Hill et al v. Granholm et al
Filing
158
OPINION and ORDER Denying 136 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HENRY HILL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 10-14568
v.
Hon. John Corbett O’Meara
RICK SNYDER, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The court
heard oral argument on July 28, 2016, and took the matter under advisement.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiffs are serving mandatory life sentences for crimes they committed
when they were under the age of eighteen. This case began in 2010 with Plaintiffs’
challenge to the constitutionality of M.C.L. § 791.234(6), which prohibits the
Michigan Parole Board from considering for parole those sentenced to life in
prison for first-degree murder. The court determined that § 791.234(6) was
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles who had received mandatory life sentences
and who were rendered ineligible for parole consideration. See Doc. 62 (January
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30, 2013 Order). The court found § 791.234(6) ran afoul of Miller v. Alabama,
132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), in which the Supreme Court held that mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Although Miller did not
categorically ban life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, it declared that
juveniles are entitled to individualized consideration of the mitigating and transient
qualities of youth before the imposition of such a sentence. Id. at 2464-69.
After this court declared M.C.L. § 791.234(6) unconstitutional as applied to
juveniles, it sought additional briefing from the parties regarding the appropriate
remedy. On November 26, 2013, the court ordered immediate compliance with
Miller and required Plaintiffs to be given parole consideration. Defendants
appealed, and the Sixth Circuit stayed the court’s November 26, 2013 order
pending appeal.
In 2014 – while this case was on appeal – the Michigan Legislature passed a
statute in response to Miller. See M.C.L. §§ 769.25, 769.25a. Section 769.25a
provides for resentencing – rather than parole consideration – in the event Miller
was determined to apply retroactively (to the Plaintiffs):
If the state supreme court or the United States supreme
court finds that the decision of the United States supreme
court in Miller v. Alabama . . . applies retroactively to all
defendants who were under the age of 18 at the time of
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their crimes, and that decision is final for appellate
purposes, the determination of whether a sentence of
imprisonment for [first-degree murder] shall be
imprisonment for life without parole eligibility or a term
of years as set forth in section 25(9) of this chapter shall
be made by the sentencing judge or his or her successor
as provided in this section.
Id.
The statute allows prosecuting attorneys to file motions requesting that
juvenile offenders be given life-without-parole sentences. With respect to
Plaintiffs, the deadline for filing these motions is August 24, 2016.1 The defendant
is then entitled to a resentencing hearing, at which “the court shall consider the
factors listed in Miller v. Alabama . . . and may consider any other criteria relevant
to its decision, including the individual’s record while incarcerated.” M.C.L. §
769.25(6). At the hearing, “the court shall specify on the record the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances considered by the court and the court’s reasons
supporting the sentence imposed. The court may consider evidence presented at
trial together with any evidence presented at the sentencing.” M.C.L. § 769.25(7).
In a recent decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals emphasized its
1
The statute provides prosecutors with 180 days after the “date the supreme
court’s decision [finding Miller retroactive] becomes final.” The Court found Miller to be
retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 71 (2016). The mandate in
Montgomery was entered on February 26, 2016, triggering the beginning of the 180-day
period.
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understanding of Miller and cautioned that “when sentencing a juvenile offender, a
trial court must begin with the understanding that, in all but the rarest of
circumstances, a life-without-parole sentence will be disproportionate for the
juvenile offender at issue. Thus, a sentencing court must begin its analysis with the
understanding that life-without-parole is, unequivocally, only appropriate in rare
cases.” People v. Hyatt, __ N. W.2d __, 2016 WL 3941269 (Mich. App. July 21,
2016). The court further noted that appellate courts should “conduct a searching
inquiry and view as inherently suspect any life-without-parole sentence imposed
on a juvenile offender under MCL 769.25.” Id.
If the prosecutor decides not to seek a life-without-parole sentence, “the
court shall sentence the individual to a term of imprisonment for which the
maximum term shall be 60 years and the minimum term shall be not less than 25
years or more than 40 years.” M.C.L. § 769.25a(4)(c).
In January 2016, the Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136
S.Ct. 718 (2016) that Miller was retroactive and that mandatory life-without-parole
sentences that became final prior to Miller (like those imposed upon Plaintiffs)
were void. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 731, 733-34 (“There is no grandfather clause
that permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids.”).
After the enactment of M.C.L. §§ 769.25 and 769.25a, and the Montgomery
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decision, the Sixth Circuit decided the appeal of this court’s orders in this case. On
May 11, 2016, the Sixth Circuit found that the significant changes that had
occurred in the legal landscape during the pendency of the appeal required remand:
After careful consideration of the substantive issues at
stake, the current procedural posture of the case, and the
significant intervening legal changes described above, we
vacate the district court’s challenged orders and remand
with instructions to provide the parties leave to amend
their pleadings and to supplement the record as needed,
particularly with respect to the current statutory scheme
governing plaintiffs’ sentences and eligibility for parole.
