USA v. Shelton

Filing 16

ORDER denying defendant's motion to set aside default judgment 15 Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 00-CV-60056
HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.
DEMETRIUS SHELTON,
Defendant.
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Pro se defendant Demetrius Shelton has filed a letter (Doc. 15) challenging a default
judgment entered against him on May 8, 2000, in a student loan action. Defendant alleges
that he was discharged from the debt because the school closed while he was a student
there, and that he never received notice of the default judgment hearing. Because
defendant is representing himself, his papers and arguments will not be held to the
standard of a practicing attorney, but will be liberally construed. Martin v. Overton, 391
F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
Given defendant’s pro se status, the court construes his letter (Doc. 15) as a motion to set
aside the default judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) articulates six reasons a default judgment may
be set aside: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence . . .;(3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). To the extent defendant’s articulated reasons in favor of setting
aside the default judgment can be construed as an alleged “mistake” or “excusable neglect”
as set forth at Rule 60(b)(1), they are barred by a one-year limitations period under Rule
60(c).

Even if defendant’s motion falls within the ambit of the residual clause set forth

under Rule 60(b)(6) for which no strict time limit applies, defendant bears a high burden as
it is well established that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is warranted “only in exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances.” Fuller v. Quire, 916 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1990). Although
there is no stated time limit on the court’s power to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the
motion for relief from the judgment must be made within a “reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(c); Fuller, 916 F.2d at 360. In determining whether the motion was filed in a
reasonable time, the court considers the record as a whole. See Smith v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Serv., 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985). Factors for the court to consider are
the length and circumstances of the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party by reason
of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief. Olle v. Henry & Wright
Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990).
Considering the facts and circumstances present here, defendant’s motion to set
aside the default judgment is untimely. The default judgment was entered fifteen years
ago. While defendant claims he was unaware of the default judgment hearing, he has
attached tax records showing that the government has been garnishing a portion of his tax
refund to satisfy the debt for a number of years beginning in 2003. Given that defendant
has been on notice of the default judgment entered in this case since at least 2003, the
filing of his motion to set aside the default judgment some twelve years later is
unreasonable. Defendant’s delay of over one decade amounts to significant prejudice to
the government should the court entertain the motion on the merits. Defendant claims his
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student loan debt was discharged in 1986 when the school he was attending closed. Now
nearly thirty years later, it is extremely unlikely that school records will be available to prove
the dates of defendant’s attendance, and defendant has not come forward with any records
in this regard. Thus, the government would be prejudiced by defendant’s significant delay
in filing his motion to set aside default judgment.
In addition to the reasonable time requirement, the Sixth Circuit has enunciated
three factors to consider in deciding a Rule 60(b) motion: (1) whether the plaintiff will be
prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether culpable
conduct of the defendant led to the default. United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastal
Line R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983). For the reasons discussed regarding the
reasonable time requirement, consideration of the first factor militates against setting aside
the default judgment as the government would be prejudiced by the significant delay.
Having found that defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment is untimely, and
that defendant’s delay in filing constitutes significant prejudice to the government,
defendant’s motion (Doc. 15) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2015
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
September 29, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also on
Demetrius Shelton, 12242 Plainview, Detroit, MI 48228.
s/Barbara Radke
Deputy Clerk

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