Anderson v. Aramark Facility Service LLC et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER Granting the Aramark Defendants' 45 Motion to Dismiss, Denying as Moot Beaugard and Bruton's 36 Motion to Dismiss, Denying Plaintiff's 53 Motions to Amend the Complaint and to Compel Discovery 61 , Vacating the Entry of Default 68 Against General Motors Flint Assembly, and Dismissing this Case in Part with and in Part Without Prejudice - Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (FMos)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
James H Anderson,
Case No. 16-cv-12398
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge
Aramark Facility Services LLC, et
Mag. Judge R. Steven Whalen
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE ARAMARK
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS , DENYING AS MOOT
BEAUGARD AND BRUTON’S MOTION TO DISMISS ,
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO AMEND THE
COMPLAINT  AND TO COMPEL DISCOVERY ,
VACATING THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST GENERAL
MOTORS FLINT ASSEMBLY , AND DISMISSING THIS
CASE IN PART WITH AND IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE
This is an employment case. Plaintiff James H. Anderson alleges
that defendants improperly reprimanded and terminated him from his
Pending are defendants Tony Beaugard and Debra M.
Bruton’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 36), defendants Aramark Facility
Services, LLC, Tony Beaugard, Jason A. Bowe, Debra M. Bruton, Diana
Curtis, and Glenn Fackler’s (“the Aramark defendants”) motion to
dismiss (Dkt. 45), plaintiff’s fourth motion to amend his complaint (Dkt.
53), and plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. (Dkt. 61.)
The Court determines that oral argument is not required
pursuant to E.D. Mich. Local R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons set forth
below, the Aramark defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, Beaugard
and Bruton’s separate motion to dismiss is denied as moot, plaintiff’s
motions to amend his complaint and compel discovery are denied, and
this case is dismissed.
Plaintiff initially filed suit in Genesee County Circuit Court on
March 15, 2016.
(Dkt. 1 at 4.)
Defendants UAW Local 598, Tony
Beaugard, and Debra M. Bruton timely removed the complaint on June
24, 2016. (Dkts. 1, 2.) The Aramark defendants filed a notice of consent
to the removal on June 29, 2016. (Dkt. 4.) The Aramark defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on June 30, 2016. (Dkt. 8.) On July 11, 2016,
plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case back to state court. (Dkt.
11.) Plaintiff then filed his first motion seeking leave to amend his
complaint on July 26, 2016. (Dkt. 18.) On September 6, 2016, plaintiff
moved to voluntarily dismiss Count XIII of his complaint, alleging
breach of employment contract against UAW Local 598 and Aramark
Facility Services. (Dkt. 23.) On September 21, 2016, the Court denied
plaintiff’s motions to remand and to amend the complaint, and granted
the motion to dismiss Count XIII. (Dkt. 24.)
On October 3, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss Count IX of
his complaint, alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation
against UAW Local 598. (Dkt. 25.) Plaintiff also filed a second motion
to amend his complaint that same day, as well another motion to
remand the case to state court. (Dkts. 26-28, 30.)
On October 28, Beaugard and Bruton filed a motion to dismiss the
claims against them. (Dkt. 36.) On November 7, 2016, Beaugard and
Bruton withdrew part of their motion to dismiss claiming that they had
not been served, as Aramark Facilities Services had already accepted
service on their behalf. (Dkt. 40.) On November 10, 2016, the Court
granted plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, denied his second
motion to remand, and denied his motion to dismiss Count IX as moot,
because the amended complaint already disposed of the count. (Dkt.
On November 25, 2016, the Aramark defendants filed a renewed
motion to dismiss the complaint, including the claims against Beaugard
and Bruton. (Dkt. 45.) On December 8, 2016, plaintiff filed his third
motion for leave to amend his complaint (Dkts. 49-51), and on December
12, 2016, he filed a fourth motion for leave to amend with corrections to
the complaint attached to the third motion. (Dkts. 53-54.)
The Aramark defendants responded to plaintiff’s motion for leave
to amend on December 22, 2016. (Dkt. 56.) Plaintiff responded to the
Aramark defendants’ motion to dismiss and replied to the response to
the motion for leave to amend on January 6, 2017. (Dkt. 57.) Plaintiff
filed a second response to the motion to dismiss on February 6, 2017.
