Barry v. Corrigan
Filing
91
OPINION and ORDER Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's 81 Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, Granting Plaintiffs' 39 Amended Motion to Certify Class, and Granting Plaintiffs' 49 Motion for Summary Judgment - Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Walter Barry, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 13-cv-13185
Hon. Judith E. Levy
v.
Maura Corrigan,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN
PART DEFENDANT’S [81] MOTION TO DISMISS AND / OR FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ [39]
AMENDED MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS, AND GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS’ [49] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action against defendant
Maura Corrigan, in her official capacity as Director of the Michigan
Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”), challenging
Michigan’s law and policy governing disqualification of “fugitive felons”
from various forms of public assistance, including federal food
assistance.
Under that law and policy, defendant disqualifies
applicants and recipients of federally-funded public assistance benefits
based on a match between the applicant’s / recipient’s name and a
record of an outstanding felony warrant in the Michigan Law
Enforcement Information Network (hereinafter “LEIN”).
Defendant
informs persons of their disqualification by means of a written notice.
Plaintiffs challenge that notice as failing to provide the due process of
law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and as failing to meet the notice requirements of the Food
and Nutrition Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C § 2011 et seq. Plaintiffs also
contend the Michigan law and DHS policy themselves violate and are
preempted by the Act.
Before the Court are defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 81), plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Certify
Class (Dkt. 39), and plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss with respect to defendant Woodward only, and deny
defendant’s motion with respect to the remainder of the relief sought;
grant plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class; and grant plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment.
2
I.
Factual background
Congress first established a permanent Food Stamp Program in
1964. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (1964).
The purpose of the program was “to promote the general welfare” and
“to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by
raising levels of nutrition among low-income households.”
Id. § 2.
Congress made significant revisions to the program in 1977.
Food
Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977). In 2008, the
Food Stamp Program was renamed the “Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program” (hereinafter “SNAP”) and the Food Stamp Act was
renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (hereinafter “SNAP Act”).1
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 1092
(2008).
SNAP is administered through state programs, although the
benefits are funded by the federal government.
7 U.S.C. §§ 2013,
2020(a), (d), (e). The state programs are governed by criteria set forth
in the SNAP Act. Those criteria include the standards for qualification
for and disqualification from SNAP benefits. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014-2015.
The parties have referred throughout this case to the Food and Nutrition Act as
the “SNAP Act.” The Court will do likewise to avoid confusion.
1
3
The eligibility standards in state plans must be “in accordance with
sections 2014 and 2015 of [the SNAP Act] and “include no additional
requirements imposed by the State agency.” Id. § 2020(e)(5). States are
expressly prohibited from imposing “any other standards of eligibility as
a condition for participating in the program,” Id. § 2014(b).
Of relevance here, section 2015(k) provides that:
No member of a household who is otherwise eligible to
participate in the supplemental nutrition assistance
program shall be eligible to participate in the program as a
member of that or any other household during any period
during which the individual is-(A) fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or
confinement after conviction, under the law of the place
from which the individual is fleeing, for a crime, or
attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the
law of the place from which the individual is fleeing or
that, in the case of New Jersey, is a high misdemeanor
under the law of New Jersey; or
(B) violating a condition of probation or parole imposed
under a Federal or State law.
7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(1).
Michigan’s SNAP program, titled Food Assistance Program
(hereinafter “FAP”), is administered by DHS. DHS also administers
4
other public assistance programs, including the Family Independence
Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Day Care
Program, and Refugee Assistance Program.
Since October 8, 2011, Michigan’s Social Welfare Act prohibits
DHS from granting public assistance benefits to any person who is
“subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony
charge against that individual in this or any other jurisdiction.” 2011
P.A. 198, codified at Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b. The Act also requires
DHS and Michigan State Police (hereinafter “MSP”) to develop an
automated program that compares DHS’ list of public assistance
recipients with MSP’s information regarding outstanding felony
warrants or extradition warrants. Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10c. That
program, dubbed the “fugitive felon interface,” has been operational
since January 2013. (Dkt. 49-2 & 49-3, Ex. A & B to Pls.’ Mot. Summ.
J.)
DHS’ computer eligibility system is known as “Bridges.” Pursuant
to the policies set forth in its Bridges Eligibility and Bridges
Administrative Manuals [hereinafter “BEM” and “BAM”], DHS
disqualifies persons from food assistance benefits who are (1) subject to
5
arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge, (2)
subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant for extradition arising
from a criminal charge, or (3) admitted fugitive felons. (Dkt. 49-5 & 496, Exs. D & E to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 204); Dkt. 49-7 & 49-8, Ex. F
& G to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 203).)
Bridges automatically
identifies matches between the DHS benefit list and the MSP warrant
information. Bridges then sets the benefit applicant’s / recipient’s file to
close, generates a criminal justice disqualification notice that is sent to
the applicant / recipient, and automatically schedules the reduction or
termination of benefits. (Dkt. 49-14, Ex. M to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BAM
811, eff. 2/1/13); Dkt. 49-15, Ex. N to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff.
5/1/13); Dkt. 49-16, Ex. O to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 7/1/13);
Dkt. 49-17, Ex. P to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 2-3.)
The individual plaintiffs in this case are Walter Barry, Heather
Woodward, Donitha Copeland, Kenneth Anderson, and Westside
Mothers, a non-profit organization with 450-500 dues-paying members
that advocates on behalf of public assistance applicants and recipients.
Barry, Woodward, Copeland, and Anderson have all received at least
one criminal justice disqualification notice and have been threatened
6
with reduction or termination of food assistance benefits, or have
experienced actual reduction or termination of benefits, based on the
criminal justice disqualification.
Plaintiffs bring four counts in their Second Amended Complaint
(Dkt. 70). Counts I, II, and III are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983:
Count I: Denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Plaintiffs allege defendant’s criminal justice
disqualification notices violate plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, before denial / reduction / termination of public
assistance benefits, as a matter of constitutional law.
Count II: Denial of due process under the
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program Act
(“SNAP Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). Plaintiffs allege the
criminal justice disqualification notices violate plaintiffs’
rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard before denial / reduction / termination of public
assistance benefits, as a matter of statutory law.
Count III: Violation of rights to receive food
assistance under the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a) and
(b) and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs allege Mich. Comp. Laws
400.10b, as well as defendant’s policies enacted pursuant to
that law, violate plaintiffs’ federal statutory right to food
assistance benefits.
7
Count IV: Preemption of Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b
and defendant’s fugitive felon policy by the SNAP Act,
7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2015(k), and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs
allege the SNAP Act expressly preempts Mich. Comp. Laws
400.10b and defendant’s fugitive felon policy and practices.
The Court will begin its analysis with the issues of whether
plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit and whether their claims are
moot.
The Court will then address plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification and the remaining issues in the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment.
II.
Standing / mootness
Defendant argues for dismissal of all plaintiffs’ claims for lack of
standing.
Defendant further maintains that the claims of plaintiffs
Barry, Woodward, and Copeland (and therefore, Westside Mothers) are
moot, and should therefore be dismissed. (Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’
Mot. Summ. J. xi.)
A.
Standing
It is an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III” that a plaintiff must have standing to bring
a case in federal court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
8
(1992). Constitutional standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to show (1)
a “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” injury, that is (2)
“fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, and is (3) “likely” to be
“redressed by a favorable decision.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
560-61.
An association has standing “when its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake
are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
The plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing these elements. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.
The relevant time for determining standing is the outset of the
litigation.
See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189 (defining standing as “the
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
But the
elements of standing must be supported throughout the litigation.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. Thus, “[a]t the pleading stage,
general factual allegations of injury resulting from defendant’s conduct
may suffice.” Id. But at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff
9
must “set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts” supporting
the existence of an injury in fact. Id.
Defendant argues that the individual plaintiffs cannot show the
first element of standing – injury in fact. Westside Mothers thus cannot
show the first element of associational standing, as its only member
among the individual plaintiffs, Copeland, lacks standing herself.
When, as here, “the suit is one challenging the legality of
government action or inaction” and the plaintiff is the “object of the
action,” then “there is ordinarily little question that the action . . . has
caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing . . . the action will
redress it.”
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62.
Indeed, the
individual plaintiffs here were the objects of the two actions they
challenge: notice of disqualification from public assistance benefits, and
disqualification from food assistance benefits.
All four individual
plaintiffs assert the same two injuries: (1) procedural injury, from
defendant’s allegedly inadequate notices, and (2) economic injury, in the
form of actual or threatened loss of food assistance benefits, from
defendant’s automatic felon disqualification policy. (Dkt. 85, Pls.’ Resp.
1.)
Plaintiff Westside Mothers asserts standing based on economic
10
injury: namely, that its members’ ability to pay dues is directly affected
by their loss of food assistance under defendant’s challenged policies.
(Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 200-201.) Westside Mothers also
claims associational standing through plaintiff Copeland.
1.
Barry
Plaintiff Barry filed the initial class action complaint in this
matter on July 25, 2013. (Dkt. 1.) At that time, he had an outstanding
felony warrant in his name, and a disqualification from food assistance
that went into effect on June 1, 2013. (Dkt. 50-2, Ex. S to Pls.’ Mot.
Summ. J.) Barry did not receive his July food assistance until July 26,
2013 – two days after he filed the complaint, and one day after he
moved for class certification. (Dkt. 70-10, Ex. I to Second Amended
Compl.)
At the time he brought his claim, Barry suffered several
injuries in fact: a procedural injury, from the allegedly inadequate
notice, and economic injuries, consisting of defendant’s withholding of
his July 2013 food assistance, the threat of having to repay those
benefits, once received, if he lost at the hearing on his disqualification,
and the threatened termination of all future benefits. Barry thus had
standing to bring the claims in this suit.
11
Defendant maintains Barry lacks standing because he has
suffered no injury in fact. (Dkt. 81, Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to
Dismiss 1.)
Defendant apparently means that because Barry has
received food assistance “every month since June 1, 2013,” he has
suffered no injury. (See Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 1.)
But defendant fails to counter evidence that (1) Barry’s food assistance
had been withheld at the time he filed the complaint, (2) Barry’s
disqualification had not been resolved at the time he filed the
complaint, leaving him exposed to the possibility of having to repay
benefits and to termination of future benefits, and (3) Barry suffered a
procedural injury from defendant’s notice.
2.
Woodward
Woodward applied for food assistance in July 2013 and received a
denial notice, based on a criminal justice disqualification, on August 1,
2013. (Dkt. 50-8, Ex. Y to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.) Woodward joined this
action in the Amended Complaint filed on August 13, 2013. (Dkt. 7.) At
that time, Woodward remained disqualified from receiving food
assistance. She therefore has established an injury in fact (both the
12
procedural injury from the notice and the economic injury from the
disqualification) and has standing to bring this suit.
