Bledsoe et al v. FCA US LLC et al

Filing 148

ORDER GRANTING 130 Plaintiffs' MOTION to Compel Discovery, and GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 129 Defendant Cummins' MOTION to Compel. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
4:16-cv-14024

JAMES BLEDSOE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY
(ECF NO. 130),

v.
FCA US LLC, a Delaware
corporation, and CUMMINS
INC., an Indiana corporation,

AND GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT CUMMINS’
MOTION TO COMPEL,
(ECF NO. 129)

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions to compel.
Plaintiffs are proposed putative class members who purchased
Defendant FCA’s 2007-2012 Dodge Ram 2500 and 3500 trucks, which are
equipped with diesel engines manufactured by Defendant Cummins, Inc.
Plaintiffs’ main claim is that the trucks are equipped with defeat devices
that allow its diesel engines to emit nitrogen oxides at levels that exceed
federal and state emissions standards and the expectations of reasonable
consumers.
This discovery dispute hinges on whether Defendants must produce
its calibration data and emissions software in their native format. See
ECF No. 130. Plaintiffs, in addition, move to compel production of the
Class

Vehicles’

Auxiliary

Emissions
1

Control

Devices

(“AECD”)

disclosures that Defendant Cummins made to the Environmental
Protection Agency in unredacted form. For its part, Defendant Cummins
moves to compel Plaintiffs to identify and describe with particularity its
basis for alleging the existence of a defeat device. See ECF No. 129.
These matters are fully briefed. Upon review, the Court concludes
that oral argument is not necessary for the disposition of these matters.
As explained below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiffs’ motion to compel
and GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Defendant’s motion to
compel.
I.

Legal Standard

The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is broad. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998).
Parties may obtain discovery on any matter that is not privileged and is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense if it is reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R.
Evid. 401. Evidence need not be admissible to be discoverable. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). District courts, however, may limit the scope of discovery
“where the information sought is overly broad or would prove unduly

2

burdensome to produce.” Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007).
Rules 33 and 34 allow a party to serve interrogatories and requests
for production of documents on an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 34.
A party receiving these types of discovery requests has thirty days to
respond with answers or objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A).
If the party receiving discovery requests under Rules 33 or 34 fails to
respond properly, Rule 37 provides the party who sent the discovery
requests the means to file a motion to compel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B).
If a court grants a Rule 37 motion to compel, or if discovery is received
after a Rule 37 motion is filed, then the court must award reasonable
expenses and attorneys’ fees to the successful party. That is, unless the
successful party did not confer in good faith before the motion, the
opposing

party’s

position

was

substantially

justified,

or

other

circumstances would make an award unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
II.

Discussion

a. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel
Plaintiffs move to compel the inspection and production of
Defendant Cummins’ complete calibration data and emissions software,
as well as its AECD disclosures to the EPA in unredacted form. The Court
addresses each issue in turn.

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i. Calibration data and emissions software.
Plaintiffs seek the production of Defendant Cummins’ complete
calibration data and emissions software “installed in the Affected
Vehicles in a ‘reasonably usable form.’” ECF No. 130, PageID.14015.
Specifically, in their Request for Production, Plaintiffs sought “complete
copies of all calibration files used in the Affected Vehicles related to the
emissions systems,” along with “any software development trail,
manuals, errata, configuration settings…or other documents relating to
design specifications or expected functions of the emissions systems.”
ECF No. 130-3, PageID.14045-46. Although Defendant Cummins had
produced a text file representing segments of its calibration data,
Plaintiffs’ expert asserts that “[t]his text-based report file is not a
substitute for the native calibration files being reviewed from within the
calibration software.”1 ECF No. 130-5, PageID.14150. As a result,
Plaintiffs seek complete calibration data and emissions software in order

