Grant v. SSA
Filing
18
OPINION AND ORDER (1) Sustaining in Part and Overruling in Part Plaintiff's 16 Objections to the Magistrate Judge's 15 Report and Recommendation, (2) Granting in Part Plaintiff's 11 Motion for Summary Judgment, (3) Denying Defendant's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment, and (4) Remanding for Further Proceedings. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TAMIKA GRANT,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-cv-12819
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING
IN PART PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF #16) TO THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF #15), (2)
GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF #11), (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #14), AND (4) REMANDING FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
In this action, Plaintiff Tamika Grant challenges the denial of her applications
for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under the
Social Security Act. Both Grant and Defendant Commissioner of Social Security
filed motions for summary judgment (see ECF ## 11, 14), and the assigned
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation in which he recommended
that the Court (1) grant the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and (2)
deny Grant’s motion for summary judgment (the “R&R”). (See ECF #15.) Grant
filed timely objections to the R&R (the “Objections”). (See ECF #16.)
1
The Court has carefully reviewed the R&R and appreciates the Magistrate
Judge’s careful and thorough consideration of the issues presented. However, as
explained below, the Court respectfully disagrees with certain aspects of the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis and recommended disposition. Accordingly, as set forth
below, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART AND OVERRULES IN PART the
Objections, GRANTS IN PART Grant’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES
the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and REMANDS this action for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.
I
A1
On August 23, 2014, Grant filed an application for disability insurance
benefits with the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”). (See Admin. R., ECF
#8-5 at Pg. ID 183-184.) She filed an application for supplemental security income
benefits on October 7, 2014 (collectively with Grant’s disability insurance benefits
application, the “Applications”). (See id. at Pg. ID 185-90.) In the Applications,
Grant alleged that she became disabled on January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2014.
(See id. at Pg. ID 183, 185.) Grant maintained that she suffered from patellofemoral
arthritis, chondromalacia of patella, and degenerative joint disease. (See Admin R.,
1
The Court recites only the facts relevant to the Objections.
2
ECF #11-6 at Pg. ID 234.) The SSA denied the Applications because it found that
Grant was not disabled. (See Admin. R., ECF #11-4 at Pg. ID 119-126.)
Grant thereafter requested and received a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge. Administrative law judge Roy LaRoche, Jr. (the “ALJ”)
held that hearing on October 16, 2015. (See ALJ Hearing Tr., ECF #8-2 at Pg. ID
57-92.) Grant and an impartial vocational expert testified at the hearing. Grant
testified that, among other things, she had not recovered from a partial knee
replacement, that she suffered from “lower back pain that’s really been bad,” and
that an orthopedic surgeon recommended that she “get a total knee replacement of
[her] left knee.” (Id. at Pg. ID 66-67.) Grant also told the ALJ that she could not
walk without a cane and that she could not “carry any weight at all” due to the
“discomfort [in her] back and [] legs.” (Id. at Pg. ID 78-79.)
Grant also submitted records from her treating physicians to the ALJ,
including records from her general physician, Nicholas Marsheh, M.D., her
neurologist, Curt Wimmer, M.D., and her orthopedic surgeon, Freemont Scott, D.O.
Relevant to the Objections, Drs. Maresh, Wimmer, and Scott each opined at various
times that Grant was unable to work due to her knee and/or back issues:
Dr. Scott opined on September 4, 2014, that Grant “should” qualify for
disability benefits because “it would be quite a while” before Grant
could “go through rehabilitation and return to more normal activities.”
(Admin R., ECF #8-7 at Pg. ID 223);
3
Dr. Marsheh opined on December 2, 2015, that “[a]t this time, until
further notice, [Grant] is unable to work due to Degenerative Disc
Disease and Chronic Back Pain.” (Admin R., ECF #8-13 at Pg. ID 857);
and
Dr. Wimmer opined on December 7, 2015, that “[i]t [was his] medical
opinion that Ms. Grant cannot carry on any job at this time and will
require ongoing pain management.” (Id. at Pg. ID 585.)
