Combs v. SSA, Commissioner of
Filing
18
OPINION AND ORDER (1) Overruling Plaintiff's 16 Objections to the Magistrate Judge's 15 Report and Recommendation, (2) Adopting Recommended Disposition in the 15 Report and Recommendation, (3) Denying Plaintiff's 13 Motion for Summary Judgment, and (4) Granting Defendant's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRANDY ROSE COMBS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 18-cv-10930
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
__________________________________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
(ECF #16) TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION (ECF #15), (2) ADOPTING RECOMMENDED
DISPOSITION IN THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, (3)
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF
#13), AND (4) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF #14)
In this action, Plaintiff Brandy Rose Combs challenges the denial of her
application for supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) under the Social
Security Act. (See Compl., ECF #1.) Both Combs and Defendant Commissioner of
Social Security (the “Commissioner”) filed motions for summary judgment. (See
Combs’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF #13; Commissioner’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF #14.)
The assigned Magistrate Judge then issued a Report and Recommendation in which
she recommended that the Court (1) grant the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment and (2) deny Combs’ motion for summary judgment (the “R&R”). (See
1
R&R, ECF #15.) Combs has filed timely objections to the R&R (the “Objections”).
(See Objections, ECF #16.) The Court has conducted a de novo review of the
portions of the R&R to which Combs has objected. For the reasons stated below,
the Court OVERRULES Combs’ Objections, ADOPTS the recommended
disposition in the R&R, DENIES Combs’ motion for summary judgment, and
GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.
I
A1
On December 15, 2015, Combs filed an application for SSI benefits (the
“Application”). (See Admin. R., ECF #7-5 at Pg. ID 220-27.) In the Application,
Combs alleged that she suffered from rheumatoid arthritis and that her disability
began on March 1, 2011. (See id. at Pg. ID 220; see also ECF #7-3 at Pg. ID 116.)
The Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) denied Combs’ request for benefits
on the ground that Combs was not disabled. (See Admin. R., ECF #7-3 at Pg. ID
124.)
Combs thereafter requested and received a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge (the “ALJ”). The ALJ held that hearing on June 7, 2017.
1
The Court recites only the facts relevant to the Objections. A full description of
the facts is available in the R&R. (See R&R, ECF #15 at Pg. ID 828-31.)
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(See Admin. R., ECF #7-2 at Pg. ID 78-105.) Combs and a vocational expert
testified at the hearing. (See id.)
At the hearing, Combs described the pain from her arthritis as a “10” on a 1to-10 scale. (Id. at Pg. ID 86.) She also said testified that she suffered headaches as
a result of her pain medications, that she does not “sleep too well” because of pain,
and that she has difficulty walking more than half a block at a time or standing for
more than 15 minutes at a time. (Id. at Pg. ID 89, 91-92.)
On September 22, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he
affirmed the SSA’s denial of benefits. (See id. at Pg. ID 47-56.) In doing so, the ALJ
applied the “five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an
individual is disabled.”2 (Id. at Pg. ID 47.)
At step one of that analysis, the ALJ determined that Combs had not engaged
in any “substantial gainful activity” since December 15, 2015, the date of the
Application. (Id. at Pg. ID 49.)
Next, at step two, the ALJ found that Combs suffered from two severe
impairments: rheumatoid arthritis and obesity. (See id.)
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Combs was not entitled to a finding of
disability because none of Combs’ severe impairments “met or medically equaled
2
A full description of this five-step analysis is included in the R&R. (See R&R, ECF
#15 at Pg. ID 829-30.)
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the severity of one of the listed impairments” in the Commissioner’s Listing of
Impairments. (Id. at Pg. ID 49-50.)
Before moving to step four of the analysis, the ALJ determined that Combs
had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the
following limitations:
[O]ccasional posturals; occasional overheard work with
the upper extremities; occasional fingering; and unlimited
handling, gross manipulation, and feeling.
(Id. at Pg. ID 50.)
In reaching this RFC, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed Combs’ medical records,
her hearing testimony, reports from the “field office personnel” who met with
Combs, and an opinion from Dr. Fountain, “a state disability physician.” (Id. at Pg.
