Fields v. Campbell

Filing 9

OPINION and ORDER Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WALTER MICHAEL FIELDS, II,
Petitioner,

Case Number: 17-13565
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
SHERMAN CAMPBELL,
Respondent.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
challenging his Michigan state court convictions for two counts of operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death. The petition raises two claims for
relief, both regarding alleged deficiencies in the jury instructions. The Court finds
that Petitioner’s claims do not warrant habeas corpus relief. Therefore, the Court is
denying the application for habeas relief.
I.

Background
Petitioner’s convictions arise from the deaths of Nadeem Sawaf and Kush

Sood. The Michigan Court of Appeals set forth the following relevant facts in its
decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions:
On December 16, 2012, after leaving a Sterling
Heights bar, Nadeem Sawaf, Kush Sood, and Erica
Cholewa traveled in Sawaf’s Honda on the I-75
expressway toward Detroit which he was driving. Sawaf

lost control of his car, causing it to spin, hit a median
wall, and ultimately stop in a perpendicular position
across the right two lanes of the highway. After the three
occupants left the car and made it safely to the
embankment, Sawaf and Sood returned to the car on the
roadway, where they were struck by defendant’s Ford
Explorer at approximately 2:00 [a.m.]
While questioning defendant, State Police Trooper
Josh Reeber, one of the first responders to the scene,
noticed a strong odor of alcohol emanating from
defendant. He also observed a full container of beer in
the front seat of defendant’s truck and a half-empty bottle
of Hennessy Cognac in a brown paper bag in the back.
Trooper Reeber performed field sobriety tests on
defendant, all of which he failed. Subsequent testing
revealed that defendant had a blood alcohol content level
of .21 at 5:39 a.m., two and a half times the legal limit of
.08.
People v. Fields, II, No. 326702, 2016 WL 4129314, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 2,
2016). These facts are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413
(6th Cir. 2009).
A jury in Michigan’s Wayne County Circuit Court found Petitioner guilty of
two counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, and the
trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for
each of the convictions. Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court
of Appeals, challenging the jury instructions, the trial judge’s response to a
question from the jury, and the trial court’s failure to strike the testimony of
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prosecution witness Sergeant Chad Lindstrom. The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, Fields, 2016 WL 4129314 at *4, and the
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Fields, 889 N.W.2d
264 (Mich. 2017).
On November 1, 2017, Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition. He raises
these claims:
I.
The Michigan Supreme Court erred when it affirmed the
decision that Mr. Fields is not entitled to a new trial where the trial
court judge did not adequately instruct the jury on the critical element
of superseding causation relating to the deaths of the two decedents.
II.
The Michigan Supreme Court erred when it affirmed the trial
court judge’s failure to adequately instruct the jury regarding
proximate causation and failed to properly respond to the jury’s
question regarding the related concept of gross negligence.
(ECF No. 1.) Petitioner was released to a term of parole on October 31, 2018. See,
http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=953497.
II.

Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established
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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if
the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme
Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the
Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs when
“a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the
facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the
writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly.” Id. at 411.
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings,” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations omitted). A
“state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief
so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
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Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized “that
even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion
was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. Pursuant to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must
determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the
state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists
could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in
a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id. A “readiness to attribute error [to a
state court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow
the law.” Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).
A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal
habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this
presumption of correctness only with clear and convincing evidence. Id.
Moreover, for claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court, habeas
review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
III.

Discussion
Petitioner raises two jury-instruction-related claims: (i) the trial court

inadequately instructed the jury on causation; and (ii) the trial court failed to
properly respond to the jurors’ question regarding gross negligence. Respondent
argues that Petitioner waived these claims and, therefore, they are procedurally
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defaulted. The Court finds that Petitioner’s first claim is procedurally defaulted
and that Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice to excuse the default,
nor has he shown that failure to consider the claim would work a manifest
injustice. Petitioner’s second claim is not procedurally defaulted, but the Michigan
Court of Appeals’ denial of the claim does not warrant habeas relief.
A.

Causation Instruction

Federal habeas relief is precluded on claims that were not presented to the
state courts in accordance with the state’s procedural rules. See Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977). The doctrine of procedural default is applicable
when a petitioner fails to comply with a state procedural rule, the rule is actually
relied upon by the state courts, and the procedural rule is “independent of the
federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Walker v. Martin, 562
U.S. 307, 315 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). Federal courts on habeas
review must decide whether a state procedural bar is adequate. That is, the
“ ‘adequacy of state procedural bars’ ... is not within the State’s prerogative finally
to decide; rather, adequacy ‘is itself a federal question.’” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S.
362, 375 (2002) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965)).
“[O]rdinarily, violation of ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ state rules ...
will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Id. at 376.

