Watkins v. Healy et al

Filing 15

ORDER Denying Defendant Robert H. Healy's 8 Motion to Abstain. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LEDURA WATKINS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-13940
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
ROBERT H. HEALY, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ROBERT H. HEALY’S
MOTION TO ABSTAIN (ECF #8)
In 1976, Plaintiff Ledura Watkins was convicted of murder and sentenced to
life in prison. In this action, Watkins asserts that Defendants Robert H. Healy, Neil
Schwartz,1 and Ronald Badaczewski violated his constitutional rights when they
suppressed favorable evidence, fabricated evidence, maliciously prosecuted him,
and conspired against him during the murder investigation and trial. (See Compl.,
ECF #1.) Watkins also maintains that Defendant the City of Detroit is liable for
Defendants Schwartz and Badaczewski’s constitutional violations because the City
had a custom or policy authorizing those actions and/or because it failed to
adequately train Defendants Schwartz and Badaczewski. (See id.) Defendant Healy

1

Schwartz is now deceased. Watkins has therefore formally brought his claims
related to Schwartz’ conduct during the murder investigation and trial against “John
Ferguson, Esq., Personal Representative of the Estate of Neil Schwartz, deceased.”
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has moved the Court to abstain from hearing and to stay this action pending the
resolution of a state court action in which Watkins seeks compensation under a
Michigan statute for wrongful imprisonment. (See Mot. to Abstain, ECF #8.) The
other Defendants have concurred in the relief sought in Healy’s motion. (See ECF
#10.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the motion and will not
abstain or stay this action.2
I
A3
On September 6, 1975, a Detroit school teacher named Yvette Ingram was
found shot to death in her home. (See Compl. at ¶12, ECF #1 at Pg. ID 4.) Healy,
then an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney employed by the Wayne County Prosecutor’s
Office, and Schwartz, then a Sergeant employed by the Detroit Police Department
(the “DPD”), investigated the murder of Ingram. (See id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 18, Pg. ID 3, 4,
6.) Following the investigation, police arrested Watkins, and the Wayne County
Prosecutor charged Watkins with murdering Ingram. (See id. at ¶¶ 43-44, 51, Pg. ID
11-13.)
Watkins was tried in Michigan’s Recorder’s Court. (See id. at ¶¶ 51, 81, Pg.
ID 12-13, 19.) At trial, the prosecution relied on two primary pieces of evidence:

2

The Court has determined that it may properly resolve Healy’s motion without a
hearing. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f).
3

The facts in Section I(A) are taken from Watkins’ Complaint in this action.
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(1) testimony by an acquaintance of Watkins that he saw Watkins shoot Ingram and
(2) expert testimony from Badaczewski, then an evidence technician with the DPD,
that a hair found on Ingram matched Watkins’ hair. (See id. at ¶¶ 65-70, 77, Pg. ID
15-17.)
On March 16, 1976, a jury convicted Watkins of first degree murder. (See id.
at ¶81, Pg. ID 19.) On April 15, 1976, the state trial court sentenced Watkins to a
term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (See id.)
B
In 2017, Watkins filed a motion for relief from judgment in state court. (See
ECF #8-7.) In that motion, Watkins argued that the state court should vacate his
conviction because, among other reasons, (1) the witness who testified that he saw
Watkins shoot Ingram recanted that testimony and (2) Badaczewski’s testimony was
unreliable, flawed, and failed to comport with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
revised standards for hair comparisons. (See id.) The Wayne County Prosecutor’s
Office agreed that Watkins’ motion for relief from judgment should be granted. The
prosecutor stipulated that Badaczewski’s hair analysis was unreliable and that a
retrial would probably result in Watkins’ release. (See ECF #8-8.) On June 15, 2017,
the state court entered a stipulated order granting Watkins’ motion for relief from
judgment and dismissing the case without prejudice. (See id.)

