Doe v. Baum et al

Filing 46

OPINION and ORDER Granting 43 Defendants' MOTION to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Shalina D. Kumar. (THal)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN et
al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 21-12492
Honorable Shalina D. Kumar
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS (ECF NO. 43)
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff Jane Doe claims that defendant University of Michigan (the

“University”) violated Title IX of The Education Act Amendments of 1972
(“Title IX”), see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Count I); University-employeedefendants David Baum, Elizabeth Seney, Margaret Gyetko, and Chung
Owyang (collectively the “Individual Defendants”) violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by breaching their duties under Title IX (Count III); and under state law,
Baum and Seney were negligent in performing related duties (Count IV).
ECF No. 20.

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After briefing and oral argument on defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of Title IX standing and other grounds, the Court determined that it
needed more information to resolve the factual issues as to whether Doe
has standing to bring her Title IX claims. ECF No. 36. The Court ordered
limited discovery into those factual issues and denied defendants’ motion to
dismiss without prejudice. Id.
Following limited discovery, defendants filed a second motion to
dismiss, addressing the factual Title IX standing issues, as well as
renewing its other arguments for dismissal. ECF No. 43. The motion is
briefed, ECF Nos. 43-45, and requires no hearing for decision. See E.D.
Mich. LR 7.1(f). For the reasons below, the Court grants defendants’
motion.
II.

Factual Background
In 2013, Jane Doe, a nineteen-year-old student at Michigan State

University, met Dr. Philip Schoenfeld, a forty-nine-year-old
gastroenterologist at the University, through an online website where they
each sought a personal relationship. ECF No. 20, PageID.271, 273; ECF
No. 43-9, PageID.867; ECF No. 43-2, PageID.791. Doe hoped to attend
medical school. ECF No. 20, PageID.271, 273. Doe and Schoenfeld
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entered a “mentoring relationship with intimacy”, in which Schoenfeld would
pay Doe $1250 per month and help her attain her goal of attending medical
school, and Doe would have sex with Schoenfeld and “maintain her
appearance.” Id. at PageID.272-73. Over the course of this relationship,
Doe alleges Schoenfeld subjected her to sexual violence and abused her.
Id. at PageID.273-76. Their sexual relationship lasted a few months, from
February 2013 to May 2013. Id. at PageID.273; ECF No. 43-2, PageID.791.
But Schoenfeld continued mentoring Doe so that she could one day gain
admission to the University’s medical school. ECF No. 43-9, PageID.866.
In 2015, Schoenfeld offered Doe an internship at the University’s
Taubman Center (the “Taubman Center”). Id. at PageID.868-69; ECF No.
20, PageID.276. Doe accepted and began the internship without submitting
any type of application, providing any identification, undergoing a
background check, or completing HIPAA compliance training. ECF No. 439, PageID.868-69; ECF No. 20, PageID.277. Indeed, Doe did not receive
any communications or acknowledgement from the University about an
internship or shadowing opportunity, nor did she sign any code-of-conduct
attestations as typically required. Id.

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Doe did not explore whether she needed to take any such steps to
formalize the internship, and she did not receive an ID or visitor badge from
the University for use whenever she was on the premises. Id. at
PageID.876. Schoenfeld did not notify anyone within the University that he
planned to have Doe shadowing him, and University administration and
leadership did not approve of any shadowing arrangement for Doe. ECF
No. 43-2, PageID.791; ECF No. 43-10, PageID.915; ECF No. 43-12,
PageID.954.
Without the University’s knowledge or preapproval, Doe shadowed
Schoenfeld in the Taubman Center on more than one occasion, although it
is disputed exactly how many times. Doe estimates that she shadowed
Schoenfeld at least once a week through the winter and summer of 2015.
ECF No. 43-9, PageID.872. Schoenfeld states that Doe shadowed him
fewer than 10 times. ECF No. 43-2, PageID.791. These shadowing visits
consisted of Schoenfeld “asking individual patients if they would allow Ms.
Doe to passively observe [their] interactions. If the patient granted verbal
approval, then [he] allowed Ms. Doe to observe.” Id.
Schoenfeld allegedly assured Doe that he obtained permission from
the University before offering her the internship. ECF No. 20, PageID.277.
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However, during the internship, Schoenfeld instructed Doe that if anyone
asked why she was on the premises, she should tell the person that she
was a family friend of Schoenfeld, which she later realized was to avoid
raising their suspicions. ECF No. 43-9, PageID.873. He also instructed Doe
to wear blue scrubs for the same purpose. Id.
Doe ended her internship in August 2015 because Schoenfeld’s
actions made her feel increasingly uncomfortable. ECF No. 43-9,
PageID.878. For example, instead of using a public elevator, Schoenfeld
would only walk her up to the Taubman Center’s restricted access floor
through a private stairwell, where he would touch her inappropriately. Id.
Doe also felt progressively uncomfortable by Schoenfeld’s written
communications to her. Id. at PageID.888-89. Doe told Schoenfeld that she
was done with the internship because she needed time to focus on her
MCAT examination. Id. at PageID.880. But she left primarily because she
felt sexually and verbally harassed by Schoenfeld. Id.
After Doe had ended their relationship, Schoenfeld allegedly stalked
her and approached her at an off-campus Walgreens in August 2017. ECF
No. 20, PageID.279.

