Doss v. Corizon Medical Corporation
Filing
28
OPINION AND ORDER (1) Granting Defendant's 20 Motion to Dismiss and (2) Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with Leave to Amend. Signed by District Judge Linda V. Parker. (BSau)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CLARY DOSS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No.: 4:18-11930
Honorable Linda V. Parker
Mag. Judge Mona K. Majzoub
v.
CORIZON MEDICAL
CORPORATION1,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND (2) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff Clary Doss-Bey (“Doss-Bey”), incarcerated at the Thumb Correctional
Facility in Lapeer, Michigan, filed this pro se civil rights action against Defendant
Corizon Medical Corporation (“Corizon”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a
violation of his 8th Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment from a
denial of corrective eye surgery. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1, Pg. ID 1.) This matter is
before the Court on Corizon’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dismiss Mot., ECF No. 20.)
Doss-Bey alleges as follows. He has a visual disability caused by cataracts and
glaucoma. (Compl. at 2, Pg. ID 2.) Corizon is the health care corporation contracted by
1
Defendant’s name is misspelled in Plaintiff’s Complaint as Corizen. The Court will use
the correct name, Corizon.
the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) to provide medical services for state
prisoners. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1, Pg. ID 1.) He contends that Corizon has denied him
corrective eye surgery which could cure his visual disability, stating to him that the
surgery is cosmetic and unnecessary. (Compl. at 2, Pg. ID 2; Pl. Resp., ECF No. 22 at 66,
Pg. ID 66.) As a result of the surgery being denied, Doss-Bey claims that he has gone
blind in his right eye and will remain so until the corrective surgery is performed. (Pl.
Resp. at 66, Pg. ID 66.) He claims—in general terms—that “his right to receive adequate
medical care, is being violated according to [MDOC] policies.” (Compl. at 2, Pg. ID 2.)
Doss-Bey argues that denial of his corrective eye surgery demonstrates deliberate
indifference toward his serious medical need in violation of the 8th Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir.
1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it
must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action . . ..” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further
2
factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court must
accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). This presumption is not applicable to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 668. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
3
Indeed, the medical treatment a prisoner receives in prison is subject to scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment2. See Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th
Cir. 2005) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 2014 (1976)). The Supreme Court has
articulated a mixed objective and subjective standard for determining the existence of a
deliberate indifference claim in the context of the 8th Amendment:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The objective component of the standard requires a demonstration of a
sufficiently serious medical need. Miller, 408 F.3d at 812. Courts have
addressed whether denial of cataract surgery amounts to deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need, reaching mixed results depending on the specific
circumstances of the case. Compare Cobbs v. Pramstaller, No. 10–2089, 2012
2
The Due Process Clause and 14th Amendment operate to guarantee the same
protections afforded post-conviction inmates by the 8th Amendment to pretrial detainees
as well. Miller, 408 F.3d at 812 (citing Thompson v. County of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d
238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994)). Here, the 8th Amendment applies.
4
WL 1194999, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr.10, 2012) (holding that medical evidence
demonstrated a detrimental effect from delay in cataract surgery), with
Stevenson v. Pramstaller, No. 07–cv–14040, 2009 WL 804748, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Mar.24, 2009) (granting summary judgment where evidence showed that
the defendants refused cataract surgery because the prisoner's eye condition was
stable). Here, Doss-Bey contends that he has gone blind in his right eye
because he has been denied the corrective eye surgery.3 Accepting Doss-Bey’s
allegations as true, the Court concludes that Doss-Bey’s medical condition
sufficiently demonstrates a serious medical need—that is, the restoration of
sight in his right eye.
Regardless, Doss-Bey’s Complaint has neither identified any individual
at Corizon responsible for denying his corrective eye surgery nor plead facts
demonstrating any Corizon employee’s knowledge of his asserted serious
medical need. The subjective component requires a showing that the
complained of person possessed “a sufficiently culpable state of mind in
denying medical care.” Miller, 408 F.3d at 813 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834.) “ ‘Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly
indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate
3
Doss-Bey’s complaint attaches a letter from MDOC noting that he had an upcoming
appointment with the Optometrist on October 12, 2017. (Comp. at 11, Pg. ID 11.) DossBey has not provided any other recent documentation concerning his medical treatment.
5
indifference.’ ” Id. (quoting Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d
653, 660 (6th Cir.1994)). In establishing this component of the standard, DossBey’s Complaint is lacking.
Section 1983 imposes liability on an entity when it, under color of state
law, violates a person’s constitutional or statutory rights. Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). “[I]t is when execution of a
government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694 (emphasis added); see also
Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987) ("to satisfy the
Monell requirements a plaintiff must 'identify the policy, connect the policy to
the [entity] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the
execution of that policy.' ”). Doss-Bey’s Complaint neither sufficiently
identifies any allegedly unconstitutional, governmental custom or policy nor
demonstrates that his alleged constitutional violation was a result of any
unconstitutional, governmental custom or policy. Doss-Bey points to MDOC
Policy 03.04.100, which states that “[p]risoners shall be provided with a
continuum of medically necessary health care services that are supported by
evidence-based medical research.” (Pl. Resp., ECF No. 22 at 1, Pg. ID 65.)
6
This, however, is clearly not a policy related to the denial of his corrective eye
surgery.
Additionally, an entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 “solely because
it employs a tortfeasor”—or, in other words, it cannot be held liable under §
1983 solely because of allegedly unconstitutional conduct by its employees or
agents. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663. Section 1983 permits suit against “a private
entity that contracts to perform traditional state functions,” but that contractor is
only liable under a Monell claim “for a policy or custom of that private
contractor, rather than a policy or custom of” a governmental entity. Johnson v.
Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Miller, 408 F.3d at 813
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (liability under § 1983 only attaches when the
execution of a policy or custom causes the constitutional violation in question).
Again, Doss-Bey has failed to sufficiently identify any policy or custom
employed by Corizon that caused his alleged constitutional violation. For the
foregoing reasons, Doss-Bey fails to state a deliberate indifference claim
against Corizon.
In sum, Doss-Bey’s Complaint lacks: (1) the identity of any person at
Corizon responsible for denying his corrective eye surgery; (2) facts
demonstrating that the responsible person at Corizon had knowledge of his
asserted serious medical need; (3) facts identifying any specific custom or
7
policy of Corizon’s that attributed to his alleged constitutional violation; and (4)
facts demonstrating a causal connection between the specific custom or policy
of Corizon’s that attributed to his alleged constitutional violation.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) is
GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is
DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff is permitted to amend
his Complaint to correct any deficiencies; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file his Amended
Complaint by September 30, 2019; If Plaintiff fails to file by the deadline, the
Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: August 15, 2019
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
and/or pro se parties on this date, August 15, 2019, by electronic and/or
U.S. First Class mail.
s/ B. Sauve
Case Manager
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?