Morris v. Detroit, City of et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING CASE, Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LAVARON MORRIS,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 16-12555
HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA

v.
THE CITY OF DETROIT,
THE CITY OF SOUTHFIELD.
THE MICHIGAN POLICE,
and OTHER POLICE BUREAUS,
Defendants.
________________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Lavaron Morris, a state prisoner at the Michigan Reformatory in Ionia,
Michigan, recently filed a pro se civil rights complaint. The defendants named in the
caption of Plaintiff’s complaint are the City of Detroit, the City of Southfield, the Michigan
Police, and other unnamed police bureaus. In the complaint itself, Plaintiff appears to
name additional parties, including police officers Woolfolk, Maynard, and Skelton of the
Detroit Police Department, the Southfield Police Department, FBI detectives, and
immigration and naturalization officers. Because Plaintiff is suing both state and federal
officials for alleged violations of his civil rights, the Court construes his complaint as one
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which is the federal analog to a suit brought
against state officials under § 1983.

The complaint and exhibits allege that Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant on
December 15, 1988, and subsequently held for five days before being arraigned or
given a probable-cause hearing. Plaintiff claims that he was interrogated repeatedly by
law enforcement officers from both state and federal agencies during those five days
and that he was not permitted to speak with an attorney. Plaintiff also appears to allege
that he was deprived of food, a mattress, and access to a bathroom during his detention
and that the prolonged detention led to a coerced confession. He seeks money
damages.
II. Legal Standard
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, federal district courts must
screen a prisoner’s complaint and dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim for which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;
Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032,
1036 (6th Cir. 2001). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in
fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
“A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations,
taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
215 (2007). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations

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omitted). In other words, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim because it challenges
pretrial procedures which apparently led to Plaintiff’s confession and subsequent
conviction on unspecified charges. To the extent Plaintiff is attacking his conviction and
present confinement, his sole remedy is a habeas corpus petition, following exhaustion
of state remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 n. 15, 500 (1973).
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence
that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)(footnote omitted)(emphasis in
original). Heck and progeny,
taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred
(absent prior invalidation) -- no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct
leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) -- “if success in that
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original).
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Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction was reversed or invalidated by state
officials or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. And to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that his confession led to his conviction
and that the confession should have been suppressed because it was coerced by the
delay in his arraignment, success in this action would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction and imprisonment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s challenge to
the pretrial procedures in his criminal case is not cognizable in this civil rights action.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Although Plaintiff also appears to be challenging the living conditions in jail during
the five days before his arraignment, his arrest and confinement in jail occurred in 1988.
In Michigan, the statute of limitations for civil rights suits filed under § 1983 is three
years. McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1988); Carroll v.
Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986)( per curiam). The “limitations period begins
to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of
his or her injury has occurred.” Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996)
(citing Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991)). And, as of
April 1, 1994, the statute of limitations is not tolled for incarceration. See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.5851(9).
Plaintiff filed his complaint in 2016, years after the three-year statute of limitations
expired, even assuming that the statute was tolled during the first several years of his

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imprisonment. Consequently, Plaintiff’s challenge to the conditions of confinement in
jail in 1988 is untimely.1
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s complaint lacks an arguable basis in law and, therefore, is frivolous.
The complaint also fails to state a plausible claim for which relief may be granted. The
Court therefore dismisses the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b). The dismissal under Heck is without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to renew his
claim if he succeeds in getting state or federal officials to invalidate his conviction or
sentence. Jiron v. Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 413 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2004); Schafer v.
Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995). The dismissal of the issue about the conditions
of confinement in jail is with prejudice. Additionally, the Court certifies that an appeal
from this order would be frivolous and could not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Date: August 23, 2016

s/John Corbett O’Meara
United States District Judge

1

The Court recognizes that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). The Supreme Court, however, stated in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
at 215, that, “[i]f the allegations . . . show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” See also
Watson v. Wayne County, 90 F. App’x 814, 815 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that a district
court may sua sponte raise a statute-of-limitations issue when the defense is apparent
on the face of the pleading) (citing Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2nd Cir. 1995));
Scruggs v. Jones, 86 F. App’x 916, 917 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal of a prisoner’s civil rights complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds);
Castillo v. Grogan, 52 F. App’x 750, 751 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that, “[w]hen a
meritorious affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations is
obvious from the face of the complaint, sua sponte dismissal of the complaint as
frivolous is appropriate”) (citing Pino, 49 F.3d at 53-54).
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