We vacate the court’s prior orders to enable the court to
address remedies in the context of the new legal
landscape and because it is necessary in light of our
instructions to allow the parties leave to amend the
pleadings.
Hill v. Snyder, 821 F.3d. 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2016).
After remand, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to challenge the
constitutionality of M.C.L. §§ 769.25 and 25a under the Eighth Amendment and
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction, requesting that the court stop state prosecutors from
seeking life-without-parole sentences in their cases, consistent with the court’s
previous orders granting Plaintiffs parole eligibility. The court granted the TRO,
setting a hearing date for the preliminary injunction for July 28. Defendants
appealed and the Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the TRO relied upon this
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court’s previous orders, which were all vacated by the Sixth Circuit on May 11,
2016.
Acknowledging the Sixth Circuit’s decision, Plaintiffs base their injunction
motion on the new claims raised in their amended complaint, rather than the
court’s previous orders. Plaintiffs seek a determination that the life-without-parole
resentencing statute (§ 769.25a) would subject them to unconstitutional
punishment. Plaintiffs urge the court to enjoin state prosecutors from seeking lifewithout-parole sentences pursuant to § 769.25a.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court considers
four factors: (1) the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether
the moving party will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3)
whether an injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the public
interest. See Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 689-90 (6th Cir.
2014). Although these are factors to be balanced, rather than prerequisites,
“[w]hen a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential
constitutional violation, ‘the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the
determinative factor.’” Liberty Coins, 748 F.3d at 689 (citation omitted).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of
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M.C.L. § 769.25a because it continues to allow the possibility of life-withoutparole sentences for juveniles. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that § 769.25a is an
ex post facto law and that it violates the Eighth Amendment.
The changes in the legal landscape present difficulties for Plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims. This case began as a challenge to the parole statute (M.C.L. § 791.234(6))
that denied Plaintiffs consideration for parole. This court found Plaintiffs’ claim to
be cognizable under § 1983 because Plaintiffs sought only the opportunity to be
considered for parole; they did not seek to challenge their sentences or invalidate
the duration of their confinement. See Docket No. 31 (July 15, 2011 order) at 8-9;
Docket No. 62 (January 30, 2013 order) at 4-6. See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 78 (2005).
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and request for injunctive relief is different.
Plaintiffs now argue that M.C.L. § 769.25a – which governs sentencing, not parole
– subjects them to “ongoing unconstitutional punishment.” Pls.’ Reply at 3.
Plaintiffs argue that it is unconstitutional to subject them to the possibility of lifewithout-parole sentences and that state prosecutors are impermissibly seeking lifewithout-parole sentences as a routine matter.
The court pauses to note that Plaintiffs have not yet been resentenced; none
has received a life-without-parole sentence pursuant to M.C.L. § 769.25a.
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Plaintiffs argue that the court should preclude state courts from considering such
sentences. The Supreme Court has not, however, categorically banned lifewithout-parole sentences for all juveniles. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (“Although
we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases,
we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”).
The Court has also reserved for the States the determination of how to comply with
Miller. See Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 735 (noting that “[w]hen a new substantive
rule of constitutional law is established, this Court is careful to limit the scope of
any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon
the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems.”). Although
the Michigan Legislature could have achieved compliance by providing Plaintiffs
with the opportunity for parole hearings, it took the resentencing approach. This
approach allows Plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating factors
and their rehabilitation, which is consistent with what Plaintiffs have sought from
the beginning of this case.
Plaintiffs argue that the possibility that they may be resentenced to life
without parole is unconstitutional and that the court should preclude state
prosecutors from seeking such a sentence. This claim oversteps the boundary – so
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carefully drawn in the original complaint – between cases Plaintiffs may bring
pursuant to § 1983 and those they may not. The Supreme Court has made clear
that a “prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or
duration of his confinement.’ He must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or
appropriate state relief) instead.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
See also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Wilkinson, the Court
explained that it “has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only
habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration
of their confinement – either directly through an injunction compelling speedier
release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the
unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81.
Plaintiffs contend that they should not be subject to life-without-parole
sentences, which are only appropriate for “the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. Such a challenge is
appropriately brought in state court at their resentencing hearings, then upon
appellate and habeas review, as necessary. Because Plaintiffs may not challenge a
sentence of life without parole under § 1983, they are unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their claim for injunctive relief.
It remains to be determined whether Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
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otherwise presents a claim upon which this court may grant relief. Plaintiffs have
not, however, demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of the
claims before the court in their preliminary injunction motion. Therefore,
Plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to
injunctive relief.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction is DENIED.
s/John Corbett O’Meara
United States District Judge
Date: August 3, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record on this date, August 3, 2016, using the ECF system.
s/William Barkholz
Case Manager
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