Taylor et al v. DLI Properties, L.L.C, d/b/a FORD FIELD et al

Filing 65

OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendants' 57 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff Melissa Taylor's Complaint. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (SBur)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Melissa Taylor and Douglas St.
Pierre,
Case No. 15-13777
Plaintiffs,
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge

v.
DLI Properties, LLC, d/b/a Ford
Field, S.A.F.E. Management, LLC,
Donna Farmer; and Sabrina
Wiggins,

Mag. Judge David R. Grand

Defendants.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [57] AGAINST PLAINTIFF MELISSA TAYLOR
Plaintiffs Taylor and Douglas St. Pierre, Taylor’s husband, brought
this personal injury action based on a confrontation between themselves
and Farmer and Wiggins, employees of S.A.F.E. Management, at DLI
Properties’ Ford Field in Detroit, Michigan. Plaintiffs raised a variety of
tort claims against defendants, as well as several disability claims. (Dkt.
1.) Defendants DLI Properties, LLC, S.A.F.E. Management, LLC, Donna
Farmer, and Sabrina Wiggins filed a motion to dismiss all of plaintiff

Melissa Taylor’s claims. (Dkt. 57.) In their motion to dismiss, defendants
argue that Taylor is judicially estopped from raising these claims because
she failed to disclose this lawsuit in her Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition.
(Id. at 2-5.)
I.

Background
As set forth previously in the Court’s amended partial summary

judgment opinion and order (Dkt. 34), plaintiffs Melissa Taylor and her
then-fiancé Douglas St. Pierre attended a football game at Ford Field
Stadium in Detroit, Michigan on October 27, 2013. Defendant DLI
Properties, LLC, since dismissed (Dkt. 41 at 2), owns the property and
contracted with defendant S.A.F.E. Management, LLC to provide guest
services and security. S.A.F.E. Management employed defendants Donna
Farmer and Sabrina Wiggins as Courtesy Team members to assist
patrons and monitor assigned areas at Ford Field that day.
A scuffle unfolded between plaintiffs and Farmer and Wiggins
during the game. Plaintiffs assert that Farmer and Wiggins prevented
them from using a family restroom together—which they sought to do
because St. Pierre had open heart surgery a few weeks before—and used
physical force to do so. (Dkt. 34 at 2-3.) Farmer and Wiggins counter that
2

that it was actually Taylor who became physically aggressive when
Farmer told her that she could not enter the restroom with St. Pierre.
(Id. at 3.) They also state that they did not know of St. Pierre’s medical
condition. (Id.) Plaintiffs claim that defendants caused personal injuries,
and this suit ensued.
Over the course of litigation, the parties and claims have changed.
Plaintiffs initially alleged several theories of tort liability against
defendants, under both intentional torts and negligence, as well as
violations of the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act
(“PWDCRA”) and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Dkt.
1; Dkt. 29 at 24.) After granting and denying in part defendants’ motion
for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment (Dkts. 34, 39, 41), these claims remained for trial: Taylor’s
assault and battery claim against Farmer and Wiggins; plaintiffs’
negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims against S.A.F.E.
Management; and St. Pierre’s PWDCRA claims against Farmer and
S.A.F.E. Management. (Dkt. 41 at 2.)
While discovery was underway in this case, Taylor filed a Voluntary
Petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy on October 5, 2016 in the United
3

