Watson v. Jamsen et al

Filing 42

OPINION and ORDER Adopting Magistrate Judge's 39 Report and Recommendation; Granting (1) Defendant Sirena Landfair's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; and Granting (2) Defendant Lana McCarthy's 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DERRYL WATSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-13770
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
CHARLES JAMSEN, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S AUGUST
11, 2017 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING (1)
DEFENDANT SIRENA LANDFAIR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 10]; AND (2) DEFENDANT LANA MCCARTHY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 21]
On October 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed this pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1.) This matter was referred to Magistrate
Judge R. Steven Whalen for all pretrial proceedings, including a hearing and
determination of all non-dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)
and/or a report and recommendation (“R&R”) on all dispositive matters pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 5.) Defendants Sirena Landfair
(“Landfair”) and Lana McCarthy (“McCarthy”) subsequently filed motions for
summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 10, 21.)

I.

Background
On August 11, 2017, Magistrate Judge Whalen issued his R&R

recommending this Court grant Defendants Landfair’s and McCarthy’s motion for
summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, thereby
dismissing both defendants, without prejudice. (ECF No. 39.) Magistrate Judge
Whalen found Plaintiff failed to name Defendant Landfair in his administrate
grievance and identify any conduct of hers that denied him medical treatment. (Id.
at 5-6.) Although Plaintiff did name Defendant McCarthy in his grievance,
Magistrate Judge Whalen found there were no facts indicating Defendant
McCarthy had any involvement in denying Plaintiff medical treatment.
Magistrate Judge Whalen concluded by advising the parties they may object
to and seek review of the R&R within fourteen days of service upon them. (Id. at
8.) Specifically, he further advised the parties that “[f]ailure to timely file
objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed
an objection on August 24, 2017. (ECF No. 40.)
II.

Standard of Review
When objections are filed to a magistrate judge’s R&R on a dispositive

matter, the Court “make[s] a de novo determination of those portions of the report
or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court, however, “is not required to articulate all of the
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reasons it rejects a party’s objections.” Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942,
944 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citations omitted). A party’s failure to file objections to
certain conclusions of the report and recommendation waives any further right to
appeal on those issues. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.
2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Likewise, the failure to object to certain
conclusions in the magistrate judge’s report releases the Court from its duty to
independently review those issues. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
A court must construe a pro se litigant’s submissions liberally and interpret them in
a manner to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Kirkland v.
Cablevision Sys., 760 F. 3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, general objections, or those merely
restating arguments previously presented, do not sufficiently identify alleged errors
on the part of a magistrate judge. Watkins v. Tribley, No. 09-14990, 2011 WL
4445823, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2011). An objection that does nothing more
than disagree with a magistrate judge’s conclusion, or simply summarizes what has
been argued before, is not considered a valid objection. Howard v. Sec’y of Health
and Human Servs., 932 F. 2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991). Only specific objections
are entitled to de novo review, not those objections that are “frivolous, conclusive
or general.” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F. 2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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III.

Applicable Law & Analysis
Plaintiff’s sole objection is that the magistrate judge erred when he found

Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies against Defendants
Landfair and McCarthy. Plaintiff has failed to provide the court with any authority
to support his contention that stating “any and all medical staff” exhausts his
administrative remedy and was sufficient to identify Defendants Landfair and
McCarthy.
Section 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires the exhaustion of all administrative
procedures before filing a claim in federal court. “A prisoner exhausts his
remedies when he complies with the grievance procedures put forward by his
correctional institution.” Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F. 3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2017).
Administrative exhaustion is an affirmative defense prison officials must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Lee v. Willey, 789 F. 3d 673, 677 (6th
Cir. 2015). “[P]rison officials waive any procedural irregularities in a grievance
when they nonetheless address the grievance on the merits.” Mattox, 851 F. 3d at
591; see also Randall v. Winnicki, No. 16-cv-207, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85807,
at *6-7 (W.D. Mich. May 8, 2017).
Pursuant to the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) Policy
Directive 03.02.130 § B: “Complaints filed by prisoners regarding grievable issues
as defined in this policy serve to exhaust a prisoner’s administrative remedies only
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when filed as a grievance through all three steps of the grievance process in
compliance with this policy.” (ECF No. 10-2 at Pg ID 59.) More Specifically,
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 § R requires “[i]nformation provided . . . to be
limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where,
why, how). Dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being
grieved are to be included.” (Id. at Pg ID 61.)
Pursuant to MDOC’s grievance procedure Plaintiff was required to state
specifically the conduct of each Defendant he alleges denied him access to proper
medical care. As Magistrate Judge Whalen correctly found, Plaintiff does not
identify Defendant Landfair in any administrative grievance. MDOC Policy
Directive 03.02.130 § R specifically requires the names of all individuals involved
in the grievance to be named, as well as the specific conduct at issue. Although
Plaintiff names Defendant McCarthy in his Step 1 Grievance No. 16-05-080712D2 (“Grievance 12D2”), he does not allege what, if any, involvement she had in
the grievance.
Plaintiff asserts that because the prison officials decided his grievances on
the merits and never cited any deficiencies, Defendants have waived any
exhaustion requirement. However, as it relates to Defendant Landfair, Defendants
had no reason to suspect there were any issues with Plaintiff’s grievance process
because Defendant Landfair was never named in any grievance. Therefore,
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Defendants were not on notice that Defendant Landfair had engaged in any
unlawful conduct. Further, although Defendant McCarthy is mentioned in Step 1
of Grievance 12D2, again, Plaintiff failed to describe what, if any, conduct
Defendant McCarthy engaged in that was unlawful. The basis of Grievance 12D2
was that Defendant Jamson refused to see Plaintiff following his foot surgery.
Plaintiff even notes in his grievance that his request to be seen was “Sent to MP to
review,” and he later refers to “MP” as Defendant Jamson. (ECF No. 10-3 at Pg
ID 82.) It is insufficient for Plaintiff to simply name Defendant McCarthy and
“any and all medical staff unable to name” without alleging specific conduct
associated with the unidentified medical staff. This particular grievance is very
specific to Defendant Jamson’s conduct. Even if this grievance was resolved on
the merits, the basis of the resolution was based on Defendant Jamson’s refusal to
see Plaintiff, not Defendant McCarthy, who was not Plaintiff’s “MP.”
For these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s objection to Magistrate Judge
Whalen’s August 11, 2017 R&R and adopts the recommendations in the Report &
Recommendation.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Sirena Landfair’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Lana McCarthy’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants (1) Sirena Landfair and (2)
Lana McCarthy are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 26, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, September 26, 2017, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ R. Loury
Case Manager

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