Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility v. New Grace Rehabilitation Center, PLLC et al

Filing 44

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 35 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Adjourn Scheduling Order Dates. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE PLACEMENT
FACILITY,

4:17-CV-11007-TGB-DRG
HON. TERRENCE BERG

Plaintiff,
vs.
NEW GRACE REHABILIATION
CENTER, PPC, PRODIGY
SPINAL REHABILITATION,
PLC. VAN DYKE
REHABILITATION CENTER,
PLLC, SUMMER ROSE
FAKHOURI, D.C., MICHAEL
STEVEN MEERON, D.C., and
ANTHONY EUGENE PULICE,
D.C.,

ORDER DENYING IN PART
AND GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY
RESPONSES AND ADJOURN
SCHEDULING ORDER DATES

Defendants.

The Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (the
“MAIPF”) sued New Grace Spinal Rehabilitation Center, PLLC (“New
Grace”), Prodigy Spinal Rehabilitation, PLLC (“Prodigy”), Van Dyke
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Spinal Rehabilitation Center, PLLC (“Van Dyke”), Summer Rose
Fakhouri, D.C., Michael Steven Meeron, D.C., and Anthony Eugene
Pulice, D.C. for allegedly violating the Michigan No-Fault Act, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 500.3101 et seq. (2017). Specifically, MAIPF claims the
Defendants participated in a racketeering enterprise intended to
fraudulently generate bills for unnecessary medical services provided to
individuals whose no-fault claims the MAIPF was adjusting under the
Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, Mich. Comp. Laws §500.3171 (2012).
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to
Discovery and to Adjourn Scheduling Order Dates (ECF No. 35).
BACKGROUND
The Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, a provision of the Michigan
No-Fault Act, provides benefits to eligible individuals involved in car
accidents where no insurance company is immediately responsible.
Second Am. Compl. 3, ¶ 3, ECF No. 26.

The MAIPF, while not an

insurance company itself, administers the Michigan Assigned Claims
Plan by assigning claims brought under it to a servicing insurer. Id.
Servicing insurers adjust and pay the claims and are then reimbursed by
the MAIPF. Id. ¶¶ 3, 18. MAIPF is thus ultimately responsible for
paying claims assigned under the Michigan Assigned Claim Plan. Id.
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MAIPF alleges that the Defendants, chiropractic facilities and their
owners or senior employees, as well as other “like-minded practitioners,”
defrauded MAIPF by billing its servicing insurers for unnecessary or nonexistent services Defendants provided to individuals purportedly injured
in car accidents whose claims were assigned under the Michigan
Assigned Claims Plan. Id. ¶ 29.
The parties have reached an impasse concerning certain of
Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production, specifically
Request Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9. See generally Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, ECF No.
35; Defs.’ Resp. to Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 37. Plaintiff first sent the
interrogatories and discovery requests at issue to Defendants Fakhouri,
Meeron, and Pulice on November 15, 2017. Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, Ex. 1,
ECF No. 35-1. After much squabbling between the parties, and the
Court’s signing of a stipulated protective order, Defendants provided
their Second Amended Responses to Plaintiff’s First Interrogatories and
Requests for Production. Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, Ex. 2, ECF No. 35-2.
Those responses included blanket objections of overbreadth, vagueness,
and irrelevance to Defendants’ Requests for Production Nos. 5, 6, 7, and
9, and were provided jointly on behalf of all Defendants. See id. Plaintiff
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communicated its dissatisfaction with these responses and requested
that Defendants provide individualized answers and identify specific
grounds for their objections to Requests Nos. 5 through 9.1 Pl.’s Mot. to
Compel, Ex. 3, 1–2, ECF No. 35-3.
Unable to resolve their disagreement about the proper scope and
nature of Defendants’ discovery obligations, the parties scheduled a
conference with the Court. See Min. Entry dated Aug. 3, 2018. Shortly
before that conference, Defendants served their Third Amended
Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Requests for Production on
Plaintiff. Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, Ex. 5, ECF No. 35-5. Those amended
responses provided individual answers to Requests for Production Nos.
5, 6, 7, and 9 on behalf of Fakhouri, Meeron, and Pulice, but contained
the same blanket objections as the Second Amended Responses. Pl.’s
Mot. to Compel, Ex. 5, 5–8, ECF No. 35-5. Unable to resolve the issues,

Defendants’ response to Request No. 8 is no longer at issue according to
Plaintiff because Defendants later explained they have no documents
responsive to that request. Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, 5 n.3, ECF No. 35. See
also Pl.’s Mot. To Compel, Ex. 5 at 6–7, ECF No. 35-5 (explaining
Defendants are not in possession of documents responsive to Request No.
8).
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Plaintiff sought and received leave to file a motion to compel documents
responsive to its Requests for Production Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9, as permitted
by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Pl.’s
Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 35.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation.”

Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-

Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 499 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 392 (1947)). Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party . . .”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Relevance is broadly construed

for discovery purposes and is not limited to the precise issues set out in
the pleadings or to the merits of the case. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380 (1978). The Sixth Circuit has
stated that while a plaintiff should not be denied access to facts and
information necessary to prove her claims, “neither may a plaintiff be
permitted to go fishing and a trial court retains discretion to determine
that a discovery request is too broad and oppressive.” Surles ex rel.
Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007)
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(internal quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court
must exercise its “wide discretion” to balance the needs and rights of both
Plaintiff and Defendants in resolving these discovery disputes. Scales v.
J.C. Bradford and Co., 925 F.2d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Trevino
v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff asks this Court to overrule Defendants’ objections to
Plaintiff’s Requests for Production Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9 and order
Defendants to produce documents responsive to those requests. Pl. Mot.
To Compel, 12–16, 22, ECF No. 35.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues

Defendants’ objections to the requests are impermissible “boilerplate”
objections and tantamount to providing no objections at all. Id. See also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B) (allowing a party to file a motion to compel
where another party fails to respond to a discovery request or where the
party's response is evasive or incomplete).
Boilerplate objections are those that merely state the legal grounds
for objection without specifying how the discovery request is deficient or
how the objecting party would be harmed if forced to respond to the
request. Wesley Corp. v. Zoom T.V. Prod., LLC, No. 17-10021, 2018 WL
372700, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11. 2018) (citation omitted).
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Rule

34(b)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plainly disallows
boilerplate objections to discovery requests and requires parties to “state
with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the
reasons.” (emphasis added). The Rule further provides that any objection
to a discovery request must “state whether any responsive materials are
being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C).
Because boilerplate objections do not facilitate the efficient completion of
the discovery process and are not permitted under the Federal Rules,
courts in this district have consistently voiced their disapproval of
generalized, blanket objections. See e.g., Strategic Mktg. & Research
Team, Inc. v. Auto Data Solutions, Inc., 15-12695, 2017 WL 1196361, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2017) (Murphy III, J.) (“Boilerplate or generalized
objections are tantamount to no objection at all and should not be
considered.”) (quoting Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Johnson N. Am., Inc., No.
09-11783, 2011 WL 669352, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2011) (Majzoub,
M.J.)); Black v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 09-13616, 2014 WL
3577949, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 21, 2014) (Tarnow, J.) (“The Court
strongly condemns the practice of asserting boilerplate objections to
every discovery request”); Lowe v. Vadlamudi, No. 08-10269, 2012 WL
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3731781, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2010) (Lawson, J.) (noting that a
party’s boilerplate objections “do not gain in substance through
repetition.”). This Court joins those judges in the district who have
expressed their strong disapproval of generalized objections to discovery
requests that neither explain the specific basis for the objection nor state
whether documents or information are being withheld because of the
objection. Counsel should articulate particularized reasons that relate
specifically to the nature of the evidence sought, its potential materiality
and relevance to the claims at issue—or lack thereof—and explain
precisely how and why, if the objection is vagueness, overbreadth, or
burdensomeness, the request suffers from such defects, and what harm
answering the request would cause. Such a specific objection having been
articulated, counsel must also state whether any responsive materials
exist that are being withheld subject to that objection. Fed. R. Civ. P.
34(b)(2)(c).
Here, Defendants objected to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production
Nos. 5–7 and 9 only by stating that the requests are “overly broad, vague,
and the answers to the requests are irrelevant and/or not reasonably
likely to lead to admissible evidence.” Pl.’s Mot. to Compel, Ex. 5, 5–8,
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ECF No. 35-5. These objections lack the specificity mandated by Rule
34(b)(2)(B) and are almost identical to requests other courts in this
district have identified as impermissible boilerplate objections. See, e.g.,
Lowe, 2012 WL 3731781, at *2 (finding objections stating only that
requests are “unduly burdensome, overly broad, and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” are boilerplate
objections); Cratty v. City of Wyandotte, 296 F.Supp.3d 854, 858 (E.D.
Mich. 2017) (Stafford, M.J.) (objections stating only that requests are
“vague, overly broad and lacking specific” are boilerplate).
Additionally, Defendants have failed to state whether they are
withholding any documents on the basis of their generalized objections
to Requests Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9, which Rule 34(b)(2)(C) requires them to
do. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(c) (instructing the objecting party to “state
whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that
objection.”). See also Bally v. First Nat’l. Bank Omaha, No. 17-10632,
2018 WL 1558861, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (Stafford, M.J.) (criticizing
party for relying upon numerous boilerplate objections without indicating
whether it was withholding production of documents).