States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio (Dkt. 57-2 at
2)—less than a year after she filed her complaint in this case. This was
Taylor’s second bankruptcy; the first she filed in 2010, also in the
Northern District of Ohio. (Dkt. 57-3.)
The Petition required several affirmations and disclosures. In her
Official Form 101, the first form of the Petition, Taylor swore under
“penalty of perjury that the information provided [in the petition] is true
and correct.” (Dkt. 57-3 at 7.) In the Schedule A/B, question thirty-three
asked whether Taylor had any “[c]laims against third parties, whether or
not you have filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment. Examples:
Accidents . . . or rights to sue.” (Id. at 15.) She answered “No.” (Id.) Taylor
had to affirm again under penalty of perjury that her schedules were
accurate. (Id. at 43.) She did so by signing the document. The Statement
of Financial Affairs asked in question nine: “Within 1 year before you
filed for bankruptcy, were you a party in any lawsuit, court action, or
administrative proceeding? List all such matters, including personal
injury cases . . . .” (Id. at 46.) Taylor answered “Yes” and listed some cases,
but did not list any claims arising from this case. (Id.) Taylor concluded
her Statement again by signing under oath that her answers were true
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and correct. (Id. at 49-50.) She did, however, disclose that she was
seeking discharge of some of her medical debts arising from this case
elsewhere in the Petition in another required schedule. (Id. at 27, 30-34.)
After Taylor’s Petition was filed, this case and the bankruptcy
proceedings went forward. A meeting of creditors was held on November
23, 2016. (Dkt. 57-6 at 2-4.) Taylor’s trustee certified her bankruptcy
estate, verified the meeting of creditors was held, and requested to be
discharged three days later. (Id. at 3-4.) Six days after that, Taylor was
deposed in this case. (Dkt. 21-2 at 1.) In late January 2017, about two
months after the meeting of creditors and Taylor’s deposition, the
bankruptcy court issued an “Order of Discharge” and a “Final Decree.”
(Dkt. 57-6 at 5.)
On the eve of trial in this case, defendants filed an “Emergency
Motion to Adjourn Trial” (Dkt. 56) and this motion to dismiss Taylor’s
remaining claims against all defendants. (Dkt. 57.) Defendants’ counsel
had independently discovered Taylor’s Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition a
little over a week before trial was set to begin. (Dkt. 56.) Defendants
argue that Taylor is judicially estopped from asserting her claims here

5

because she failed to include them in her Petition, specifically in her
Schedule A/B and State of Financial Affairs. (Id. at 2-3; Dkt. 57 at 2-5.)
Taylor subsequently filed a motion to reopen her bankruptcy case,
which the bankruptcy court granted. That court also reappointed her
bankruptcy trustee on April 16, 2018. (Dkt. 63-1.) Two days later, she
amended her Schedule A/B, listing this claim as worth $75,000. (Dkt. 64.)
II.

Legal Standard
Because defendants filed their motion to dismiss after they

answered plaintiffs’ complaint, it must be construed as a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(c). “A Rule 12(c)
motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted is nearly identical to that employed under a
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.” Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir.
2006) (citing EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th
Cir. 2001)). When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
Court
must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accept all of the complaint's factual allegations as
true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

6

him to relief . . . [but the district court] is not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.
Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., 276 F. App’x 473, 475 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted). A plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
When ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion
to dismiss, courts “primarily consider[ ] the allegations in the complaint,
although matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record
of the case,” and attachments that are “referred to in the plaintiff’s
complaint and are central to her claim” are included in the complaint. See
Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations omitted). Items of public record are subject to judicial notice
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.
v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). This includes
bankruptcy proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(2); see, e.g., Eubanks v.
CBSK Fin. Grp., Inc., 385 F.3d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 2004).
Although the Court received and read Taylor’s affidavit (Dkt. 62),
the Court declines to consider it, and so this motion is not converted to a
7

motion for summary judgment. See Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand
Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 2008); In re Baker, 51 F. A’ppx 522,
530 n.3 (6th Cir. 2002). Even if defendants’ motion were converted to a
motion for summary judgment, however, the affidavit would have no
effect because it provides no additional facts that create a genuine issue
of material fact. In her affidavit, Taylor affirms that she subjectively
misunderstood the questions in her Petition and that her bankruptcy
trustee plans to pursue this claim (Dkt. 62), supporting her argument
that the trustee is the real party in interest and thus application of
judicial estoppel is inappropriate. (Dkt. 61 at 24-25.) As set forth below,
a subjective misunderstanding is not “mistake or inadvertence” within
the meaning of Sixth Circuit precedent on judicial estoppel. See infra
Section III.b.iv. And only when a plaintiff actually substitutes a trustee
as the real party in interest do courts decline to apply judicial estoppel.
See, e.g., Stevenson v. Haddad, 529 F. App’x 522, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2013);
Stephenson v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 265, 270 (6th Cir. 2012); Brooks v. Cent.
Irrigation Supply, Inc., No. 10-cv-13717, 2012 WL 6579582, at *5-6 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 17, 2012).
III. Analysis
8