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The Michigan Court of Appeals found Petitioner’s jury instruction claim
waived because the trial court instructed the jury as requested by the defense and,
after the court instructed the jury, defense counsel expressed approval of the jury
instructions. Fields, 2016 WL 4129314 at *1-3. The rule that the express approval
of a jury instruction constitutes a waiver and extinguishes any objection is firmly
established and regularly followed by Michigan state courts. See Morgan v. Lafler,
452 F. App’x 637, 646 n.3 (6th Cir. 2011). The Michigan Court of Appeals
expressly relied on this rule in reviewing Petitioner’s claim.
In his application for habeas relief, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel
objected to the modified causation instruction the court read to the jury. (Pet. at
12, ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 17.) In fact, however, the trial court read the instruction
proposed by defense counsel, over the prosecution’s objection, and defense
counsel stated his approval of the instructions given. (1/7/15 Trial Tr. at 12-13, 1821, 83-85, 91, ECF No. 7-11 at Pg ID 942-43, 950, 872-73, 877-80.) Petitioner’s
challenge to the jury instruction is thus procedurally defaulted unless Petitioner
shows cause for the default and actual prejudice that resulted from the alleged
violation of federal law or that there will be a fundamental miscarriage of justice if
the claim is not considered. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991).
Petitioner neither alleges nor establishes cause to excuse his default. The
Court need not address the issue of prejudice when a petitioner fails to establish
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cause to excuse a procedural default. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533
(1986); Long v. McKeen, 722 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983).
Additionally, Petitioner has not established that a fundamental miscarriage
of justice has occurred. The miscarriage of justice exception requires a showing
that a constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995). “ ‘[A]ctual
innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). “To be credible, [a claim of actual
innocence] requires [the] petitioner to support his [or her] allegations of
constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory
scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical
evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner
fails to address the procedural default and advances no actual innocence argument.
This claim, therefore, is procedurally defaulted.
B.

Response to Jury Question

Petitioner next argues that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question on
gross negligence coupled with the court’s inadequate instructions on causation
rendered his trail unfair. Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally
defaulted. The Michigan Court of Appeals did not rely upon a firmly established

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state procedural rule to deny this claim; instead, the state court denied the claim on
the merits. The claim is not procedurally defaulted.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking: “In order for victims to be
considered grossly negligent, must they meet all of the elements as listed in
[CJI2d] 16.18?” Fields, 2016 WL 4129314 at *3. In response, the trial court
instructed the jury as follows:
The gross negligence instruction is to be read and considered as part
of paragraph (5) [of operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing
death] under the elements of the offense. All elements must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt before a verdict of guilty can be
rendered.
Id.1

1

The fifth element of operating a motor vehicle causing death concerns whether a
defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the victims’ deaths. The trial court’s original
instruction on this element was as follows:
To cause the victims’ deaths, the Defendant’s operation of the vehicle must
have been a factual cause of the death. That is, but for the Defendant’s
operation of the vehicle, the death would not have occurred.
In addition, operation of the vehicle must have been a proximate cause of
death. That is, death or serious injury must have been a direct and natural
result of operating the vehicle.
It is claimed that Defendant’s operation of his vehicle was not a proximate
cause of the deaths of Mr. Sood and Mr. Sawaf because of an intervening,
superseding cause. Gross negligence or intentional misconduct on the part
of Mr. Sood or Mr. Sawaf constitutes an intervening, superseding cause.
A superseding, intervening cause must not be reasonably foreseeable. Gross
negligence is not reasonably foreseeable. If you find that there was an
intervening, superseding cause in this case, then you must find the
Defendant not guilty.
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The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim reasoning that,
even if the instruction was inadequate, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial
court’s response to the jury’s question. Id. The court of appeals held that, if the
supplemental instruction burdened anyone, it burdened the prosecution:
By also instructing the jury that the elements of gross
negligence are part of the elements of the charged
offense, the court in essence instructed the jury that in
order to prove that defendant was a proximate cause of
the victims’ deaths, the prosecution had the additional
burden of disproving that the victims were grossly
negligent. Accordingly, not only was the trial court’s
responsive instruction consistent with defendant’s
requested special instruction, any error was more harmful
to the prosecution. Consequently, there is no basis for
concluding that defendant was prejudiced by the trial
court’s response. Because the trial court instructed the
jury just as the defense requested and the responsive
instruction did not lessen the prosecution’s burden of
proof, defendant was not denied a fair trial.
Id.

Gross negligence means more than carelessness. It means willfully
disregarding the results to others that might follow from an act or failure to
act.
The decedents were grossly negligent if they knew of the danger, that is,
they knew that there was a situation that required them to take ordinary care
to avoid injury, they knew that they could have avoided the injury by using
ordinary care, and that they failed to use ordinary care to prevent injury
when to a reasonable person it must have been apparent that the result was
likely to be serious injury.
(ECF No. 7-11 at Pg ID 942-43.)
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“Generally speaking, a state court’s interpretation of the propriety of a jury
instruction under state law does not entitle a habeas claimant to relief.” Rashad v.
Lafler, 675 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). A habeas petitioner is entitled to habeas
relief for a jury instruction claim only when the “instruction is so flawed as a
matter of state law as to ‘infect[ ] the entire trial’ in such a way that the conviction
violates due process.” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154
(1977)). A state court’s finding that challenged jury instructions “adequately
reflected the applicable state law and corresponding state charges” is binding on
federal habeas review. White v. Steele, 629 F. App’x 690, 695 (6th Cir. 2015).
Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question
was “so flawed as a matter of state law” that it violated due process. Rashad, 675
F.3d at 569. The state court concluded that the instruction, if at all inappropriate,
increased the prosecution’s burden. The instructions, considered as a whole,
informed the jury of each element of the charged offense and conveyed the
prosecution’s burden of proof. In consideration of the deference owed the state
court’s assessment of the adequacy of these instructions, the Court concludes that
Petitioner fails to show that the state court’s holding was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

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IV.

Certificate of Appealability
“[A] prisoner seeking postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has no

automatic right to appeal a district court’s denial or dismissal of the petition.
Instead, [the] petitioner must first seek and obtain a [certificate of appealability.]”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). A certificate of appealability may
issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To receive a certificate of
appealability, “a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (2003) (internal quotes and citations
omitted).
Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s
claims to be debatable or wrong. The Court therefore declines to issue a certificate
of appealability.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is

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DENIED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 3, 2020

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