Dykes v. Roberts, et al

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL, Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT DYKES,
Case Number: 2:13-CV-13812

Plaintiff,

HON. JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

v.
McROBERTS, ET AL.,
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
This is a pro se civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Michigan prisoner
Robert Dykes (Plaintiff), currently incarcerated at the Michigan Reformatory in Ionia,
Michigan, alleges that he was denied due process during the prison grievance process and
during prison misconduct proceedings. Plaintiff names seven defendants, all employees of
the Michigan Department of Corrections. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as
well as compensatory and punitive damages. For the reasons that follow, the complaint will
be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
I.

Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a
demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to

“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice pleading standard does not
require “detailed” factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more than
the

bare

assertion

of

legal

conclusions

or

“an

unadorned,

the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for
this action. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua
sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines
that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e©; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees that it finds
to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was deprived
of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be
construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
II.

Discussion
First, Plaintiff challenges a prison misconduct proceeding. A prisoner’s ability to

challenge a prison misconduct conviction depends on whether the conviction implicated any
liberty interest. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court prescribed certain
minimal procedural safeguards that must be followed before depriving a prisoner of
good-time credits on account of alleged misbehavior. This decision did not create a right to
due process that attaches to all prison disciplinary proceedings. The right to due process
arises only when the prisoner faces a loss of liberty. The loss of good-time credits may
implicate due process concerns where the good time credits create a right to a shorter
sentence rather than when they are simply one factor considered by the parole board.
Plaintiff does not allege the loss of good-time credits, nor would such an allegation
save Plaintiff’s claims. In Michigan, prisoners, like Plaintiff, who were convicted after April
1, 1987 the loss of disciplinary credits does not necessarily affect the duration of a prisoner’s
sentence because the parole board retains discretion to grant or deny parole. Thomas v. Eby,
481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007).
Even absent a due process interest in disciplinary credits, a prisoner may be able to
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raise a due-process challenge to prison misconduct convictions that result in a significant,
atypical deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). From the information
contained in the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff lost privileges for a single day. The Sixth
Circuit has found that loss of privileges does not present an “atypical and significant”
hardship implicating a protected liberty interest. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571
n. 19 (1974) (“We do not suggest, however, that the procedures required by today’s decision
for the deprivation of good time would also be required for the imposition of lesser penalties
such as the loss of privileges.”); Ingram v. Jewel, 94 F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004)
(fourteen-day loss of privileges did not impose an atypical, significant deprivation); Dixon
v. Morrison, 2013 WL 6512981, *7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2013) (fifteen-day loss of
privileges did not impose an atypical, significant deprivation implicating due process).
Plaintiff has not identified any significant and atypical deprivation arising from his
misconduct conviction. Because Plaintiff’s misconduct conviction did not result in either an
extension of the duration of his sentence or some other atypical hardship, his due-process
claim fails. See Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff also argues that his right to due process was violated during the prison
grievance process. It is well-settled that a Michigan prisoner does not have a due process
right to an inmate grievance procedure or the right to an effective procedure. See Walker v.
Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer,
80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing cases). Michigan law does not create a liberty
interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983);
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Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93–2411, 1994 WL 105907, *1 (6th Cir. March 28, 1994). Thus,
Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the defendants’ responses to his complaints or grievances fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Carlton v. Jondreau, 76 F. App’x
642, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) (prisoner failed to state a claim based upon defendant’s failure to
investigate grievance); Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 766-67 (E.D. Mich. 2009)
(Borman, J., adopting magistrate judge's report).
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that if Plaintiff elects to appeal this decision, he may
not proceed without prepayment of the fees and costs on appeal because an appeal would be
frivolous and could not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
s/John Corbett O’Meara
United States District Judge
Date: December 19, 2013

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties of record on this date,
December 19, 2013, using the ECF system and/or ordinary mail.

s/William Barkholz
Case Manager

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