“The doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘generally prevents a party from
prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a
contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.’” White v. Wyndham
Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 476 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)). It is “an equitable
doctrine meant to preserve the integrity of the courts by preventing a
party from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship,
achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite to suit an
exigency of the moment.” Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Grp., Inc., 385 F.3d 894,
897 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d
1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990)). But judicial estoppel “should be applied with
caution to ‘avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court,
because the doctrine precludes a contrary position without examining the
truth of either statement.’” Id. (same).
Applying judicial estoppel is appropriate when a plaintiff has filed
for bankruptcy if a court finds that: (1) the debtor plaintiff “assert[ed] a
position that is contrary to one that the [plaintiff] has asserted under
oath in a [bankruptcy] proceeding . . . [,] (2) the [bankruptcy] court
adopted the contrary position either as a preliminary matter or as part
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of a final disposition,” and (3) the plaintiff’s failure to disclose was not
due to “mistake or inadvertence.” White, 617 F.3d at 476 (quoting
Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 776 (6th Cir. 2002)). A court considers
the following factors to evaluate whether a debtor plaintiff’s failure to
disclose a possible or actual lawsuit in a bankruptcy proceeding was the
result of a mistake or inadvertence: (a) “the debtor lack[ed] knowledge of
the factual basis of the undisclosed claims,” (b) “the debtor has no motive
for concealment,” and (c) there was an absence of bad faith. Id. at 476-77
(same).
In this case, the critical question centers on the third prong of the
judicial estoppel test, which is whether Taylor’s failure to disclose was
due to mistake or inadvertence. The first and second prongs of the test
are plainly resolved by Sixth Circuit precedent, as are the first two
factors of the third prong. This leaves only one factor in question under
mistake or inadvertence: whether Taylor acted absent bad faith.
a. Judicial Estoppel Inquiries Plainly Resolved by Precedent
The first two prongs of the judicial estoppel test, as well as the first
two factors of the third prong are settled by precedent. Under the first
prong, the documents from Taylor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings,
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which this Court judicially notices, unquestionably show that Taylor
asserted a contrary position to the one asserted in this case. Under the
second prong, the documents also reveal that the bankruptcy court
adopted this position in a final judgment. And under the third prong,
Taylor knew of the factual basis of her claims here, and she had motive
to conceal these claims.
The first prong is satisfied because Taylor undoubtedly asserted a
position in her Petition, that her lawsuit does not exist, contrary to the
one here—clearly, that her lawsuit exists. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Malloy,
700 F.3d 265, 274 (6th Cir. 2012); White, 617 F.3d at 479. Taylor was
explicitly obligated by the questions in the Petition to list her claim and
had a duty to disclose it in her Schedule A/B and Statement of Financial
Affairs under 11. U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B), which she did not do. By failing
to disclose the claim, she took the position that the claim did not exist.
See, e.g., White, 617 F.3d at 479 (citing § 521(a)(1)). Taylor offers no
competing authority on this point, and her argument that judicial
estoppel is inappropriate because she only took a partially contrary
position—not a complete one—by listing some medical debts, but not all,

11

related to her injuries from the events in this case, is contrary to binding
precedent and is unpersuasive.
The second prong is also met because it is apparent that the
bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Ohio adopted Taylor’s
position that her claim did not exist in its final disposition of her
bankruptcy. See Stephenson, 700F.3d at 274 (“[W]hen the bankruptcy
court granted [plaintiff’s] discharge . . . it acted in reliance on the
representations

he

made

concerning

his

assets—including

the

representation that this lawsuit did not exist.”); cf. White, 617 F.3d at 479
(holding the bankruptcy court adopted plaintiff’s contrary position when
it confirmed plaintiff’s Chapter 13 plan, the final disposition of a Chapter
13 bankruptcy case); Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 F. App’x 420, 425
(6th Cir. 2005) (same); Browning, 283 F.3d at 769 (holding the
bankruptcy court adopted plaintiff’s contrary position when it confirmed
plaintiff’s Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, the final disposition of a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case).
Taylor puts forth a novel argument that the second prong is not met
because she reopened her bankruptcy case after this motion was filed,
meaning that the bankruptcy court did not actually adopt her position in
12

