Fowler et al v. Johnson

Filing 35

AMENDED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RE: 21 OPINION and ORDER Granting Plaintiffs' 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (JOwe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ADRIAN FOWLER and
KITIA HARRIS, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Case No. 17-11441
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
RUTH JOHNSON, in her official
capacity as Secretary of State of the
Michigan Department of State,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
AMENDED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
On December 14, 2017, this Court issued an opinion and order granting
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 21.) In that decision, the
Court provided: “Defendant is enjoined from enforcing Michigan Compiled Laws
§ 257.321a to suspend the driver’s licenses of people unable to pay their traffic
debt.” (Id. at Pg ID 268.) Defendant appealed and asked the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals to stay the injunction. On December 28, 2017, the Sixth Circuit stayed
this Court’s injunction for thirty days and remanded the matter “for the limited
purpose of modifying the injunctive relief granted … to provide direction to the
State as to the type of process required to comply with the court’s order.” (ECF
No. 30, emphasis added.) The Sixth Circuit further indicated in its decision: “The

State has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its
challenge to the district court’s ruling on procedural due process.” (Id. at Pg ID
450.)
In response to the Sixth Circuit’s remand order, this Court issued an order on
January 5, 2018, clarifying its injunction. (ECF No. 31.) The order stated:
To be clear, in its December 14, 2017 decision, this Court
intended to enjoin Defendant from suspending any further driver’s
licenses of individuals because of their inability to pay their traffic
debt until the State: (1) provides drivers a hearing where they have the
opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay; (2) provides
reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing; and (3) institutes
alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic
payment plans or volunteer service).
(Id. at Pg ID 452-53.) The Court further scheduled a hearing for January 17, 2018,
to address any questions or concerns the parties may have had concerning the
intended modification to the preliminary injunction order. (Id. at Pg ID 453.) The
Court instructed Defendant to “be prepared to inform opposing counsel and the
Court of how the State intends to satisfy the Court’s injunction.” (Id.)
Prior to the January 17 hearing, Plaintiff filed a brief suggesting changes to
the language used in the Court’s proposed modified preliminary injunction. (ECF
No. 32.) Defendant filed a twenty-six page brief and exhibits, attempting to
convince the Court that it should vacate the preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 33.)
As the Court stated at the January 17 hearing, it did not read the Sixth
Circuit’s remand order as inviting it to revisit the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
2

While the Sixth Circuit recognized that additional briefing or evidentiary hearings
may be needed, its order did not suggest that additional evidence could be
considered to reconsider this Court’s December 14, 2017 decision. In fact, the
Sixth Circuit specifically contemplated briefing and/or hearings only “to provide
direction to the State as to the type of process required to comply with the court’s
order.” (ECF No. 30 at Pg ID 450-51, emphasis added.) Nevertheless, Defendant
used the remand proceedings, including the hearing on January 17, to continue to
argue the merits of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Defendant offered little assistance to the
Court in fashioning a mechanism to execute the process this Court finds
constitutionally necessary before suspending driver’s licenses of individuals unable
to pay the traffic fines, costs, fees, or assessments for which the lack of payment
leads to suspension under Section 257.321a.
Despite the lack of cooperation from Defendant, the Court believes it now
can sufficiently direct Defendant as to the specific actions it should take to comply
with the constitutional due process requirement. Because Section 257.321
delegates the authority to suspend driver’s licenses (i.e., a property interest) to
Defendant, the Constitution imposes on Defendant the State’s concomitant duty to
see that no deprivation occurs without adequate procedural protections.
Accordingly,

3

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant is enjoined from suspending any further
driver’s licenses of individuals because of nonpayment of any fine, cost, fee or
assessment under Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.321a unless and until Defendant
or another entity: (1) offers drivers the option to request a hearing where they have
the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or
assessment; (2) provides a hearing when requested 1; (3) provides reasonable notice
to drivers of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment
for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service).

Dated: January 24, 2018

s/Linda V. Parker
U.S. District Court Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on January 24, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens acting in the Absence of Richard Loury
Case Manager

1

Defendant contends that it would be too burdensome to hold a formal hearing
with a hearing officer for every individual who risks suspension of a driver’s
license under Section 257.321a. There certainly are other ways for Defendant
and/or the State to comply with the due process requirement. For example,
Defendant could provide an opportunity for individuals to submit documentation if
they claim an inability to pay and evaluate that documentation as the courts do
when considering an application to proceed in forma pauperis, providing a hearing
only to allow individuals deemed able to pay to challenge that finding. Further,
Defendant could delegate to the courts the responsibility to conduct the hearing
when individuals first appear in response to a citation but only if individuals are
provided adequate notice that they may assert inability to pay in that forum.
4