Pina v. Chrysler Group LLC
Filing
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ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANA MARIA PIÑA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-10716
v.
Hon. John Corbett O’Meara
CHRYSLER GROUP, L.L.C.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss, which was filed on April
21, 2014, and which has been fully briefed. The court heard oral argument on
August 6, 2014, and took the matter under advisement. For the reasons explained
below, Defendant’s motion is granted.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff Ana Maria Piña has brought a product liability claim against
Defendant Chrysler Group, L.L.C. On January 14, 2012, Plaintiff was driving her
Chrysler Jeep Cherokee XJ near Valparasio, Indiana, when her vehicle was rearended. The fuel tank ruptured and the vehicle caught on fire, causing extensive
injuries to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s Jeep was first sold in Michigan in 1999. Plaintiff purchased the
car in Indiana in 2005. Plaintiff contends that the Jeep was defective as designed,
because the fuel tank was located in the vehicle’s crush zone. Plaintiff filed this
action on January 9, 2014.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Indiana statute of
repose. The Indiana Products Liability Act provides that a products liability action
must be commenced within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial
user or consumer. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-20-3-1. Plaintiff filed this action in 2014,
more than ten years after the Jeep was first sold in 1999.
The issue is whether Indiana law applies here to bar Plaintiff’s claim. In a
diversity action, this court applies Michigan choice-of-law principles. See
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 723 F.3d 690, 692 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). In tort actions,
Michigan courts recognize a presumption in favor of the law of the forum “unless a
‘rational reason’ to do otherwise exists.” Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv.,
Ltd., 454 Mich. 274, 286 (1997).
First, we must determine if any foreign state has an
interest in having its law applied. If no state has such an
interest, the presumption that Michigan law will apply
cannot be overcome. If a foreign state does have an
interest in having its law applied, we must then determine
if Michigan’s interest mandates that Michigan’s law be
applied despite the foreign interests.
Id.
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In cases similar to this one, Michigan courts have applied the law of the
place of the injury and the plaintiff’s residence, where the only connection to
Michigan was the headquarters of the auto manufacturer defendant. See Hall v.
General Motors Corp., 229 Mich. App. 580, 582 (1998) (finding North Carolina
statute of repose barred plaintiff’s claim where he lived and worked in North
Carolina at the time of the accident, which occurred in North Carolina); Farrell v.
Ford Motor Co., 199 Mich. App. 81, 93 (1993) (finding North Carolina statute of
repose barred the plaintiff’s claim based on an allegedly defective vehicle where
the accident occurred in North Carolina and the plaintiff was a resident of North
Carolina); Hampshire v. Ford Motor Co., 155 Mich. App. 143, 147 (1986)
(applying California law to products liability claim where accident occurred in
California and injured a California resident).
Following Hall, Farrell, and Hampshire in an automobile products liability
action, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Tennessee’s interest in applying its law
outweighed Michigan’s interest. Standard Fire, 723 F.3d at 694-99. In Standard
Fire, the plaintiff insurance companies filed a products liability action against Ford
Motor Company in Michigan as subrogees of their insured, John Lombard.
Lombard is a Tennessee resident whose personal property and Tennessee home
were damaged when his 1997 Lincoln Town Car caught fire in his driveway in
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2007. The car was licensed, registered, and insured in Tennessee. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that Tennessee’s interest in seeing its
law applied outweighed Michigan’s, where Michigan’s interest was limited to
being the site of Ford’s headquarters.
Following the court’s analysis in Standard Fire, the court finds that Indiana
has a greater interest than Michigan in applying its law to this case. Plaintiff is a
resident of Indiana, purchased and registered her Jeep in Indiana, and was injured
in an accident in Indiana. The Michigan connections are that the Jeep was first
sold in Michigan and that Defendant’s headquarters are in Michigan. Under
similar facts, Michigan courts have found that the presumption in favor of
Michigan law was overcome. See Hall, Farrell, Hampshire, supra.
Plaintiff argues that the “wrong” here actually occurred in Michigan, where
the Jeep was designed and first placed into the stream of commerce. This
argument was rejected by the Standard Fire court, which noted: “The problem with
this argument is that it finds no support in Michigan law.” Standard Fire, 723 F.3d
at 698. Plaintiff also notes the importance of regulating the automotive industry in
Michigan. Although Michigan does have an interest in regulating the automotive
industry, this factor has not been found to mandate the application of Michigan law
in similar automotive products liability cases. See id. at 699.
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Plaintiff also argues that Michigan’s borrowing statute does not allow for the
“borrowing” of another state’s statute of repose. Michigan’s borrowing statute,
which concerns the borrowing of statutes of limitations, is silent with respect to
statutes of repose. See M.C.L. 600.5861. This silence, however, has not been
interpreted to preclude the application of another state’s statute of repose under
Michigan’s choice-of-law rules. See Hall, 229 Mich. App. at 592 (declining to
address argument regarding borrowing statute where court found North Carolina’s
statute of repose applied under choice-of-law analysis).
Consistent with the analysis in Standard Fire, the court finds that Indiana’s
interest in applying its law outweighs Michigan’s. Indiana’s statute of repose
applies to bar Plaintiff’s products liability claim.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED.
s/John Corbett O’Meara
United States District Judge
Date: August 19, 2014
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record on this date, August 19, 2014, using the ECF system.
s/William Barkholz
Case Manager
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