Crawford v Gerard M. Anderson, et al
ORDER (1) Granting Plaintiff's 2 Application to Proceed Without Prepaying Fees or Costs and (2) Dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Complaint. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Case No. 17-cv-13698
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
GERARD ANDERSON, et al.,
ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED
WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF FEES OR COSTS (ECF #2) AND (2)
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT (ECF #1)
On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff Anitra Crawford filed this action against
various executives of four telecommunications companies. (See Compl., ECF #1.)
Crawford appears to allege that the telecommunication companies that Defendants
work for have caused her harm by “transmit[ing]” “energy … [and] data” which has
“penetrate[d]” and “absorb[ed]” into her skin. (Id. at Pg. ID 5.) She further alleges
that these telecommunications companies have “broadcast” her “communications.”
Crawford has also filed an application to proceed in this action without the
prepayment of fees or costs (the “Application”). (See ECF #2.) For the reasons
stated below, the Court GRANTS the Application and DISMISSES the Complaint.
Applications to proceed without the prepayment of fees or costs are governed
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). That statute provides that a federal court “may authorize
the commencement ... of any suit, action, or proceeding ... by a person who submits
an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets ... that the person is unable to pay
such fees....” Id.
In the Application, Crawford says that she does not have any money in any
bank accounts and cannot otherwise afford to pay the required filing fee. (See
Application, ECF #2 at Pg. ID 11-12.) The Court has reviewed the Application and
is satisfied that the prepayment of the filing fee would cause an undue financial
hardship on Crawford. The Court will therefore GRANT the Application.
When a plaintiff is allowed to proceed without the prepayment of fees or costs,
the Court is required to screen the complaint and dismiss it if it (i) asserts frivolous
or malicious claims, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
and/or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). While
the Court must liberally construe documents filed by a pro se plaintiff, see Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a complaint filed by such a plaintiff must still
plead sufficient specific factual allegations, and not just legal conclusions, in support
of each claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–679 (2009); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard
in Iqbal applies to a Court’s review of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) for failure to
state a claim).
Here, as described above, Crawford appears to allege that the
telecommunications companies that Defendants work for “are responsible for the
transmission of data” that has caused her to “suffer from moderate to serious bodily
injuries.” (Compl., ECF #1 at Pg. ID 5.) Even when the Court construes her
allegations liberally, it concludes that she has failed to state a viable claim against
the Defendants. Her allegations are conclusory and do not allege specific facts that
tie the actions of the named Defendants to any harms that she allegedly has suffered.
Indeed, Crawford’s allegations do not mention the named Defendants at all.
Moreover, Crawford has not identified any cognizable theory of liability. Simply
put, Crawford has failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).1
This is not the first time that this Court has dismissed a Complaint Crawford has
filed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly dismissed Complaints, like the one filed here, in which Crawford has
brought frivolous or inadequately pleaded claims against telecommunications
companies and/or their employees. See Crawford v. Stephenson, Case No. 16-cv10218 (E.D. Mich.), Dkt. #4 (dismissing Complaint and concluding that claims
Crawford made related to electromagnetic fields emanating from cell phone towers
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
(1) the Application (ECF #2) is GRANTED and (2) the Complaint (ECF #1) is
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
12(h)(3). The Court further certifies that any appeal from this decision cannot be
taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 16, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on November 16, 2017, by electronic means and/or
s/Holly A. Monda
and the stealing of her genetic code were “irrational and delusional”); Crawford v.
AT&T et. al., 12-cv-14781 (E.D. Mich.), Dkt. #3 (dismissing Complaint in which
Crawford alleged that “an implant was sealed in her body” and that she was being
subjected to “surveillance of her at her residence” for failure to state a claim);
Crawford v. Stephenson, Case No. 13-13358 (E.D. Mich.), Dkt. #4 (“The complaint
here is frivolous”).
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