Defendant argues that Woodward lacks standing because (1) she
was denied food assistance as an applicant, not a recipient, of benefits,
and (2) she currently receives food assistance benefits. (Dkt. 75, Def.’s
Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3.)
standing:
the
first
goes
to
But neither argument bears on
Woodward’s
adequacy
as
a
class
representative, while the second goes to mootness (see below).
3.
Copeland
Copeland applied and was approved for food assistance in
September 2012. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 137-38.) She
received a criminal justice disqualification notice dated December 31,
2012, terminating her food assistance effective February 1, 2013. (Dkt.
70-21, Ex. T to Second Amended Compl.)
Copeland reapplied and
received a notice dated February 12, 2013, denying benefits based on a
criminal justice disqualification. (Dkt. 70-22, Ex. U to Second Amended
Compl.) Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint and motion for class
certification on October 28, 2013, adding Copeland to both. (Dkt. 38.)
13
At that time, Copeland still had an outstanding felony warrant and
remained disqualified from receiving food assistance benefits.
She
therefore has established procedural and economic injuries, and has
standing to bring her claims.
Defendant argues that Copeland lacks standing because she (1)
failed to request an administrative hearing, and (2) has moved out of
state.
(Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3.)
The only
authority defendant provides for the proposition that Copeland had to
exhaust her state administrative remedies in order to have standing to
bring this suit is an unpublished order denying a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. (See Dkt. 75-4, Ex. 3 to Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ.
J.) Defendant does not explain, nor can the Court discern, why this
case is relevant.
In fact, as explained below, there is a strong
presumption against requiring a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies
before bringing a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patsy v. Bd. of
Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Copeland’s failure
to request a state administrative hearing on her disqualification does
not preclude her from bringing this suit. As for Copeland’s relocation to
Alaska, that argument goes to mootness, not standing.
14
4.
Anderson
It is undisputed that Anderson still has an outstanding felony
warrant in his name and is not receiving food assistance benefits.
Defendant only argues that Anderson lacks standing based on
Anderson’s failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. (Dkt. 75,
Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3.) As with Copeland, Anderson’s
failure to request a state administrative hearing does not affect his
standing to bring this action.
5.
Westside Mothers
Because Copeland had standing at the time Westside Mothers
joined the case, Westside Mothers has associational standing.
The case for Westside Mothers’ independent standing, however, is
more difficult, and turns on an element of standing not addressed by
the parties: redressability.
Westside Mothers has met the injury
element by asserting economic injury in the form of lost dues payments
from members. However, when “a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from
the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else . . . causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the
15
response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government
action or inaction.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562. In such
circumstances, standing “is ordinarily substantially more difficult to
establish.” Id.
Here, a decision in favor of plaintiffs would plausibly lead to some
members of Westside Mothers receiving food assistance benefits. As a
result, those members could reasonably be expected to have more
money to spend on other, non-food expenses. But the alleged economic
injury to Westside Mothers can only be remedied if those members
decide to spend a portion of that money as dues.
That is, the
redressability of Westside Mothers’ economic injury depends on
decisions beyond the Court’s control. While the scenario here is not
precisely analogous to that in Defenders of Wildlife – where
redressability hinged on the decisions of third parties not before the
Court – it is close enough to require more from Westside Mothers to
show it meets the redressability element of standing.
The Court
therefore finds that Westside Mothers has associational, but not
independent, standing to bring this action.
B.
Mootness
16
Courts have often described mootness as “the doctrine of standing
set in a time frame.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189. On this view, the
relationship between standing and mootness is as follows: “The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation
(standing)
must
continue
throughout
its
existence
(mootness).” Id. If the plaintiff’s personal interest, or “stake in the
outcome of the lawsuit,” is eliminated during the litigation, “the action
can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.”
Genesis
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2013).
There are recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine,
including the exception, invoked here by plaintiffs, for claims that are
“capable of repetition yet evading review.” See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at
191. This exception applies “when (1) the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subject to the same action again.”
Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2004). The party
asserting that this exception applies has the burden of establishing both
elements. Id. But it is not necessary to show that “recurrence of the
17
dispute [is] more probable than not,” only that “the controversy [is]
capable of repetition.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319 n.6 (1988).
1.
Barry
Defendant argues Barry’s claims are moot because “there is no
Department action against his food assistance, he no longer has a felony
warrant in his name and he is receiving benefits.” (Dkt. 81, Def.’s Br. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss 6.) While it is undisputed that Barry is
receiving benefits, it also appears undisputed that he has a second
outstanding felony warrant in his name. (Dkt. 79-8, Ex. G to Pls.’ Reply
in Support of Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 86, Def.’s Sur-reply to Amended Mot.
Cert. Class 4, 6.) At the hearing on these motions, defendant’s counsel
stated that defendant had been advised by email that all of Barry’s
warrants had been resolved. Defendant has not, however, proffered the
email or any other evidence that Barry’s second warrant has, in fact,
been resolved.
Barry’s claims are therefore not moot – there is a
reasonable expectation that he will be again subject to defendant’s
criminal disqualification policy and notice.
2.
Woodward
18
Defendant maintains that Woodward’s claims have become moot,
because she “no longer appears as a fugitive felon” and receives food
assistance benefits. (Dkt. 81, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 6.) In support,
defendant points to the affidavit of Dale Shaw, a Cash Assistance
Senior Policy Analyst at DHS. (Dkt. 74-2, Ex. 1 to Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’
Amended Mot. Cert. Class [hereinafter “Shaw Aff.”) Shaw states that
Woodward “is not currently listed as a fugitive felon.” (Id.) He further
states that Woodward applied for food assistance on August 11, 2014.
(Id.) On that same day, “[i]t appears the caseworker changed her FF
[sc. fugitive felon] status from yes to no,” but “there are no notes . . . as
to whether the caseworker verified that she had resolved her FF
status.”
Woodward was approved for food assistance benefits on
September 4, 2014. (Id.)
Woodward’s outstanding felony warrant was apparently related to
her alleged theft of exercise equipment from her father’s house. While
her father has submitted a declaration stating that he does not wish to
pursue charges against Woodward, and has advised police accordingly
(Dkt. 52, Ex. YY to Pls.’ Mot. Sum. J.), it is not clear from the record
whether the warrant has, in fact, been resolved.
19
Plaintiffs do not, however, assert that Woodward still has an
outstanding warrant. Rather, they maintain Woodward’s claims are
not moot based on her ongoing interest in receiving declaratory and
notice relief that would allow her to recover food assistance benefits she
lost while disqualified. (Dkt. 79, Pls.’ Reply in Support of Mot. Class.
Cert. 9).
Because Woodward is currently receiving food assistance benefits
and is not at risk of disqualification based on an outstanding felony
warrant, she no longer has a personal stake in the injunctive relief
sought by plaintiffs. Under Green v. Mansour, declaratory relief against
a state runs afoul of the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of a
continuing or threatened violation of federal law.
474 U.S. 64, 73
(1985). And the notice relief sought by plaintiffs cannot stand on its
own, but only “escape[s] the Eleventh Amendment bar” if it is ancillary
to another type of relief.
Green, 474 U.S. at 71.
Given, then, that
neither declaratory nor notice relief would be available to Woodward,
her alleged interest in such relief cannot keep her claims alive in this
case. Woodward’s claims are therefore moot.
3.
Copeland and Westside Mothers
20
Defendant maintains Copeland’s claims are moot because she no
longer has an outstanding felony warrant and has moved to Alaska.
(Dkt. 81, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 6.)
Plaintiffs counter there is a
reasonable expectation that Copeland will be again subject to
disqualification (and notice thereof), because (1) her warrant was
dismissed without prejudice, (2) that warrant was the result of someone
stealing Copeland’s identity, and that person could commit further
crimes using Copeland’s identity, and (3) Copeland will return to
Michigan in November 2014.
Whether Copeland’s claims are moot is a close question. Copeland
has submitted a declaration in which she states that she moved to
Alaska for seasonal employment and intends to return to Michigan
thereafter. (Dkt. 83, Ex. E to Pls.’ Reply in Support of Mot. Summ. J.,
Second Copeland Dec. ¶ 2 [hereinafter “Second Copeland Dec.”].)
Copeland notified DHS of her move to Alaska and expects to reapply for
food assistance benefits upon her return to Michigan, as she does not
have employment arranged in Michigan. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) On the basis of
Copeland’s declaration, the Court finds a reasonable expectation that
21
she will not be disqualified from receiving food assistance benefits on
the basis of her residency.
Still, Copeland must show there is a reasonable expectation she
will again be subject to defendant’s fugitive felon disqualification policy.
Again, she need not show it is more likely than not she will be subject to
the disqualification policy. Honig, 484 U.S. at 319 n.6. Copeland raises
the possibility that her felony warrant could be reinstated, and that her
identity could again be used in the commission of a felony. The facts in
Barry’s case are certainly suggestive of the latter possibility: at least
two felony warrants have issued in his name for acts he did not commit.
Although it seems less likely that Copeland’s warrant will be
reinstated, the two possibilities together – of reinstatement of
Copeland’s felony warrant, and of a new warrant issuing in Copeland’s
name – are enough to create a reasonable expectation that Copeland
“faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the same controversy in
the future.” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,
398 (1980).
Copeland’s claims are therefore not moot.
Because
Copeland’s claims are not moot, Westside Mothers’ claims are similarly
not moot.
22
4.
Anderson
Defendant does not challenge Anderson’s claims as moot, and with
good reason, as Anderson still has an outstanding felony warrant in his
name and is not receiving food assistance benefits.
In sum, of the five named plaintiffs, only Woodward’s claims are
moot. Defendant’s motion to dismiss thus cannot succeed on mootness
grounds.
Even if the claims of all named plaintiffs were moot, this case
would nonetheless survive defendant’s motion under the “special
mootness rules [that] exist for class actions.”
Brunet v. City of
Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 1993). It is well-established in this
Circuit that mooting the named plaintiffs’ claims while a motion for
class certification is pending does not moot the case. See Carroll v.
United Compucred Collections, Inc., 399 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2005);
Dozier v. Haverman, No. 14-12455, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at
*25-36 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014) (thoroughly surveying relevant cases).
Here, plaintiffs Barry, Woodward, and Copeland joined in the
motion for class certification before being approved for food assistance –
23
the act that defendant maintains mooted their claims.
Barry’s food
assistance benefits were reinstated the day after he filed his motion for
class certification.
(Dkt. 70-10, Ex. I to Second Amended Compl.)
Woodward joined the First Amended Class Action Complaint on August
13, 2013, and the proposed Amended Motion to Certify Class on October
28, 2013. (Dkt. 7, 39.) Her fugitive felon status was changed in DHS’
records on August 11, 2014, and she was approved for food assistance
benefits on September 4, 2014. (Shaw Aff. ¶ 5.) Copeland joined the
proposed Second Amended Class Action Complaint and the Amended
Motion to Certify Class on October 28, 2013. (Dkt. 39, 40.) Her felony
warrant was dismissed without prejudice on November 19, 2013. (Dkt.
