J & J Sports Productions, Incorporated v. Herriman et al

Filing 34

ORDER granting 33 Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Entry of Default Judgment as to Cruisin1, Inc., and Dismissing Defendants Tiger White and Stanley Kalisek. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (AChu)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
No. 4:17-cv-11155-TGB-DRG
Hon. Terrence G. Berg

v.
CRUISIN1, INC., CRUISIN CLUB,
AND TIGER WHITE AND
STANLEY KALISEK, Individually,
jointly and severally,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO CRUISIN1,
INC. AND DISMISSING DEFENDANTS TIGER WHITE AND
STANLEY KALISEK (ECF No. 33)
In this case, Defendants allegedly intercepted and exhibited
for public viewing at their bar the boxing event entitled Manny
Pacquiao v. Timothy Bradley, II WBO Welterweight Championship
Fight Program for private financial gain without paying the
requisite commercial licensing fee to Plaintiff. See, e.g., ECF No. 1.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Renewed Motion for Default
Judgment Against Defendant Cruisin1 Inc., and to Dismiss
Defendants, Tiger White, and Stanley Kalisek.” ECF No. 33. The
record reflects Cruisin1 Inc. was properly served with notice of this
pending lawsuit through service on its resident agent, Cheyenne
1

Usewick, on July 3, 2017. ECF No. 8; ECF No. 5-1, PageID.27
(corporate entity details). Defendant Cruisin1 Inc. has failed to
respond to the complaint or otherwise plead. On July 26, 2017,
Plaintiff obtained a clerk’s entry of default. ECF No. 12.
Once a default is entered against a defendant, that party is
deemed to have admitted all the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint pertaining to liability. See Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441
F. Supp. 2d 837, 846 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (citing Matter of Visioneering
Construction, 661 F. 2d 119, 124 (6th Cir. 1981)).
On January 22, 2018 the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment; only counsel for Plaintiff appeared.
Although Plaintiff requested a judgment on both liability and an
award of damages, the Court concluded that it would be appropriate
to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant
Cruisin1 Inc. on liability only at that time. This is because Plaintiff
sought and was granted leave to amend its complaint, dismissing
one defendant and adding two new individual defendants who
Plaintiff believed may be liable. See Amended Complaint, ECF No.
18; and Stipulation and Order, ECF No. 19. Because the complaint
sought joint and several liability against all defendants, the Court
thought it proper to await the determination of any amount of
damages until after the litigation regarding the additional
defendants is completed.
2

Judgment was therefore entered in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendant Cruisin1 on the issue of liability only.
Plaintiff now moves to enter default judgment against
defendant Cruisin1 on the issue of damages, claiming that “[t]here
is sufficient evidence to calculate and liquidate damages with the
need for an evidentiary hearing to establish damages.” ECF No. 33,
PageID.163. Plaintiff alleges that the cost of the program—if
defendants had legally purchased the rights to display it—was
$3200.00. ECF No. 33-6 (rate card). Plaintiff claims as well to have
incurred fees and costs in relation to this action totaling $7,201.25
($6,198.50 in attorney’s fees, and $1002.75 in costs). ECF No. 33–7
(Plaintiff’s counsel’s time and expense tracking).
Plaintiff also seeks judgment against defendant Cruisin1 in
the amount of $110,000.00, for “enhanced statutory damages,” plus
$7,201.25 for “reasonable attorney fees [and] costs,” plus “statutory
interest on the judgment.” ECF No. 33, PageID.164. Plaintiff
further seeks to dismiss defendants Tiger White and Stanley
Kalisek from this case.
For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Default Judgment Against
Defendant Cruisin1 Inc., and to Dismiss Defendants, Tiger White,
and Stanley Kalisek, awards damages of $10,000, and attorneys’
fees and costs of $7,201.25. ECF No. 33.
3

I.

Statutory Damages
A.

Communications Act of 1934 – 47 U.S.C. § 605

The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, prohibits the
unauthorized interception of radio communications. 47 U.S.C. §
605(a). That section has been interpreted as outlawing satellite
signal piracy and applies in this case. Cablevision of Michigan, Inc.
v. Sports Palace, Inc., 27 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s
complaint establishes the elements of liability required to state a
claim under 47 U.S.C. § 605.
Section 605 permits recovery of actual damages or statutory
damages of between $1,000–$10,000 for each non-willful violation
of this section. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) & (II). Non-willful
violation of this section is a strict liability offense—it is unnecessary
to prove intent or knowledge to establish liability under the Act. Joe
Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Easterling, No. 4:08-cv-1259, 2009 WL
1767579 at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2009), citing Int'l Cablevision,
Inc. v. Sykes, 997 F.2d 998, 1004 (2d Cir. 1993) and Kingvision Pay
Per View Ltd. v. Williams, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1481, 1484 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
The court also has discretion to increase the award by up to
$100,000.00 for willful violations of the act. 47 U.S.C. §
605(e)(3)(C)(ii) (“In any case in which the court finds that the
violation was committed willfully and for purposes of direct or
indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain, the court
4