On May 19, 2016, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he affirmed the
SSA’s denial of the Applications. (See Admin. R., ECF #8-2 at Pg. ID 43-51.) The
ALJ first found that Grant suffered from the following severe impairments:
“osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees status – post right knee arthroplasty and left
knee arthroscopy, right foot hallux valgus[,] and degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine.” (Id. at Pg. ID 45.) The ALJ further determined that Grant could not
perform her past relevant work as home health aide due to her physical limitations.
(See id. at Pg. ID 50.) The ALJ nonetheless concluded that Grant was not disabled
and that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that Grant could perform. (See id. at Pg. ID 50-51.)
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ appeared to discount the opinions of Drs.
Marsheh and Wimmer, and he provided “little weight” to the opinion of Dr. Scott.
(Admin R., ECF #8-2 at Pg. ID 49.) As to Drs. Marsheh and Wimmer, the ALJ
addressed their opinions in a single, combined sentence: “However, neither Dr.
4
Marsheh nor Dr. Wimmer, [sic] noted any functional limitations and the issue of
disability is one that is reserved to the commissioner.” (Id.) The ALJ did not indicate
what weight, if any, he was assigning to these opinions. The ALJ then assigned
“little weight” to Dr. Scott’s opinion in one sentence of analysis: “Although [Dr.
Scott’s] opinion restricted [Grant] from work, it appears to refer to an inability to
perform [Grant’s] past work and expected to be for a restricted period. Therefore,
the undersigned gave this opinion little weight.” (Id.)
B
Grant filed this action challenging the SSA’s denial of benefits on August 25,
2017. (See Compl., ECF #1.) Grant and the Commissioner then filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. (See Grant’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #11; Commissioner’s
Mot. Summ. J., ECF #14.)
The Court referred the cross-motions to the assigned Magistrate Judge. On
August 23 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R in which he carefully
analyzed the arguments that parties made in their motions for summary judgment.
(See R&R, ECF #15.) The Magistrate Judge ultimately recommended that the Court
grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Grant’s motion. (See id.) In reaching
this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge rejected Grant’s argument that the ALJ failed
to “accord adequate weight to the opinion[s] of [her] treating physicians.” (Id. at Pg.
ID 995.)
5
On September 19, 2017, Grant timely filed the Objections in which she raises
two objections to the R&R. (See ECF #16.) First, Grant argues that the “the
Magistrate erred by finding that the ALJ properly discounted the opinions of [her]
treating physicians.” (Id. at Pg. ID 1016.)
Second, Grant contends that “the
Magistrate erred in finding that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.” (Id. at Pg. ID 1018.) The Court will address each alleged error in turn
below.
II
A
When a party objects to a portion of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the Court
reviews that portion de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also Lyons v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to
conduct an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which a party has not
objected. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
B
In reviewing the disputed findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to
determining whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence and are
made pursuant to proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla
6
of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “An ALJ’s failure to
follow agency rules and regulations denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even
where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.” Cole v.
Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
III
A
In Grant’s first objection, she seeks relief on the basis that the ALJ failed to
provide “good reasons” for not giving controlling weight to the opinions offered by
her treating physicians Drs. Maresh, Wimmer, and Scott. (Objections, ECF #16 at
Pg. ID 1016-18.)
The Court agrees that the ALJ’s treatment of the treating
physicians’ opinions was inadequate.
Under the “treating physician rule,” the opinion of an applicant’s treating
physician must be given “controlling weight” if “(1) the opinion ‘is well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical laboratory diagnostic techniques;’ and (2) the
opinion ‘is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.’”
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). If an ALJ does not provide controlling weight to a
7
treating-physician’s opinion, the ALJ is required to “provide ‘good reasons’ for
discounting the weight given to [that] opinion.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2)). “These reasons must be supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers
the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the
reasons for that weight.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “This procedural
requirement ‘ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits
meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Finally, “even if the
treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, there remains a
presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that the opinion of a treating physician is
entitled to great deference.” Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009)
(internal punctuation omitted).