79-9, Ex. H to Pls.’ Reply Br. in Support of Mot. Cert. Class.)
Copeland’s food assistance benefits were approved thereafter. (Dkt. 79,
Pls.’ Reply Br. in Support of Mot. Cert. Class 10.)
In short, defendant’s attempts to moot the individual plaintiffs’
claims, if they had been successful, would still not have prevented this
case from going forward as a class action.
III. Motion to Certify Class
24
Having found that the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring
their claims and that the claims of four individual plaintiffs are not
moot, the Court must now determine whether class certification is
warranted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
A.
Standard of Review
Plaintiffs bear the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that
their proposed class meets all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and
satisfies at least one provision of Rule 23(b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Senter v. Gen’l Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511,
522 (6th Cir. 1976). Rule 23(a) provides for class certification only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Plaintiffs maintain their proposed class falls
within Rule 23(b)(2), which comprises actions in which “the party
25
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23 further includes an “implicit requirement”
that “an ascertainable class of persons to be represented” exists. Dozier,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *37 (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). Failure to satisfy any of these requirements precludes
certification. Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 484 (6th Cir. 2013).
“Meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a) requires something more
than mere repetition of the rule’s language; there must be an adequate
statement of the basic facts to indicate that each requirement of the
rule is fulfilled.” Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537
(6th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To that
end, the Court must perform a “rigorous analysis,” including, if
necessary, “prob[ing] behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the
certification question.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2551-52 (2011).
B.
Analysis
1.
Ascertainability
26
A threshold question in determining a motion for class
certification is whether the defined class is “sufficiently definite so that
it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a
particular individual is a member of the proposed class.” Young, 693
F.3d at 537-38. The Court must be able to make this determination by
reference to objective criteria. Id.
Plaintiffs propose the following class, termed a “Due Process
Class”:
[A]ll past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of,
benefits administered by the Michigan Department of
Human Services (DHS) under the
Food Assistance Program (FAP)
Family Independence Program (FIP)
State Disability Assistance Program (SDA)
Child Day Care (CDC), and
Refugee Assistance Programs (RAP)
public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer
actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of
public assistance benefits based on DHS’ determination that
the applicant / recipient or a member of the applicant /
recipient’s household is ineligible based on a criminal justice
disqualification, and who do not receive a written notice, at
the time of denial and at least 10 days prior to an actual or
threatened termination or reduction, that details:
27
(i)
the nature and duration of the intended agency
action,
(ii) the specific actions they can take to lift the
disqualification and fully access benefits, and
(iii) the factual and legal reasons for the negative
action, including
a. which of the given types of criminal justice
disqualifications is at issue,
b. the name of the person whose alleged conduct
has resulted in the disqualification,
c. the date, place, and nature of the alleged crime
and the resulting conviction or warrant,
d. the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred
or the warrant was issued,
e. the name of a specific person or entity with
knowledge of the basis for the disqualification
whom the individual can contact for additional
information,
f. where applicable, the basis for concluding that
the disqualified individual is aware that he or
she is being sought by law enforcement and is
fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or custody
or confinement for a felony, and
g. where applicable, the basis for concluding that
law enforcement is actively seeking the
individual.
(Dkt. 39, Amended Mot. Class Cert. 2-3.) Plaintiffs also propose the
following subclass, termed “Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass”:
All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of,
Michigan’s Food Assistance Program benefits, who have
suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial,
termination, or reduction of Food Assistance Program
28
benefits based on DHS’s policy of disqualifying individuals
as “fugitive felons,” without a finding that the individual is
intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or
custody or confinement after conviction, and/or without
finding that the individual is actively sought by law
enforcement, for a crime that is a felony.
(Id. at 3-4.)
On
plaintiffs’
view,
the
proposed
Due
Process
Class
is
ascertainable by reference to membership in a specific group (those
having suffered denial, reduction, or termination of benefits based on a
criminal justice disqualification), and to a specific harm (receipt of the
allegedly inadequate criminal justice disqualification notice). (Dkt. 39,
Pls.’ Br. in Support of Mot. Class Cert. 3-4.) Likewise, the Automatic
FAP Disqualification Subclass is ascertainable by reference to
membership in a specific group (applicants for or recipients of food
assistance benefits, who are alleged to have an outstanding felony
warrant), and to a specific harm (denial, reduction, or termination of
food assistance benefits without a determination that the person is
fleeing or actively sought by law enforcement). (Id. at 13-14.)
Defendants respond that the proposed classes are not welldefined, because they include (1) people who have not been harmed, and
29
(2) both felons and non-felons. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert.
5, 10.) As with all of defendant’s counterarguments, this depends on
defendant’s redefinition of plaintiffs’ harm as “their erroneous
disqualifications based on LEIN records of outstanding felony
warrants.” (Id. at 5.)
The Court can find no reason why it should accept defendant’s
definition of plaintiffs’ harm over plaintiffs’ own definition. The injuries
plaintiffs allege – inadequate notice and disqualification without a
determination that they are fleeing to avoid prosecution and are
actively sought by law enforcement – are legally cognizable injuries.
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (holding “the denial of
procedural due process should be actionable . . . without proof of actual
injury); Dozier, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *66 (certifying class
on basis of claims that (1) notice was inadequate under both Medicaid
statute and Fourteenth Amendment and (2) defendant unlawfully
terminated plaintiffs’ Medicaid coverage without evaluating plaintiffs’
eligibility for other Medicaid categories).
Furthermore, as plaintiffs note, what defendant terms the “real”
harm – erroneous LEIN records – caused no harm to plaintiffs until
30
defendant used the LEIN records to disqualify plaintiffs from food
assistance benefits. (Dkt. 79, Pls.’ Reply in Support of Amended Mot.
Class Cert. 4 n.6.)
In other words, the question of whether the
disqualification is lawful is different from the question of whether the
LEIN records are accurate. (See id.) Accordingly, the Court rejects
defendant’s attempted redefinition of plaintiffs’ harm and, along with it,
defendant’s primary argument against class certification.
While plaintiffs’ proposed subclass satisfies the ascertainability
requirement, their proposed class definition is problematic, in that it
arguably implicates the merits on a central issue: the adequacy of
defendant’s disqualification notice. See Dozier, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
153395, at *41. By defining the class in terms of what was lacking from
the notice, plaintiffs assume what a constitutionally and statutorily
adequate notice should contain. The Court will therefore exercise its
authority to sua sponte modify plaintiffs’ proposed class definition. See
id. at *39 (citing Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d
592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to
modify class definitions . . .”)). Accordingly, the Court will evaluate the
following class definition under Rule 23:
31
[A]ll past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of,
benefits administered by the Michigan Department of
Human Services (DHS) under the
Food Assistance Program (FAP)
Family Independence Program (FIP)
State Disability Assistance Program (SDA)
Child Development and Care Program (CDC), and
Refugee Assistance Program (RAP)
public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer
actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of
public assistance benefits based on DHS’ determination that
the applicant / recipient or a member of the applicant /
recipient’s household is ineligible based on a criminal justice
disqualification, and who receive or have received a written
notice at the time of denial issued by DHS informing the
applicant / recipient of the criminal justice disqualification.
2.
Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the proposed
class and subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
While the number of potential class members is not
dispositive, “the sheer number of potential litigants in a class, especially
if it is more than several hundred, can be the only factor needed to
satisfy [numerosity].”
Other factors to consider include “judicial
economy, geographical dispersion of class members, ease of identifying
putative class members, and practicality with which individual class
32
members could sue on their own.” Crawley v. Ahmed, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40794, at *28-29 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2009).
Plaintiffs point to a Michigan State Police press release reporting
4,562 matches when MSP cross-checked names of persons with
outstanding felony warrants against a list of DHS public assistance
recipients. (Dkt. 39-2, Ex. A to Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert.) These matches
were only those made in January and February 2013. On this basis,
plaintiffs claim the class and subclass are so numerous that joinder will
be impracticable. Plaintiffs also note the likely geographical dispersion
of class and subclass members (across Michigan), the difficulty they face
in bringing suit on their own (given their likely low-income status), and
the ease of identifying them through DHS databases.
Defendant counters by again redefining the harm as erroneous
disqualification based on an outstanding felony warrant. Based on that
definition, defendant cites evidence that, between February 2013 and
August
2014,
administrative
hearings
on
criminal
justice
disqualifications resulted in only 13 reversals. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. 1112). On that basis, defendant contends plaintiffs have failed to meet
the numerosity requirement. Having rejected defendant’s redefinition
33
of the harm, the Court finds this argument meritless. Plaintiffs have
adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the numerosity requirement of
Rule 23(a)(1).
3.
Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the
class.” “[T]here need be only a single issue common to all members of
the class.” In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir. 1996).
Resolution of that issue should “affect all or a significant number of the
putative class members,” Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d
410, 424 (6th Cir. 1998), and should “advance the litigation.” Sprague
v. Gen’l Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998).
According to plaintiffs, the legal issue common to the Due Process
Class is whether the disqualification notices were inadequate as a
matter of constitutional and statutory law. The legal issue common to
the subclass is whether disqualification based on Michigan’s fugitive
felon law and policy violated the SNAP Act. Again, defendant counters
that the real injury plaintiffs allege is disqualification based on an
erroneous LEIN match. Separate adjudications will thus be necessary
34
to determine whether each proposed class member did or did not have a
valid outstanding felony warrant.
Again, the Court rejects defendant’s redefinition of plaintiffs’
injury.
Plaintiffs have identified a single legal issue common to all
members of the Due Process Class, and one common to all members of
the Disqualification Subclass.
The alleged inadequacy of the
disqualification notices is “central to the validity of each one of the
claims” – specifically, Counts I and II – of both the named plaintiffs and
the class members. Likewise, whether Michigan’s fugitive felon law
and policy violates the SNAP Act is central to the validity of the claims
of both the named plaintiffs and the class members in Counts III and
IV. Resolution of these two issues will not only “advance the litigation,”
Sprague, 133 F.3d at 397, it will be dispositive of the claims of all class
members. Plaintiffs have therefore met the commonality requirement
of Rule 23(a)(2).
4.
Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) requires the claims of the class representatives to be
typical of the claims of the class. The Sixth Circuit has concluded a
35
proposed class representative’s claim is typical if “it arises from the
same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims
of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same
legal theory.” In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1082. The result is
that “the representative’s interests will be aligned with those of the
represented group, and in pursuing his own claims, the named plaintiff
will also advance the interest of the class members.” Id. The typicality
requirement thus “ensures that the representative party adequately
protects the interests of the proposed class.” Crawley, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40794, at *35.
Plaintiffs maintain the class representatives’ claims arise from the
same conduct of defendant, involve the same harm, and rest on the
same legal theories. Yet again, defendant maintains plaintiffs’ injuries
“derive from the supposed mismatches” between plaintiffs and
outstanding felony warrants in the LEIN. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Mot.