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C
On July 25, 2017, Watkins filed a lawsuit against the State of Michigan in the
Michigan Court of Claims under Michigan’s Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation
Act (the “WICA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1751 et seq. (the “Court of Claims
Action”). (See Ct. of Claims Compl., ECF #8-9.) The Michigan Legislature enacted
the WICA to compensate formerly convicted persons who could show that new
evidence established their innocence. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1755(1)
(requiring that a plaintiff prove as one element of a WICA claim that “[n]ew
evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff did not perpetrate the crime and was not an
accomplice or accessory to the acts that were the basis of the conviction . . . .”). The
WICA sets compensation for a successful plaintiff at $50,000 for each year
imprisoned. See id. The Michigan Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over
claims under the WICA. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1753.
Watkins alleges in the Court of Claims Action that new evidence, including
the eye-witness’s recantation of his testimony and the unreliability of Badaczewski’s
analysis and testimony, establishes his innocence. Thus, Watkins contends, he is
entitled to compensation under the WICA. (See Ct. of Claims Compl., ECF #8-9.)
Discovery has begun in the Court of Claims Action. Among other things,
Watkins has taken the depositions of Healy and Badaczewski in that case.

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D
On December 6, 2017, Watkins filed this action against Healy, Schwartz,
Badaczewski, and the City of Detroit. (See Compl., ECF #1.) In Count I of the
Complaint, Watkins asserts the following constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the Defendants:
1. Healy, Schwartz, and Badaczewski (the “Individual Defendants”)
fabricated evidence against him. (See id. at ¶113, Pg. ID 29-32.)
2. Schwartz and Badaczewski failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in
violation of their obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
(See id.)
3. Schwartz maliciously prosecuted Watkins. (See id.)
4. Healy and Schwartz conspired to fabricate evidence. (See id.)
5. The City of Detroit had a custom or policy that authorized, condoned,
tolerated, and approved illegal and unconstitutional actions by the DPD
officers and staff. (See id.)
6. The City of Detroit failed to provide adequate training to its police officers.
(See id.)
Watkins also asserts common law malicious prosecution claims against
Schwartz and Healy in Counts II and III, respectively, and an intentional infliction

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of emotional distress claim against all of the Defendants in Count IV. (See id. at Pg.
ID 34-38.)
On February 20, 2018, Healy filed a motion in which he asked this Court to
abstain and stay this action pending resolution of the Court of Claims Action
pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976), and its progeny. (See Mot. to Abstain, ECF #8.) The other Defendants
thereafter filed statements concurring in the Motion to Abstain. (See ECF #10.)
II
A
Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear and adjudicate
claims falling within their original jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist., 424 U.S. 800 at 817. However, the Supreme Court in Colorado River
recognized a limited exception to this obligation: in certain “exceptional”
circumstances, a federal court may abstain to a parallel state court proceeding. Id.
Whether it is proper to abstain under Colorado River is a two-step inquiry.
First, a court must determine if the federal and state proceedings are “parallel.”
Romine v. Compuserve Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1998). Second, if the
proceedings are parallel, a court must consider and apply eight factors to determine
if abstention is appropriate: (1) whether the state court has assumed jurisdiction over
any res or property; (2) whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties;
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(3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which jurisdiction was
obtained; (5) whether the source of governing law is state or federal; (6) the
adequacy of the state court action to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights; (7) the
relative progress of the state and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence
of concurrent jurisdiction. See id. at 340-41. “These factors, however, do not
comprise a mechanical checklist. Rather, they require a careful balancing of the
important factors as they apply in a given case depending on the particular facts at
hand.” Id. at 341 (internal quotations omitted).
“When a district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it
presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation will be an adequate
vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties. If
there is any substantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious abuse of discretion to
grant the stay or dismissal at all.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983). Finally, the Supreme Court has “emphasize[d] that
our task in cases such as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise
of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is to ascertain whether
there exist exceptional circumstances, the clearest of justifications, that can suffice
under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 25-26
(emphasis original).

