Jones v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DEBORAH JONES,
Case No. 13-11740
Plaintiff,
Hon. John Corbett O’Meara
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEBORAH JONES’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING CAROLYN W. COLVIN’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Deborah Jones filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) October 9, 2013.

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin

(“Commissioner”) filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a) February 10, 2014. Plaintiff then filed a reply brief February 27, 2014.
For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income alleging a disability commencing on or near July 1, 2010. Upon denial of

the claims, Plaintiff sought hearing-based review before an ALJ and a hearing took
place on September 9, 2011. Resulting from that hearing, the ALJ issued Plaintiff
an adverse decision on November 23, 2011.

Based on the adverse decision,

Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council; however, the Appeals Council
denied review.

Because that makes the decision of the Commissioner final,

Plaintiff seeks review by this court.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), “[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . .
may obtain a review of such decision by civil action. . . .” If the court finds that
there is substantial evidence to support the record, then the decision of the ALJ is
conclusive and the decision must be affirmed. Id.; see also Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Johnson v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 948 F.2d
989, 992 (6th Cir. 1991).
“The substantial evidence standard is less exacting than the preponderance
of the evidence standard.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007),
citing Bell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1996). Substantial
evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson,
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402 U.S. at 401, citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Bass, 499 F.3d at 509.
1. Treating-Physician Rule
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not afford proper weight to Dr. Rasak’s
and Dr. Krugel’s opinions with regard to the ALJ’s disability analysis. It is well
established that an ALJ “must give a treating source opinion controlling weight if
the treating source opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the case record.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406
(2009), citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (2004) (quoting
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) currently (c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This is known as the treating-physician rule.
In considering the weight to give to a treating physician’s opinion under the
treating-physician rule, the ALJ is to evaluate “the length of the treatment
relationship and frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the
record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician.” Blakley, 581
F.3d at 406; Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). With respect to
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), the decision of the ALJ must “contain specific reasons
for the weight given to the treating source’s medical opinion, supported by the

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evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight . . . [given] to the treating source’s medical
opinion . . . .” SSR 96-2P, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996); Blakley, 581 F.3d at
406-07; Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544.
A. Dr. Krugel’s Medical Opinion
With respect to Plaintiff’s contentions, the ALJ considered the proper factors
when discrediting Dr. Krugel’s medical opinion. As to factor one, length of the
treatment relationship and frequency of examination, the ALJ’s opinion indicates
that the relationship began around July 2010 and continued until September 2011.
(Tr. 21-24.) As to factor two, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the
ALJ considered that Plaintiff saw Dr. Krugel for her right knee pain, gave her a
cortisone injection, and prescribed pain relievers. (Tr. 20.) As to factor three,
supportability of the opinion, the ALJ found that the doctor’s opinion was inhibited
because of Plaintiff’s “lack of urgency,” regarding the MRI imaging. (Tr. 20-23.)
As to factor four, consistency with the opinion and record as a whole, the ALJ
found that this opinion conflicted with the doctor’s own opinions and indicated that
his opinion was given “modest weight.”

(Tr. 24.)

Lastly, as to factor five,

specialization of the treating physician, the ALJ properly considered that Dr.
Krugel was an orthopedic surgeon. (Tr. 20.)

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B. Dr. Rasak’s Medical Opinion
Turning to Dr. Rasak’s medical opinion, the ALJ properly concluded that the
doctor’s opinion was only given slight weight. In reviewing the 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c) factors from above and factor one, the ALJ properly noted that the
treatment relationship began in January of 2011 and extended to as late as August
of 2011. (Tr. 21-23.) As to factor two, the ALJ indicated that the doctor ordered a
stress test, made the relative evaluations, and cleared Plaintiff for a surgery and an
MRI for Dr. Krugel. (Tr. 21.) As to factor three, through Dr. Rasak’s stress test,
there were credible findings to support the doctor’s determination that Plaintiff’s
cardiac conditions were improving, had good blood flow, and suffered only from
poor exercise tolerance. (Tr. 21.) As to factor four, consistency with the record as
a whole, the ALJ indicated that there was some contradiction in the doctor’s own
notes. (Tr. 21-23.) Although Plaintiff was getting better, the letter-based opinions
progressively got worse. (Tr. 21-23.) As to factor five, the ALJ noted that Dr.
Krugel was the treating cardiologist. (Tr. 21.)
The ALJ properly considered and weighted the factors elaborated in 20
C.F.R. 404.1527(c) and as conveyed through Sixth Circuit precedents. Although
the ALJ did not put all of the factors in a concise format, the ALJ did consider
them.