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While Defendants’ objections fail to comply with the Rule’s
specificity requirement, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Requests Nos. 5,
6, 7, and 9 are hardly exemplars of well-crafted and narrowly drawn
discovery requests. They contain no limitation in temporal scope and, on
their face, seek production of all documents relating to Defendants’
profits, employees, payroll, and financial records from at least the
beginning of each Defendant’s respective practice through the present.
See Mot. to Compel, Ex. 1, 3–4, ECF No. 35-1. In these specific ways the
requests are indeed overly broad and possibly unduly burdensome. The
requests are also impermissibly vague. For example, Request No. 9 asks
the Defendants to produce “all documents pertaining to your financial
records.” Id., 4. The request does not specify what types of financial
documents it seeks or whether it is limited to Fakhouri, Meeron, and
Pulice’s business records.
Because Plaintiff’s Requests Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9, and Defendants’
objections thereto are all lacking in specificity, the Court will deny
without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendants to produce
documents responsive to those requests. As stated in open court during
the December 20, 2018 hearing on this motion, Plaintiff is instructed to
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re-formulate its requests to include appropriate temporal limits (2010
through 2017, or as otherwise agreed upon by the parties) and specific
descriptions of the requested documents within 20 days of the date of this
Order. Defendants shall respond to these re-formulated requests as
required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Should Defendants
seek to interpose any objections to these reformulated requests—which
the Court does not expect because the requests will be properly tailored
and carefully drafted—such objections must specifically describe the
nature of the objection, as described above, and must indicate whether
any materials are being withheld pursuant to the objection. Failure to
make properly drawn objections, or reassertion of boilerplate objections,
will result in sanctions. Additionally, Defendants will at a minimum
produce the following documents in response to Plaintiff’s reformulated
requests:
 A list of the individuals who worked for each Defendant
during the relevant period;
 Contracts, operating agreements, partnership agreements,
profit sharing agreements, indemnity agreements, non-

Defendant Pulice need not respond to Plaintiff’s reformulated Request
for Production No. 5 because Plaintiff stated during the hearing on this
motion that she is satisfied with Pulice’s answer to Request No. 5.
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2

disclosure agreements, and any other agreements amongst
the defendants, including emails relevant to any of the
aforementioned agreements; and
 Business ledgers, statements of accounts, income statements,
accounts receivable, and records of payments to employees.
The Court further grants Plaintiff’s request to adjourn the dates in
the Scheduling Order. As instructed by this Court’s Minute Entry dated
December 20, 2018, the new discovery cutoff in this matter will be May
15, 2019, and the dispositive motions deadline will be June 21, 2019.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and to Adjourn Scheduling Order
Dates (ECF No. 35) without prejudice and instructs Plaintiff, within 20
days of the date of this Order, to send Defendants reformulated versions
of its Requests Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9 that state with specificity the
information sought by the requests, and their temporal scope.3
Defendants’ responses to those requests will be due in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also GRANTS IN PART
Plaintiff’s motion insofar as it seeks adjournment of dates in the current

3

See supra note 2.
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Scheduling Order (ECF No. 35). As instructed by this Court’s Minute
Entry dated December 20, 2018, the new discovery cutoff will be May 15,
2019, and the dispositive motions deadline will be June 21, 2019.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 29, 2019
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on
January 29, 2019, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification
to each party.
s/ Amanda Chubb
Case Manager

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