its final decree. (Dkt. 61 at 16.) However, Taylor provides no support for
this position. This is most likely due to the fact that she places this
consideration under the wrong prong of the judicial estoppel test.
Generally, courts look at a motion to reopen a bankruptcy case as an
effort to advise the bankruptcy court of the omission to determine
whether there was a lack of bad faith under the mistake or inadvertence
prong, the third prong of the judicial estoppel test. E.g., White, 617 F.3d
at 481; Williams v. Saxon Mortg. Servs. Inc., No. 13-10817, 2014 WL
765055, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing Maxwell v. MGM Grand
Detroit, LLC, No. 03-73134, 2007 WL 2050795 (E.D. Mich. July 16,
2007)); see infra Section III.b.i. This is what Taylor herself does when she
cites Knight v. Quicken Loans, No. 10-CV-14147, Dkt. 17 at 7 (E.D. Mich.
April 21, 2011). (Dkt. 61 at 23-24.)
Furthermore, allowing Taylor to evade judicial estoppel by pointing
only to her motion to reopen her bankruptcy case would be an end-run
around White, which held that post facto efforts to advise a bankruptcy
court of an omission by filing a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case in
order to amend filings is insufficient alone to prevent the application of
judicial estoppel under the third prong. 617 F.3d at 481; see infra Section
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III.b.i. Permitting Taylor to do so would only undermine the purpose of
judicial estoppel by increasing gamesmanship and the need for accurate
disclosures in bankruptcy proceedings. See White, 617 F.3d at 480-81.
There is no support for this Court to examine Taylor’s motion to reopen
her bankruptcy case after final judgment under both the second prong
and third prong of the test. Whether a judgment depended on plaintiff’s
contradictory position is determined when the judgment was made.
Next, under the third prong, mistake or inadvertence, Taylor
undeniably had knowledge of the factual basis of her undisclosed claims
at the time of her Petition because this litigation was pending. See White,
617 F.3d at 479; Stephenson, 700 F.3d at 274. This litigation was not out
of sight and out of mind; in between the meeting of creditors and the final
bankruptcy decree, Taylor was deposed in this case. She even included
some of her debts from the medical bills arising from the events
underlying this case in her bankruptcy schedules. Taylor not only knew
of the factual basis of her claims, but also that her claims had value. See
Bone v. Taco Bell of America, LLC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 872, 882 (E.D. Tenn.
2013) (holding a plaintiff knew of the factual basis of her claim because
she claimed “medical debt related to her injury”).
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Finally, Taylor certainly had a motive for concealment. The Sixth
Circuit has held that where a plaintiff filed a lawsuit prior to filing her
Petition, the plaintiff had “a motive for concealment [because] if the [ ]
claim became a part of her bankruptcy estate, then the proceeds from it
could go towards paying [plaintiff’s] creditors, rather than simply to
paying [plaintiff].” White, 617 F.3d at 479 (citing Lewis, 141 F. App’x at
426); see also Stephenson, 700 F.3d at 274. In fact, “[i]t is always in a
Chapter 13 [Bankruptcy] petitioner’s interest to minimize income
assets.” Lewis, F. App’x at 426. This is presumably more so for Chapter 7
petitioners because all of their debts are discharged. See Bone, 956 F.
Supp. 2d. at 883 (citing Stephenson, 700 F.3d at 274).
b. Absence of Bad Faith
An absence of bad faith, the final factor courts consider under
mistake or inadvertence, can prevent a court from applying judicial
estoppel. See White, 617 F.3d at 476-77 (discussing Eubanks, 385 F.3d at
895, 898-99). A plaintiff can demonstrate an absence of bad faith “by
showing her attempts to correct her initial omission,” including the
extent, effectiveness and timing of such efforts. Id. at 480. Courts
examine a plaintiff’s attempts to notify the bankruptcy court of omissions
15