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B
The Court declines to abstain under Colorado River because this action is not
parallel to the Court of Claims Action. To be considered parallel, the federal and
state proceedings must be “substantially similar.” Romine, 160 F.3d at 340. Actions
are substantially similar “where (1) the parties are substantially similar and (2) [the
plaintiff’s] claims against the [defendants] are predicated on the same allegations as
to the same material facts.” Id. Neither of these circumstances exist here.
First, the Defendants in this action are not substantially similar to the
defendant in the Court of Claims Action. The State of Michigan is the sole defendant
in the Court of Claims Action; it is not a defendant in this action. The Defendants
here are (1) three individuals who were not employed by the State of Michigan and
(2) the City of Detroit, a municipal entity that is distinct from the State of Michigan.
Given the difference in defendants, the parties in the Court of Claims Action and this
action are not substantially similar. See Crawley v. Hamilton Cty. Comm’rs, 744
F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1984) (concluding that officials of Hamilton County, Ohio
named as defendants in a federal action were not substantially similar to officials of
the City of Cincinnati, Ohio who were named as defendants in a state action).
Second, the claims in this action and the Court of Claims Action are not
predicated on the same allegations as to the same material facts. Indeed, the facts
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that are “material” to both actions differ sharply. “A fact is material” if, among other
things, “proof of that fact would have effect of establishing or refuting one of
essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties….” Kendall
v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations and internal quotations
omitted). The elements of the WICA claim in the Court of Claims Action and the
elements of the claims in this action vary widely, and thus many of the material facts
are different in each action.
Watkins’ WICA claim requires him to prove “by clear and convincing
evidence” that: (1) he was “convicted of 1 or more crimes . . . and sentenced to
imprisonment”; (2) his “judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either
the charges were dismissed or [he] was determined on retrial not to be guilty”; and
(3) “[n]ew evidence demonstrates that [he] did not perpetrate the crime . . . .” Mich.
Comp. Laws § 691.1755(1). The first two elements do not appear to be meaningfully
in dispute in the Court of Claims Action. Therefore, the key material factual issue
in that action is whether Watkins murdered Ingram.
The disputed material facts at issue here are both different and broader
because the elements of Watkins’ claims here are different and broader. For
example, several of Watkins’ claims in this Court have as an element that the
Individual Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind. See e.g., Mills v. Barnard,
869 F.3d 473, 484 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[t]he basis of a fabrication-of9

evidence claim under § 1983 is an allegation that a defendant knowingly fabricated
evidence against him...”) (internal quotations omitted)); Newman v. Twp. of
Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that under Michigan law, a
malicious prosecution claim requires that plaintiff “show malice”) (internal
quotations omitted)). Likewise, some of Watkins’ claims here involve causation
questions that do not bear on Watkins’ innocence. See, e.g., Sykes v. Anderson, 625
F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a constitutional malicious prosecution
claim requires a showing that the defendant “made, influenced, or participated in the
decision to prosecute”); Dalley v. Dykema Gossett, 287 Mich. App. 296, 321, 788
N.W.2d 679, 694 (2010) (noting that an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim requires that defendant’s conduct caused severe emotional distress).
Additionally, Watkins’ conspiracy claim necessarily depends on whether there was
an agreement to injure him by unlawful action. See Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658
F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011) (“A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is an agreement
between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” (internal
quotations omitted)). Thus, many of the key factual questions here relate to the
Individual Defendants’ states of mind, whether the Individual Defendants’ actions
caused Watkins’ prosecution or injury, and whether an agreement existed – factual
questions that are not presented in the Court of Claims Action.

