Hayse v. City of Melvindale et al

Filing 120

OPINION and ORDER Rejecting Defendants' 113 Objections to the Magistrate Judge's August 2, 2018 108 Opinion and Order. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHAD HAYSE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MELVINDALE, a political
Subdivision of the State;
MELVINDALE CITY COUNCIL, a
legislative body of the City of
Melvindale, NICOLE BARNES,
WHEELER MARSEE, MICHELLE
SAID LAND, DAVE CYBULSKI,
CARL LOUVET, and STEVEN
DENSMORE, individuals, sued in
their official and personal capacities

Civil Case No. 17-13294
Honorable Linda V. Parker
Mag. Elizabeth A. Stafford

Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS [ECF
NO. 113] TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S AUGUST 2, 2018 ORDER
(ECF NO. 108)
This matter currently is before the Court on Defendants’ Objections to
Magistrate Judge Stafford’s August 2, 2018 Order on Defendants’ Motion to
Enforce Protective Order and Cease and Desist from Continued Violation. (ECF
No. 108.) Defendants filed their Objections to the Order on August 16, 2018.
(ECF No. 113.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Response to the Objections on

August 30, 2018. (ECF No. 116). For the reasons that follow, the Court rejects
Defendants’ Objections.
Standard of Review
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive decision, the
reviewing court must affirm the magistrate judge’s ruling unless the objecting
party demonstrates that it is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard does not
empower a reviewing court to reverse a magistrate judge’s finding because it
would have decided the matter differently. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). Instead, the “clearly erroneous” standard is
met when despite the existence of evidence to support the finding, the court, upon
reviewing the record in its entirety, “ ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
“ ‘An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant
statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.’ ” Mattox v. Edelman, No. 12-13762,
2014 WL 4829583, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2014) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, No. 08-12960, 2009 WL 2922875, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2009)).

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The reviewing court “must exercise independent judgment with respect to the
magistrate judge’s conclusions of law.” Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162
F.R.D. 289, 291 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (citing Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684,
686 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Procedural Background
On July 30, 2018, Magistrate Judge Stafford held oral argument with respect
to Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Protective Order and Cease and Desist from
Continued Violation. (ECF No. 79.) Defendants sought the Court’s intervention
in enforcing Plaintiff’s compliance with a January 30, 2018 Stipulated
Confidentiality Protective Order. (ECF No. 31.) Defendants alleged Plaintiff
violated the Order by disclosing confidential discovery materials and transcripts
from this litigation. On August 2, 2018, Magistrate Judge Stafford ruled against
Defendants and denied their motion. (ECF No. 108.) Subsequently, Defendants
filed their Objections on August 16, 2018. (ECF No. 113.) In turn, Plaintiff filed
his Response on August 30, 2018. (ECF No. 116.)
Defendants’ Objections
Defendants object to Magistrate Judge Stafford’s ruling, arguing she
committed clear error by: (1) failing to consider all violations of the Protective
Order; (2) misinterpreting the Order; (3) applying a good cause standard in
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refusing to enforce the Order; (4) interpreting the Order to require parties to mark
deposition testimony as confidential; (5) considering emails provided by Plaintiff
on the date of the motion hearing that were not attached to Plaintiff’s Response;
and (6) finding no violation of the Order.
Analysis
First, Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Stafford committed clear error
by failing to consider all violations of the Protective Order, specifically Plaintiff’s
counsel’s disclosure of personnel file documents marked as confidential to her
other non-party client for use in his ongoing litigation against Defendants. The
Court does not agree that Magistrate Judge Stafford failed to consider each of
Defendants’ allegations against Plaintiff simply because each allegation was not
enumerated in her Order. Plaintiff correctly notes that in examining the record of
the July 30, 2018 Oral Argument, Magistrate Judge Stafford considered
Defendants’ potential “intent to shield from the public things . . . the public has a
right to know about.” (ECF No. 116-10 at Pg ID 7068-71.) Furthermore,
Magistrate Judge Stafford stated that Defendants’ efforts “to insulate itself or any
of its officials . . . would [] be directly contrary to public policy.” (Id.) Thus,
Magistrate Judge Stafford rejected Defendants’ allegations, finding that
interpreting the Protective Order as Defendants’ requested would frustrate
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significant public policy concerns. The Court agrees and, therefore, rejects
Defendants’ first objection.
Second, Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Stafford committed clear
error by not interpreting the Protective Order according to its “clear and
unambiguous language.” Whether ambiguity exists is a question of law for the
Court to determine. Aqua Grp. LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820
(E.D. Mich. 2009). Magistrate Judge Stafford determined that (1) the language in
the Protective Order could have different interpretations and (2) that Defendants’
interpretation appeared “overly broad” and as a result “not sanctioned by Rule 26.”
(ECF No. 116-10 at Pg ID 7071.) The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’
argument that the placement of one comma clearly dictates the parties’ intent and
the ordinary meaning of the language at issue so much so that no other
interpretation would be possible. For this reason, the Court rejects Defendants’
second objection.
Third, Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Stafford committed clear
error by applying a good cause standard in refusing to enforce the Protective
Order. Magistrate Judge Stafford did not err in applying a good cause standard.
As mentioned above, Magistrate Judge Stafford found that Defendants’
interpretation of the Order contradicted established tenets of Rule 26. In fact, Rule
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26 states that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect” from
certain harms that might befall a party from whom discovery is sought. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (emphasis added). To argue that it is clear error to apply a
standard that is entrenched in the very language of the rule permitting protective
orders is sorely misguided. Consequently, the Court rejects Defendants’ third
objection.
Fourth, Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Stafford committed clear
error by interpreting language in the Protective Order to require parties to mark
deposition testimony as confidential, rather than interpreting the Order to be
deemed “Confidential” without having to orally indicate such on the record.
Magistrate Judge Stafford did not err when interpreting the Order to require parties
to mark deposition testimony as confidential. Notwithstanding the Order
alleviating the need to orally indicate confidentiality designations on the record,
the Order can still be read to require parties to mark deposition testimony as
confidential. For this reason, the Court rejects Defendants’ fourth objection.
Fifth, Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Stafford committed clear error
by finding ambiguity in the language of the Protective Order and considering
emails provided by Plaintiff on the date of the hearing that were not attached to
Plaintiff’s Response and which were already considered by Judge Parker.
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Defendants offer no legal authority that supports the contention that Magistrate
Judge Stafford could not consider the emails provided by Plaintiff. As discussed
previously, Magistrate Judge Stafford determined that the language in the
Protective Order could have different interpretations. The Court agrees and,
therefore, rejects Defendants’ fifth objection.
Finally, Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Stafford committed clear
error by finding no violation of the Protective Order. The Court agrees with
Plaintiff that Magistrate Judge Stafford properly applied relevant case law and
public policy concerns to find that there was no violation of the Order.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ final objection.
For these reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’ Objections to Magistrate
Judge Stafford’s August 2, 2018 Order.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Objections to Magistrate Judge
Stafford’s August 2, 2018 Order (ECF No. 113) are REJECTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Stafford’s August 2,
2018 Order (ECF No. 108) is AFFIRMED and Defendants’ Motion to Enforce
Protective Order and Cease and Desist from Continued Violation (ECF No. 79.) is

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DENIED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 15, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, October 15, 2018, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ R. Loury
Case Manager

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