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In January 2018, Doe contacted the University’s Title IX office to
report Schoenfeld for rape and “predatory behavior.” Id. at PageID.280;
ECF No. 43-9, PageID.881. In February 2018, she met with defendants
Baum and Seney, the University’s Title IX Coordinator and Assistant
Coordinator. ECF No. 20, PageID.280; ECF No. 43-9, PageID.881. Baum
and Seney informed Doe that they could not conduct a formal investigation
because Doe was not an active University student or employee but they
would conduct an informal investigation into her report. ECF No. 20,
PageID.280; ECF No. 43-9, PageID.881. Baum emailed Doe in April 2018
to inform her Schoenfeld’s adjunct professorship with the University was
“discontinued” and that he had been informed of her allegations. ECF No.
20, PageID.280. In June 2018, Baum emailed Doe stating that Schoenfeld
was terminated and had been the subject of disciplinary action based on
her reports. Id.
Doe alleges that in October 2018 she met with defendant Owyang,
Schoenfeld’s supervisor at the time of the internship, to discuss her safety
at the hospital and that, at the meeting, Owyang informed Doe he had
terminated Schoenfeld’s employment based on her report and the resulting
informal investigation. Id. at PageID.281; see ECF No. 43-10, PageID.915.
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But according to Owyang’s account of his meeting with Doe, Doe explained
her situation with Schoenfeld to him, and he called Schoenfeld afterwards
for clarification. ECF No. 43-10, PageID.915. Schoenfeld maintains that
Owyang is the only individual from the University with whom he discussed
his relationship with Doe. ECF No. 43-4, PageID.812.
Doe alleges that she later learned there is no record of any
disciplinary action against Schoenfeld by the University, Schoenfeld was
never informed of her Title IX report, and that, rather than being terminated,
Schoenfeld elected to end his position during a phone call with Owyang in
April 2018. ECF No. 20, PageID.282.
In September 2019, Doe learned through a public social media post
that Schoenfeld was interviewing for a position at Stanford University that
would involve both practicing medicine and teaching. Id. Out of concern
that Schoenfeld would use this role to target Stanford students in the way
he targeted Doe, Doe contacted Stanford’s Title IX office and reported her
experience with him. Id. After Doe began making allegations against him,
Schoenfeld brought a defamation suit against her in California. In order to
settle that case, Doe eventually sent written statements to several private

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parties retracting some of her allegations against Schoenfeld. See, e.g.,
ECF No. 13-2, PageID.152-53. Doe then filed this suit. ECF No. 1.
III.

Standards of Review
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) permits dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Where, as here, a defendant moves to dismiss for
lack of standing, the motion amounts to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. White v. Am. Educ. Servs., 2021 WL 6340986,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2021), report and recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 94896 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2022).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may mount a factual attack on the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th
Cir. 1994). In factual attacks, the Court “is free to weigh the evidence and
satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. Critically,
the party invoking federal jurisdiction—here, Doe—bears the burden of
proving the existence of federal jurisdiction. Funderwhite v. Loc. 55, United
Ass’n, 702 F. App’x 308, 311 (6th Cir. 2017). The Court, however, must
ultimately “police the boundaries of its limited jurisdiction.” Williams v. City
of Detroit, 2019 WL 2410719, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 7, 2019).
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B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for the failure to state a claim. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all
allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir.
2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”).
IV.

Analysis
A. Title IX Standing (Count I)
As a threshold matter, Doe must have standing to bring a Title IX

