Bell v. Starks

Filing 68

OPINION and ORDER Accepting and Adopting 62 The Magistrate Judge's January 21, 2025, Report and Recommendation and Denying 49 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Response due 3/19/2025). Signed by District Judge F. Kay Behm. (KCol)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LARRY BELL,
v.

Case No. 23-10074

Plaintiff,

Hon. F. Kay Behm
United States District Judge

SHANA STARKS,

Hon. David R. Grand
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Defendant.
___________________________ /

OPINION AND ORDER ACCEPTING AND ADOPTING
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S JANUARY 21, 2025,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF No. 62) AND
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 49)
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 49), and Magistrate Judge Grand’s
Report and Recommendation on that Motion (ECF No. 62). For the
reasons set out below, the court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the Report
and Recommendation in full and thus DENIES Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY & FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1

Although the court reviews proper objections to a dispositive
report and recommendation under a de novo standard of review, the
purpose of the Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, is in part to
reduce duplicative work and conserve judicial resources. Owens v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-CV-47, 2013 WL 1304470, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 28, 2013) (citing, e.g., Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court has reviewed the
record and largely repeats the facts as the Magistrate Judge has
described them. See ECF No. 62, PageID.453. In summary:
Pro se plaintiff Larry J. Bell (“Bell”), an
incarcerated person, brings this action under 42
U.S.C. §1983 against Corrections Officer Shana
Starks (“Starks”), alleging that she acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
(ECF No. 14). Specifically, Bell alleges that on
September 4, 2022, when he was housed at the
Woodland Center Correctional Facility, he
informed Starks that he was having suicidal
thoughts, and that Starks responded, “You should
make the world a better place by going on and kill
yourself then.” Bell claims that he then cut
himself badly enough that he became
unresponsive. Another corrections officer who
was “making his rounds” observed Bell and asked
Starks to get help, but Starks allegedly
responded, “just shut the door [to Bell’s cell].”
ECF No. 62, PageID.453-54.
2

In his amended complaint,
Bell also asserts claims of negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
asks for substantial compensatory and punitive
damages.
Id. at 454.
A.

Bell’s allegations
Bell alleges that, in September 2022, he was
“being treated for mental illness” at [MDOC’s
Woodland Center Correctional Facility (“WCC”)],
which is “a facility specifically designated for that
purpose.” (ECF No. 14, PageID.46). He alleges
that, on September 4, 2022, Starks “did a round”
of his unit “at approximately 10:30 p.m.,”
although “[t]he exact time [of Starks’ round] is
not presently known.” (Id.). Bell alleges that,
while Starks was rounding his unit, he notified
her that “he was having suicidal thoughts and
that he was overwhelmed by urges to act upon
those thoughts.” (Id.). Starks allegedly
responded, “You should make the world a better
place by going on and kill yourself then,” and
“proceeded to walk away from [Bell’s] cell and
occupied herself by playing on the computer, with
no concern for [Bell’s] mental disability and
safety.” (Id.). Bell alleges that “[a]s soon as
[Starks] walked away from [his] cell door, he
severely cut himself,” and “[o]ther prisoners who
were aware of this even began kicking their cell
doors to draw attention to [Bell’s] critical need for
medical attention,” but Starks “refused to
respond.” (ECF No. 14, PageID.47). Bell
eventually “became unresponsive from the loss of
blood and need for sutures.” (Id.).
3

Bell alleges that, “[o]n that same night, C/O
[Durand] Jones was working with [] Starks,” and
“[a]s C/O Jones was making his rounds, he
became aware of [Bell’s] condition and opened his
cell door.” (Id.). Jones allegedly “urgently told []
Starks that they needed to get [Bell] immediate
medical attention,” but Starks replied, “Just shut
the door.” (Id.). About a minute or so later,
Jones “called over his radio a code blue for
available assistance to a plea of ‘unresponsive
prisoner.’” (Id.). Bell alleges that “[i]f not for C/O
Jones’ intervention, [Bell] would have very likely
bled to death.” (Id.).
Id. at 455.
B.