in its discretion may increase the award of damages, whether actual
or statutory, by an amount of not more than $100,000 for each
violation of subsection (a) of this section.”). The statute does not
define “willful,” but in Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Easterling, the
Northern District of Ohio collected cases discussing the parameters
of willfulness under Section 605,
“The Supreme Court has defined “willful” in the
context of civil statutes as conduct showing
“disregard for the governing statute and an
indifference to its requirements.” Transworld
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127, 105
S. Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985).
For purposes of § 605, courts have identified
conduct as “willful” where there were repeated
violations over time, or there was a sophisticated
understanding of the satellite programming
industry and there was a violation of the statutes
that
regulate
the
conduct. Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prod., 902 F.2d
829, 851 (11th Cir. 1990); Home Box Office v.
Champs of New Haven, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 480, 484
(D. Conn. 1993).
Other district courts have ruled that a court may
draw an inference of willfulness from a defendant's
failure to appear and defend an action in which the
plaintiff demands increased statutory damages
based on allegations of willful conduct. Time
Warner Cable of New York City, [a Div. of Time
Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v. Olmo, 977 F. Supp. 585,
589 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)]; Fallaci v. The New Gazette

5

Literary Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
One district court has interpreted 47 U.S.C. §
605(e)(3)(C) (ii) to include substantial unlawful
monetary gains by a defendant as an appropriate
factor to consider when exercising discretion in
increasing
the
amount
of
statutory
damages. Home Box Office, 837 F. Supp. at 484.
Another district court has required that there
must be egregious circumstances before awarding
maximum
statutory
damages. Joe
Hand
Promotions v. Burg's Lounge, 955 F. Supp. 42, 44
(E.D. Pa. 1997).”
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Easterling, No. 4:08CV1259, 2009 WL
1767579, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2009) (quoting Buckeye
Cablevision, Inc. v. Sledge 2004 WL 952875, 2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 8,
2004)). In similar cases, this court and others have approached
damages using a variety of methods. J & J Sports Productions, Inc
v. Matti, No. 2:13-cv-13963 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2014) (per-patron
fee multiplied by factor of four); J & J Sports Production, Inc. v. Sig
Brothers Too, LLC, 2:13-cv-12014 (E.D. Mich. April 16, 2014)
(default judgment awarding all damages requested by Plaintiff);
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Granada Lounge, Inc., No. 11-13062,
2012 WL 447272, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2012) ($3,000 is
adequate deterrent and not an amount that “could put Defendants
out of business” where Plaintiffs requested $110,000); J & J Sports
Prods., Inc. v. Ribeiro, 562 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
6

(When the exact number of patrons is known, the court may
multiply that number by an amount between “$20 and $300,
although

most

courts

set

a

number

around

$50.”);

J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Trier, No. 08–cv–11159, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6415, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2009) (“[f]acts relevant to
this determination include the number of patrons in the
establishment at the time the violation occurred, the seating
capacity of the establishment, the various rates, including the
residential rate, charged by the plaintiff for the viewing of the
broadcast, and whether the defendant charged patrons a cover for
the viewing or was likely to have obtained significant profits in
another manner.”); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. McBroom, No.
5:09-cv-276(CAR), 2009 WL 5031580 at *6 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2009)
(treble licensing fee)); Entertainment by J & J, Inc. v. Suriel, 01 Civ.
11460(RO), 2003 WL 1090268 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.11, 2003) (When the
exact number of patrons is unknown, a flat sum based on
considerations of justice may be awarded).
B.
The

Cable and Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 – 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)
Cable

and

Television

Consumer

Protection

and

Competition Act of 1992 makes it illegal to intercept without
authorization any communications service offered over a cable
system. 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). Arranging to air a pay-per-view cable

7

cast program without paying for it is intercepting without
authorization a communications service offered over a cable system.
See Id.; see also Cablevision of Michigan, Inc. v. Sports Palace, Inc.,
27 F.3d 566, No. 93-1737 (6th Cir. 1994) (table).
This Act permits recovery of actual damages or statutory
damages of between $250–$10,000 for non-willful violations. 47
U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i)&(ii). As with Section 605, this is a strict
liability issue, and no proof of knowledge or intent need be shown.
Easterling, 2009 WL 1767579 at *4. The court also has discretion to
increase the award by up to $50,000.00 for willful violations of the
act—violations done for indirect commercial advantage or private
financial gain. 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B).
C.