That response was untimely and a second response to a
motion to dismiss is not permitted, therefore the Court will not consider
On March 9, 2017, the Court denied the still-pending first motion
to dismiss by the Aramark defendants and plaintiff’s third motion to
amend. (Dkt. 60.) On March 13, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion to compel
discovery. (Dkt. 61.) The Aramark defendants’ motion to dismiss is
Plaintiff has also failed to serve defendants Bobby Banks, Kevin
Woodrum, Hydro Chem, and General Motors Flint Assembly. On April
6, 2017, the Court issued an order for plaintiff to show cause why the
claims against these defendants should not be dismissed for failure to
serve. (Dkt. 63.) Plaintiff responded on April 17, 2017. On April 26,
2017, plaintiff requested an entry of default against General Motors
Flint Assembly (Dkt. 67), and on April 28, 2017, the Clerk of Courts
entered the requested default. (Dkt. 68.)
Plaintiff was employed by Aramark Facility Services, LLC, at the
General Motors Flint Assembly.
He was also a member of a union
during his employment. The operative complaint in this case alleges
that on September 9, 2015, Woodrum and Beaugard called plaintiff to
the break room of his workplace to reprimand him for a no-call/no-show
(not showing up to work or notifying his superiors of his absence). (Dkt.
30 at 3.) Plaintiff informed Woodrum and Beaugard that he believed he
was not scheduled to work that day, and that he was not asked if he
needed a union representative during the conversation. (Id.) He also
states that Beaugard told him that he could write the word “appeal” on
the back of the disciplinary form and it would likely be overturned,
which plaintiff did. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his appeal of the matter
was arbitrarily and discriminatorily ignored. (Id.)
Plaintiff then alleges that Beaugard berated plaintiff, stating that
he did not want to represent plaintiff, and accused plaintiff of lunging
at him. (Dkt. 27 at 4.) Beaugard and plaintiff continued to argue, at
which point security escorted plaintiff off of the premises. (Id.)
On September 11, 2015, plaintiff discussed the situation with
Banks, who informed him that he was suspended for thirty days. (Id.)
On September 15, 2015, plaintiff was told to be at the General Motors
Flint Assembly at 9 AM, where he met with Curtis and Bruton. (Id.)
Plaintiff asked about the status of the investigation, at which point he
states Curtis spoke to him in a “derogatory and demeaning” fashion,
informing him that he was required to take anger management classes
and chastising him for using his radio during the confrontation with
Beaugard. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he then sent letters to Curtis
and Hydro Chem that were ignored. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he returned to work on October 16, 2015, and
Woodrum drove with him in a cart to meet with Banks, Bruton,
Beaugard, and “a first shift supervisor accompany[ied] with two big
body guards.” (Id.) Bruton then told plaintiff that the purpose of the
meeting was to discuss an allegation that plaintiff had threated to
punch an unidentified witness. (Id.) Banks told plaintiff that he was
on his last leg as well. (Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff alleges that another employee lodged a complaint about
his behavior on January 16, 2016. (Id. at 6.) On January 26, 2016,
plaintiff had a dispute with another coworker over his boots. (Id.) On
January 27, 2016, Woodrum and Bowe gave plaintiff a three-day
disciplinary layoff pending investigation. (Id.) On January 28, 2016,
plaintiff had a phone call with Fackler, who instructed plaintiff to write
down his version of events that occurred on January 27, 2016, and to
report to the Aramark Human Resources Office on February 1, 2016.
(Id.) On February 1, 2016, plaintiff met with Fackler and Bruton, who
at that point informed plaintiff that he was terminated from his job and
that he would receive the findings of the investigation in the mail. (Id.
Plaintiff’s original complaint includes numerous exhibits that are
incorporated by reference into his later amended complaints.
include Employment Action/Disciplinary Notice Forms issued on March
12, 2015, June 6, 2015, July 22, 2015, August 24, 2015, September 10,
2015, September 11, 2015, September 15, 2015, January 11, 2016,
January 28, 2016, and February 1, 2016, notifying plaintiff that he
violated shop rules 2 and 6 under the operative collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) and/or that he clocked into work late. (Dkt. 1 at 7477, 86-89, 101-104, 117-118; see also Dkt. 38-4 (a copy of the CBA).)