Record Evidence
WCC is the facility which “presently houses the
Inpatient Mental Health and Crisis Stabilization
Program for MDOC.” (ECF No. 49-2,
PageID.265). The Crisis Stabilization Program
(“CSP”) is “a referral based program for prisoners
experiencing a serious mental health crisis,” and
the “intention is to diagnose, treat and stabilize
the prisoners.” (Id.). Between July 29, 2014, and
November 14, 2022, Bell had been sent to WCC
on at least eight occasions for treatment. (ECF
No. 49-3). On August 23, 2022, Bell was sent to
the WCC for the eighth time, and he was
incarcerated there during the time of the incident
on September 4, 2022. (Id., PageID.268).
While at WCC, Bell was evaluated by a Qualified
Mental Health Professional (“QMHP”) and placed
on an Intermediate Management Plan on August
29, 2022. (ECF No. 49-7, PageID.322). The Plan
4

states that Bell was assessed to be an
“INTERMEDIATE RISK” for suicide or self
injury, and so the “Frequency of Observation” for
Bell should be “Routine,” the types of “Behaviors
to Observe and Report” include “Any comments,
threats, or acts suggestive of possible harm to self
or attempt to kill self . . .,” and staff should
“[d]iscourage any preoccupation with self-harm or
suicide and encourage focusing on positive
thoughts,” and “[r]efer to QMHP and Treatment
for further assessment and intervention.” (Id.).
The WCC’s “Unit Logbook” reflects that, on
September 4, 2022, Starks made rounds of Bell’s
unit at 7:30 p.m., 8:30 p.m., and 9:30 p.m. (ECF
No. 49-5, PageID.283-84). Thereafter, correctional
officer Durand Jones made rounds of Bell’s unit
at 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. (Id., PageID.284).
The Logbook shows an entry made by Starks at
10:40 p.m., which states:
Prisoner Ford [] notified Officer Jones
that prisoner Bell [] stated he was
bleeding. Officer Jones reported to cell
19 and observed prison [sic] Bell []
with self inflicting wounds to his arm
area and was bleeding. Prisoner
appeared to be unresponsive. Control
Center was notified by C/O Starks and
[] code blue was called over the radio
by me C/O Starks. [] Prisoner Bell []
seen by healthcare and sent out via
ambulance.
(Id., PageID.285).
For reference, the logbook entries are included in this opinion:
5

Logbook, page 1 (events preceeding Bell’s emergency). ECF No. 49-5, PageID.284.

Logbook, page 2 (including entry describing Bell’s emergency). ECF No. 49-5,
PageID.285.

In an affidavit, Jones explained the logbook’s significance (ECF
No. 51-1, PageID.367):
6

Every time that I begin a round, I write in the
unit logbook that I have made a round and the
time that I started the round. On the unit
logbook for September 4, 2022, I completed
rounds at 1830 (6:30 p.m.), 1900 (7:00 p.m.), 2000
(8:00 p.m.), 2200 (10:00 p.m.), and 2230 (10:30
p.m.). . . . At the “2040” (10:40 p.m.) time in the
logbook, it notes that I was notified by Prisoner
Ford [] that Prisoner Bell [] was bleeding. I went
to the cell and saw that Bell was bleeding from
wounds on his arms. At that time, Bell appeared
to be unresponsive. I notified Officer Starks to
make the code blue call to the control center and
healthcare was sent to our unit and Bell was
ultimately transported to a hospital. . . . (Id.,
PageID.367-68).
ECF No. 62, PageID.457-58.
A “Critical Incident Participant Report” authored
by Jones states that, at 10:42 p.m., he reported to
inmate Bell, where he observed Bell bleeding
from wounds on his arms. (ECF No. 49-7,
PageID.302). Bell appeared to be unresponsive,
and Jones notified Starks to notify the Control
Center. (Id.).
ECF No. 62, PageID.459.
Starks also filled out a Critical Incident Report, which largely
agrees with the facts in Jones’ report regarding what happened with
Bell after 10:40p.m. ECF No. 49-7, PageID.296. Several other reports
were filed as well, which also agree on those basic facts. Id. at
PageID.297-318.
7

Picture taken by Jones of Bell’s cell after he was taken for treatment.
ECF No. 49-7, PageID.324.

