decide certain
issues, such as a claimant’s RFC. Nevertheless, in assessing a claimant’s RFC, an
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ALJ must consider all relevant record evidence, including medical source opinions
on the severity of a claimant’s impairments.” Sparck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
11-10521, 2012 WL 4009650, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2012) (citations
omitted). The “Court has stressed the importance of medical opinions to support a
claimant’s RFC, and cautioned ALJs against relying on their own expertise in
drawing RFC conclusions from raw medical data.” Lindsey v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 12-12585, 2013 WL 6095545, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2013) (citing
Wyatt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-11406, 2013 WL 4483074, at *16 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 19, 2013); Sparck, 2012 WL 4009650, at *12 (“The residual functional
capacity opinions of treating physicians, consultative physicians, and medical
experts who testify at hearings are crucial to determining a claimant’s RFC
because ‘[i]n making the residual functional capacity finding, the ALJ may not
interpret raw medical data in functional terms.’”) (citing Isaacs v. Astrue, No. 08cv-00828, 2009 WL 3672060, at *10 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
Although the court in Lyndsey recognized that there are instances when the
ALJ can make a commonsense judgment about a claimant’s RFC absent a medical
opinion, the court emphasized that such a finding is appropriate only when the
“medical evidence shows relatively little physical impairment.” Lyndsey, 2013
WL 4483074 at *7. Ultimately, because Lyndsey was not a case of “relatively little
physical impairment,” the court remanded the case on the basis that a qualified
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medical opinion was necessary in order for the ALJ to accurately determine the
plaintiff’s functional capacity. Lyndsey, 2013 WL 4483074 at *7; see also Wyatt,
2013 WL 4483074, at *17 (“[T]here was no medical opinion to support the ALJ’s
RFC determination. The ALJ impermissibly relied on his own interpretation of the
medical data of record; therefore, the ALJ’s RFC determination is unsupported by
substantial evidence. This case should be remanded for a redetermination of
Plaintiff’s RFC.”).
Defendant cites to Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 531 F. App’x 719 (6th Cir.
2013) to support his contention that a medical opinion was not necessary for the
ALJ to determine Plaintiff’s RFC. However, Defendant’s interpretation of Rudd is
misplaced because the ALJ did not determine plaintiff’s functional capacity based
on the ALJ’s own interpretation of raw medical data as the ALJ has done in this
case. In Rudd, there was testimony from a radiologist who had interpreted the
plaintiff’s raw medical data. Rudd, 531 F. App’x at 727. The Sixth Circuit found
that “the ALJ did not interpret raw medical data beyond her ability. The x-rays of
Rudd’s hands and lumbar spine, which were the only raw medical data, had
already been read and interpreted by a radiologist.” Id. Further, the Court found in
light of the radiologist’s interpretation of the raw data, a medical expert was not
necessary, and the ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence.

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Relying on Wagner v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 15-11553, 2016 WL 1729553
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2016), Defendant asserts that even if there is a medical
opinion, the ALJ is not bound to a physician’s RFC assessment. (ECF No. 28 at
Pg ID 440.) This is not inconsistent with the R&R. In Wagner, the ALJ chose to
credit the opinion of a physician whose RFC assessment was consistent with the
medical evidence but unfavorable to the plaintiff. The court found that the ALJ
was not required to conform its findings to a physician’s RFC assessment when the
ALJ’s finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Poe v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 156-57 (6th Cir. 2009) (refusing to
conform its RFC finding to the physician’s assessment because the ALJ found that
it was based on the claimant’s subjective complaints and not the objective medical
evidence).
Defendant has failed to provide the court with any authority to support his
contention that an ALJ may interpret raw medical data without the aid of a medical
opinion when such data proves to be beyond little physical impairment. Even
absent a physician’s RFC assessment, there is no record of even a qualified
medical professional interpreting the raw medical data at issue in this case. See
Lyndsey, 2013 WL 4483074 at *7; see also Wyatt, 2013 WL 4483074, at *17. The
ALJ improperly made a finding as to Plaintiff’s functional capacity based on an

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independent review of Plaintiff’s raw medical data without an opinion from a
treating or examining source, which is inconsistent with the practice of this Circuit.
For these reasons, the Court rejects Defendant’s objections to Magistrate
Judge Grand’s July 13, 2017 R&R and adopts the recommendations in the Report
& Recommendation.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 25) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff’s
application for benefits under the Social Security Act is REVERSED and
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the R&R.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 25, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, September 25, 2017, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ R. Loury
Case Manager

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