Here, with respect to the opinions of Drs. Marsheh and Wimmer, it is not at
all clear what weight, if any, the ALJ provided these opinions or why the ALJ chose
to assign that weight. As noted above, the ALJ addressed the opinions of Drs.
Marsheh and Wimmer in a single, perfunctory sentence: “However, neither Dr.
Marsheh nor Dr. Wimmer, [sic] noted any functional limitations and the issue of
disability is one that is reserved to the commissioner.” (Admin R., ECF #8-2 at Pg.
ID 49.) This sentence perhaps suggests that the ALJ assigned the opinions no
8
weight, but it does not state with sufficient clarity what specific weight, if any, he
gave to these opinions. That failure “alone constitutes error.” Cole, 661 F.3d at 938
(noting that the failure to “assign a specific weight” to a treating physician’s opinion
“alone constitutes error as a finding that a treating source medical opinion ... is not
entitled to controlling weight does not mean that the opinion should be rejected”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
It may be that the ALJ concluded that he need not accord any weight to these
opinions because they were conclusory and therefore did not constitute valid medical
opinions under the applicable regulations.2 See, e.g., Dunlap v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
509 F. App’x 472, 476 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that “conclusory statements that a
claimant is disabled or unable to work” may not constitute a valid medical opinion
under the applicable regulations); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (defining a
medical opinion as one “that reflects[s] judgments about the nature and severity of
[a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and
prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the
claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions”). But if that was the ALJ’s intent, he
needed to clearly express it. And if the ALJ decided to accord less than controlling
2
The Court makes no such determination of the validity of these medical opinions
here.
9
weight to the opinions of Drs. Marsheh and Wimmer for a different reason, he
needed to explain that reason and justify it based upon the record.
For all of these reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Grant’s first objection to the
R&R, and the Court will remand her applications for benefits to the Commissioner
for further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ shall provide additional explanation
and analysis with respect to his treatment of the opinions of Drs. Marsheh and
Wimmer, and he shall also explain in greater detail the basis for his decision to
provide “little weight” to the opinion of Dr. Scott. Importantly, nothing in this
Opinion and Order precludes the ALJ from according less than controlling weight,
or no weight at all, to the opinions of Drs. Marsheh, Wimmer, and Scott. The Court
expresses no view of the merits of their opinions. The Court is simply requiring the
ALJ to thoroughly and carefully explain his treatment of those opinions.
B
In Grant’s second objection, she seeks relief on the basis that the ALJ’s
decision was not supported by “substantial evidence.” (Objections, ECF #16 at Pg.
ID 1018.) In this objection, Grant does not identify any specific portion of the R&R
or any particular finding of the Magistrate Judge with which she disagrees. Instead,
she takes issue with the R&R in toto. For example, in the Objections, instead of
identifying specific medical records that she contends the Magistrate Judge
overlooked, or failed to properly credit, Grant simply describes pages of medical
10
records without ever tying those records back to the R&R or the Magistrate Judge’s
analysis. (See id. at Pg. ID 1018-21.)
Such an objection is insufficient. “A general objection to the entirety of the
magistrate’s report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district
court’s attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the
initial reference to the magistrate useless. The functions of the district court are
effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court perform identical
tasks. This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving
them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” Howard v. Sec. of
Health and Human Svs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Indeed, near the end of
Grant’s second objection, she attempts to incorporate all of the arguments she raised
in her summary judgment motion. (See Objections, ECF #16 at Pg. ID 1021.) This
broad incorporation, if allowed, would lead to the precise type of “duplication of
time and effort” that the Sixth Circuit warned against in Howard. Accordingly, the
Court will OVERRULE Grant’s second objection to the R&R.
IV
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Grant’s Objections to the R&R (ECF #16) are SUSTAINED IN PART
AND OVERRULED IN PART as set forth above;
Grant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #11) is GRANTED IN
PART;
11
The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #14) is
DENIED; and
The action is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 20, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on September 20, 2018, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
(810) 341-9764
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?