Bell was taken to University of Michigan Hospital and treated for
his injuries, which included swallowing the metal piece he used to cut
himself. ECF No. 49-7, PageID.294.
Magistrate Judge Grand issued a Report and Recommendation on
January 21, 2025 on the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 62),
and recommends that this court grant the DENY the motion. The court
did not hold a hearing on the motion, finding that the issues were
8

adequately presented in the briefs and record. ECF No. 62,
PageID.454. Defendant Starks has filed objections to the Report and
Recommendation (ECF No. 64). The court has fully reviewed the
record.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party may object to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation on dispositive motions, and a district judge must
resolve proper objections under a de novo standard of review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B)-(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(3). This court “may accept,
reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.” Id. “For an objection to be proper,
Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 72.1(d)(1) requires parties to
‘specify the part of the order, proposed findings, recommendations, or
report to which [the party] objects’ and to ‘state the basis for the
objection.’” Pearce v. Chrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339,
346 (6th Cir. 2018). Objections that dispute the general correctness of
the report and recommendation are improper. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d
373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).

9

Moreover, objections must be clear so that the district court can
“discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Id. (citing
Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th
Cir. 1991)); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (explaining
that objections must go to “factual and legal” issues “at the heart of the
parties’ dispute”). In sum, the objections must be clear and specific
enough that the court can squarely address them on the merits.
See Pearce, 893 F.3d at 346. And, when objections are “merely
perfunctory responses . . . rehashing . . . the same arguments set forth
in the original petition, reviewing courts should review [a Report and
Recommendation] for clear error.” Ramirez v. United States, 898
F.Supp.2d 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Funderburg v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 15-10068, 2016 WL 1104466, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22,
2016) (Hood, J.) (noting that the plaintiff’s objections merely restated
his summary judgment arguments, “an approach that is not
appropriate or sufficient”).
IV.

ANALYSIS
Starks brings two objections in response to the Magistrate Judge’s

report and recommendation. First, she asserts that the R&R
10

improperly found that Bell has established a genuine issue of fact as to
his timeline of events and therefore cannot establish a constitutional
violation. Second, she argues that the R&R improperly found that
Starks is not entitled to qualified immunity “for the reason that Bell
has not created a genuine issue of material fact that Starks violated any
of his constitutional rights.” ECF No. 63, PageID.488.
Up front, the second objection is not a proper objection. Although
labeled as an objection to the recommended denial of qualified
immunity, it does not challenge the finding that, assuming that Bell
could establish a constitutional violation, then Stark’s actions would not
be entitled to qualified immunity. See R&R, ECF No. 62, PageID.470 (a
jury could find that Starks demonstrated deliberate indifference to
Bell’s serious medical need, and if that were the case, then that act of
disregarding his medical need would violate clearly established law).
The objection instead only challenges the recommended denial of
qualified immunity on the grounds that there was no constitutional
violation – a conclusion that is entirely dependent on the first objection.
The court therefore OVERRULES the second objection and focuses
only on the substance of the first objection: whether there is a question
11

of material fact as to whether Starks demonstrated deliberate
indifference to Bell’s serious medical needs, based in particular on
whether a reasonable jury could accept Bell’s version of the events.
A.

R&R Conclusions and Objection

There is no objection, at this step, to the R&R’s conclusion that
Bell was struggling with suicidal thoughts, and that he informed Starks
of that. ECF No. 62, PageID.467. There is no dispute at all that the
incident took place in WCC, which is the MDOC facility specifically
designated for handling and treating inmates experiencing serious
mental health crises, such as Bell. The Magistrate Judge found that
Bell raised a material dispute as to whether Starks exhibited deliberate
indifference to Bell’s serious medical needs by disregarding Bell’s
complaints that he was having suicidal thoughts and urges to cut
himself, and by encouraging Bell to act on suicidal impulses to harm
himself. See Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001);
Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir.
2020); ECF No. 62, PageID.464-65.
Starks’ objection to that conclusion comes down to whether Bell’s
testimony could be believed by a reasonable jury: that Starks walked by
12