Plaintiff may only recover under one section,
not both

When a defendant is liable under both Sections 553 and 605,
a plaintiff may recover under only one section. See J & J Sports
Productions, Inc. v. Palumbo, No. 4:12-cv-2091, 2012 WL 6861507
at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2012); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. RPM
Management Co. LLC, No. 2:11-cv-377, 2011 WL 5389425 at *2
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2011). In this case Plaintiff requests damages
under Section 605(a) and seeks an award of statutory damages (as
opposed to actual damages). ECF No. 33, PageID.172–173 (citing
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II)).

8

Plaintiff requests enhanced damages, alleging that defendant
willfully violated Section 605. ECF No. 33, PageID.173–174.
Plaintiffs say that Defendant’s willfulness can be shown here based
on “defendant's failure to appear and defend an action in which the
plaintiff

demands

increased

statutory

damages

based

on

allegations of willful conduct.” ECF No. 33, PageID.174 (quoting
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Easterling, No. 4:08CV1259, 2009 WL
1767579, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2009)).
But in the cases cited by the Easterling court upon which
Plaintiff relies, Defendant had not merely failed to appear. In the
first, Defendant had also “modified the investigators’ two devices to
receive [Plaintiff’s] cable programming.” Time Warner Cable of New
York City, a Div. of Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v. Olmo, 977 F.
Supp. 585, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The second case cited by the
Easterling court dealt with unauthorized reproduction of a
newspaper article and photograph in violation of the copyright law,
not Section 605. Fallaci v. The New Gazette Literary Corp., 568 F.
Supp. 1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has never laid out how exactly
Defendant obtained the signal for the boxing match, whether by
paying for a less expensive residential license and then
broadcasting it within the establishment, or by modifying some
piece of hardware to steal the signal, or by some other means. The
9

mere act of playing the broadcast—even where Defendant failed to
appear or defend, and may have obtained “commercial advantage
or private financial gain”—is not enough to establish that the
Defendant willfully violated Section 605. Though perhaps unlikely,
the record before the Court cannot exclude the possibility that
Defendant’s televisions played the boxing match through some
technological happenstance or mistake on the part of Plaintiff,
without any act from Defendant causing it to happen. A showing of
willfulness under Section 605 requires, at the very least, an
allegation that Defendant took some action to cause the program to
be broadcast without paying the licensing fee.
In the instant case, there is also no allegation of “disregard for
the governing statute and an indifference to its requirements,” nor
“repeated violations over time,” nor “sophisticated understanding
of the satellite programming industry[.]” See Transworld Airlines,
Inc., 469 U.S. at 127; Cable/Home Communication Corp., 902 F.2d
at 851; Home Box Office, 837 F. Supp. at 484. Plaintiff similarly
makes no showing of “substantial unlawful monetary gains” by
defendant. Home Box Office, at id.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not
adequately alleged the Defendant willfully violated Section 605.
D.

Determining damages

10

Plaintiff supplied an affidavit from an investigator, Joe
Rossetti, who attests that he visited “Cruisin Club” on April 12,
2014 (the night of the fight) and made several observations. See
ECF No. 33-5. Mr. Rossetti paid a $10 cover fee at the door, walked
past several security guards, and entered the main area of the
location, which sounds like a standard bar. ECF No. 33-5,
PageID.205. Within this area, Mr. Rossetti observed five total
televisions, but only two of them were showing the Manny Pacquiao
v. Timothy Bradley fight program. Id. Mr. Rossetti said that there
also was a DJ playing live music at the same time. Id. Mr. Rossetti
claims that the maximum capacity for this location is 200 people,
though it is unclear whether this is his best approximation based
on his observations only, or if he obtained this number from a Fire
Marshal certificate or something other public record. Id. Mr.
Rossetti claims to have performed three head counts during his
visit, observing about 130 people in the establishment. Id. It is
unclear whether Mr. Rossetti included service staff and members of
security in his head count.
Plaintiff’s actual damages are $3,200—the amount of the
unpaid licensing fee.1 Plaintiff only accuses Defendant of a single
violation of Section 605.
Plaintiff supplies a “Rate Card” indicating that the fee for an establishment
with a capacity of 200 people is $3,200.00. ECF No. 33-6, PageID.208. Mr.
1