ID 50-54.) Dr. Fountain’s opinion was the only medical opinion in the record. He
“concluded that [Combs] could perform light work with limitations of occasional
posturals, occasional overhead work with the left upper extremity, and occasional
fingering with the right hand.” (Id. at Pg. ID 54.) The ALJ accorded “great weight”
to Dr. Fountain’s opinion because it was “consistent with the record as a whole” and
“accommodated [Combs’] occasional swelling in her hands and knees.” (Id.)
The ALJ then moved to step four of the analysis. At this step, he concluded
that, given Combs’ RFC, Combs could perform her past relevant work as a direct
care worker. (See id.)
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The ALJ then said that because he determined that Combs could perform her
past work, he did not need to proceed to step five of the analysis. (See id.) But the
ALJ further noted that if he had proceeded to step five, he would have concluded
that “there [were] other jobs existing in the national economy” that Combs could
perform given her limitations, including attendant worker, visual inspector, and
lobby/gate attendant. (See id. at Pg. ID 54-55.)
For these reasons, the ALJ concluded that Combs was not disabled. (See id.
at Pg. ID 56.)
B
On March 21, 2018, Combs filed this action in which she challenges the
SSA’s denial of benefits. (See Compl., ECF #1.) Combs and the Commissioner then
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (See Combs’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF
#13; Commissioner’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF #14.) Combs raised four primary
arguments with respect to the ALJ’s decision:
1) [T]he RFC does not accurately reflect [Combs’]
impairments[, and Combs cannot perform light work,]
because she cannot stand for six hours in an eight-hour
workday; 2) the ALJ ignored [Combs’] testimony of
efforts to obtain pain relief, which should have resulted
in a higher credibility findings; 3) the ALJ improperly
weighed the opinion of her treating physician[s], and 4)
the ALJ failed to consider the [side] effects of her
medications on her ability to work.
(R&R, ECF #15 at Pg. ID 831.)
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The Court referred the cross-motions to the assigned Magistrate Judge. On
January 29, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R in which she carefully
analyzed the arguments in the summary judgment motions. (See R&R, ECF #15.)
The Magistrate Judge ultimately rejected each of the arguments that Combs
presented and “conclude[d] that the ALJ’s opinion [was] supported by substantial
evidence.” (Id. at Pg. ID 832.)
On February 12, 2019, Combs timely filed the Objections. (See Objections,
ECF #16.) Combs objects to the R&R on two grounds. First, she argues that “[t]he
Magistrate erred in supporting the ALJ’s determination that [she] can perform light
work.” (Id. at Pg. ID 844-45.) Second, Combs argues that “[t]he Magistrate erred
when she determined that the ALJ properly evaluated and considered the side effects
of [her] many medications.” (Id. at Pg. ID 845-47.) The Court will examine each
of these objections in turn below.
II
A
When a party objects to portions of a Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, the Court reviews those portions de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3); see also Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich.
2004). The Court has no duty to conduct an independent review of the portions of
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the R&R to which a party has not objected. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149
(1985).
B
In reviewing the disputed findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to
determining whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence and are
made pursuant to proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “The substantial
evidence standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the
Secretary may proceed without interference from the courts.” Felisky v. Bowen, 35
F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted).
III
A
Combs first objects that “[t]he Magistrate erred in supporting the ALJ’s
determination that [Combs] can perform light work.” (Objections, ECF #16 at Pg.
ID 844.) More specifically, Combs notes that in “order to perform light work, an
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individual must be able to stand or walk, off and on, for approximately six hours out
of an 8-hour day,” and she argues that she cannot meet that requirement because she
suffers from “chronic joint stiffness and leg pain.” (Id.) Combs supports her
argument with (1) a citation to her testimony before the ALJ that she could “walk
only half a block before she experiences sharp pains in her knees and ankles,” (2) a
self-assessment form in which she reported that she could only walk “one block”
before needing to rest for an hour before walking again, and (3) a single page from
her medical records that indicates that she was seen in an emergency room on July
15, 2014, for knee pain. (Id. at Pg. ID 845.) Combs says that this “medical evidence”
demonstrates that she “could [not] perform light work on a regular and continuing
basis.” (Id.) The Court overrules this objection for two reasons.