For reasons that are not entirely clear, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted
their expert’s sworn declarations under the pseudonym “E1”, and without
any identifiable person’s signature. Defendant asks that the declarations
be stricken because of this omission. While the Court agrees that the
declarations should not have been submitted with the name and
signature of declarant omitted, that problem can be solved by requiring
Plaintiffs to refile these declarations, with the name and signature of the
declarant included, within 5 days of the date of this order. Plaintiffs are
hereby ordered to do so.
4
1

to figure out how the purported defeat devices allow “excessive emissions
despite ‘passing’ emissions testing.” ECF No. 130, PageID.14012-14.
Defendant Cummins responds that it has already produced a
“complete, unredacted and searchable calibration” data set in accordance
with its obligations under the Stipulation and Order Governing the
Collection and Production of Documents and Electronically Stored
Information, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this Court’s Model
ESI Order. ECF No. 135, PageID.14289. Defendant Cummins argues
that what it has produced already complies with the “reasonably usable
form” standard. Id. at PageID.14292-93. For that reason, Defendant
asserts that the kind of production that Plaintiffs seek here would be
duplicative. Id. In addition, Defendant Cummins reasons that it is not
obligated to produce its calibration data in native format because such
data constitute “proprietary trade secrets” that would allow Plaintiffs to
view “any Cummins engine in any vehicle or other engine platform found
in the field.” Id. at PageID.14290. (emphasis in original). Defendant
Cummins explains that its competitive advantage would suffer
“catastrophic” damage as a result of inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of such data. Id.
Both parties agree that the nature of the alleged defeat devices is
one of, if not, the central issue in this case. See ECF No. 129,
PageID.13926; ECF No. 130, PageID.14012. And as explained in the
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section below, Plaintiffs claim that their response to Defendant’s motion
to compel depends on their ability to understand and interpret the nature
of the calibration data and emissions software. Furthermore, other than
claiming that such data are proprietary trade secrets, Defendant
Cummins has not provided authority supporting the withholding of data
in its native format, especially where parties have agreed to a protective
order to account for sensitive commercial materials. ECF No. 135,
PageID.14295. Defendant points out that “the parties’ ESI Stipulation
does not require production calibrations in native file format” and that
“the parties agreed that the only files that are required to be produced in
native format are ‘Non-redacted Microsoft Excel files and nonprintable
files.’” ECF No. 135, PageID.14292 (citing ECF No. 113, PageID.1369899). But an agreement that specifies that certain kinds of files must be
produced in native format does not necessarily prohibit the production of
other kinds of records in native format.
In any event, even if the data are proprietary trade secrets, by
Defendant Cummins’ own admission, that data has already been
disclosed—albeit in a non-native format. Defendant Cummins insists
that the data provided are “complete, unredacted, and searchable.” ECF
No. 135, PageID.14289. If the confidentiality protections in place are
sufficient to safeguard the data already disclosed, it is unclear why their
being trade secrets would prevent production in native format. Plaintiffs
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are merely asking to make that production more accessible and
comprehensible. A more relevant inquiry, therefore, might be whether
compelling Defendant Cummins to disclose its complete calibration data
and

emissions

software

would

be

disproportionate

or

unduly

burdensome. But Defendant Cummins makes no such showing.
Instead, Defendant Cummins argues that because it has already
produced the calibration data in a text file, it is no longer obligated to
produce the same information in native format. ECF No. 135,
PageID.14292. Defendant Cummins points to the fact that the text file is
“printable, searchable, and written in English rather than computer
code” as proof that its method of production is satisfactory. Id. at
PageID.14293. But Plaintiffs’ expert declaration states that the nonnative format is much more difficult to use or interpret. See ECF No. 1305. For instance, Plaintiffs’ expert attests that he is “completely unable to
rely on the data in this report file by itself to form any opinions about the
[engine control unit’s] behavior.” Id. at PageID.14151. In addition, based
on the text files alone, Plaintiffs’ expert “cannot determine what
specifically they pertain to just from the labels, and without any
supporting documentation that explains the logic of how and when these
calibration values are used.” Id. at PageID.14150. Plaintiffs’ expert
cannot use such a “text-based report file” to determine “a vehicle’s
combustion and emissions behavior.” Id. Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that
7

“Cummins deliberately converted select segments of the calibration
parameters into unintelligible text files.” ECF No. 130, PageID.14013.
This “selective conversion destroys the dynamic operational structure
inherent in the native files that is necessary to understanding the data.”
Id.
The Advisory Committee Notes under Rule 34 explicitly prohibit
producing parties from taking data in its native format and converting it
to a different form “that makes it more difficult or burdensome” to use
the information efficiently. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 Adv. Comm. (2006). The
record suggests that may have happened here. In short, the production
Plaintiffs seek is relevant, not subject to any privileges, and Defendant
has not established that disclosure in native format would be
disproportionate or unduly burdensome.
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to compel
Defendant Cummins to produce its emissions software and calibration
data installed in the vehicles at issue in their native format. Production
will be done pursuant to the parties’ Stipulation and Order Governing
the Collection and Production of Documents and Electronically Stored
Information, ECF No. 113, and Stipulation and Order Regarding Nonwaiver of Privileges and Production of Privilege Logs, ECF No. 115. In
order to mitigate concerns about inadvertent disclosures, Defendant
Cummins is ordered to load its calibration files and emissions software
8