Plaintiff asserts twelve counts in his complaint: 1) interference
with an employment relationship against Bruton; 2) negligence against
Fackler; 3) negligence against Curtis; 4) negligence against Banks; 5)
negligence against Bowe; 6) negligence against Beaugard; 7) negligence
against Woodrum; 8) intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Aramark Facility Services; 9) negligent supervision against Aramark
Facility Services; 10) negligent supervision against Hydro Chem; 11)
negligent supervision against General Motors Flint Assembly; and 12)
wrongful discharge against Fackler.
Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint eliminates the negligence
claim against Curtis and the wrongful discharge claim against Fackler,
and adds in a retaliation claim under Michigan’s Employee Right to
Know and Freedom of Information Acts against Curtis. It also blacks
out certain portions of previously pleaded claims.
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc.,
684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plausible claim need not contain “detailed
factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pro se
complaint is entitled to a liberal construction and “must be held to less
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that, in the case of an amendment
outside of the twenty-one days after service, “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” “In
the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice
to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility
of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be
‘freely given.’” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Plaintiff’s fourth proposed amended complaint abandons his third
and twelfth claims: negligence against Curtis and wrongful discharge
against Fackler. On review of the complaint and plaintiff’s response to
the Aramark defendants’ motion to dismiss, which fails to specifically
defend these claims, these two claims are dismissed.
A. The Aramark Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Despite Aramark Facility Services answering on their behalf,
Beaugard and Bruton filed a separate motion to dismiss arguing both
that plaintiff failed to state a claim and that plaintiff failed to serve
Beaugard and Bruton later filed a notice admitting that
Aramark Facility Services accepted service on their behalf. (Dkt. 40.)
Because Aramark Facility Services accepted service on their behalf and
filed a motion to dismiss on their behalf, Beaugard and Bruton’s motion
to dismiss is denied as moot.
It is undisputed that plaintiff was a member of a union during his
employment. Plaintiff also provided extensive documentary evidence
that he was repeatedly reprimanded for absenteeism, threatening or
assaulting others in the workplace, and disregarding his superiors. The
Aramark defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims against Beaugard and
Bruton, both union officials, are preempted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and that all
claims against all of the Aramark defendants fail to state a claim.
The claims against the Aramark defendants are:
with an employment relationship against Bruton, negligence against
Fackler, negligence against Bowe, negligence against Beaugard,
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Aramark Facility
Services, and negligent supervision against Aramark Facility Services.
LMRA Preemption of State-Law Claims
The Aramark defendants first argue that the state-law claims
against Bruton, the local union’s committee chairperson, and Beaugard,
a union steward, are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. “[Section] 301 of
the LMRA preempts any state-law claim arising from a breach of a
collective bargaining agreement.” Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d
1326, 1329 (6th Cir. 1989). “Preemption under § 301 applies not only to
state-law contract claims, but has been expanded to include state-law
tort claims as well.” Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir.
2004) (further citations omitted). Tort claims must be independent of
the CBA to survive § 301 preemption. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1989).
To determine whether a state-law claim is sufficiently
“independent” to survive § 301 preemption, this court has
adopted a two-step inquiry. First, courts must determine
whether resolving the state-law claim would require
interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. If so, the claim is preempted. Second, courts
must ascertain whether the rights claimed by the plaintiff
were created by the collective bargaining agreement, or
instead by state law. If the rights were created by the
collective bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted. In
short, if a state-law claim fails either of these two
requirements, it is preempted by § 301.
Mattis, 355 F.3d at 906 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in
The Sixth Circuit has previously analyzed whether a Michigan
state-law claim for tortious interference with a business relationship,
such as the claim asserted against Bruton, survives § 301 preemption.
DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994). In Michigan,
this claim requires the plaintiff to establish:
(1) the existence of a valid business relation (not necessarily
evidenced by an enforceable contract) or expectancy; (2)
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of
the defendant interferer; (3) an intentional interference
inducing or causing a breach or termination of the
relationship or expectancy; and (4) resulting damage to the
party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.
Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Vulcan Dev., Inc., 323 F.3d 396, 404
(6th Cir. 2002) (citing Mich. Podiatric Med. Ass’n v. Nat’l Foot Care
Program, 175 Mich. App. 723, 736 (1989)).