because “the bankruptcy system depends on accurate and timely
disclosures.” Id. Further, the timing of efforts to advise a bankruptcy
court can make a difference in this context because the goal is to prevent
gamesmanship. Id. “Other factors,” such as the inclusion of other
lawsuits, also play into this inquiry. Id. at 482.
Taylor argues that she took swift measures to re-open her
bankruptcy case and amend her schedule when defendants filed their
motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 61 at 12-13, 24.) But when a plaintiff makes
efforts to advise the bankruptcy court of an undisclosed claim after a
dispositive motion has been filed against her alleging judicial estoppel,
more is required. The extent, timing, and effectiveness of her efforts to
advise the bankruptcy court of this lawsuit, as well as the fact that Taylor
listed other lawsuits in her Petition and that this was her second
bankruptcy, demonstrate there are no facts showing she failed to disclose
this lawsuit absent bad faith.
i. Extent and Timing of Efforts to Advise Bankruptcy
Court
A plaintiff can successfully show an absence of bad faith when a
plaintiff goes to a great extent by making “numerous attempts . . . [before
a motion from defendant] to advise the [bankruptcy] court and the
16

Trustee of their claim” through “correspondence, motions, and status
conference requests,” and amendments to the bankruptcy petition.
Eubanks, 385 F.3d at 897-99. In other words, a plaintiff’s “constant
affirmative actions” before a defendant files a motion can convince a court
that the plaintiff asserted sufficient factual matter indicating a lack of
bad faith in response to a motion to dismiss. Id. at 899 n.3.
In contrast, a lack of any effort and post facto efforts alone are
insufficient to show the failure to disclose was without bad faith. In
Lewis, making no efforts to advise the bankruptcy court or trustee of a
possible claim was not enough to show an absence of bad faith. 141 F.
App’x at 427. Efforts to advise the bankruptcy court after a motion raising
a judicial estoppel issue has been filed are also insufficient. In White, the
court determined that considering such an amendment on its own as
evidence of good faith would play into the exact evils judicial estoppel
aims to prevent—gamesmanship. 617 F.3d at 481.
In terms of extent and timing, Taylor’s efforts present a very
different picture than that in Eubanks. The Eubanks plaintiff seized
upon multiple opportunities to advise the bankruptcy court of her
potential civil lawsuit at different points before the defendants filed a
17

motion to dismiss. Taylor did no such thing. She only sought to re-open
her bankruptcy case and amend her petition after the defendants in this
case filed their motion to dismiss, which is exactly what the plaintiff in
White did. Taylor makes no factual assertions that she attempted to
notify her trustee or the bankruptcy court aside from her motion to
reopen her bankruptcy case to amend her Petition. Though Taylor argues
that she made efforts to correct her failure to disclose “as soon as she was
made aware of the omission” (Dkt. 61 at 23), her actions are not the
“constant affirmative actions” of the Eubanks plaintiff, 385 F.3d at 899
n.3, but rather are simply consistent with the plaintiff’s insufficient
efforts in White.
Taylor points to Finney v. Free Enterprise System, Inc., No. 3:08CV-383-S, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33858 (W.D. Ky. March 29, 2011), and
Knight v. Quicken Loans, No. 10-CV-14147, Dkt. 17, (E.D. Mich. April 21,
2011), to show that acting swiftly to amend and file a motion to reopen
bankruptcy cases are sufficient to show an absence of bad faith (Dkt. 61
at 24), but these cases are not controlling. Moreover, they point to a
conclusion that Taylor acted in bad faith. In Finney, where the plaintiff
quickly amended his bankruptcy petition upon learning of his failure to
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disclose his other lawsuit, there were no other facts indicating bad faith,
such as an inaccurate amendment to bankruptcy filings or a disclosure of
other lawsuits. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33858, at *7-8; see infra Section
III.b.iii. And the timing of Taylor’s bankruptcy and the undisclosed
lawsuit is different than in Knight. There, the plaintiff’s bankruptcy had
concluded before she brought her civil claim, and the filing of the claim
was “triggered” by a meeting with her attorney, rather than the
conclusion of her bankruptcy. No. 10-CV-14147, Dkt. 17 at 6-8. This
mitigated the fact that the Knight plaintiff only reopened her case when
she became aware of the discrepancy as a result of the defendant’s
motion. See id. This is not the case here, where Taylor filed this case
before she filed her Petition.
Taylor also attempts to distinguish her case from Spohn v. Van
Dyke Public Schools, 296 Mich. App. 470, 487 (2012), and Lisiecki v. Bank
of America, N.A., No. 08-12380, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42868, at *11,
(E.D. Mich. May 19, 2009), where the plaintiffs were found to have acted
in bad faith. Taylor argues that unlike those plaintiffs, she took at least
one step to notify the bankruptcy court and did not actively deny her duty
to disclose after this motion was filed. (Dkt. 61 at 20.) Again, these cases
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are not controlling, and regardless, these cases are consistent with
finding Taylor acted in bad faith. Taylor reopened her bankruptcy case
to file an amendment, which is more than the plaintiffs did in Lewis,
Spohn, and Lisiecki. But all Taylor accomplishes is showing that she
acted in less bad faith than those plaintiffs, not that she acted without
bad faith. Contrary to Taylor’s representations, efforts to reopen and
amend after a motion to dismiss are not enough to indicate a lack of bad
faith without other facts.
ii. Effectiveness of Efforts to Advise Bankruptcy Court
Taylor’s efforts to advise the bankruptcy court of her claims in this
case were also ineffective. An amendment that does not reflect reflect the
estimated value of the claim demonstrates the ineffectiveness of such an
amendment, further cutting against a finding of good faith. Id. at 482.
Like the plaintiff in White, even after this motion to dismiss was filed,
Taylor still failed to make accurate amendments to her bankruptcy
filings. Taylor did not amend her Property Schedule A/B so that it
accurately reflected the value of her claims in this Court. She lists the
value of her claims in her amended schedule as $75,000 (Dkt. 64-1 at 15),
though she alleges at least $194,912.09 in medical expenses alone in this
20