onto a single secured stand-alone laptop that may not be connected to
any network or external storage device, whether wirelessly or by direct
connection. Plaintiffs must store the laptop in a locked storage container
and may not remove or export the data. See In re Facebook PPC
Advertising Litigation, 2011 WL 1324516, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
ii. Unredacted AECD disclosures.
Plaintiffs next seek the production of information regarding
AECDs2 in the Class Vehicles that Defendant Cummins disclosed to the
EPA—and Plaintiffs want this information produced in an unredacted
format. ECF No. 130, PageID.14003. Plaintiffs argue that “Cummins is
inappropriately redacting its AECDs, without any valid explanation for
doing so.” Id. at PageID.14020. For instance, Joseph Sawin, a Defendant
Cummins employee responsible for “personally reviewing and submitting
AECD disclosures for multiple engine platforms,” attests that in
responding to Plaintiffs’ request for AECD disclosures, he identified and
redacted portions that “have no apparent connection to Plaintiffs’
allegations.” ECF No. 135-5, PageID.14310. But he “did not redact the

In its previous Order, the Court defined AECDs as “devices that alter
the normal operation of the emissions system in a vehicle. AECDs are
necessary to ensure adequate performance in certain scenarios, and are
not illegal on their own. But when an AECD is designed to circumvent
emissions standards requirements, and is not disclosed in the application
for a certificate of conformity, it is called a ‘defeat device,’ and it is illegal.”
Bledsoe v. FCA US LLC, 378 F. Supp.3d 626, 633 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
9

2

headings or subheadings of these sections” in order to provide “a log of
redacted information.” Id. While Defendant Cummins argues that it is
only redacting portions that are not relevant to the issues in this case,
Plaintiffs reply that this Court has deemed that “all of the AECDs are
relevant in this case.” ECF No. 130, PageID.14003. (emphasis in
original). When Defendant Cummins submits AECD documents for
regulatory review, “all AECDs for a single engine are contained in the
same document.” ECF No. 135, PageID.14294-95.
This means that if Defendant Cummins produces the AECD
documents for a particular vehicle that were provided to the EPA, then
the requesting party would have access to every AECD for that vehicle.
Defendant Cummins asserts that “disclosing the irrelevant redacted
sections of the AECD Disclosures would significantly harm Cummins.”
Id. at PageID.14298. Specifically, Defendant Cummins argues that in
order to protect its competitive advantage, Plaintiffs should only be
allowed to view the AECDs that are relevant to the issues in this case. In
addition, Defendant Cummins contends that it is redacting portions of
the AECD disclosures that constitute trade secrets. Id. at PageID.1429596.
Plaintiffs reply that the AECDs “disclosed to the EPA all relate to
the Class Vehicles” because “they work in tandem with each other” to
operate the vehicle and “do not function independently.” ECF No. 140,
10

PageID.17804. As a result of “this complex interplay of systems,
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant AECDs is impossible.” Id.
In considering the parties’ briefs, the Court is unpersuaded by
Defendant Cummins’ argument that it may “redact individual AECDs
that do not relate in any way to Plaintiffs’ allegations or Defendants’
defenses.” See ECF No. 135, PageID.14295. Relevance redactions are
generally inappropriate, especially where parties have agreed to a
Stipulation and Order governing the process for designating certain
materials as confidential or highly confidential. See ECF Nos. 113 and
115; see also Weidman v. Ford Motor Company, 2021 WL 236072, at *4
(E.D. Mich. 2021) (holding that the parties’ proposed order rendered
relevance redactions “unnecessary and improper.”).
Consequently, the Court orders Defendant Cummins to produce its
Class Vehicles’ AECD disclosures to the EPA in unredacted format. As
with the production of its complete calibration data and emissions
software, Defendant Cummins shall produce such materials in the same
single secured stand-alone laptop described in Section II(a)(i) of this
Order. See Facebook Advertising Litigation, 2011 WL 1324516, at *3.
Production of the unredacted AECD disclosures shall be subject to the
parties’ Stipulation and Order Governing the Collection and Production
of Documents and Electronically Stored Information, ECF No. 113, and

