Saginaw County v. STAT Emergency Medical Service, Inc.
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER DENYING 23 Plaintiff's MOTION for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SAGINAW COUNTY, a Michigan municipal corporation
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 4:17-cv-10275
Hon. Terrence G. Berg
v.
STAT EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE, INC., a Michigan for-profit corporation
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION (ECF No. 23)
I.
Introduction
Saginaw County—a Michigan county organized as a munici-
pal corporation under Michigan law—passed an ordinance in 2016
requiring anyone seeking to provide ambulance services in the
county to first obtain the approval of the County Board of Commissioners. One ambulance company—licensed to provide ambulance
services by the State of Michigan—operated in the county without
the Board’s approval. The County (“Plaintiff” or “Saginaw”) sued
that company, STAT Emergency Medical Services (“STAT” or “Defendant”), seeking a declaratory judgment that its ordinance is legal under state law and that enforcing it against Defendant would
not violate the federal Sherman Antitrust Act (the “Sherman Act”).
STAT is a for-profit corporation that operates ambulance services
throughout the state of Michigan, including within Saginaw
County. STAT moved to dismiss the County’s complaint. The Court
heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss on May 2, 2018. In a
detailed Opinion and Order dated July 31, 2018, that motion was
granted. See Opinion and Order, ECF No. 22.
Saginaw County now moves this Court to reconsider its opinion, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Rule 7.1(h). Saginaw County
says that the Court “was misled by Defendant’s representations in
pleadings and before the Court, that there was no evident actual or
ripe controversy between it and Saginaw County under federal
anti-trust law that postdates STAT’s licensing in Saginaw County.”
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 23, PageID.626.
Saginaw County claims the court “committed palpable error
when it concluded that Saginaw County had not pled damages that
would occur if its exclusive contract with MMR were not enforceable
in the face of anti-trust claims.” Id. at PageID.627.
Saginaw County also claims the Court committed palpable error “when it completely ignored the County’s argument that it was
using the Declaratory Judgment Act as intended by Congress to adjudicate the anti-trust claims of STAT […] before any possible anti-
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trust damages were accrued, not because it wanted to avoid expensive anti-trust attorney’s fees.” Id.
II.
Legal Standards
In a motion for reconsideration, the “movant must not only
demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties
and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different
disposition of the case.” E.D. MICH. L.R. 7.1(h); see also Moody v.
Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1990);
Huff v. Metro Life Insurance Co., 678 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1982).
The Court will not grant a motion for reconsideration that "merely
present[s] the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly
or by reasonable implication." Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) requires that any such motion be filed no later than 28 days
after entry of the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
Local Rule 7.1(h)(2) normally proscribes any response from
non-moving party, but this Court ordered a response and reply from
parties. Notice, ECF No. 24.
III. Analysis
Saginaw County takes issue with its interpretation of the
Court’s Opinion and Order, describing in several places where they
believe the Court was “obviously” incorrect (ECF No. 23,
PageID.631, 632), where the ruling is “unfair and plainly wrong”
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(Id. at PageID.631), where the Court’s understanding was “plainly
not true” (Id.), and where the order amounted to an “abuse of discretion” (Id. at PageID.633). Despite the rigor of these complaints,
Saginaw County did not see fit to cite even once to a specific page
of the Court’s opinion and order. In multiple places, Saginaw
County incorrectly ascribes a position to the Court not taken in its
Order, thereby betraying a misapprehension of the legal principles
at issue in this case. Despite these failings the Court now addresses
the two “palpable defects” that Saginaw County specifically mentions in their motion, and a third instance in which they believe the
Court was misled by Defendant.
a. The Court was not misled as to the existence of a case
or controversy
Plaintiff alleges first that the Court was misled by Defendant
as to the existence of a controversy. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 23, PageID.626. In support of this, Plaintiff points
to an article on “MLive” about the Court’s dismissal of the case.
MLive Article, ECF No. 23-1. In that article, Defendant’s vice president and chief operating officer, Joseph Karlichek, is quoted saying, among other things, “Saginaw County and MMR know full well
that their actions are not only contrary to the EMS statutes of the
State of Michigan, but in violation of Federal law.” Id.
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Defendant responds that this is “the same argument this
Court considered and rejected in its opinion and order dismissing
the case in the first place.” Defendant’s Resp., ECF No. 25,
PageID.652. Defendant goes on to say “the Court recognized that
there is no “case or controversy” present before the Court based on
public comments made by STAT and its attorneys.” Id.