civil action. (Dkt. 61 at 5.) There is also no indication that Taylor
amended her Financial Statement where she lists possible legal actions.
(See Dkt. 57-3 at 46, 50.)
iii. Other Factors
Several other factors cut against a finding of good faith. First,
Taylor listed other lawsuits in her Statement of Financial Affairs, as did
the plaintiff in White. Taylor argues that she only understood the Petition
to require listing lawsuits in which she owed money, but this only
strengthens the conclusion here that the court in White reached—that
inclusion of other lawsuits was evidence of a self-serving, ad hoc
interpretation of the questions in the Petition. See 617 F.3d at 482-83.
Only listing lawsuits where Taylor owed debts, which stood to be
discharged at the conclusion of her bankruptcy, is not a mark of good
faith. Second, this is not Taylor’s first bankruptcy, but her second. No
reasonable person could believe that she lacked any understanding that
the bankruptcy process required disclosure of assets, including valuable
lawsuits.
Construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Taylor and
accepting all of her factual allegations as true, she cannot prove any facts
21

that would permit her to avoid this Court’s application of judicial
estoppel.
iv. Subjective reasonable mistake defense
Taylor relies on a blanket defense that she subjectively
misunderstood the questions on her Schedule A/B and Statement of
Financial Affairs, and that her misunderstanding was reasonable given
the context and language of the Petition. (Dkt. 61 at 16-18.) This
argument lacks merit. Taylor does not cite to a single case where a court
has found that a subjective misunderstanding of law prevents the
application of judicial estoppel. Spohn, which Taylor cites, finds that in
cases such as this, “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” 29 Mich. App at
487-88 (quoting Riddle v. Chase Home Fin., No. 09-11182, 2012 WL
3504020, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2010)). “Mistake or inadvertence” is
expressly discussed in White, and there is no indication that a subjective
misunderstanding is the sort of mistake or inadvertence that should
prevent the application of judicial estoppel. If anything, subjective
mistakes of law without anything more would lead to the sort of
gamesmanship that judicial estoppel seeks to prevent.
IV.

Conclusion
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As set forth above, defendants’ motion, construed as a motion for
judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim, is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Melissa Taylor’s remaining claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice. The only remaining claim in this case is St. Pierre’s
PWDCRA claim against S.A.F.E. Management, LLC and Farmer.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 28, 2018
Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on September 28, 2018.
s/Shawna Burns
SHAWNA BURNS
Case Manager

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