Class Cert. 18.)
The named plaintiffs’ claims, like those of the class, arise from the
same conduct: (1) the allegedly inadequate disqualification notices, and
(2) the application of the allegedly invalid fugitive felon law and policy.
36
Furthermore, the named plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same legal
theory as the class and subclass claims: that defendant’s inadequate
notice violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and under the SNAP Act, and that defendant’s
denial, reduction, or termination of food assistance benefits based solely
on a felony warrant match, without a determination that the applicant
or recipient was fleeing to avoid prosecution or was actively sought by
law enforcement, violated plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the SNAP
Act. See Crawley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794, at *38-39.
5.
Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires the named plaintiffs to show that they have
common interests with the unnamed class members, and will vigorously
prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel. Young,
693 F.3d at 543. “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they
seek to represent. A class representative must be part of the class and
possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class
members.”
Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir.
2007).
37
Because, as discussed above, the legal claims and injuries of the
named plaintiffs are the same as those of the proposed class and
subclass members, their interests in the litigation are common. As for
the qualifications of proposed class counsel, their resumes demonstrate
significant experience in class action suits related to public benefits
programs such as Medicaid and SNAP.
Defendant insists that named plaintiffs are inadequate to
represent the class, because they lack standing or their claims are moot.
Defendant further claims proposed class counsel is inadequate because
two of them have retired. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert. 1920.) As discussed above, all named plaintiffs have standing, and the
claims of only one plaintiff are moot. As for counsel, Jacqueline Doig,
proposed lead class counsel, indicated at oral argument that she would
continue to work until this case concludes, and defense counsel
indicated defendant had no objection to Doig’s qualifications as class
counsel.
The qualifications of the other proposed class counsel are
apparent from their experience handling similar matters. The Court
accordingly finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule
23(a)(4).
38
6.
Whether defendant acted on grounds generally applicable to
the class
Rule 23(b)(2) requires plaintiffs to show that defendant has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. It applies
“only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide
relief to each member of the class.
It does not authorize class
certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a
different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.”
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. Thus, “[l]awsuits alleging class-wide
discrimination are particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since
the common claim is susceptible to a single proof and subject to a single
injunctive remedy.” Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th
Cir. 1976). Such is the case here: defendant has allegedly provided the
same inadequate notice of disqualification to all proposed class
members, and has denied, reduced, or terminated food assistance of all
proposed subclass members based on the same allegedly invalid law
and policy.
Defendant again counters that proposed class members have not
suffered the same injuries. She adds that classwide injunctive relief is
39
inappropriate, apparently on the grounds that defendant’s arguments
about the adequacy of the notices and the validity of the fugitive felon
policy are correct. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 22.) But
this latter argument concerns the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, which are
not properly considered in determining a motion for class certification.
The Court has already rejected the former argument. Accordingly, the
Court finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of 23(b)(2).
C.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs have met their burden to show this action satisfies the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b). Accordingly, the Court
will grant plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39).
IV.
Cross-motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment arguments overlap with two of
defendant’s arguments in favor of dismissal. Those arguments will
accordingly be treated together below, as cross-motions for summary
judgment. Defendant’s mootness argument has been dispensed with
above. The absence of a private right of action under the SNAP Act
would preclude Counts II, III, and IV. The Court will therefore treat
40
that issue before reaching the parties’ arguments on the substantive
claims.
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is required where “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A
dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court
“views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn
from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure
Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App'x 132, 135 (6th Cir.
2004) (citing Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th
Cir.2002)).
B.
Private right of action
The SNAP Act does not explicitly confer a private right of action to
enforce its provisions.
The test for determining whether a federal
statute confers an implied right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was
articulated by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329
41
(1997), and clarified in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
Under Blessing, a plaintiff seeking to enforce a statutory provision by
private suit must show that (1) Congress “intended that the provision in
question benefit the plaintiff”; (2) “the right assertedly protected by the
statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would
strain judicial competence”; and (3) “the statute . . . unambiguously
impose[s] a binding obligation on the States.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 34041. The Gonzaga Court clarified the first element of the test: only an
“unambiguously conferred right . . . not the broader or vaguer benefits
or interests” can support an action brought under § 1983. Gonzaga, 536
U.S. at 283 (emphasis added).
The Court’s analysis should focus not on the SNAP Act as a whole,
but on “individual provisions of the statute to determine whether a
private right of action exists under each portion.” John B. v. Goetz, 626
F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding individual provisions in Medicaid
Act enforceable under § 1983); accord Westside Mothers v. Olszewski,
454 F.3d 532, 538-44 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding some provisions of
Medicaid Act supported private right of action, while others did not).
1.
The provisions at issue
42
Two SNAP Act provisions are at issue. Section 2014(a) underpins
plaintiffs’ claim in Count III. It provides that “[a]ssistance under this
program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make
application for such participation.”
Section 2020(e)(10) applies to
plaintiffs’ claim in Count II. It requires a state plan of operation to
provide notice, fair hearing, and a “prompt determination” to “any
household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any
provision” of the state plan.
2.
Whether the provision creates an “unambiguously conferred
right”
This element is the focus of defendant’s challenge. The goal of the
court’s inquiry regarding this element is to determine congressional
intent. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285. To that end, the Court’s analysis
should focus on the text of the statutory provision at issue, and on the
structure of the overall statute. See id. at 286 (“where the text and
structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to
create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit,
whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action.”). For the
provision to create a private right, the text must be “phrased in terms of
43
the persons benefited,” id. at 284, and must have an individual, rather
than an “aggregate,” focus. See id. at 288.
Defendant makes three arguments for finding no private right of
action in the SNAP statute: (1) the statute contains no rights-creating
language; (2) the statute’s focus is aggregate rather than individual;
and (3) courts have found the statute creates no private right of action.
a.
As
an
Section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii)
initial
matter,
plaintiffs
point
out
that
section
2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) contains the following language: “Records described in
subparagraph A [namely, records necessary to determine the state
program’s compliance with federal law] shall . . . be available for review
in any action filed by a household to enforce any provision of this
chapter (including regulations issued under this chapter) . . .” (emphasis
added). As plaintiffs maintain, this provision would make little sense if
Congress did not intend for the SNAP Act to be enforceable by private
action. The language here contemplates private actions to enforce any
provision of Chapter 51 (the SNAP program), as well as any related
regulations.
44
At the hearing on these motions, defendant argued for the first
time that section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) refers not to private actions to enforce
the SNAP Act, but to state administrative review of benefits
determinations.
This
argument
is
unpersuasive.
Section
2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) concerns an “action” that is “filed” to “enforce any
provision” of the SNAP Act. Section 2020(e)(10), which obliges states to
provide for review of agency actions, requires a “hearing” and a
“determination,” not an “action.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). It is a “normal
rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). A corollary rule is
that “when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the
statute and different language in another, the court assumes different
meanings were intended.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711
n.9 (2004) (citation omitted). Here, the Court presumes Congress used
the term “action” in section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) to mean something
different from “hearing”
in section 2020(e)(10).
If Congress meant
otherwise, it could easily have said so – by using the same word in both
sections.
45
Defendant’s argument is also at odds with the common usage of
the terms “action” and “hearing.”
“Action” and “filed” are terms
associated with bringing a lawsuit in court, not with seeking
administrative review of an agency decision. Plus, a “hearing” is more
restricted in scope than an “action,” which may comprise multiple
hearings and, ultimately results in a judgment rather than a
“determination.”
Section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) alone is arguably enough to show that
Congress intended for a private right of action to be available under the
SNAP Act. Application of the Blessing / Gonzaga test to the provisions
at issue here leads to the same conclusion.
b.
Language of the provisions
Defendant points to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (both cited by the
Gonzaga Court) as examples of “rights-creating” language.
Those
statutes provide that “No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to
discrimination . . .” By contrast, in defendant’s view, section 2020 of the
SNAP Act speaks in terms of state responsibility – e.g., “The State
46
agency shall provide for the granting of a fair hearing . . .” 7 U.S.C. §
2020(e)(10).
Defendant does not address the language of section
2014(a).
Section 2014(a) is “phrased in terms of the persons benefited.”
The focus throughout this provision is on which households are eligible
to participate in SNAP.
The final sentence of the section states,
“Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible
households who make application for such participation.”
Section 2020(e)(10) is also “phrased in terms of the persons
benefited.”
Although the section begins with the phrase “The State
agency shall provide,” the substance of what the agency must provide is
focused on the individual households receiving benefits.
First, the
agency must provide “for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt
determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of
the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation as it
affects the participation of such household in the supplemental
nutrition assistance program or by a claim against the household for an
overissuance.”
(emphasis added).
Second, “any household which
timely requests such a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of
47
agency action reducing or terminating its benefits . . . shall continue to
participate and receive benefits . . . until such time as the fair hearing is
completed . . .” (emphasis added). In the first sentence above, the focus
is entirely on the right of an individual household to have a fair hearing
and a prompt determination. In the second sentence, “any household”
is the grammatical subject of the sentence, which concerns the
household’s right to continuation of benefits pending adjudication of its
complaint.
As plaintiffs note, courts in this Circuit have found similar
language in the Medicaid Act to create private rights. (See Dkt. 80-11,
Ex. J to Pls.’ Reply in Support of Mot. for Summ. J.)
Section 1396a(a) of the Medicaid Act is parallel to section 2020(e)
of the SNAP Act. Section 1396a(a) is titled “State plans for medical
assistance: Contents.” The Sixth Circuit has held that language
directing that “[a] State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide
that [ ] any individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs)
may obtain such assistance” establishes a private right of action.
Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2006) (analyzing
Medicaid provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)) (emphasis added). The
48
Court reasoned that “in giving ‘any individual eligible for medical
assistance’ a free choice over the provider of that assistance, the statute
uses the kind of individually focused terminology that unambiguously
confers an individual entitlement under the law.” Id. And rather than
interpret the clause beginning “A State plan” as showing the provision
lacked an individual focus, the Court reasoned that “by saying ‘[a] State
plan . . . must . . . provide’ this choice, the statute uses the kind of
rights-creating, mandatory language that the Supreme Court and our
court have held establishes a private right of action.” Id. at 461-62
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 1396a(a)(3) states that “A State plan for medical
assistance must provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing
before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical
assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable
promptness . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (emphasis added).
That
provision was held enforceable under § 1983 in Gean v. Hattaway, 330
F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2003).
Substituting “household” for
“individual,” the language of § 2020(e)(10) is closely parallel: “The State
agency shall provide for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt
49
determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of
the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation . . .” 7
U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (emphasis added).