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Stipulation and Order Regarding Non-waiver of Privileges and
Production of Privilege Logs, ECF No. 115.
b. Defendant Cummins’ Motion to Compel
Defendant

Cummins

challenges

Plaintiffs’

response

to

Interrogatory No. 2 and moves to compel Plaintiffs “to provide a complete
and substantive response.” See ECF No. 129. Interrogatory No. 2 asks, in
essence, for Plaintiffs to “identify and describe with particularity all
defeat devices” that are allegedly “present in the Subject Vehicles.” ECF
No. 129-2, PageID.13939. Defendant Cummins argues that Plaintiffs’
unwillingness to provide a response to this question “prejudices
Cummins’ ability to defend against” allegations that it “install[ed] defeat
devices in the RAM Trucks.” ECF No. 129, PageID.13925.
Plaintiffs objected to Interrogatory No. 2, ECF No. 129-2,
PageID.13939, in the following ways:
Objections:
Plaintiffs object to this Interrogatory based on General
Objection Nos. 8, 9, and 10.3

General Objection No. 8 states “Plaintiffs object on the ground that the
Interrogatory is a contention interrogatory and is therefore premature.”
General Objection No. 9 states “Plaintiffs object on the ground that the
Interrogatory is premature in that it calls for expert discovery.”
General Objection No. 10 states “Plaintiffs object on the ground that the
Interrogatory seeks information already in Cummins’ possession.” ECF
No. 129-2, PageID.13935.
12

3

Plaintiffs object to this Interrogatory based on Objection to
Definition No. 2.4
Response:
See Objections.
Plaintiffs will not provide a response at this time, but will
supplement as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Court orders, including pretrial schedule
orders.
See ECF No. 129-2, PageID.13939, Plaintiffs’ Objections and
Response to Defendant Cummins Inc.’s First Set of Interrogatories.
(emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs also argue that their responses were limited because
“Cummins has deliberately and systematically withheld evidence that
Plaintiffs need to answer” Interrogatory No. 2. ECF No. 133,
PageID.14229. Plaintiffs allege that their expert “reviewed Cummins’
discovery materials” and concluded that “he could not render an opinion”
about how the emissions systems operate. Id. In fact, it is the information
that Plaintiffs seek in their own motion to compel that “is necessary and
essential to intelligibly answer Interrogatory No. 2.” Id. Plaintiffs state
that once they receive complete calibration data and emissions software,

Definition No. 2 states “Plaintiffs object to the words ‘any other person’
in the definition of ‘Plaintiff’ or ‘Plaintiffs’ (Definition No. 2) on the
grounds that the words are vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly
burdensome and not proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. at
PageID.13936.
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4

they “intend to fully describe the defeat devices, including how they work,
in their expert reports.” ECF No. 133, PageID.14231.
Defendant Cummins counters that requiring Plaintiffs to disclose
what it knows now would be useful in learning about the allegations
against it. ECF No. 129, PageID.13927-28. Furthermore, Plaintiffs
cannot argue that it must wait for the expert report because “the
information is within Plaintiffs’ possession,” therefore they do not
“require additional analysis” from their expert prior to responding. ECF
No. 129, PageID.13928.
Interrogatories are governed by Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Interrogatories are “not objectionable merely because it
asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of
law to fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). For instance, “contention
interrogatories,” serve legitimate and useful purposes, “such as ferreting
out unsupportable claims, narrowing the focus and extent of discovery,
and clarifying the issues for trial.” In re Dow Corning Corp., 2010 WL
3927728, at *12 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (citing Starcher v. Correctional Med.
Sys., Inc., 144 F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998)). Contention
interrogatories may take several forms, including asking a party “to state
what it contends, or whether it makes a specified contention; to state all
the facts upon which it bases a contention; to state the legal or theoretical
basis for contention; and to explain or defend how the law invoked applies
14