11

Even if the Court found that defendant willfully violated
Section 605, $110,000 would be excessive, as that is an amount that
would likely put defendant out of business. See Joe Hand
Promotions, Inc. v. Granada Lounge, Inc., No. 11-13062, 2012 WL
447272, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2012) (awarding an amount that
is adequately deterrent but not enough to put Defendants out of
business); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Ribeiro, 562 F. Supp. 2d 498,
502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v.
Polanco, 05 Civ. 3411(DC), 2006 WL 305458, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 7,
2006) (“Courts, however, must bear in mind that ‘although the
amount of damages should be an adequate deterrent, [a single]
violation is not so serious as to warrant putting the restaurant out
of business.’”).
Section 605 allows damages for non-willful violations either
in the amount of actual damages plus “any profits of the violator
that are attributable to the violation which are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages,” or in an amount
between $1,000 and $10,000, as the Court considers just. 47 U.S.C.
§ 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)&(II). Plaintiff has not provided any allegation of
Defendant’s gross revenue or what they believe to be Defendant’s
profits gained from airing the boxing match—elements that are
Rossetti attested that the capacity of Cruisin Club was exactly 200 people. ECF
No. 33-5, PageID.205.
12

required for the Court to award actual damages under 47 U.S.C. §
605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I). The Court instead exercises its discretion under
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) to award an amount it considers just.
Accordingly, the Court awards a total of $10,000 statutory
damages—less than one-tenth of the amount requested—to
Plaintiff for Defendant’s single, non-willful violation of Section 605.
See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). This amount is the maximum
statutory damages allowable for non-willful violations, and the
minimum amount allowable for willful violations. If the Court had
found Defendant’s mere default adequate to establish a willful
violation, the amount awarded would still have been $10,000,
reflecting no prior history of violations by Defendant, and an atbest-de-minimis showing of willfulness. However, in awarding the
maximum statutory damages for non-willful violations, the Court
is observing that Defendant’s unacceptable conduct in allowing the
broadcast to air in their establishment was compounded by their
default.
The Court finds $10,000 to be just, and adequate to send a
deterrent message to other establishments to be very careful about
airing programs without paying the requisite licensing fee. This
amount also more-than-adequately compensates Plaintiff, as it is
more three times their actual damages in lost licensing fee revenue.

13

The Court GRANTS an award of $10,000.00 in damages to
Plaintiff for Defendant Cruisin1’s non-willful violation of Section
605.
II.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Section 605 also requires an award of costs and reasonable
attorney's fees. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) (“The court— shall
direct the recovery of full costs, including awarding reasonable
attorneys’ fees to an aggrieved party who prevails.”).
Counsel from Hubbell DuVall, PLLC submitted a Time and
Expense tracking sheet in support of their requested fees. ECF No.
33-7. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will approve
$7,201.25 in total costs and fees for Hubbell DuVall, PLLC.
E.

Lodestar analysis

The first step in determining attorneys’ fees is “multiplying
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a
reasonable hourly rate.” U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures,
Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1193 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–37 (1983) (noting that “[t]he most
useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable
fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate”)). The party requesting the
fees has the burden of establishing that they are entitled to the
requested amount. Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837,
14

848 (6th Cir. 2013). “The key requirement for an award of attorney’s
fees is that the documentation offered in support of the hours
charged must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable
the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such
hours were actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of
the litigation.” Inwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531,
553 (6th Cir. 2008). The trial judge must “question the time,
expertise, and professional work of [the] lawyer” applying for fees.
Earl v. Beaulieu, 620 F.2d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1980). And, in
calculating the appropriate award, “the district court is required to
give a clear explanation,” as to its reasoning. Moore v. Freeman, 355
F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
To determine a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys or firms
located out-of-state, “courts use as a guideline the prevailing
market rate, which is defined as the rate that lawyers of
comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command
within the venue of the court of record.” Northeast Ohio Coalition
for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 715 (6th Cir. 2016)
(citing Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004)
(quotation marks omitted)). As such, the Court uses a report
produced regularly by the State Bar of Michigan called the “2017
Economics of Law Practice, Attorney Income and Billing Rate
Summary