Similarly, section 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act states that “A
State plan for medical assistance must provide that . . . such assistance
shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals
. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). That provision was held enforceable by
private action in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 368 F. Supp. 2d 740,
761-62 (E.D. Mich. 2005). Section 2014(a) of the SNAP Act states in
similar language that “Assistance under this program shall be
furnished to all eligible households who make application for such
participation.” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a).
The plain language of sections 2020(e)(10) and 2014(a) is
primarily “phrased in terms of the persons benefited” – namely, eligible
households. Case law interpreting parallel language in the Medicaid
Act confirms this conclusion.
c.
Aggregate vs. individual focus
50
The parties’ arguments here largely mirror those concerning the
language of the provisions. As discussed above, the Court finds the
focus of the relevant SNAP provisions to be on the individual
households, not on the “aggregate services provided by the state” or a
“generalized duty” of the state. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 281-82.
d.
Case law
The only case defendant discusses in any depth is Almendares v.
Palmer, No. 00-7524, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258 (N.D. Ohio 2003). In
Almendares, the court held that section 2020(e)(1)(B) did not create an
implied right. But as plaintiffs point out, that section is not at issue in
this case – an important distinction, as the Court must examine the
particular provision at issue to determine whether an implied right of
action exists. See Goetz, 626 F.3d at 362. Moreover, in contrast to the
provisions at issue here, the focus of section 2020(e)(1)(B) is expressly
aggregate.
Section 2020(e)(1)(B) pertains to the “use of appropriate
bilingual personnel and printed material . . . in those portions of
political subdivisions in the State” in which a “substantial number of
members of low-income households speak a language other than
English.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The provision’s
51
focus is on political subdivisions and groups of households, not
individual households.
Section 2020(e)(1)(B) and the analysis in
Almendares thus have little relevance to the statutory provisions at
issue here.
A number of other courts have found provisions of the SNAP Act
to have created private rights of action. E.g., Briggs v. Bremby, No. 12324, 2012 WL 6026167, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012) (holding sections
2020(e)(3) and (e)(9) create private rights of action); Williston v.
Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding sections
2020(e)(2)(B), (e)(3), and (e)(9) create private rights of action); One case,
although decided before Gonzaga, applied the Blessing test in holding
that one provision at issue here, § 2020(e)(10), created a private right of
action. Meachem v. Wing, 77 F. Supp. 2d 431, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The
court in Meachem found that section 2020(e)(10) created an individual
right to a fair hearing, reasoning that “whether or not a fair hearing has
been conducted properly depends solely on whether one particular
recipient’s benefits have been modified or terminated without the
process that is required.” Id. at 439. The Court finds this reasoning
persuasive.
52
The other two cases cited by defendant deserve little weight.2 The
court in Willis v. Ahmed, No. 10-10504 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2010) stated
at a hearing on a motion to dismiss that “[n]o private action was
intended by Congress for violation of the Food Stamp Act . . . the
Gonzaga case has made that clear.” (Dkt. 30-9, Ex. I to Def.’s Resp. to
Mot. TRO.) The court did not analyze the specific provision at issue, see
Goetz, 626 F.3d at 362, nor did it offer anything further on the issue.
The analysis in Howard v. Hawkins, No. A-09-CA-577-SS (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 14, 2009) is cursory and relies heavily on the use of the phrase “The
State agency shall” in sections 2020(e)(3) and (e)(9) to find no private
right of action. As already discussed, the Court finds that reasoning
unpersuasive.
3.
Whether the rights asserted are too vague or amorphous to
be enforceable
Defendant does not appear in her briefing to dispute the second
element of the Blessing test. At the hearing, however, defendant argued
that judicial competence to enforce rights under the SNAP Act would be
Plaintiffs correctly point out that defendant erroneously cites the decision in
Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2007) as holding provisions of
the SNAP Act unenforceable. See id. at 190 (finding theory of liability premised on
private right of action in SNAP Act “not preserved on appeal” and therefore
“abandoned”).
2
53
“strained,” in the sense that judicial enforcement would hamper the
Secretary of Agriculture’s ability to create uniform standards governing
SNAP and to enforce those standards consistently. Plaintiffs responded
at the hearing that this element refers to a court’s technical competence
to enforce a particular right, not to the possibility of conflicting court
decisions or standards. The Court agrees with plaintiffs. As originally
articulated in Blessing, judicial competence is strained when the
relevant statutory standard gives little or no guidance on how it should
be enforced. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 345. For example, a regulation
requiring the state to have “sufficient staff” to carry out certain
functions under the Social Security Act would “strain judicial
competence” to enforce, because it provided no guidance as to what
“sufficient” meant. Id. at 346.
At any rate, the rights at issue – to a fair hearing, and to
assistance upon application by an eligible household – are not “vague”
or “amorphous,” nor would it “strain judicial competence” to enforce
them. Courts routinely determine the adequacy of notice and hearing
procedures, and the SNAP Act’s “fleeing felon” standard is clear and
objective.
54
4.
Whether the provisions are mandatory
The third element is not in dispute here: the language of the
SNAP provisions is “mandatory, not precatory.”
In particular, the
provision at issue in Count II states that “The State plan of operation . .
. shall provide . . . for the granting of a fair hearing . . .” 7 U.S.C. §
2020(e)(10) (emphasis added). The provision at issue in Count III states
that “Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible
households who make application for such participation.” 7 U.S.C. §
2014(a) (emphasis added).
Having analyzed sections 2014(a) and 2020(e)(10) in the manner
Gonzaga requires, the Court concludes that those provisions of the
SNAP Act create individual rights.
5.
Whether Congress intended to create a private remedy
“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual
right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” Gonzaga, 536
U.S. at 284.
It is defendant’s burden to rebut that presumption by
showing that Congress either expressly, or “impliedly, by creating an
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement
55
under § 1983,” intended to preclude private suits to enforce the right.
Id. at 285 n.4 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341).
Defendant has made no such showing. Defendant suggests that
the enforcement powers granted by the SNAP Act to the Secretary of
Agriculture preclude § 1983 claims.
Those powers comprise the
mandatory withholding of administrative funding, in an amount
determined “appropriate” by the Secretary, and the discretion to ask the
Attorney General to seek injunctive relief against the relevant state
agency. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g). The Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit
have held these powers are not indicative of congressional intent to
preclude § 1983 claims in other statutory contexts. Wilder v. Virginia
Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22 (1990) (finding Medicaid Act’s
authorization of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
withhold funds and approval of state plans was not “sufficiently
comprehensive” to indicate Congress’ intent to preclude § 1983 claims);
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 428 (1987) (holding U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s powers to audit and cut off federal funds insufficient to
indicate congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims to enforce
56
Housing Act); Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d
565, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (state administrative review procedures and
authority of Attorney General to enforce Help America Vote Act not
indicative of congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims).
Understandably so, as those powers are not directed at obtaining relief
for aggrieved individuals.
See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90
(distinguishing Wright and Wilder on the ground that in those cases,
unlike in Gonzaga, “an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review
mechanism”); Briggs, 2012 WL 6026167, at *12 (finding aggrieved
individuals lack federal review mechanism under SNAP Act and
holding SNAP Act sections enforceable under § 1983).
Defendant suggests that the Secretary’s withdrawal of funding or
referral of the matter to the Attorney General could pressure a state to
address individual SNAP Act claims. But too many contingencies are
involved – the Secretary must find a “pattern of lack of compliance,”
exercise his or her discretion to refer the matter to the Attorney
General, and must withhold enough funding to prompt state action, to
name just three – to conclude that the statute’s enforcement scheme
would
redress
individual
grievances
57
and
would
thereby
be
“incompatible” with § 1983 actions. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g); see also
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285 n.4.
Defendant further suggests that the hearing requirement in §
2020(e)(10) evidences an intent to preclude § 1983 claims. However,
“the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily
foreclose resort to § 1983.” Wright, 479 U.S. at 427-28 (1987).
Even the court in the case primarily relied upon by defendant,
Almendares, found that “[t]he administrative scheme in the Food Stamp
Act is not the type of remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to
supplant a § 1983 claim.” 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258, at *16 n.4.
Other courts addressing this issue have held likewise.
Victorian v.
Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 723 (5th Cir. 1987); Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d
1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987); Briggs, 2012 WL 6026167, at *12; Williston,
379 F. Supp. 2d at 577-78.
6.
Conclusion
7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a) and 2020(e)(10) create individual, private
rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
C.
Procedural due process (Counts I and II)
58
Plaintiffs maintain they are entitled to summary judgment on
Counts I and II, which allege violation of procedural due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment and under the SNAP Act, respectively.
They argue that defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices
were inadequate as a matter of constitutional and statutory law.
Defendant counters that she is entitled to summary judgment on
Counts I and II, because the notices were adequate as a matter of both
constitutional and statutory law, and because plaintiffs failed to show
that state administrative remedies were inadequate. Defendant also
appears to argue that she is entitled to summary judgment on these
counts because plaintiffs failed to exhaust state administrative
remedies before filing this suit.
1.
Inadequacy and exhaustion of state remedies
As an initial matter, defendant argues that, in order to sustain
their due process claim under Count I, plaintiffs must show their state
administrative remedies failed to provide due process, citing Jefferson v.
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. System, 360 F.3d 583, 585 (6th Cir. 2004).
According to defendant, three individual plaintiffs – Woodward,
59
Copeland, and Anderson – failed to pursue state administrative
remedies and are thereby estopped from challenging the adequacy of
those remedies. (Dkt. 81, Def.’s Br. 11.) And plaintiff Barry secured
relief through the state administrative process, proving that defendant
provided due process of law. (Id. at 10-11.)
Defendant urges the Court to extend the application of Jefferson
to Counts II-IV.
Defendant further asks the Court to apply an
exhaustion of state remedies requirement and dismiss plaintiffs’ claims
for failure to pursue their claims in state proceedings.
a.
Inadequacy of state remedies
Jefferson does not apply in this case.
Shortly after deciding
Jefferson, the Sixth Circuit held that Jefferson only applies to
procedural due process claims brought under § 1983 when the property
deprivation results from a “random or unauthorized act.” Mitchell v.
Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 484 (6th Cir. 2004). When, as here, the
alleged deprivation results from “established state procedures,”
however, a plaintiff is “required neither to plead nor prove the
inadequacy of . . . state-law remedies in order to prevail.” Id. at 483-84.
60
Count I is therefore not barred by plaintiffs’ failure to show
administrative remedies were inadequate. It follows that Counts II and
III, which are also brought pursuant to § 1983, are not barred.
Jefferson has no application to Count IV, as that count is not brought
pursuant to § 1983.
b.
Exhaustion of state remedies
As already discussed in section II.B supra, the Supreme Court has
held that “exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be
required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.”
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Courts
have nonetheless recognized that a federal statute may contain an
explicit or implicit requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative
remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim. Id. at 502 n.4. “The mere
provision of state administrative remedies, however, is not enough to
demonstrate an implicit Congressional intent to impose an exhaustion
requirement on a plaintiff seeking to bring a § 1983 action.” Talbot v.