Here, plaintiff asserts that Bruton, as “an employee, agent,
servant [of the] union of ARAMARK [FACILITY] SERVICES”
interfered with the employment relationship between him and Aramark
Facility Services by, among other things, failing to conduct a proper
investigation as required by the CBA. Because plaintiff’s claim would
require the Court to interpret the provisions of the CBA to determine
what rights he was owed and whether Bruton failed to provide him
those rights during her investigation, this claim fails the first and
second parts of the § 301 preemption test and is preempted. Further,
plaintiff’s state-law claim requires that he prove a breach of the
relationship between him and his employer. Because he is required to
prove a breach of a relationship governed by a CBA, this claim fails the
second part of the § 301 preemption test. DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 218.
Despite the requirement that the Court hold plaintiff to a less
stringent standard than a party represented by counsel, plaintiff has
shown repeatedly via his motions to amend and arguments in response
to the motion to dismiss that he intends to assert state law claims. But
even under this standard of review, plaintiff’s preempted state law
claim is not a federal claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for tortious
interference with a business relationship against Bruton is dismissed.
Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Beaugard is also preempted by
He alleges that Beaugard had certain duties, including
submission of a written and signed statement concerning the September
9, 2016 incident, and obtaining a signed statement from Woodrum,
among other duties, each of which are procedures required by the CBA
in Beaugard’s role as a union steward.
These would all be rights
guaranteed by the CBA, and would therefore be preempted under the
second part of the § 301 analysis. Plaintiff’s negligence claim against
Beaugard is dismissed.
The Aramark defendants next argue that plaintiff has failed to
state claims for negligence against Fackler, Curtis, and Bowe.
Generally, plaintiff alleges that each of the three negligently performed
their duties in relation to his evaluation. (Dkt. 27 at 9-14.) Plaintiff
does not argue in his timely filed response to the motion to dismiss that
his negligence claims should survive.
In Michigan, negligence is a tort claim requiring the plaintiff to
“prove the four elements of duty, breach of that duty, causation, and
damages.” Rupert v. Daggett, 695 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Brown v. Brown, 478 Mich. 545, 552 (2007)). The Michigan Supreme
Court has “decline[d] to recognize an action in tort for negligent
evaluation.” Ferrett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 438 Mich. 235, 236 (1991).
There is “no separate and distinct duty imposed by law to evaluate or
correctly evaluate employees.”
Id. at 246.
negligence claims against Fackler, Curtis, and Bowe are dismissed.
“Under Michigan law, to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, [the plaintiff] must allege extreme or outrageous
conduct which, intentionally or recklessly, causes extreme emotional
distress.” Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 799 (6th
Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “Liability for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress has been found only where the conduct complained of
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Doe v. Mills, 212
Mich. App. 73, 91 (1995). “Liability does not extend to mere insults,
trivialities,” and will only stand where “the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
Plaintiff appears to plead this claim against all defendants, but he
argues that this claim is actually against the entity in charge of
training, monitoring, and supervising the individual defendants. (Dkt.
27 at 18.) That entity is Aramark Facility Services. At most, plaintiff
alleges that Aramark Facility Services engaged in “outrageous and
shocking, threatening intimidating tactics” and failed to treat him with
“common courtesy.” (Id. at 17.) Even taking plaintiff’s allegations as
true, and not holding him to the stringent standards of parties
represented by counsel, the facts as he has pleaded them are too vague
to rise to the level of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. It
is entirely unclear from the complaint what Aramark Facility Services
did besides engage in unspecified “tactics” and not provide “common
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is dismissed.
Negligent Supervision Claim
Plaintiff asserts that Aramark Facility Services negligently
supervised some or all of its employees. Defendant argues that plaintiff
has failed to state a claim because he may not bring a claim asserting a
tort based on negligence against his employer. Plaintiff did not respond
to defendant’s argument.
§ 418.131, “bars claims brought by employees against their employer for
injuries sustained in the course of employment unless the claim is one
for an intentional tort.” Downer v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 191 Mich.
App. 232, 235 (1991). Plaintiff’s assertion of a tort based on negligence
against his employer is barred by Michigan law, and must be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend His Complaint
Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint must be denied as futile.
“A proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff retained ten of the
twelve claims from his prior complaint in his proposed amended
complaint, and each of those claims must be dismissed for the reasons
set forth either in the Court’s analysis of the Aramark defendants’
motion to dismiss or because plaintiff failed to serve the remaining
defendants. The remaining claim is a retaliation claim brought against
Curtis. (Dkt. 54 at 24-25.)