Bell’s cell, told him that he ought to kill himself, and that Bell
subsequently did cut himself within a short time period of that
statement – when the officers’ logbook shows that Starks’ last round
was at 9:30p.m. and Bell was found bleeding at 10:40p.m. The R&R
found Bell’s testimony sufficiently consistent to raise a fact issue:
Bell’s statements that Starks told him to kill
himself during the 10:30 p.m. round
demonstrates that he could not remember the
exact timing of events during the approximately
one-hour span between when Starks allegedly
told him to kill himself after she started her last
round at 9:30 p.m., and when officer Jones found
him bleeding and unconscious in his cell at 10:40
p.m., which is hardly evidence that “completely
contradicts” Bell’s fundamental claim that Starks
knew he needed serious medical attention, yet
disregarded that need. To be clear, the Court is
not saying the alleged discrepancy is irrelevant to
the merits of Bell’s claim. Certainly, Starks’
proffered evidence may bear on Bell’s credibility
as to his recollection of the events, and as to what
did and did not take place. But those issues are
for a jury to consider and decide, and are not
properly before the Court at the summary
judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (stating that, at the
summary judgment stage, “[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . .”).
ECF No. 62, PageID.468.
13

In Starks’ view, she “presented contemporary record evidence that
blatantly contradicted Bell’s timeline such that no reasonable jury could
believe it and this Court should not adopt Bell’s version of the facts.”
ECF No. 64, PageID.485. According to her, Starks’ only round during
the relevant timeframe was completed at 9:30p.m., an entire hour
before Bell (in her view) cut himself. Bell has testified that he cut
himself “as soon as she walked away” from his cell. Id. (citing Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 14, PageID.47). Ultimately, says Starks, these
records show that she “was nowhere near his cell when Bell injured
himself, and had not been near him for over an hour.” ECF No. 64,
PageID.487.
Starks’ objection rests, therefore, almost entirely on the record
evidence that Starks was not on rounds at what she says is the relevant
time period. The primary evidence for this is the logbook:

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Logbook entries

Starks (“SS”) did rounds at
8:30pm and 9:30pm

Jones (“DJ”) did rounds at
10pm and 10:30pm

She also relies on Officer Jones’ testimony as to when he did
rounds and how he did rounds (ECF No. 49-6, PageID.289), and on the
affidavit of Kaitlin Reed, another corrections officer who reviewed Bell’s
internal grievance request, and who avers that the surveillance video of
the hallway at 10:30pm did not show Starks near Bell’s cell (ECF No.
49-10, PageID.349).
B.

Conclusions of the court

The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s evaluation of the
factual record in the R&R. There is no incontrovertible evidence
showing exactly when Bell cut himself, only that he was discovered
around 10:40pm after another prisoner notified Jones that Bell was
bleeding. See ECF No. 49-5, PageID.285. While discrepancies between
Bell’s testimony and other record evidence exist, it is possible that Bell
15

cut himself well before 10:40pm. As the Magistrate Judge pointed out,
Jones testified as to how he does rounds generally (i.e., “I conduct
rounds in the unit by stopping by each cell housing a prisoner to ensure
that there is a “living breathing” body,” and “that each prisoner is in
their cell and are not experiencing any health emergency”), but he does
not speak to any specific observations of and/or interactions with Bell
during his rounds on September 4, 2022. ECF No. 49-6, PageID.289.
As a result, the exact amount of time that passed between when Starks
spoke to Bell, to Bell cutting himself, to Bell being found, is not critical.
The point is that, if Bell is telling the truth about what Starks said to
him, but does not have the time quite right on when exactly each officer
was on rounds, the sequence could still be enough to prove his case for
deliberate indifference even if the entire incident took place over about
an hour. While discrepancies between his testimony and other evidence
are likely relevant information to consider, these differences (and Bell’s
credibility) are for a jury to weigh. ECF No. 62, PageID.468.
Defendant objects to this conclusion because, she says, the record
evidence contradicts Bell’s timeline, but a reasonable jury could choose
not to credit Starks’ evidence as conclusive. Assume, as Defendant
16