Lucy Corr Nursing Home, 118 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 1997). “If there is
doubt as to whether an exception applies, courts should refrain from
requiring exhaustion in § 1983 suits because Patsy leaves no doubt that
61
the presumption in strongly in favor of no exception.”
Id. (quoting
Alacare, Inc.-North v. Baggiano, 785 F.2d 963, 967 (11th Cir. 1986).
Here, there is no explicit exhaustion requirement in the SNAP
Act. While § 2020(e)(10) imposes notice and fair hearing requirements
upon states, defendant points to no indication of an implicit
congressional intent to require § 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust state
administrative remedies before bringing suit, nor can the Court discern
any such intent. See Commonwealth of Mass. v. Lyng, 893 F.2d 424,
427 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he scheme of the food stamp statute does not
require exhaustion”); Williston, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70 (same, citing
other S.D.N.Y. cases).
2.
Constitutional due process
a.
Standard
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970), the Supreme Court
established that recipients of public benefits must receive an
evidentiary hearing before suspension or termination of benefits. For
such a hearing to be conducted “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner,” id. at 267, a recipient must also receive “timely
62
and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination,
and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse
witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.”
Id. at 268.
Adequate notice, for purposes of due process, must “inform a
recipient of the precise questions raised about his continued eligibility”
and state “the legal and factual bases” for the state’s action. Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 268. The notice must comprise “(1) a detailed statement of
the intended action . . . (2) the reason for the change in status . . . 3)
citation to the specific statutory section requiring reduction or
termination; and (4) specific notice of the recipient’s right to appeal.
Garrett v. Pruett, 707 F.2d 930, 931 (6th Cir. 1983).
The central point emerging from the relevant Supreme Court and
Sixth Circuit cases is that the explanation of the proposed action and of
the reasons for the action must be detailed enough to allow for a
meaningful hearing. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938)
(“The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence
but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing
party and to meet them”); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) (“Notice, to
63
comply with due process requirements . . . must set forth the alleged
misconduct with particularity”); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 561 (6th
Cir. 2004) (holding notice of rejection of application for benefits violated
due process where applicants were “not adequately informed as to how
to fully receive the benefits to which they were entitled . . . nor were
they fully apprised of the reasons for denial”).
b.
Application
The notice received by Barry on 12/31/12 (Dkt. 70-2, Ex. A to
Second Amended Compl.) is titled “Notice of Case Action.”
It is
representative of all the notices at issue in this case, although later
notices include a minor change, discussed below.
The notice lists
Barry’s name and address, his case number, and provides the name of a
DHS specialist, the program office address, and telephone and fax
numbers. The notice states in relevant part:
Food Assistance Program Summary
Period: 02/01/2013 – Ongoing
Action: Closed
Your ongoing benefit has been cancelled but you will
continue to receive benefits through the day before the
period listed above.
64
Reason for Intended Action
Walter D Barry – Not Eligible
You or a member of your group is not eligible for
assistance due to a criminal justice disqualification.
Please contact your local law enforcement agency to
resolve.
Manual Item(s): BEM 203, ERM 202
The notice then states that “you do have a right to a hearing to contest
the Department’s calculation that you or a member of your group are no
longer eligible for program assistance.”
An attached form titled
“Request for a Hearing” provides the date by which DHS must receive a
hearing request in order “to continue your assistance at the former level
or to have your current assistance continued or reinstated.” The form
also gives the last date by which DHS must receive the hearing request.
Instructions are provided for requesting an administrative hearing.
The notice recipient is advised that “[a]t the hearing, you can explain
why you think this action is wrong, and give evidence.” The form also
states that the person may contact a local DHS office to get more
information about how the hearing works. A web address is provided
“[t]o find out if free legal help is available in your area.”
65
A later version of the notice changes the language in the “Reason
for Intended Action” section as follows: “Please have the disqualified
member of your group contact a local law enforcement agency – such as
a police department, sheriff’s department or the Michigan State Police –
to resolve. The law enforcement agency will require you to provide
picture identification.” (Dkt. 50-8, Ex. Y to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.)
It is undisputed that the notices meet the fourth Garrett factor, as
they include notice of an applicant’s / recipient’s appeal rights. As to
the third factor, the notices do not cite to the specific statutory section
requiring reduction or termination of benefits. Rather, the notices refer
to the relevant section of the BEM. (E.g., Dkt. 70-18, Ex. Q to Pls.’
Second Amend. Compl.) The BEM, in turn, lists the state and federal
statutory sections purportedly supporting the reduction or termination
of benefits. (E.g., Dkt. 70-30, Ex. CC to Pls.’ Second Amend. Compl.)
Defendant maintains this satisfies the third Garrett factor, but cites no
authority in support. (Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 9.)
The crux of the issue, however, is whether the notices adequately
explain the reduction or termination, and the reasons for it – the first
and second Garrett factors.
66
The notices state the intended action – denial or reduction of
benefits. For example, the May 16, 2013 notice sent to Barry provides,
under the heading “Intended Action,” a summary of benefits – in this
instance, listing “Food Assistance Program.” (Dkt. 70-6, Ex. E to Pls.’
Second Amend. Compl.)
The notice shows the relevant action as
“closed” and states, “[y]our ongoing benefit has been cancelled but you
will continue to receive benefits through the day before the period listed
above.” (Id.)
The reason given for the action is simply “You or a member of your
group is not eligible for assistance due to a criminal justice
disqualification.” (Dkt. 70-2, Ex. A to Second Amended Compl.) This
fails to indicate whose conduct is at issue. It also fails to indicate which
of the five types of criminal justice disqualifications applied by DHS is
being invoked. (See Dkt. 49-8, Ex. G to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.) From at
least 2012 to mid-2013, the notices referred to section 203 of the BEM,
where five types of criminal justice disqualifications from public
assistance benefits were listed. (See id.) In June 2013, DHS placed the
fugitive felon disqualification in its own section of the BEM (204). (Dkt.
49-5, Ex. D to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.) But the notices thereafter continue
67
to use the general phrase “criminal justice disqualification.” Thus, a
notice recipient must still be able to (1) determine that “BEM 204”
refers to the Bridges Eligibility Manual, section 204, (2) determine that
the relevant type of criminal justice disqualification can be found there,
and (3) get access to the BEM. (See Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ¶
300.)
Even if a notice recipient locates a copy of the BEM and
determines the type of disqualification, he or she still does not know
anything about the outstanding warrant – not the underlying charge,
nor which law enforcement agency issued the warrant. The recipient
thus has no basis for making an informed decision whether to contest
the disqualification, nor what issues need to be addressed at a hearing.
Defendant maintains that notice recipients could call the DHS
contact person and number listed on the notice to receive further
information regarding their disqualification.
But defendant cannot
satisfy due process by requiring notice recipients to call elsewhere. See
Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, in
this instance such a call would be fruitless: DHS staff are instructed
“not to disclose ‘Fugitive Felon’ status information to the individual.”
(Dkt. 49-2, Ex. A to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.; see also Dkt. 49-17, Ex. P to
68
Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3 (“DHS specialists are NOT to inform a client of
their fugitive felon status.”).)
Defendant further maintains that notice recipients can obtain the
necessary information by contacting law enforcement.
This is
potentially as ineffective as contacting DHS, as the named plaintiffs’
experiences shows.
Law enforcement may not be able to determine
which warrant is causing the disqualification, as happened in Barry’s
case. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 28-30; Dkt. 70-3, Ex. B to
Second Amended Compl.)
He discovered the existence of the first
outstanding warrant only through defendant’s intervention. (Dkt. 70,
Second Amended Compl. ¶ 66; Dkt. 70-11, Ex. J to Second Amended
Compl.) Woodward experienced similar difficulty, despite following the
notice’s instructions and contacting law enforcement: she contacted the
Taylor police department about a misdemeanor case, but was unaware
of an outstanding felony warrant in Livingston County. (Dkt. 51-9, Ex.
QQ to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 17-19; Dkt. 52-1, Ex. ZZ to Pls.’ Mot.
Summ. J.)
She only discovered the existence of the felony warrant
through defendant’s intervention.
69
At least two courts in other districts have analyzed notices of
termination of federal food assistance benefits that are as brief and
lacking in detail as the notice at issue here. Febus v. Gallant, 866 F.
Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1994); Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Del.
1985), aff’d, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
Massachusetts’ notice of termination of public benefits, including
federal food assistance benefits, gave as a reason for disqualification
that
“you
and/or
a
household
member
are
living
outside
of
Massachusetts and do not intend to return soon.” Febus, 866 F. Supp.
at 46. The court held that notice constitutionally inadequate. Id. at 47.
Delaware’s notices contained one-sentence explanations for termination
of benefits, including federal food assistance benefits, such as,
“children's wages exceed eligibility limit,” or “you are over the gross
income eligibility limit,” or “you did not provide a protective payee as
requested.” Ortiz, 616 F. Supp. at 1061. The court held those notices
constitutionally inadequate. Id. at 1063.
Other courts have held similar boilerplate, nonspecific statements
constitutionally inadequate. Gault, 387 U.S. at 31 (holding statement
“said minor is a delinquent minor” constitutionally inadequate notice of
70
charge); Hamby, 368 F.3d at 560 (holding notice stating applicants for
state health insurance had failed to apply during open enrollment
period constitutionally inadequate for failing to specify that applicants
were uninsurable); Moffit v. Austin, 600 F. Supp. 295, 297 (W.D. Ky.
1984) (holding Medicaid notices stating “Your care needs no longer meet
the criteria for intermediate care” or “according to information in your
medical record you no longer require the care provided” constitutionally
inadequate).
Defendant relies primarily on Rosen v. Goetz, 410 F.3d 919, 930-31
(6th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that due process does not require
notices to include specific, individualized reasons for benefit denial,
reduction, or termination.
(Dkt. 81, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 8.)
But
defendant’s reliance is misplaced: the Rosen court held the notices in
that case adequate because “the very facts the plaintiffs claim are
missing [sc. from the termination notices] are supplied by the State
through a second letter that follows the Termination Notice and that
the Termination Notice itself references and brings to the attention of
recipients.” 410 F.3d at 931. While defendant is technically correct
that the notice itself does not need to include specific, individualized
71
reasons for the agency action, those details must nonetheless be
provided in some form.
See id. (“Due process does not require
‘reasonably calculated’ notice to come in just one letter, as opposed to
two.”). Unlike in Rosen, they were not provided here.
Defendant’s notice is inadequate in another respect: it fails to
inform recipients “as to how to fully receive the benefits to which they
were entitled.” Hamby, 368 F.3d at 561. The claims in Hamby focused
on health benefit denial notices sent by the Tennessee Department of
Health.