10

Moreover, Watkins’ claim against the City of Detroit turns, in part, upon his
allegation that the City had a particular custom or practice, see Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and that issue, too, is absent
from the Court of Claims Action. Accordingly, this action will present important
factual issues concerning the City of Detroit’s practices that are absent from the
Court of Claims Action.
Finally, when determining whether two actions are parallel, courts also
consider the similarity of the theories of recovery in each proceeding. See, e.g.,
Baskin v. Bath Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 15 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1994)
(highlighting the “very different theories advanced” by the parties in the state and
federal actions to determine that the proceedings were not parallel); Gentry v. Wayne
Cty., No. 10-CV-11714, 2010 WL 4822749, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2010)
(“[W]hen the state and federal cases present different theories of recovery, courts do
not generally characterize the proceedings as ‘parallel.’”). As described above, the
theories of recovery in this action and the Court of Claims Action differ markedly.
These differences underscore that the actions are not parallel.
C
Even if the Court had concluded that the proceedings were parallel, the Court
would still decline to abstain because the balance of the relevant factors weigh
against abstention. The Court considers each factor in turn.
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(1) whether the state court has assumed jurisdiction over any res or property:
This factor weighs against abstention. There does not appear to be res or property
at issue in the Court of Claims Action.
(2) whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties: This factor
weighs against abstention.

Defendants do not argue that this forum is less

convenient. (See Mot. to Abstain, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 75.)
(3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation: This factor weighs against
abstention.

“Piecemeal litigation occurs when different courts adjudicate the

identical issue, thereby duplicating judicial effort and potentially rendering
conflicting results.” Romine, 160 F.3d at 341. As described above, the issues
presented in this action and the Court of Claims Action are far from identical.
Moreover, the claims in the two actions will be decided under differing burdens of
proof – preponderance of the evidence here and clear and convincing evidence in
the Court of Claims Action. These different burdens highlight that the fact finders
in the two actions will not be deciding the same questions.
(4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained: This factor weighs in favor
of abstention. The Court of Claims Action was filed about five months before this
action.
(5) whether the source governing law is state or federal: This factor weighs
against abstention. In this action, Watkins asserts federal constitutional claims under
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 (in addition to his state law claims). The presence of those federal
claims weighs against abstention in this case.
(6) the adequacy of the state court action to protect federal plaintiff’s rights:
This factor counsels heavily against abstention. The Michigan Court of Claims
cannot hear the bulk of the federal claims asserted by Watkins in this action. As
relevant here, that court has jurisdiction over “any claim . . . against the state or any
of its departments or officers.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6419. As the Defendants
concede, the City of Detroit, a municipality, does not fall within that grant of
jurisdiction. (See Mot. to Abstain, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 76.) Schwartz and Badaczewski,
as Detroit Police Officers, likewise do not fall within the scope of that jurisdiction.4
Thus, the Court of Claims cannot hear Watkins’ federal claims against most (if not
all5) of the Defendants and, accordingly, cannot adequately protect Watkins’ federal
rights. Finally, the amount of relief available to Watkins is limited under the WICA
in the Court of Claims Action, and he faces no similar limit on his recovery for any
violation of federal law he may establish here.

4

Even if Schwartz and Badaczewski were employed as law enforcement officers by
the State of Michigan, the Court of Claims would still lack jurisdiction over Watkins’
claims against them.  See Burnett v. Moore, 314 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that state police trooper was not a state officer for purposes of Court
of Claims jurisdiction).  
5
In addition, it seems unlikely that the Court of Claims could hear Watkins’ federal
claims against Healy, an assistant prosecuting attorney, because he does not appear
to be a State “officer.” See Burnett, supra.
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(7) the relative progress of the state and federal proceedings: This factor
weighs slightly in favor of abstention.

Unlike in this action, discovery has

commenced in the Court of Claims Action.
(8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction: This factor weighs
against abstention. As noted above, the Michigan Court of Claims could not hear
most (if not all) of Watkins’ claims in this case.
The balance of these factors counsels against abstention in this case. Six of
the eight factors weigh against abstention. And the two factors that favor abstention
– the fourth and seventh – do so only slightly. The factors that weigh against
abstention, in contrast, tip heavily in that direction. For these reasons, the Court
would not abstain even if the two actions were parallel.
III
For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Defendant Healy’s
motion to abstain (ECF #8).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2018

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on March 26, 2018, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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