to facts. Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., 2007 WL 6025288, at *5 (N.D.
Ohio 2007) (citations omitted). Parties serving contention interrogatories
must establish good reason that “answers to well-tailored questions will
contribute meaningfully to clarifying the issues in he case, narrow the
scope of the dispute, or setting up early settlement discussions, or that
such answers are likely to expose a substantial basis for a motion under
Rule 11 or Rule 56.” Id. (quoting In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108
F.R.D. 328, 336 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
However, “a court may postpone a response to contention
interrogatories until discovery is closer to completion.” Dow Corning,
2010 WL 3927728, at *12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2)). Contention
interrogatories need not be answered until after designated discovery has
closed. See 8A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2167.
The purpose is to protect “the responding party from being hemmed into
fixing its position without adequate information.” Dow Corning, 2010 WL
3927728, at *12 (citing Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199,
233 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).
Here, Interrogatory No. 2 is relevant to the core issue of whether
Defendant Cummins knowingly installed defeat devices in the vehicles
at issue. However, Defendant Cummins “has the burden of proving how
an earlier response serves the goals of discovery.” See Schweinfurth, 2007
WL 6025288, at *5. Defendant Cummins argues that they are entitled to
15

a more complete response because Plaintiffs’ allegations went “beyond
merely alleging there was a gap” when they alleged that Defendants
“knowingly and intentionally equipped the RAM Trucks with a
prohibited defeat device.” ECF No. 134, PageID.14282.
Plaintiffs, however, have already disclosed what evidence they have
in support of their allegations: that emissions testing has revealed a
discrepancy in the performance of Defendant Cummins’ diesel engines.
For instance, through informal supplements to its interrogatory
responses, ECF No. 133, PageID.14230. Plaintiffs also provided a
detailed table in their response to Interrogatory No. 6, which asks for
identification of “the test file associated with” their emissions tests. ECF
No. 129-2, PageID.13942. And in any event, a review of Plaintiffs’ Second
Consolidated and Amended Class Action Complaint is inconsistent with
Defendant Cummins’ characterization about the extent of Plaintiffs’
allegations. See ECF No. 62, PageID.8341-44.
So, while perhaps little will be accomplished by compelling
Plaintiffs

to

provide

a

complete

and

substantive

response

to

Interrogatory No. 2 when they lack the underlying information to do so,
it is nevertheless wrong for them to avoid supplying a good faith answer,
even if part of that answer is an admission that they do not currently
know for certain what the exact nature of the defeat device is or how it
works. As far as a detailed answer, Plaintiffs’ argument that they cannot
16

fully respond to Interrogatory No. 2 without the production of materials
they are asking for in their own motion to compel appears to be justified
at this time. See ECF No. 129. Indeed, attempting to provide a complete
response to Interrogatory No. 2 before the satisfaction of Plaintiffs’ own
motion to compel would be an inefficient use of time and resources.
Furthermore, production of complex information in its native form
naturally calls for the use of an expert to analyze that information. That
expert will then need time to process and interpret the complex
information for Plaintiffs’ review. Although Defendant Cummins
contends that it risks prejudice because an unsatisfactory answer to
Interrogatory No. 2 weakens its ability “to defend against Plaintiffs’
vague allegations” regarding its diesel truck engines, Plaintiffs cannot be
forced to provide answers that they do not currently possess. Indeed,
Defendant Cummins is in the better position at this point to analyze and
make conclusions about its own products.
Therefore, the Court will order Plaintiffs to supplement their
response to Interrogatory No. 2 by providing a good faith answer
consistent with whatever facts Plaintiffs currently possess, and qualified
by whatever explanations may be necessary, including if appropriate an
admission of a lack of sufficient knowledge or information. In such an
answer Plaintiffs may also indicate that their full and complete response
to the Interrogatory will be provided after they receive adequate
17

information involving complete calibration data, emissions software, and
AECD disclosures. See id. If Plaintiffs require an expert to process said
disclosures in order to respond to Interrogatory No. 2, then Plaintiffs
shall supplement their response when they produce their expert report.
See ECF No. 127, PageID.13916.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’
motion to compel and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendant Cummins’ motion to compel. Defendant Cummins is directed
to disclose its complete calibration data in native format, including its
emissions software, pursuant to the directives outlined in this Order.
Defendant Cummins is further directed to produce its Class Vehicles’
AECD disclosures to the EPA in unredacted form. In addition, Plaintiffs
are directed to answer Interrogatory No. 2 to the best of their current
ability, as well as provide a more complete and substantive response to
that Interrogatory after they have received the necessary materials to do
so. Finally, Plaintiffs are ordered to refile any of the sworn declarations
that were submitted under the pseudonym “E1” in a form bearing the
true name and signature of the declarant.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 30, 2021

s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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