This claim alleges that Curtis retaliated against plaintiff by
wrongfully discharging him following his submission of requests for
information under Michigan’s Employee Right to Know and Freedom of
Information Acts. However, in his statement of facts, plaintiff states
that Bruton and Fackler, not Curtis, conducted the investigation that
led to his termination, and that Fackler, not Curtis, made the final
decision to terminate him. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges only that Curtis
ignored the letters he sent requesting information, but alleges nothing
beyond a cursory legal conclusion that she committed some act
constituting retaliation against him. (Id. at 5.) Even under the less
stringent standard applied to pro se complaints, plaintiff has not
plausibly pleaded that Curtis retaliated against him.
C. Plaintiff’s Failure to Serve Bobby Banks, Kevin
Woodrum, Hydro Chem, or General Motors Flint
Plaintiff asserted the following additional claims in his complaint:
negligence against Banks and Woodrum, negligent supervision against
Hydro Chem, and negligent supervision against General Motors Flint
Assembly. None of those defendants have been served. On April 6,
2017, the Court issued an order requiring plaintiff to show cause why
the claims against Bobby Banks, Kevin Woodrum, Hydro Chem, and
General Motors Flint Assembly should not be dismissed for failure to
serve those parties. (Dkt. 63.) Plaintiff responded on April 17, 2017.
Plaintiff states that General Motors Flint Assembly was served
with the summons and complaint, and attaches a certified mail return
receipt showing that the documents were delivered to the main address
for the facility on May 25, 2016. (Id. at 6.) The receipt does not indicate
whether the person who signed for the package was authorized to
receive service under Mich. Ct. R. 2.105(D), which governed service on
corporations at the time this case was filed in state court. The address
label also did not identify an officer, registered agent, or other
appropriate person to receive service under Rule 2.105(D). Sending a
summons and a copy of the complaint by registered mail to the
corporation is only proper in certain limited conditions, none of which
plaintiff has shown to apply here. Mich. Ct. R. 2.105(D)(4)(a)-(c).
On April 28, 2017, the Clerk of Courts entered a default against
General Motors Flint Assembly for failure to plead or otherwise defend.
(Dkt. 68.) Because plaintiff did not properly serve General Motors Flint
Assembly, that default is vacated.
Plaintiff also states that he attempted to serve Hydro Chem, but
served a different company with that name. (Dkt. 6 at 2.) He has not
attempted to serve the correct Hydro Chem since he was informed of
that error in a letter sent by the wrongly-served Hyrdo Chem on May
27, 2016. (Dkt. 64 at 10.) Plaintiff has also not served Bobby Banks or
Kevin Woodrum, but says that his motion to compel discovery concerns,
in part, information needed to serve Banks. (Id. at 3.)
plaintiff filed that motion on March 13, 2017, nearly ten months after
he filed his complaint. Plaintiff has not shown that his failure to serve
any defendant, including Banks and Woodrum – within either the 91day period Michigan provides or the 120-day period the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provided when he filed his suit – was for good cause.
See Mich. Ct. R. 2.102(D), Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (each requiring that a
party show good cause for failure to serve a defendant).
Accordingly, the claims against Banks, Woodrum, Hydro Chem,
and General Motors Flint Assembly are dismissed without prejudice
based on plaintiff’s failure to serve them with the summons and
D. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel certain discovery from
defendants, including the addresses of unserved defendants. (Dkt. 61.)
Discovery has not yet begun in this case, so plaintiff’s motion to compel
To the extent plaintiff requests information needed to
serve the unserved defendants, his requests are both months late and
not properly brought in a motion to compel discovery.
claims against all defendants have been dismissed, meaning no
discovery could be compelled even if the motion were properly brought.
Accordingly, this motion is denied.
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ordered that:
The Aramark defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 45) is
Beaugard and Bruton’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 36) is DENIED AS
Plaintiff’s motions to amend his complaint (Dkt. 53) and to compel
discovery (Dkt. 61) are DENIED;
The entry of default against General Motors Flint Assembly (Dkt.
68) is VACATED;
All claims against Banks, Woodrum, Hydro Chem, and General
Motors Flint Assembly are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
This case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 1, 2017
Ann Arbor, Michigan
s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on May 1, 2017.
s/Felicia M. Moses
FELICIA M. MOSES
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