Taylor v. Livonia Police Department

Filing 6

OPINION and ORDER Summarily Dismissing Complaint and Denying as Moot, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (RLou)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PETER C. TAYLOR, #311226,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 4:18-cv-10596
Honorable Linda V. Parker

v.
LIVONIA POLICE DEPARTMENT,
SGT. CAIDE, & CITY OF LIVONIA,
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING COMPLAINT
AND DENYING, AS MOOT, MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL
I. Introduction
This is a pro se civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Michigan prisoner Peter C. Taylor (“Plaintiff”), confined at the Bellamy Creek
Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, alleges his constitutional rights were
violated during his state criminal proceedings. In particular, he asserts that the
investigating officer provided false testimony during court proceedings and
violated his rights during interrogations. He names the Livonia Police Department,
Livonia Police Sergeant Caide, and the City of Livonia as the defendants in this
action. He sues the defendants in their personal and official capacities and seeks

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monetary damages and other relief. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed
without prepayment of the fees for this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
II. Discussion
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court is
required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service if it
determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court
is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government
entities, officers, and employees that it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint
is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The
purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While such notice pleading does not require detailed factual
allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he
was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution
or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978);
Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009). A pro se civil rights
complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972). Despite this liberal pleading standard, the Court finds that the civil rights
complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
First, Plaintiff names the Livonia Police Department as a defendant in this
action. That body, however, is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See
Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (police department is
an improper defendant in a § 1983 case); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120
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(6th Cir. 1991) (sheriff’s department may not be sued under § 1983); Edward v.
Jail, 2:16-cv-11596, 2016 WL 2937146, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 20, 2016) (citing
cases and ruling that county jails, sheriff departments, and other governmental
agencies are not legal entities amenable to suit under § 1983); Laise v. City of
Utica, 970 F. Supp. 605, 608 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (city police department is an
agency of the city and not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff’s
claims against the Livonia Police Department must, therefore, be dismissed.
Second, any claims against the City of Livonia must be dismissed because
Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating the personal involvement of the City of
Livonia in the events giving rise to the complaint. It is well-settled that a civil
rights plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of a defendant to state a claim
under § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92
(1978) (Section 1983 liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009)
(same); see also Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 69 F.3d 716, 727-28
(6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant participated,
condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in alleged misconduct to establish
liability). Plaintiff makes no such factual allegations against the City of Livonia.
Plaintiff also does not allege facts showing that any claimed injury is the result of
any policy or regulation, or that any improper conduct arose from the deliberate
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failure to adequately investigate, train, or supervise employees. See Ellis v.
Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (setting forth threepart test for such claims). Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim
under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57; Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351,
390-91 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted against the City of Livonia.
Further, as to Plaintiff’s allegation that Sgt. Caide gave false testimony at
Plaintiff’s trial, Sgt Caide benefits from absolute immunity. The United States
Supreme Court stated in Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 (1983) that a police
officer who gives false testimony at trial cannot be held liable for a § 1983
violation.
Subjecting government officials, such as police officers,
to damages liability under § 1983 for their testimony
might undermine not only their contribution to the
judicial process but also the effective performance of
their other public duties. Section 1983 lawsuits against
police officer witnesses, like lawsuits against
prosecutors, “could be expected with some frequency.”
Police officers testify in scores of cases every year and
defendants often will transform resentment at being
convicted into allegations of perjury by the state’s
official witnesses.
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 343; Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 390 (6th Cir.
2009) (“‘all witnesses -- police officers as well as lay witness -- are absolutely
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immune from civil liability based on their trial testimony in judicial proceedings.’
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 328. A witness is entitled to testimonial immunity ‘no matter
how egregious or perjurious that testimony was alleged to have been.’”)
In any event, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed because he challenges
the validity of his state criminal proceedings in his complaint, which fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under §
1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner challenging a condition of his
imprisonment, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973), not the validity of
continued confinement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding
that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his
imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing
confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This holds true regardless of the relief
sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 487-89.
Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a
state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the
relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s
suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success
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in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). The underlying basis
for the holding in Heck is that “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at
486. Consequently, his claims are barred by Heck and must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the
complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Given this determination, the
Court DENIES, as moot, Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. Lastly,
the Court concludes that an appeal from this order cannot be taken in good faith.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 18, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of
record and/or pro se parties on this date, April 18, 2018, by electronic and/or U.S.
First Class mail.
s/ R. Loury
Case Manager

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