The notices in Hamby were constitutionally inadequate
because they did not inform benefit applicants that they had to appeal
the denial, rather than reapply, to receive full retroactive benefits, and
what the consequences of filing new applications would be. Id. at 560.
The notice here similarly fails to inform recipients what they must
do to lift the disqualification.
If a recipient “resolves” the
disqualification, benefits are automatically reinstated only if other
household members are “active” – i.e., continue to receive the type of
assistance from which the notice recipient has been disqualified. (Dkt.
49-16, Ex. O to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., BAM 811.)
Otherwise, a
disqualified individual must not only “resolve” the criminal justice
72
disqualification with law enforcement, but must also reapply for
benefits. The notice fails to communicate this information. The notice
also fails to make clear whether a hearing request is necessary to
resolve disqualifications, even if the issue is resolved with law
enforcement.
In sum, the disqualification notice fails to provide the due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
3.
SNAP Act and regulations
a.
Notice requirements
Section 2020(e)(10) obligates state agencies to provide “for the
granting of a fair hearing” to households whose food assistance is
reduced or terminated.
While not explicitly requiring notice, it is
presumed that a household will “receiv[e] individual notice of agency
action reducing or terminating its benefits.”
The regulations implementing section 2020 require that, if an
application for food assistance is denied,
the State agency shall provide the household with written
notice explaining the basis for the denial, the household's
right to request a fair hearing, the telephone number of the
73
food stamp office (a toll-free number or a number where
collect calls will be accepted for households outside the local
calling area), and, if possible, the name of the person to
contact for additional information. If there is an individual
or organization available that provides free legal
representation, the notice shall also advise the household of
the availability of the service.
7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g)(ii) (emphasis added).
When the state agency
reduces or terminates benefits, it must “provide the household timely
and adequate advance notice before the adverse action is taken.”
C.F.R. § 273.13(a). The regulation further provides that
The notice of adverse action shall be considered adequate if
it explains in easily understandable language: The proposed
action; the reason for the proposed action; the household's
right to request a fair hearing; the telephone number of the
food stamp office (toll-free number or a number where collect
calls will be accepted for households outside the local calling
area) and, if possible, the name of the person to contact for
additional information; the availability of continued benefits;
and the liability of the household for any overissuances
received while awaiting a fair hearing if the hearing official's
decision is adverse to the household. If there is an individual
or organization available that provides free legal
representation, the notice shall also advise the household of
the availability of the service.
7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(2) (emphasis added).
74
7
Other courts have interpreted adequacy, for purposes of this
regulation, to require an individualized, specific explanation of the
adverse action and the reasons for it. For example, the court in Febus,
866 F. Supp. at 47, held that Massachusetts’ notice stating that “you
and/or a household member are living outside of Massachusetts and do
not intend to return soon” not only failed to provide constitutional due
process, but also failed to meet the requirements of § 273.13(a)(2).
b.
Application
Defendant’s disqualification notice fails to meet the requirements
of the SNAP Act and its supporting regulations for the same reasons
that it is constitutionally inadequate. As discussed above, the notices
do not “explain” the reasons for denial or termination, and it would be
fruitless for recipients to use the contact information provided to seek
further information.
4.
Conclusion
Defendant’s disqualification notice is inadequate under both the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and under section
2020(e)(10) of the SNAP Act, and its implementing regulations, 7 C.F.R.
75
§§ 273.10(g) and 273.13(a). Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary
judgment on Counts I and II.
To meet the requirements of constitutional due process and of the
SNAP Act, defendant’s notice must explain, in detail:
(1) the nature of the intended action and its duration;
(2) the factual and legal bases for the action, including:
(a) which type of criminal justice disqualification (e.g., fugitive
felon status) is at issue,
(b) the name of the person whose alleged conduct has resulted
in the disqualification,
(c) the date of the relevant warrant or conviction, as well as any
other identifying information, including but not limited to a
warrant
number,
case
number,
or
National
Crime
Information Center number,
(d) the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant
was issued,
76
(e) the name of a specific person or entity with knowledge of the
basis for the disqualification whom the individual can
contact for additional information,
(f) where applicable, a statement that, in accordance with the
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k),
defendant has determined that (i) the disqualified individual
is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or custody or
confinement for a felony, and (ii) law enforcement is actively
seeking the individual; and
(3)
the specific actions a disqualified individual can take to
obtain resolution of the disqualification and full access to benefits.
Defendant already has access to at least some of this information
through the fugitive felon interface. (See Dkt. 49-10, Ex. I to Pls.’ Mot.
Summ. J.) Moreover, defendant already follows at least some of these
requirements in the context of child protection, foster care, and juvenile
justice cases. (See Dkt. 52-6, Ex. EEE to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 52-7,
Ex. FFF to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 52-8, Ex. GGG to Pls.’ Mot. Summ.
J.)
For example, defendant requires Child Protective Services (CPS)
staff to verify LEIN information before including it in narratives in
77
reports, petitions, and other documents. (Dkt. 52-6, Ex. EEE to Pls.’
Mot. Summ. J. 5.) Information is verified by CPS – for example, by
contacting law enforcement or the relevant prosecuting attorney’s office.
(Id.) Staff are “encouraged” to consult with the prosecuting attorney or
DHS counsel to assess the evidentiary value of corroborating
information. (Id. at 2.) The Court can discern no reason why defendant
cannot
similarly
verify
LEIN
information
before
disqualifying
applicants for and recipients of public assistance benefits, and
communicate that information in the disqualification notice.
Moreover, DHS staff already contact Michigan’s Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) when a recipient of a disqualification notice
comes into a local DHS office requesting information. (Dkt. 49-2, Ex. A
to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 49-3, Ex. B to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.) An OIG
agent then verifies the warrant, determines if the warrant is still active,
and then contacts the relevant law enforcement agency to determine if
they will send someone to the DHS office to arrest the person. (Dkt. 493, Ex. B to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.)
In other words, at least in some
circumstances, defendant verifies the warrant and determines whether
law enforcement is “actively seeking” the notice recipient. See 7 U.S.C.
78
§ 2015(k)(2) (requiring law enforcement to be “actively seeking” a
person for that person to be disqualified from SNAP benefits). There is
no obvious reason why defendant cannot make the “actively seeking”
determination before issuing a disqualification notice, and include the
basis for that determination in the notice. With respect to at least some
of the notice requirements listed above, then, the burden on defendant
appears to be minimal.
D.
Substantive violation of the SNAP Act (Counts III and
IV)
Plaintiffs claim entitlement to summary judgment on Counts III
and IV based on defendant’s alleged failure to conform to the
requirements of the SNAP Act. Counts III and IV represent alternative
paths to the same result (namely, enjoining enforcement of Michigan’s
fugitive felon law and policy): (1) defendant violated plaintiffs’
substantive right to benefits under the SNAP Act, by imposing invalid
eligibility requirements on plaintiffs (Count III), and (2) defendant’s
fugitive felon law and policy are preempted by the SNAP Act (Count
IV).
1.
Text of the SNAP Act
79
7 U.S.C. § 2015 is titled “Eligibility disqualifications.”
Section
2015(k) is titled “Disqualification of fleeing felons” and provides as
follows:
(1) In general
No member of a household who is otherwise eligible to
participate in the supplemental nutrition assistance
program shall be eligible to participate in the program as a
member of that or any other household during any period
during which the individual is-(A) fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or
confinement after conviction, under the law of the place
from which the individual is fleeing, for a crime, or
attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the
law of the place from which the individual is fleeing or
that, in the case of New Jersey, is a high misdemeanor
under the law of New Jersey; or
(B) violating a condition of probation or parole imposed
under a Federal or State law.
(2) Procedures
The Secretary shall-(A) define the terms “fleeing” and “actively seeking” for
purposes of this subsection; and
(B) ensure that State agencies use consistent
procedures established by the Secretary that disqualify
individuals whom law enforcement authorities are
actively seeking for the purpose of holding criminal
proceedings against the individual.
80
7 U.S.C. § 2015(k). The SNAP Act prohibits states from imposing “any
other standards of eligibility as a condition for participating in the
program,” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b), and requires the eligibility standards in
state plans to be “in accordance with sections 2014 and 2015 of [the
SNAP Act] and to “include no additional requirements imposed by the
State agency.” Id. § 2020(e)(5).
The Michigan law at issue is Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b, a
provision enacted in 1996 as part of Michigan’s Social Welfare Act, and
then amended in 2011. 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 190; 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts
2011. Section 400.10b provides that “the department [sc. of Human
Services] shall not grant public assistance under this act to an
individual if the department receives information . . . that the
individual is subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising
from a felony charge against that individual in this or any other
jurisdiction.” The Michigan law does not mention fleeing or fugitive
status, nor does it distinguish persons whom law enforcement is
actively seeking.
2.
Whether state law controls the definition of “fleeing”
81
At oral argument, defendant suggested for the first time that state
law controls the definition of “fleeing” in section 2015(k). In defendant’s
view, the clause “under the law of the place from which the individual is
fleeing” modifies all that comes before it. Thus, whether a person is
“fleeing to avoid prosecution” is determined by reference to Michigan
law in this case.
While grammatically possible, defendant’s position is legally
implausible.
It is well-established that “in the absence of a plain
indication to the contrary, . . . Congress when it enacts a statute is not
making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.”
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43
(1989) (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)). This
is especially true where, as with the SNAP Act, the federal law is
intended to have “uniform nationwide application.” See Holyfield, 490
U.S. at 43-44. There is no “plain indication” in section 2015(k) that
Congress intended for states to define “fleeing.” In fact, there is an
obvious indication to the contrary: the express provision that the
Secretary of Agriculture “shall define” both “fleeing” and “actively
seeking.” 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(2)(A).
82
Alternatively, defendant suggests the Court should decline to
interpret section 2015(k) in deference to the proposed rule that would,
among other things, define the terms “fleeing” and “actively seeking.”
(Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 21); see Clarification of
Eligibility of Fleeing Felons, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,907 (proposed Aug. 19,
2011) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 272-73).
To be sure, where
Congress has expressly delegated to the agency authority to define a
statutory term, the agency’s definition is “entitled to more than mere
deference or weight,” but rather “is entitled to legislative effect.”
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). But the courts “do
not abdicate review” in such circumstances.3 Id. Here, of course, there
is no agency definition to review, as the relevant rule has not yet been
finalized. Defendant points to no authority for the proposition that the
Court cannot determine the meaning of the statute in the interim, nor
has the Court itself found any such authority.
Indeed, the Court’s
determination of the meaning of “fleeing to avoid prosecution” would be
subject to displacement by any conflicting definition later promulgated
by the Secretary.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Any definition promulgated by the agency would still be subject to challenge under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. See Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 44.
3
83
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-84 (2005). But absent any authority
to the contrary, the Court discerns no compelling reason why plaintiffs’
claims should be left in legal limbo.4
3.
