Greer et al v. CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, MI et al

Filing 25

ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' 12(C) 17 Motion and Granting Plaintiffs' 22 Motion For Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (KWin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Haskell G. Greer, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 15cv12444

v.

Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge

City of Highland Park, et al.,
Mag. Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ 12(C) MOTION [17] AND GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT [22]
On July 1, 2016, oral argument was heard on defendants’ motion
under Rule 12(c) to grant summary disposition on all claims in this
lawsuit.

(Dkt. 17.)

For reasons stated on the record, defendants’

motion was granted in part and denied in part without prejudice to
plaintiffs’ having leave to move to file a second amended complaint.
Now before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion to file a second amended
complaint (Dkt. 22) and defendants’ opposition.

(Dkt. 24.)

reasons provided below, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.

For the

I.

Background
Plaintiffs are Haskell and Kim Greer, their two adult daughters

Ashley and Catera Greer, their 7-year-old daughter Kailaa Greer, and
their adult nephew Alexander Lawrence. Their lawsuit arises from an
incident that occurred in the early morning hours of October 30, 2014,
when defendants, the Chief and officers of the Highland Park Police
Department, allegedly entered, searched, and seized property from
plaintiffs’ home in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They
also allege that plaintiff Lawrence was falsely arrested during the
search.

The proposed amended complaint alleges violations of the

Fourth Amendment by the individual defendants, municipal liability for
the same Fourth Amendment violations through Chief Coney’s alleged
authorization of the unlawful search and the city’s inadequate training
of its officers, and a state-law claim of false imprisonment against the
as-yet-unnamed officer or officers who handcuffed Lawrence. (Dkt. 22-2
at 11-16.)
Plaintiffs assert that defendants were in “SWAT” gear or
otherwise masked and plain-clothed when they entered the Greer
family home, making identification of individual officers and what
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specific actions each defendant may have taken during the search
difficult to plead with specificity.

(Dkt. 22 at 2-3, 13.)

Discovery,

including depositions of the officers involved, was ongoing at the time
plaintiffs filed their current motion for leave to amend; therefore,
plaintiffs suggest that they will be able to provide more specificity
regarding individual officers’ actions when discovery is complete. (Id. at
13.)
II.

Analysis
Leave to amend a complaint is to be granted “freely . . . when

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The animating principle of
Rule 15 is that cases “should be tried on their merits rather than the
technicalities of pleadings.”

Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557,

559 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir.
1982)).
A motion to amend will be denied if it “is brought in bad faith, for
dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing
party, or would be futile.” Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir.
1995).

Prejudice to the opposing party is an essential consideration in

evaluating a motion for leave to amend. Id. at 562 (stating that “delay
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alone is not a sufficient reason for denying leave,” but rather prejudice
from that delay must be shown) (citing Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n
v. Inland Marine Products Corp., 542 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1976);
Beeck v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1977); Buder v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir.
1981)).

Prejudice typically arises when a defendant has already

expended time, effort, and expense to litigate a set of claims and
prevailed in that effort. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 489
F.2d 968, 971 (6th Cir. 1973). A proposed amendment to a complaint is
futile and must be denied if the amendment could not survive a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000).
Here, there is no bad faith, dilatory purpose, or prejudice to
defendants in plaintiffs’ motion. It is reasonable in circumstances such
as this that plaintiffs will be able to discover readily the names of each
officer who was on site during the search of their home, but not be able
to discern which officer was responsible for which specific action until
depositions have been taken and a precise account of each individual’s
activity can be developed. Neither have defendants asserted that they
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would be prejudiced through an amendment at this stage of the
litigation.
Defendants instead argue that this motion should be denied as
futile, because plaintiffs’ proposed amendments do not satisfy the
pleading standards for any of their claims. (Dkt. 24.) They first claim
that the failure to attribute the alleged misconduct to specific
defendants does not set forth plausibly pleaded facts.

(Id. at 8-9.)

Second, they argue that plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish the
requisite elements for municipal liability. (Id. at 9). Finally, they state
that the false-imprisonment claim cannot be brought against a
municipality or the Chief of Police. (Id.)
Defendants’

oppositions

are

unavailing.

First,

plaintiffs’

allegations regarding the conduct of the individual officers are
sufficiently pleaded, given that they are alleged to have performed the
search of the home in SWAT gear and clothing that hid their identifying
features. The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) does not a plaintiff
to already know all the facts relevant to his claim in order to file his
complaint.

Surely, when the defendants allegedly shielded their

identity and the only way to discern who was responsible for which
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conduct is to depose the officers, plaintiffs cannot be penalized for not
knowing prior to the depositions who among the group of defendants did
what.
Second, plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint adequately pleads
the claim of municipal liability under Monell. Monell v. Dep’t of Social
Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Their amended complaint alleges that the
Chief of Police personally participated in the alleged raid of the Greer
home, and that in doing so he ordered or ratified an unlawful search.
(Dkt. 22-2 at 13-14.) If true, this would factor heavily in the jury’s
consideration of municipal liability. They also allege that the City of
Highland Park provides only training at the police academy for cadets
on obtaining and serving search warrants, despite its awareness that
its officers consistently execute search warrants in ways that are
constitutionally infirm. (Id. at 14.) These facts are sufficient to satisfy
the Monell elements for municipal liability.

See, e.g., Burgess v.

Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013).
Finally, while some of the defendants—notably the Chief of
Police—may have a governmental immunity defense to plaintiffs’ claim
that Lawrence was subjected to false imprisonment, it would not be
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prudent to deny leave to amend this portion of the complaint at this
time. It is proper to deny leave to amend where the amendment would
be futile because the amended complaint could not overcome an
affirmative defense such as immunity.

See, e.g., Budsgunshop.com.

LLC v. Sec. Safe Outlet, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-00390-KSF, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72575, at *27-28 (E.D. Ky. May 23, 2012) (citing inter alia
Riverview Health Inst. LLC, 601 F.3d 505, 523 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Defendants argue that Police Chief Coney and the City of Highland
Park are immune from liability for the tort of false imprisonment. (Dkt.
24 at 9 (citing MCL § 691.1407(5)).) This may very well be the case, but
plaintiffs have only asserted this claim against an individual officer or
officers who handcuffed Lawrence (Dkt. 22-2 at 15), and as noted above,
at this time they have not yet discovered through depositions which
officers were responsible for this conduct.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons provided above, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a

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second amended complaint is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 10, 2016
Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on August 10, 2016.
s/Kelly Winslow for
FELICIA M. MOSES
Case Manager

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