Defendant is correct. The Court already discussed at length
the framework for identifying “case or controversy” requirements,
and declines to repeat them here, especially because Plaintiff has
presented no new authority or different analysis of the relevant
statutes and case law. See Opinion and Order, ECF No. 22,
PageID.594–597. Plaintiff presents nothing more than a rehash of
its previous argument; it fails to identify any a palpable error in the
Court’s determination that no case or controversy exists.
b. The Court did not commit palpable error regarding imminent damages
Plaintiff next alleges that the Court committed palpable error
“when it concluded that Saginaw County had not pled damages that
would occur if its exclusive contract with MMR were not enforceable
in the face of anti-trust claims.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 23, PageID.627. Plaintiff also says, “Saginaw County
has adequately pled governmental reasons for its restraint of trade
and damages that are incurring and before they could be accruing
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if it does not promptly resolve this controversy.” ECF No. 23,
PageID.632. Though bordering on inscrutable, Plaintiff’s position
appears to be that it adequately plead that damages would occur if
this Court dismissed the suit. Once again, this is a rehash of a previous argument, and ignores the reality that there is no active controversy at hand. The Court already discussed this issue in its opinion and order as follows:
At the hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff high-lighted the possibility that STAT will bring a
federal antitrust case against it in response to its efforts
to enforce the Ordinance, which could lead to prolonged
federal antitrust litigation. This sentiment is echoed
throughout Plaintiff’s pleadings and briefing. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Plaintiff’s efforts to enforce the Ordinance, whatever they might be, would lead
to STAT initiating a federal antitrust lawsuit against
Plaintiff. If confronted with sanctions, STAT could very
well adapt its behavior; there is no way for the Court to
know what might happen. Plaintiff’s suit nevertheless
seeks a declaration of what the law would be if the
County were to undertake enforcement activity against
STAT and STAT were to respond by filing an antitrust
lawsuit against it. But, even assuming for a moment
that such an enforcement action may take place in the
future, to be ripe, a suit seeking a declaratory judgment
must allege what harm the defendant would suffer from
the denial of judicial relief right now. The prospect of
protracted federal antitrust litigation is no more diminished if it is pursued in this litigation than through a
subsequent action brought based on a ripe and actual
controversy. For these reasons, the Court finds that parties will suffer little hardship if judicial relief is denied
at this stage and further that, based on the record to
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date, it is unclear whether the harm alleged by Plaintiffs
will ever come to pass.
Opinion and Order, ECF No. 22, PageID.613–14. Saginaw County,
then and now, has failed to allege adequately that any imminent
harm or damages would occur upon the Court’s dismissal of this
action. No palpable error, or any error, has been shown.
IV.
The Court did not commit a palpable error when it
found, alternatively, that Plaintiff failed to state a
claim under the Sherman Act upon which relief may
be granted
Lastly, Saginaw County claims the Court committed palpable
error “when it completely ignored the County’s argument that it
was using the Declaratory Judgment Act as intended by Congress
to adjudicate the anti-trust claims of STAT […] before any possible
anti-trust damages were accrued, not because it wanted to avoid
expensive anti-trust attorney’s fees.” ECF No. 23, PageID.627. In
the accompanying brief, Plaintiff goes on to say, “the Court committed palpable error when it found that Saginaw County has failed to
cite policy justifications for the contract and ordinance that restrain
trade in order to state a defensible anti-trust position.” ECF No. 23,
PageID.631. It is not surprising that Plaintiff provides no cite to the
page of this Court’s order on which one might locate this particular
finding. That is because there is no such finding in the order.
Rather, this Court found that Saginaw County failed to explain how its primary services contract, 911 Plan, and Ordinance
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did not violate the Sherman Act by creating an unlawful restraint
of trade. See Opinion and Order, ECF No. 22, PageID.616–17. For,
if Saginaw County cannot effectively explain how its plans do not
violate the Sherman Act, the Court would be unable to provide the
declaratory judgment it seeks. The Court explained that, “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint similarly fails to allege any facts to plausibly show it is entitled to a declaration that its 911 Plan, the Ordinance, and the contract with MMR do not violate Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.… Thus, even if the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim, it would be subject to
dismissal.” Id. at PageID.617.
In their Reply to the Defendant’s Response to the instant motion, Plaintiff says, “by citing State policy and how its contract with
MMR advances that state policy, MMR [sic] has stated a classic
state action immunity defense to § 1 of the Sherman Act.” Reply,
ECF No. 26, PageID.666. Plaintiff referenced this argument in their
First Amended Complaint when they noted several courts in other
jurisdictions that found similar ambulance service contracts were
not subject to the Sherman Act because of the state action immunity defense. ECF No. 10, PageID.217; and n.1. But Plaintiff never
applied the state action immunity defense test to the facts of their
complaint. Instead, they merely allege that such a defense exists.
Vague reference to a test that may or may not apply is not “stat[ing]
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a classic state action immunity defense,” and Plaintiff cannot rely
on the Court to fill in the blanks of its filings.
Plaintiff sought a declaration that their ambulance plan was
legal and not in violation of the Sherman Act, among other statutes.
But they did not plead adequate facts to show that this is true. The
Court made no finding whatever on the question of whether Saginaw County’s plan ran afoul of the Sherman Act, it simply concluded that, on the facts as alleged, the Court could not declare as
a matter of law that the plan does not violate the Act. The Court’s
finding that Plaintiff failed to adequately allege facts showing the
contract, 911 Plan, and Ordinance were not in violation of the Sherman Act is not a palpable defect.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsidera-
tion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 25, 2019
s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically filed, and the
parties and/or counsel of record were served on March 25, 2019.
s/A. Chubb
Case Manager
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