Plain language of the statute
Turning then to section 2015(k), the Court begins with “[a]
fundamental canon of statutory construction . . . that when interpreting
statutes, the language of the statute is the starting point for
interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if the plain
meaning of that language is clear.” United States v. Douglas, 634 F.3d
852, 858 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the Michigan law and defendant’s policy
violate the plain language of § 2015(k), because they do not require a
determination that an individual is both fleeing to avoid prosecution or
custody and is actively sought by law enforcement.
The language of the SNAP Act plainly requires that the person be
“fleeing to avoid prosecution” in order to be disqualified.
“Fleeing”
necessarily entails movement away from a place. See The American
At the time of the issuing of this opinion, the proposed rule defining “fleeing” and
“actively seeking” have been pending for over three years.
4
84
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2014) (defining
“flee” as “[t]o run away, as from trouble or danger”); Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language (1993) (defining
“flee” as “to run away”). The other appearance of the word “fleeing” in
section 2015(k)(1)(A) confirms this reading: the relevant crime must be
a felony “under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing”
(emphasis added). A person cannot be fleeing from a place (such as the
state of Michigan) if he or she remains in that place. Furthermore, by
specifying that the person must be fleeing to avoid prosecution, the
SNAP Act incorporates an element of intent.
Neither of these elements – actual physical flight, or the intent to
avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement – is present in the Social
Welfare Act. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b(1). Disqualification is
triggered simply by the existence of an outstanding warrant. Id. The
existence of an outstanding warrant does not necessarily imply flight or
intent. (See Dkt. 79-4, Ex. C to Pls.’ Reply in Support of Amended Mot.
Class Cert., Shea Aff.) Under Michigan law, an arrest warrant directs
law enforcement to apprehend a person; it does not order the person to
turn him- or herself in. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 764.1b. DHS policy
85
implementing section 400.10b likewise fails to require a determination
that a person is “fleeing to avoid prosecution.” See BEM 203, 204.
The SNAP Act also clearly requires law enforcement to be
“actively seeking” a person for that person to be disqualified from
receiving food assistance benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(2). It is equally
clear that the Social Welfare Act lacks this requirement. See Mich.
Compl. Laws § 400.10b. At oral argument, defendant suggested the
mere existence of an outstanding warrant means that law enforcement
is, in fact, actively seeking the person.
This is not a plausible
argument. Defendant’s interpretation would write the word “actively”
out of the SNAP Act: if issuing a warrant equates to “actively seeking,”
then “actively seeking” would be no different from plain “seeking.” See
Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Under
accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes
as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to
interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the
same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.”). DHS policy
implementing section 400.10b likewise fails to require determinations
that a person is actively sought by law enforcement. See BEM 203, 204.
86
In fact, DHS staff are instructed to proceed with disqualification even
when law enforcement, upon being informed that a benefits applicant or
recipient with an outstanding warrant is present at a DHS office,
declines to arrest the person. (Dkt. 49-3, Ex. B to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J.)
The Court’s reading of the plain language of the SNAP Act finds
support in the nearly identical language of the Social Security Act and
the related case law. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(4)(A)(i) disqualifies a person
from receiving Supplemental Social Security Income (SSI) if the person
is “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after
conviction, under the laws of the place from which the person flees, for a
crime, or an attempt to commit a crime, which is a felony under the
laws of the place from which the person flees.” Both this provision and
section 2015(k) of the SNAP Act were enacted as sections 202(a)(5) and
821(k) of the same law: the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. There is accordingly a strong
presumption that Congress meant the same thing by “flee” in both
provisions. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
Courts interpreting the Social Security Act have found the mere
existence of an outstanding felony warrant insufficient to show that a
87
person is fleeing and therefore disqualified from receiving SSI benefits.
Fowlkes v. Adamec, 432 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The statute does
not permit the Commissioner to conclude simply from the fact that
there is an outstanding warrant for a person’s arrest that he is fleeing
to avoid prosecution.”); Cambero v. Commissioner, No. 06-00551 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 10, 2007); Blakely v. Commissioner, 330 F. Supp. 2d 910
(W.D. Mich. 2004); Hull v. Barnhart, 336 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Or.
2004); Garnes v. Barnhart, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
Thomas v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 1529280 (D. Me. June 24, 2004).
Based on the plain language of section 2015(k) of the SNAP Act
and the parallel language in § 1382(e)(4)(A)(i) of the Social Security Act,
the Court finds that Michigan’s Social Welfare Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §
400.10b and DHS’ fugitive felon policy, as currently embodied in BEM
204, impose requirements upon applicants for and recipients of food
assistance benefits that exceed the requirements imposed by the SNAP
Act.
Because 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) expressly prohibit
states from imposing additional eligibility requirements, Michigan
cannot disqualify a person based solely on the existence of an
outstanding felony warrant. That amounts to requiring a person not to
88
have any outstanding felony warrants to be eligible for SNAP benefits,
a requirement that goes beyond the requirements of the SNAP Act. The
Court accordingly finds that Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and BEM 204
deprive plaintiffs of their right to food assistance benefits in violation of
the SNAP Act.
4.
Preemption
Michigan’s fugitive felon law and policy are invalid on a second,
independent basis: they are preempted by the SNAP Act.
“Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, “state
laws that interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made
in pursuance of the constitution are invalid.”
Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) (quoting Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)).
Preemption “turns principally on congressional intent.” Gibson v. Am.
Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943, 948 (6th Cir. 2002). Such intent may be
manifest in an express preemption clause in the relevant statute. See
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977
(2011).
89
Sections 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5) of the SNAP Act expressly
preempt state eligibility requirements that exceed the federal eligibility
requirements. See Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 222-23 (6th
Cir. 2000) (holding provision of Medical Device Amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that prohibited states from
imposing requirements “different from, or in addition to” federal
requirements was express preemption clause).
Mich. Comp. Laws §
400.10b and DHS’ fugitive felon policy are therefore expressly
preempted by federal law.
Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ preemption argument fails
because it relies on a proposed regulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 51,907. But the
proposed regulation is unnecessary to the Court’s analysis: as discussed
above, the plain language of the SNAP Act alone requires the
determinations that (1) the person is fleeing law enforcement, and is
doing so with the intent of avoiding prosecution, custody, or
confinement, and (2) law enforcement is actively seeking the person.
Because Michigan’s fugitive felon law and policy do not require these
determinations, they effectively impose a requirement beyond what
90
federal law prescribes.
Michigan’s fugitive felon law and policy are
therefore preempted by the SNAP Act.
5.
Conclusion
Under both approaches to the issue – deprivation of rights under
the SNAP Act (Count III), or preemption (Count IV) – plaintiffs are
entitled to summary judgment.
V.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
(1)
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss / Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 81) is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to plaintiff
Heather Woodward only.
Woodward’s claims are moot and are
DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant’s motion
is DENIED with respect to the remainder of the relief sought;
(2)
Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39) is
GRANTED. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), the
Court certifies the following class and subclass in this action:
Class:
91
All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of,
benefits administered by the Michigan Department of
Human Services (DHS) under the
Food Assistance Program (FAP)
Family Independence Program (FIP)
State Disability Assistance Program (SDA)
Child Development and Care Program (CDC), and
Refugee Assistance Program (RAP)
public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer
actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of
public assistance benefits based on DHS’ determination that
the applicant / recipient or a member of the applicant /
recipient’s household is ineligible based on a criminal justice
disqualification, and who receive or have received a written
notice at the time of denial issued by DHS informing the
applicant / recipient of the criminal justice disqualification.
Subclass:
All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of,
Michigan’s Food Assistance Program benefits, who have
suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial,
termination, or reduction of Food Assistance Program
benefits based on DHS’s policy of disqualifying individuals
as “fugitive felons,” without a finding that the individual is
intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or
custody or confinement after conviction, and/or without
finding that the individual is actively sought by law
enforcement, for a crime that is a felony.
92
The Court names plaintiffs Walter Barry, Donitha Copeland,
Westside Mothers, and Kenneth Anderson as class representatives.
The Court further appoints Elan Nichols, Jacqueline Doig, Miriam
Aukerman, and Sofia Nelson as class counsel.
Plaintiffs are directed to exchange with defendant a proposed
notice that will be served upon all members of the class. If the parties
agree upon the content and form of the notice, plaintiffs shall submit
the notice to the Court no later than February 9, 2015. Otherwise, the
parties shall notify the Court and the Court will set a conference for
resolution of the dispute;
(3)
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49) is
GRANTED;
(4)
It is DECLARED that
(a)
Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices
used from December 31, 2012 to present, violate the rights of
the individual named plaintiffs and the class members to
meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
93
(b)
Defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices
violate the rights of the individual named plaintiffs and the
subclass members to notice under 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10), as
implemented by 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.10(g) and 273.13(a),
(c)
Defendant’s fugitive felon policy, and the portions of
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 400.10b and 10c on which the policy is
based, violate plaintiffs’ and subclass members’ rights to food
assistance benefits under 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a), by imposing
eligibility requirements that exceed those under federal law,
in violation of 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b) and 2020(e)(5),
(d)
Pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, defendant’s
fugitive felon policy, and the portions of Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 400.10b and 10c on which the policy is based, are
preempted by 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2015(k), and 2020(e)(5),
and implementing regulations;
(5)
Defendant is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from:
(a)
Denying, reducing, or terminating public assistance,
including assistance under the Food Assistance Program,
Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance
94
Program, Child Development and Care Program, and
Refugee Assistance Program, without first providing notice
that explains, in detail:
1. The nature of the intended action and its duration;
2. The factual and legal bases for the action, including:
a. which type of criminal justice disqualification
(e.g., fugitive felon status) is at issue,
b. the name of the person whose alleged conduct has
resulted in the disqualification,
c. the date of the relevant warrant or conviction, as
well
as
any
other
identifying
information,
including but not limited to a warrant number,
case number, or National Crime Information
Center number,
d. the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or
the warrant was issued,
e. the name of a specific person or entity with
knowledge of the basis for the disqualification
95
whom the individual can contact for additional
information,
f. where applicable, a statement that, in accordance
with the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2015(k), defendant has determined that (i) the
disqualified
individual
is
fleeing
to
avoid
prosecution, arrest, or custody or confinement for
a felony, and (ii) law enforcement is actively
seeking the individual; and
3. the specific actions a disqualified individual can to
obtain resolution of the disqualification and full
access to benefits,
(b)
Automatically disqualifying plaintiffs and subclass
members from receiving food assistance benefits based
solely on an outstanding felony warrant, without
determining that the person is intentionally fleeing to
avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement after
conviction, and that law enforcement officials are
actively seeking the person; and
96
(6)
It is further ORDERED that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiffs
are directed to follow the requirements in E.D. Mich. L.R. 54.1 and
54.1.2 for obtaining costs and attorney’s fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 9, 2015
Ann Arbor, Michigan
/s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 9, 2015.
/s/Felicia M. Moses
FELICIA M. MOSES
Case Manager
97
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