claim. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). As a nonstudent,
Doe establishes such standing if she shows she experienced discrimination
“while participating in, or at least attempting to participate in,” a University
education program or activity. Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686,
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708 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127, 131 (1st
Cir. 2018)). According to Snyder-Hill, even if the so-called internship was
not a bona fide education activity because it was merely a guise for
Schoenfeld’s exploitation, Doe could be deemed as “attempting to
participate in an education program”—and thereby establish factual
standing—if she “believed that [s]he was receiving a bona fide” internship
with the University’s Taubman Center. Id. at 709 (emphasis in original).
Defendants argue that the limited discovery completed by the parties
establishes that Doe could not have believed that she was attempting to
participate in a bona fide internship. They point to evidence that shows (1)
she engaged in lies and deception with Schoenfeld regarding her presence
at the Taubman Center, see ECF No. 43-9, PageID.873, 878; (2) she failed
to investigate or comply with University policy or complete any required
application, training, or background screening, see ECF No. 43-9 at
PageID.868-69; ECF No. 43-6, PageID.842-49; ECF No. 43-11,
PageID.932; and (3) the University did not provide acknowledgement, let
alone any express or implied authorization of her presence at the Taubman
Center, see ECF No. 43-2, PageID.791; ECF No. 43-10, PageID.915; ECF
No. 43-12, PageID.954; ECF No. 43-9, PageID.876.
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Doe fails to counter defendants’ argument and evidence. She argues
that defendants did not follow their policies and procedures in connection to
her internship with Schoenfeld. But she does not dispute the evidence that
shows she engaged in lies and deception during her internship, overlooked
any steps typically required to establish a real University internship—such
as submitting an application—and received no administrative authorization
for her internship. Moreover, she offers no other evidence to show she
believed that she was attempting to participate in a legitimate University
internship. Because the evidence demonstrates that Doe did not believe
that shadowing Schoenfeld at Taubman Center was a bona fide internship
offered by the University, the Court finds that Doe has no standing in fact
and dismisses her Title IX claim against the University (Count I) for lack of
standing. See Snyder-Hill, 48 F.4th at 709; Ritchie, 15 F.3d at 598;
Funderwhite, 702 F. App’x at 311.
B. Failure to State § 1983 Claims (Count III)
Doe claims under § 1983 that Individual Defendants failed to
investigate her Title IX report, thereby violating Title IX and subjecting her
to discrimination. ECF No. 20, PageID.292-93; see ECF No. 44,
PageID.996. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables individual capacity suits for
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money damages against state officials. In order to state a § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) a person, (2) acting under color of state law, (3)
deprived him or her of a federal right. Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 297
F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2002).
Defendants argue that Doe’s § 1983 claims against Individual
Defendants invalidly rest on alleged violations of Title IX. Defendants rely
on Wilkerson v. University of North Texas, which held that a plaintiff cannot
state a claim under § 1983 based on an underlying violation of Title IX. 223
F. Supp. 3d 592, 608 (E.D. Tex. 2016), reversed on other grounds, 878
F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2017). The Court holds likewise.
As the Wilkerson court observed, “Title IX does not allow suit against
individuals.” Id.: see Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246,
257 (2009) (“[Title IX] has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing
suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals.” (citation
omitted)). Like in Wilkerson, Doe attempts to circumvent this restriction by
claiming under § 1983 that defendants violated substantive rights under
Title IX. See 223 F. Supp. 3d at 608. If permitted to do so, Doe would gain
rights that would be unavailable under Title IX—in conflict with Supreme
Court precedent. See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 257; see also id. at 255-56
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(suggesting that § 1983 claims are precluded where they would allow
access to new remedies).
Doe counters that Title IX does allow suits against individuals.
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that Title IX does “not
authoriz[e] suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals.” Id.
at 257. The Court, therefore, concludes that a plaintiff cannot state a
§ 1983 claim based only on an underlying violation of Title IX. Because
Doe attempts to do just that, the Court dismisses her § 1983 claim against
Individual Defendants.
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Remaining State Claims (Count
IV)
Doe’s state law claim for negligence remains. Under 28 U.S.C.
§1367(c)(3), the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction”
over remaining claims if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” It is undisputed that the Court lacks original jurisdiction
over the remaining negligence claim.
The Sixth Circuit has historically applied “a strong presumption
against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims have
been dismissed.” Packard v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Columbus, 423
Fed. App’x. 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011); Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465
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F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006). Even if a court dismisses all federal claims, it
may appropriately hear any remaining state claims if doing so would be
particularly efficient. See Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 952
(6th Cir. 2010); Moon, 465 F.3d at 728 (stating court must weigh “the
interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation”
against a “concern over needlessly deciding state law issues”).
In Harper v. AutoAlliance Intern, Inc., 392 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2004),
the Sixth Circuit found it appropriate to retain supplemental jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. Id. at 211. Among its chief
considerations was that the parties completed discovery; their summary
judgment motions were ripe for decision; the plaintiff had engaged in forum
manipulation; and through substantive rulings, the district court was familiar
with the case facts and already had invested significant time in the case. Id.
at 211-12.
As defendants argue, none of these factors compel the Court to
retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining negligence claim. The
parties conducted only limited discovery as to Doe’s standing to bring her
Title IX claims. No substantive motion awaits the Court’s decision. There is
no sign of forum shopping or manipulation. And the Court has not become
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so familiar with the case facts that it would be against the interest of judicial
efficiency to dismiss the negligence claim. Doe does not provide any
counterargument as to why the Court should retain supplemental
jurisdiction over the negligence claim. Accordingly, the Court declines to do
so and, as a result, dismisses the negligence claim without prejudice
against Baum and Seney.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to

dismiss. ECF No. 43. The complaint (ECF No. 20) is DISMISSED.

Dated: September 26, 2024

s/ Shalina D. Kumar
SHALINA D. KUMAR
United States District Judge

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