First, this objection is deficient because it repeats, in some portions verbatim,
the same argument that Combs initially presented to the Magistrate Judge on
summary judgment. (Compare ECF #16 at Pg. ID 844-45 with ECF #13 at Pg. ID
804-05.) In general, an objection to an R&R that simply “rehashes” the same
arguments that were presented on summary judgment is insufficient. Davis v.
Caruso, 2008 WL 540818, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2008) (overruling objections).
See also Potter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 452173, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3,
2015) (holding objections to report and recommendation were waived where
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objections were “nothing more than a re-submission of [plaintiff’s] original motion
for summary judgment” and did not address reasoning of the Magistrate’s report).
Second, the objection fails on its merits. Combs asserts in this objection that
the “Magistrate Judge incorrectly held that ‘Combs does not identify any specific
error in the ALJ analysis.’” (Objections, ECF #16 at Pg. ID 844, quoting R&R, ECF
#15 at Pg. ID 832.) She further argues that “the medical evidence confirms on
numerous occasions [Combs’] chronic joint stiffness and pain.” (Id.) But Combs
has failed to connect her complaints of joint stiffness and pain with the inability to
perform light work. As described above, the only evidence that Combs relies upon
in support of this objection are her own subjective reports that she is unable to walk
without pain and a citation to one medical record that reflected that she was seen in
the emergency room for “some mild throbbing knee pain.” (Admin. R., ECF #7-7 at
Pg. ID 412.) None of that evidence, individually or collectively, establishes that the
Magistrate Judge erred when she concluded that there was substantial evidence to
support to ALJ’s conclusion that Combs could perform light work.
Indeed, both the Magistrate Judge and the ALJ identified substantial other
evidence from Combs’ own medical records that supported the conclusion that
Combs’ symptoms were “consistently characterized as minimal or mild.” (R&R,
ECF #15 at Pg. ID 833, citing to medical records; Admin. R., ECF #7-2 at Pg. ID
50-54, same.) Moreover, the only medical opinion in the record – the opinion of Dr.
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Fountain – took into account Combs’ claim that she could only walk one block and
nonetheless concluded that Combs could perform light work. (See Amdin R., ECF
#7-3.) Combs did not address any of this evidence in her Objections, and she did
not attempt to show in any way how the Magistrate Judge or the ALJ misinterpreted
this evidence. Under these circumstances, Combs has failed to show that the ALJ’s
conclusion that she could perform light work was not supported by substantial
evidence. Combs’ first objection is therefore OVERRULED.
B
Combs next argues that “[t]he Magistrate Judge erred when she determined
that the ALJ properly evaluated and considered the side of effects of [Combs’] many
medications.” (Objections, ECF #16 at Pg. ID 845.)
Combs asserts that the
Magistrate Judge wrongly “found that [Combs] did not identify evidence to support
her claim” that the side effects from her medications make it impossible for her to
work. (Id. at Pg. ID 846.) The Court disagrees and therefore overrules this objection.
Combs insists that “side effects common among [her] medications include
fatigue, nausea, insomnia, headaches and muscle pain.” (Id.) And she identifies
evidence in the record that she sought medical care for headaches, nausea, and chest
pain that she now insists were caused by her medications. (Id.) However, Combs
has not identified any evidence that her medications caused her headaches, nausea,
and chest pain. As the Magistrate Judge aptly noted, one of the pieces of evidence
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that Combs relies upon – a treatment note related to her headaches – indicates that
her headaches “are associated with tension [and] stress” and does not attribute the
headaches to medication use. (Admin. R., ECF #7-8 at Pg. ID 645.) Combs also
relies upon the fact that she was “seen in an emergency room for nausea” in 2014.
(Objections, ECF #16 at Pg. ID 846.) But nothing in the medical records from that
visit ties the nausea to Combs’ medications. In fact, those records indicate that
Combs was not even taking any medications at that time. (See Admin. R., ECF #77 at Pg. ID 386.) Combs simply has not identified sufficient evidence in the record
that her medications caused side effects that made it impossible for her to work. This
objection is therefore OVERRULED.
IV
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
The Court ADOPTS the recommended disposition in the R&R (ECF
#15);
Combs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #13) is DENIED; and
Combs’ Objections to the R&R (ECF #16) are OVERRULED;
The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #14) is
GRANTED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 19, 2019
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on March 19, 2019, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
(810) 341-9764
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