Doe v 27th Judicial District Court, et al

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANE DOE,
Case No. 11-14541
Plaintiff,
Honorable John Corbett O’Meara
v.
27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT and
NATALIE SHAUL,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ JUNE 29, 2012 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter came before the court on defendants 27th Judicial District Court and Nancy Shaul’s
June 29, 2012 motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Jane Doe filed a response July 18, 2012; and
Defendants filed a reply brief July 30, 2012. Oral argument was heard September 27, 2012.
BACKGROUND FACTS
In 2009 plaintiff Jane Doe was convicted of a misdemeanor in Michigan’s 27th District
Court and sentenced to probation. Plaintiff alleges that Robert Samson, her probation officer,
solicited sexual relations from her in exchange for favorable treatment during her probation. It is
undisputed that Samson’s misconduct was limited to propositioning Plaintiff.
Samson had joined the court’s probation department as a volunteer in 1983. The court then
hired him to a part-time, paid position in August 1996. Defendant Natalie Shaul began working at
the court as the director of the probation department in November 1996, and it was Samson who
trained Shaul in the policies and procedures of the probation department.

Plaintiff Jane Doe was placed on probation for possession of narcotic paraphernalia on May
19, 2009; and the court assigned Samson as her probation officer. Plaintiff later claimed that
Samson sexually accosted her and solicited her to have sexual relations with him on multiple
occasions. Plaintiff reported Samson’s conduct to the police; and on September 21, 2009, Samson
was arrested and charged with four felony counts of soliciting criminal sexual conduct. After his
arraignment, Samson was released on bond. On September 22, he telephoned defendant Shaul and
apologized for his misconduct. Shaul told Samson he was fired. In the afternoon of September 24,
after Samson failed to go to the probation office to return his keys and badge and to retrieve his
belongings, a police officer informed Shaul that Samson had committed suicide.
Nearly a year later, on September 3, 2010, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Wayne County Circuit
Court against these same defendants, 27th District Court, Natalie Shaul, and Robert Samson’s estate.
In September 2011, the circuit court dismissed the claims against 27th District Court and in
November denied Shaul’s dispositive motion based on governmental immunity. Shaul has appealed
that ruling, and it is pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff then filed this action in this court October 19, 2011, alleging the following causes of
action, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Count I, accosting and soliciting against defendant Samson;
Count II, deliberate indifference against the defendant court and Shaul; Count III, refusing or
neglecting to prevent violation against the defendant court and Shaul; Count IV, unlawful policies
and customs against the defendant court and Shaul; Count V, conspiracy against the defendant court
and Shaul; and Count VI, which in the complaint is erroneously labeled Count V, vicarious liability
against the defendant court and Shaul. Defendants 27th District Court and Shaul have moved for
summary judgment.

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LAW AND ANALYSIS
In general, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages brought in federal court
against a state unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or has consented to be sued. See
Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 816 (6th Cir. 2000). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that Michigan’s district courts are arms of the state for
sovereign immunity purposes. See Pucci v. Nineteenth District Court, 628 F.3d 752, 762 (6th Cir.
2010). Defendant 27th District Court is entitled to such immunity, and all claims against it in this
action must be dismissed.
The claims alleged in Count I are against the estate of Samson. It appears as though the estate
is not represented by counsel.
Count II alleges deliberate indifference against defendant Shaul. A constitutional violation
occurs where the deprivation alleged is sufficiently serious and the officer has acted with deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Negligence does not establish deliberate indifference. Pahssen v. Merrill Comm. Sch. Dist., 668
F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2012). In this case Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to establish that
Shaul knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff’s health and safety. The
court will assume for purposes of this motion that, as alleged by Plaintiff, Shaul had previously
received a letter from Amanda Mowery, another person who complained that Samson had sought
sexual favors from her during the course of her probation. The court will also assume that Shaul
failed to investigate those allegations and in response to the letter told Mowery that Samson was “a
good guy.”

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Those events occurred around 1997, twelve years before the misconduct alleged by Plaintiff
in her complaint. There is no evidence that Shaul was put on notice at any other time in the
intervening twelve years. Shaul could not plausibly be said to have known of and disregarded a
substantial risk of serious harm to female probationers in 2009 based on the Mowery letter she
received in 1997. A single incident is insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Thus,
under the facts alleged by Plaintiff, the evidence cannot support a finding that Shaul was deliberately
indifferent.
In Count III Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to instruct, supervise, control and
discipline Samson. Failure to train and/or supervise employees will trigger § 1983 liability “only
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights” of member of the public
with whom the employees interact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). However,
where the proper course of conduct is obvious to all without training or supervision, the failure to
train or supervise generally does not support an inference of deliberate indifference by policy makers
to the need to train or supervise. Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992).
With regard to “misdeeds relate[d] to . . . basic norms of human conduct,” a supervisor ordinarily
“need not expend precious resources on training or supervision but can instead rely on the common
sense of her employees.” Id. at 301.
In this case it cannot be found that Samson’s misconduct occurred because of Defendants’
failure to proper train him. In addition, a supervisor’s failure to supervise or control an offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific intent of the
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that
the supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the

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unconstitutional conduct of the offender. McQueen v. Beecher Comm. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th
Cir. 2006). Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be based upon a mere failure to act but must
be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir.
2002).
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ “existing policies and/or customs directly led
to the foreseeable sexual abuse Plaintiff experienced at the hands of a probation officer.” Compl.
at ¶ 102. However, liability for an unconstitutional policy or custom cannot arise from a single act.
Rather, a custom can be shown only by evidence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional conduct. Crawford v. Van Buren County, 678 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2012). In this
case, where Plaintiff’s only evidence of a pattern of behavior consists of a letter twelve years earlier
that alleged the same type of misconduct, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count
IV.
Count V alleges a civil conspiracy under § 1983 among the defendants. To prevail on such
a claim, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: 1) a single plan existed, 2) the defendant
shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and
3) an over act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused the injury. See Bazzi v.
City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Conspiracy claims must be pleaded with some
degree of specificity; vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are not
sufficient to state such a claim under § 1983. Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Public Sch., 655 F.3d
556, 563 (6th Cir. 2011). In this case Plaintiff has failed to plead any degree of specificity for her
conspiracy claim. Furthermore, to state a cause of action for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff
must prove the existence of a conspiracy among two or more persons. However, a governmental

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entity, in this case 27th District Court, cannot conspire with its own agents or employees. United
Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738, 753 (6th Cir. 2004).
Finally, § 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of
respondeat superior. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006). Moreover,
the statute does not impose vicarious liability on a government entity for the constitutional torts of
its employees. Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997). Therefore,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count VI.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants 27th District Court
and Natalie Shaul’s June 29, 2012 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

s/John Corbett O'Meara
United States District Judge

Date: October 23, 2012

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on
this date, October 23, 2012, using the ECF system.

s/William Barkholz
Case Manager

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