There was sufficient evidence in the record described with accurate

specificity to support the ALJ’s conclusion. “[I]f substantial evidence supports the
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ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’”
Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406, quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.
1997).
2. Credibility Assessment
Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility analysis is not supported
by substantial evidence. The court disagrees. Under 20 C.F.R. § 1529(a), the ALJ
will consider “all of your statements about your symptoms, such as pain . . . .
However, statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish
that you are disabled . . . .”

Any subjective statements are considered and

discredited if not objectively corroborated by evidence in the record. Id. In
reviewing subjective statements of pain, the first step of the analysis asks if there is
“objective medical evidence of an underlying condition.” Felisky v. Brown, 35
F.3d 1027, 1038-39. If so, then the second step asks whether the “objective
medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain . . . or . . . objectively
established medical condition . . . can be expected to produce . . . [the] pain.” Id.
The above-mentioned legal framework is expressly mentioned in the ALJ’s
opinion. (Tr. 19.) As to the ALJ’s legal analysis, the court finds that there was no
error. (Tr. 19.) Thus, this court must determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion. If there was sufficient evidence, then
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this court defers to the ALJ—even if there was sufficient evidence to support an
opposite result. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406.
To begin, the ALJ considered the disability report and its contents,
describing Plaintiff’s personal limitations. (Tr. 19.) Plaintiff’s testimony mildly
corroborates the personal limitations she claims; the ALJ considered the Plaintiff’s
testimony in detail. (Tr. 19.) However, Plaintiff’s statements were then measured
against the objective evidence in the record. (Tr. 19.) In support, Dr. Walker’s
opinion supported Plaintiff’s statements, ordering an x-rays and prescribing
Meloxicam. (Tr. 19.)
Most prejudicial to Plaintiff’s own testimony and Dr. Walker’s opinion, the
ALJ noted, was that the Plaintiff was not adamant in seeking treatment. (Tr. 1922.) Disregarding Dr. Walker’s opinion, Plaintiff did not get the x-rays. (Tr. 20.)
Plaintiff noted that she did not have time to get the x-rays. (Tr. 20.) After months
had passed, Plaintiff then sought treatment by Dr. Krugel who was able to take the
x-rays. (Tr. 20.) The x-rays did indicate mild osteoarthritis, and Plaintiff received
a cortisone injection. (Tr. 20.) After further allegations of pain, Dr. Krugel
prescribed Tylenol and Mobic (Meloxicam). (Tr. 20.) However, when Dr. Krugel
ordered an MRI, Plaintiff did not go to get the MRI scan. (Tr. 20.)
Upon Plaintiff’s heart condition and related hospitalization, Plaintiff was
treated by Dr. Rasak, a cardiologist. (Tr. 21.) Dr. Rasak’s opinion, stress tests,
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and related examinations yielded results that indicated a heart condition, but the
recovery was “quite well.” (Tr. 21.) Dr. Rasak cleared Plaintiff for surgery and an
MRI with Dr. Krugel; however, the surgery and the MRI were never performed.
(Tr. 21.)
With regard to Plaintiff’s psychological issues, Plaintiff sought treatment by
Dr. Bhavsar who made the relative evaluations. (Tr. 21-22.) Plaintiff treatment by
Dr. Bhavsar occurred one year after Plaintiff complained of psychological
conditions to Dr. Walker. (Tr. 22.) After being diagnosed, Plaintiff waited two
months before seeking treatment for her condition. (Tr. 22.)
While this is not intended to be a complete summary of evidence presented
and considered, the ALJ properly measured the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
against her activities and the objective evidence in the record.

(Tr. 22-23.)

Because this court finds that there was substantial evidence in the record to support
the ALJ’s opinion, this court defers to the ALJ to make the credibility
determinations. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406; Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486
F.3d 234, 247-48 (6th Cir. 2007) (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the
reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of the witness, including the
claimant.”).

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CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff Deborah Jones’s October 9, 2013
motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Commissioner’s February 10, 2014 motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.

Date: July 31, 2014

s/John Corbett O’Meara
United States District Judge

I hereby certify that on July 31, 2014 a copy of this opinion and order was
served upon counsel of record using the court’s ECF system.

s/William Barkholz
Case Manager

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