does, that Bell was in fact only bleeding for a few moments before other
prisoners alerted Jones and Bell was found, around 10:40p.m.
Defendant focuses much of her argument on Bell’s testimony that he cut
himself as soon as Starks walked away – and, Starks argues, she was
not rounding at any time near 10:30pm, and so his version simply
cannot be true. See, e.g., ECF No. 63, PageID.474. Defendant’s version
of events thus relies heavily on the logbook as an authoritative
accounting of where exactly each officer was at each time. Her
argument assumes that whenever she is not on rounds, she is in an
office or control room, or at least nowhere near Bell. But that is not the
only interpretation available of the logbook, and it is certainly not the
interpretation which draws all inferences in Bell’s favor, as the court
must at this stage. The logbook accounts for when rounds were made or
when certain activities occurred, but it does not make any indication
about what officers were doing when not on rounds. Is it possible that
Starks walked by his cell while Jones was rounding on the other side,
even if she herself was not performing a formal “round”? 1 Defendant
1 For example, right beneath the 10:30pm rounds entry (by Jones), an entry

with timestamp at 10:36pm (“2236”) reads “Poa out Jamison [redacted] / Poa in
Jackson [redacted]” and is initialed by Starks (“SS”). ECF No. 49-5, PageID.284.
17

has not pointed to any testimony explaining where Starks was. A jury
could choose to accept Bell’s testimony that, whatever the logbook says
about when formal rounds happened, Starks walked by his cell
“approximately” around 10:30p.m. As the Magistrate Judge pointed
out, this conclusion is not precluded by the affidavit of Kaitlin Reed,
who swore that she reviewed the video of the hallway and that “at”
10:30p.m., Starks was not in front of Bell’s cell. ECF No. 49-10,
PageID.349 (Reed’s testimony); ECF No. 62, PageID.468 (R&R). Bell
testified several times that he gave an approximate time, not an exact
time, and Reed’s affidavit does not indicate whether she reviewed any
other times. See ECF No. 62, PageID.455. If Starks was never near
Bell’s cell at any point between, say, 10:20pm and 10:42pm (covering
the moments before he is found bleeding), then evidence tending to
prove that fact would be relevant at this stage, but evidence proving
that has not been produced to the court. Further, a jury might not have
to accept Reed’s testimony at all, because that surveillance video has

Bell testified that Starks spoke to him after a “shift change for the POAs” in his
deposition. See ECF No. 49-4, PageID.282. Even accepting the logbook’s
authoritative nature about Starks’ location (the court does not), Defendant has not
shown why the logbook entries would be “incontrovertible proof” that Bell’s version
of events is wrong.
18

not been produced. See Fed. R. Evid. 1002. At this stage, material
factual questions remain, and those questions are sufficient to accept
and adopt the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation.
V.

CONCLUSION
In summary: the court OVERRULES both objections and

ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the report and recommendation in full.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED.
Although not addressed in any of the briefings on this motion, the
court notes that the Motion for Summary Judgment is, in entirety,
about Bell’s Eighth Amendment claims. However, Bell also moved to
bring claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, which were not addressed in Defendants’ motion. ECF No. 14,
PageID.47. He was granted leave to file, and was ordered to refile, that
proposed amended complaint, but never did. See ECF No. 16,
PageID.61. Defendants nonetheless brought this motion relying on that
amended complaint as his operative complaint, though they did not
address his state law claims. See, e.g., ECF No. 49, PageID.244. Their
only answer filed thus far addresses ECF No. 1, but not ECF No. 14.
ECF No. 26, PageID.89. To clarify the record as to Plaintiff’s state law
19

claims and both parties’ operative pleadings, it is FURTHER
ORDERED that, if Defendants waive any objection to accepting
Plaintiff’s amended complaint at ECF No. 14 as his operative
complaint, to file an answer to the amended complaint at ECF No. 14
within 14 days of entry of this order, or b) if Defendants are objecting to
treating ECF No. 14 as Bell’s operative complaint, including his state
law claims, to SHOW CAUSE why this court should not treat that
argument as waived by their reliance on ECF No. 14 in their motion
and the lack of objections to the Magistrate Judge’s treatment of ECF
No. 14 as Bell’s operative pleading, within 14 days of entry of this order.
The court will issue a scheduling order for remaining dates in the
case.
SO ORDERED.
Date: March 5, 2025

s/F. Kay Behm
F. Kay Behm
United States District Judge

20