Report,”

available
15

at

https://www.michbar.org/file/pmrc/articles/0000153.pdf
(hereinafter “2017 Report”).2
“The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do
rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563
U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Thus, trial courts “may take into account their
overall sense of a suit and may use estimates in calculating and
allocating an attorney’s time,” id., and need only provide “a concise
but clear explanation” of their reason for reaching a certain fee
award amount. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that the requested fee is based on a
reasonable number of hours, and that the responsible attorney’s
hourly rate of $245.00 per hour is reasonable and in line with local
attorneys of similar experience. ECF No. 33, PageID.178 (brief in
support of motion); PageID.183 (counsel’s affidavit). Counsel for
plaintiff claims that attorney fees totaled $6,198.50, costs totaled
$1,002.75, and these amounts combined equal $7,201.25.
Plaintiff’s counsel, Clinton Hubbell, provides documentation
that litigation activities comes to a total of 25.30 hours. ECF No.
33-7, PageID.217–223 (“Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Time and Expense
Tracking”). This tracking sheet includes 45 tasks, 44 of which are
In determining the reasonableness of their rates, Plaintiff’s counsel relied
upon the 2014 version of this Report, mistakenly believing it to be the most
recent update to the report. See 2014 Report, ECF No. 33-8 (Exhibit 8). The
Court uses the more recent 2017 Report.
2

16

assigned to Mr. Hubbell, and one of which was completed by
Anupama Gokarn. Id. at PageID.217. The tasks reflect standard
litigation activities (attending depositions, drafting pleadings,
court mandated telephonic conferences, etc.), and range from 0.10
hours of time on the low end (tasks such as reviewing the
scheduling order) to 3.20 hours on the high end (drafting and
revising the motion for default judgment). Id. at PageID.219–221.
Most of the tasks register as less than an hour. Though this sheet
indicates a rate of $0.00 per hour, the total number of hours
indicated (25.30 hours) multiplied by a rate of $245.00 per hour (the
rate claimed in the motion, ECF No. 33, PageID.178) does equal the
amount requested by counsel: $6,198.50.
Counsel for Plaintiff did not supply the court with his CV, nor
indicate how long he has practiced, nor what his title is—
information which is important in determining the correct lodestar
for fee awards per the 2017 Report. His profile on the Hubbell
DuVall PLLC website indicates that he graduated law school in
2008, and that he founded the firm (with fellow attorney Dylan
DuVall) that same year. See Clinton J. Hubbell, Our People,
Hubbell DuVall PLLC, https://hubbellduvall.com/people/clinton-jhubbell/. The firm is located in Southfield, Michigan and does not
appear to employ any other attorneys other Messrs. Hubbell and
and

DuVall.

About

Us,
17

Hubbell

DuVall

PLLC,

https://hubbellduvall.com/about/. As such, the Court considers Mr.
Hubbell a named partner of a small, single-office law firm, with
over ten years of experience.
The Report finds that for partners,3 the hourly billing rate
ranged from $223.00 (25th percentile) to $567.00 (95th percentile),
with median rates ranging between $290.00–$315.00, and mean
rates ranging between $300.00–$329.00. 2017 Report at 4. For all
attorneys with 11–20 years of experience, hourly rates range from
$225.00–$500.00, with a mean of $302.00. Id. Hourly rates for
attorneys located in Southfield, Michigan ranged from $220.00–
$510.00. Id. at 5.
Mr. Hubbell’s proffered hourly rate of $245.00 is well within
the range for similarly-situated attorneys, and is not approaching
the 95th percentile for any of the relevant categories examined in
the 2017 Report. Mr. Hubbell’s rate is at or below the average
hourly rates of similarly-situated attorneys.
Having reviewed all applicable categories and ranges in the
2017 Report, the Court will reimburse Mr. Hubbell at the rate and
amount requested, because both his hourly rate and the number of
hours he expended in pursuit of this case are reasonable for
similarly-situated attorneys practicing in Michigan. Accordingly,
Including “Managing Partner,” “Equity Partner/Shareholder,” and “NonEquity Partner.” 2017 Report at 4.

3

18

the Court GRANTS Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$6,198.50.
Plaintiff also requests reasonable costs, and includes in the
expense tracking sheet an accounting of the various cost-inducing
activities

associated

with

this

litigation.

ECF

No.

33-7,

PageID.224–225. These items include such things as filing fees,
court reporter costs for depositions, process server fees, and postage
costs, among other things. Id. The Court has reviewed the costs
listed and determined that they are all reasonably incurred costs
given the nature of this litigation. Accordingly, the Court also
GRANTS Plaintiff $1,002.75 for costs.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
“Renewed Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant
Cruisin1 Inc., and to Dismiss Defendants, Tiger White, and Stanley
Kalisek” (ECF No. 33), enters default judgment against Defendant
Cruisin1 Inc., and awards to Plaintiff:
$10,000.00 in damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)&(II),
$6,198.50 in reasonable attorneys’ fees,
$1,002.75 in reasonably incurred litigation costs,
for a total of $17,201.25.

19

Defendants Tiger White and Stanley Kalisek are dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2019

s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically filed, and the
parties and/or counsel of record were served on April 12, 2019.
s/A. Chubb
Case Manager

20